

THE RISE OF THE CHINESE EMPIRE

Nation, State, and Imperialism in Early China,
ca. 1600 B.C.–A.D. 8

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古代中華國族與帝國之形成

張春樹



THE RISE OF THE CHINESE EMPIRE

Volume One

NATION, STATE,
& IMPERIALISM
in EARLY CHINA,
ca. 1600 B.C.—A.D. 8



Chun-shu Chang

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This book is dedicated to the memory of five great teachers:

Professors Li Chi, Kao Ch'ü-hsun, & Ruey Yifu of Academia Sinica;
Professors Lien-sheng Yang & John K. Fairbank of Harvard University



Acknowledgments

THIS BOOK HAS BEEN a long time in the making, and I have benefited in the process from the assistance of many individuals, institutions, and organizations. I wish to acknowledge my profound indebtedness to them.

The writing of this book started in 1964 as a revision of my dissertation, completed at Harvard in 1963, entitled "The Colonization of the Ho-hsi Region: A Study of the Han Frontier System." In 1966, a chapter was published as "The Han Colonists and Their Settlements on the Chü-yen Frontier," and in 1977 another chapter was published as a long article on the Han and Hsiung-nu conflicts in early Han times. While the writing of this book continued, I also worked on a book on the Sung dynasty in the twelfth century and two books on the Ming-Ch'ing period, 1600–1700. These books were published in 1981, 1992, and 1998, respectively. The completion of this book was postponed until 1998 (with some critical additions and revisions made between 1999 and 2002), although the first draft was finished in the spring of 1982. The present version has a larger scope than and a different approach from the original project. It has four parts. The first treats the evolution of the state in early China up to the founding of the first centralized bureaucratic empire, the Ch'in (221–207 B.C.). The second treats the reformation of the Chinese empire under the Former (also called the Western) Han dynasty (202 B.C.–8 A.D.) through military expansion and a complex frontier system. The third treats the Han colonization of modern Central Asia, northern Korea, northern Vietnam, South Asia, and southeastern and southwestern China. The final part outlines how this grand expansion reshaped the political culture of the Chinese empire in its socio-economic structure, national consciousness, concept of empire and state, and worldview.

In March 1982, without having placed the manuscript for publication, I accepted an invitation from Lanchou (Lanzhou) University to teach Han era

wooden and bamboo documents (*Han-chien*), the basic source (about twelve thousand documents discovered between 1900 and 1944) of my dissertation and the main part of the new book. I left for China for six months, and the work of publication was postponed. However, during my stay in China a new and unusual research opportunity opened. I was able to see key documents recorded on some of the 22,500 Han era wooden and bamboo slips discovered in the Chü-yen and Tun-huang regions and other places in Kansu from 1972 to 1979. In addition, I was able to start my investigation of Han dynasty sites in Kansu and Sinkiang in the summer of 1982. That opened the door for continued archaeological fieldwork in 1983, 1985, and 1990. As a result, I explored almost all the major Han sites from central Kansu west to Shu-lei and Kashgar at the foot of the Pamirs in Sinkiang. Consequently I significantly revised and expanded the second and third parts of my book from 1982 to the mid-1990s. The book then went through several revisions until 1998, and the title was changed to *Frontier and Empire in Former Han China*. In 1999–2001, a few new bibliographical items were added and some revisions and additions were made. In early 2002, upon the suggestion of an anonymous reader for the University of Michigan Press, the book was changed to the current two-volume format by moving the third part of the original long manuscript to form the main body of the second volume while other parts (1, 2, and 4) constitute the first volume. Some critical changes in both volumes were also made accordingly. The new book then assumes the current title, *The Rise of the Chinese Empire*, and the two volumes are also titled individually as *Nation, State, and Imperialism in Early China* and *Frontier, Immigration, and Empire in Han China*. The book as it stands is up-to-date only to 2001 and in some special cases to the first half of 2002.

In my research for this book throughout the years, I am indebted to a number of libraries in this country and abroad, which have provided rare materials essential to my study. Space allows me to list only a few of them here: the Harvard-Yenching Library at Harvard University, the Chinese and Korean Section of the Library of Congress, the Far Eastern Library of the University of Chicago, the East Asiatic Library of the University of California at Berkeley, the East Asian Library of Columbia University, the Yale University Library, the Indiana University Library, the Fu Ssu-nien Library of Academia Sinica in Taipei, and the National Central Library in Taipei. I am grateful to the staff members of the Interlibrary Loan Department of the Harlan Hatcher Graduate Library of the University of Michigan, who arranged numerous loans from the libraries acknowledged here. For their kindness in allowing me to use some rare materials unavailable elsewhere, I wish to thank the senior staff members of Peking Library, Shanghai Library, Nanking University Library, Lanchou University Library, Chungshan University Library, T'ien-shui Culture Museum, Min-hsien Culture Museum, Wei-yuan Culture Museum, Wu-wei Culture Museum,

Chang-yeh Culture Museum, Chiu-ch'üan Culture Museum, Chia-yü Kuan Museum, Tun-huang Culture Museum, Sinkiang Provincial Museum (Archaeology and Culture), Fu-k'ang Culture Museum, Chi-mu sa-erh Culture Museum, Ch'i-t'ai Culture Museum, and Kashi (Kashgar) Museum. I owe much to my friends Wan Wei-ying and Ma Wei-yi and members of the staff of the Asia Library at the University of Michigan, who have gathered a remarkable Chinese collection that has been tremendously convenient for me, and to Miss Naomi Fukuda and Mr. Masaei Saito of the Asia Library at Michigan, who secured important Japanese books and periodicals for the library's Japanese collection.

Preparation of this book was greatly aided by generous research grants from Harvard University, the Harvard-Yenching Institute at Harvard University, and the Rackham School of Graduate Studies and the Center for Chinese Studies, both of the University of Michigan, as well as from the Chinese University of Hong Kong. My special appreciation goes to these institutions. I wish to express my special gratitude to the University of Michigan for its valuable research support through sabbatical leaves and the award of the Richard Hudson Professorship. I am most grateful to the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies for financial assistance for research on this project.

This book could not have been written without the profound instruction and inspiring guidance of my teachers in archaeology, ethnography, early Chinese history, sinological-historical methodology, and Ch'in-Han studies: Professors Li Chi, Kao Ch'ü-hsun, Ruey Yifu, Ch'en P'an, Ch'ü Wan-li, Lao Kan, Yang Hsi-mei, Li Tsung-t'ung, and Yao Ts'ung-wu, all of National Taiwan University and Academia Sinica; and Professors Lien-sheng Yang, William Hung, John K. Fairbank, and Benjamin Schwartz, all of Harvard University. I am forever indebted to them, and their example has forever guided me in my teaching career. I wish to express my profound gratitude to several senior scholars who through the years have encouraged and enriched me in my discussions with them on ancient and early Imperial Chinese history: Professors T'ao Hsi-sheng, Ch'ien Mu, Yang Hsiang-k'ui (Yang Xiangkui), Shih Nien-hai (Shih Nianhai), Wang Yü-ch'üan (Wang Yüquan), Teng Kuang-ming (Deng Guangming), Ho Ping-ti, Yen Keng-wang, Chow Tse-tsung, Chao T'ieh-han, Jachid Sechin (Cha-chi Ssu-ch'in), Kaizuka Shigeki, Hiraoka Takeo, and Muramatsu Yuji. I am most grateful to many friends who have benefited me by their works and discussions on some aspects of this study: T'ien Yü-ch'ing (Tian Yuqing), Ch'en Ch'iao-i (Chen Qiaoyi), Kwang-chih Chang, Cho-yun Hsu, Ying-shih Yü, Hao Yen-p'ing, Lo Jung-pang, David N. Keightley, Joseph F. Fletcher, Thomas Metzger, Timoteus Pokora, Han Fu-chih, Ma Hsien-hsing, Liu Kuang-hua (Liu Guanghua), Hsueh Ying-ch'ün (Xue Yingqun), Ch'u Shih-pin (Chu Shibin),

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My long stay in China and archaeological travels and explorations in Kansu (Gansu), Sinkiang, and Tsinghai (Qinghai) were made possible by the following: Presidents Liu Ping (Liu Bing), Nieh Ta-chiang (Nie Dajiang), Lu Jun-lin (Lu Runlin), and Hu Chih-teh (Hu Zhide) and Director Chang Ying-huai (Zhang Yinghui), all of Lanzhou University; and the government authorities of Xinjiang Autonomous Region, T'ien-shui (Tianshui), Wei-yuan, Min-hsien, Yü-chung, Yung-teng, Wu-wei, Chang-yeh, Chiu-ch'üan, Tun-huang, T'u-lu-fan (Turfan), Yen-ch'i (Yenqi, Karashahr), K'u-erh-lei (Kurla), Lun-t'ai, K'u-ch'e (Kucha), Pai-ch'eng, Aksu, Kashi (Kashgar), and Hsi-ning (Sining) of Tsinghai. To all of them goes my deepest gratitude.

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Parts of the book have been presented at various meetings and before both popular and scholarly groups at numerous associations, academic institutions, and international conferences in the United States, Canada, Mexico, Europe, Japan, China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. There numerous colleagues offered words of encouragement and constructive suggestions, and they all have my heartfelt thanks.

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With a few exceptions, the Chü-yen documents discovered by the Sino-Swedish Scientific Expedition are at the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica, in Taipei. The new Chü-yen documents, unearthed in the 1970s, and the Hsuan-ch'üan documents are at the Institute of Archaeology of Kansu Province in Lanzhou. I am extremely grateful to Dr. Li Chi for full access to the earlier Chü-yen documents and indebted to scholars at the Institute of Archaeology for the exchange of ideas and use of some documents. All *Han-chien* illustrations are based on the Chü-yen documents at the Institute of History and Philology in Academia (*Chü-yen Han-chien*; *Lai-tzu pi-lo yü huang-ch'üan*). The one Hsuan-ch'üan slip is from the collection in the Institute of Archaeology in Lanchou, Kansu (Lanzhou, Gansu; *Tun-huang Hsuan-ch'üan Han-chien*). All the other illustrations are photographs I took during my several archaeological trips to Kansu and Sinkiang from 1982 to 1990.

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A Note about Romanization

I HAVE FOLLOWED THE Wade-Giles system in my romanization of Chinese characters. But I have also made some necessary modifications, such as leaving out the umlauts in the words *yuan* (instead of *yüan*), *lueh* (instead of *lüeh*), *hsu* (instead of *hsü*), and *hsueh* (instead of *hsüeh*), when such changes do not affect the basic phonetic structure of a word. For place-names, I have generally employed the *Postal Atlas of China*, thus Peking for Wade-Giles's Pei-ching, Nanking for Nan-ching, Kiangsu for Chiang-su, Kansu for Kan-su, Sinkiang for Hsin-chiang, Tsinghai for Ch'ing-hai, Lanchow (or Lanchou) for Lan-chou, and so on. In certain special cases, in order to make the context clear to the reader, I have added a word romanized in the more recent pinyin system after the Wade-Giles romanization, for example, Lanzhou after Lanchou, Gansu after Kansu, Xinjiang after Sinkiang, Qinghai after Tsinghai, Zhang after Chang, Ju after Chü, Xia after Hsia, Run after Jun, and Deng after Teng.



Chronology: Ch'in-Han Rulers and Reigns, 221 B.C.–A.D. 220

The Ch'in dynasty

The First Emperor (Shih huang-ti, Ying Cheng*), 221–210 B.C.

The Second Emperor (Erh-shih huang-ti), 210†/209/††–207 B.C.

Tzu-ying, 207 B.C.

The Ch'u-Han transition

Hsiang Yü, 206–202 B.C. (Ch'u dynasty [kingdom])

Liu Pang, 206–202 B.C. (Han kingdom)

The Han dynasty, 202 B.C.–A.D. 220

The Former (Earlier, Western) Han

Emperor Kao (Kao-ti, Kao-tsu, Liu Pang*), 202–195 B.C.

Emperor Hui (Hui-ti), 195/194/–188 B.C.

Empress Lü, 187–180 B.C.

Emperor Wen (Wen-ti), 180/179/–157 B.C.

Emperor Ching (Ching-ti), 157/156/–141 B.C.

Emperor Wu (Wu-ti), 141/140/–87 B.C.

Emperor Chao (Chao-ti), 87/86/–74 B.C.

Emperor Hsuan (Hsuan-ti), 74/73/–49 B.C.

Emperor Yuan (Yuan-ti), 48–33 B.C.

Emperor Ch'eng (Ch'eng-ti), 33/32/–7 B.C.

Emperor Ai (Ai-ti), 7/6/–1 B.C.

Emperor P'ing (P'ing-ti), A.D. 1–5

Ju-tzu Ying, A.D. 5/6/–8

*Founder's name (surname first).

†The year in which a new ruler was enthroned.

††The year in which a ruler's reign officially began.

The Hsin dynasty

Wang Mang,* A.D. 9–23

The Latter (Later, Eastern) Han

Emperor Kuang-wu (Kuang-wu-ti, Liu Hsiu*), A.D. 25–57

Emperor Ming (Ming-ti), A.D. 57/58–75

Emperor Chang (Chang-ti), A.D. 75/76–88

Emperor Ho (Ho-ti), A.D. 88/89–105

Emperor Shang (Shang-ti), A.D. 106

Emperor An (An-ti), A.D. 106/107–144

Emperor Ch'ung (Ch'ung-ti), A.D. 145

Emperor Chih (Chih-ti), A.D. 146

Emperor Huan (Huan-ti), A.D. 146/147–167

Emperor Ling (Ling-ti), A.D. 168–188

Emperor Shao (Shao-ti), A.D. 189

Emperor Hsien (Hsien-ti), A.D. 189–220



Equivalents of Weights and Measures

THE HAN PERIOD

- 1 *liang* = 24 *shu* = 15.25 grams
1 *hsiao-shih* = 3/5 (0.6) *ta-shih*
1 *shih* (*hsiao-shih*) or *hu* = 10 *tou* = 100 *sheng* = 0.565 U.S. bushel =
19.9682 liters
1 *chung* = 6 *hu* 4 *tou* = 3.616+ U.S. bushels
1 *ch'ih* (foot) = 0.232 meter = 9.134 inches
1 *pu* (full pace) = 6 *ch'ih* = 1.392 meters
1 *chang* = 10 *ch'ih* = 2.32 meters = 7 feet 7.3403 inches
1 *p'i* (bolt) = 4 *chang* = 9.28 meters = 30 feet 5.3536 inches
1 *li* (mile) = 300 *pu* = 1,800 *ch'ih* = 1368.1+ English feet = 417 meters
= 0.259 mile
1 *mou* or *mu* (acre) = 0.11391+ English acre
1 *ch'ing* = 100 *mou* = 11.391+ English acres
1 *chin* (catty) = 16 *liang* = 244 grams = 0.538 pounds
1 *chün* = 30 catties = 7.32 kilograms
1 *chin* of actual gold = 244 grams = 10,000 *ch'ien* (cash, copper coins)

These weights and measures represent the standard system of Han times. Changes and regional variations in the Han dynasty and other periods are noted where applicable. The Ch'in system was different in some respects and will be so noted.



General Abbreviations and Translations of Technical Terms

app.	appendix	fig.	figure
b.	born	ibid.	in the same place
ca.	circa	no.	number
cf.	compare	p.	page
chap.	chapter	pl.	plate
comp.	compiled, compiler	pt.	part
d.	died	r.	reigned
diss.	dissertation	rev.	revised
doc.	document	sec.	section
ed.	editor, edited, edition	ser.	series
esp.	especially	suppl.	supplement
et al.	and others	trad.	traditional dating
ff.	and following	trans.	translated, translator
fl.	flourished	vol.	volume

<i>ch'ien</i>	cash, a round copper coin with a square hole in the middle
<i>chüan</i>	chapter, volume
<i>chün</i>	prefecture, province, or commandery, depending on the historical context and time (mostly Ch'in and Han); in general, "commandery" is the most appropriate translation before 180 B.C., "province" for 180–90 B.C., and "prefecture" after 90 B.C.
<i>hsiang</i>	county (Ch'in and Han)
<i>hsien</i>	district (Ch'in and Han)
<i>kuo</i>	(feudal) kingdom
<i>li</i>	ward
<i>nien</i>	age, aged
<i>sui</i>	age (Chinese system counting age)



Basic Terms: Ancient and Han Era Definitions and Usage and Modern Equivalents

THIS STUDY EMPLOYS many terms with definitions that are controversial and under debate among historians, anthropologists, and political scientists. For clarity of presentation and argument, the definitions of and conventional assumptions about such terms are given here, together with their original meanings in ancient and Han documents. These are included because their later Chinese counterparts often carry meanings that differ from the customary definitions found in the modern historical literature and have caused unnecessary polemics in modern times. The basis for these definitions is discussed in detail in the various chapters, especially the prologue, chapters 3 and 4, the conclusion, and appendixes 2 and 3, where clarification of a term's meaning is essential to the analysis.

Empire

(1) A common translation of the Chinese term *ti-kuo*, which describes a political establishment or unit comprising a unified territory or a number of territories and/or nations ruled by a single supreme authority, that is, the sovereign, monarch, or emperor. Sometimes the territory is included in such a unit, as in the terms *Han-chia*, the Han empire; *Han-ti*, the territory of the Han empire, as in the expression “within the Han or Chinese empire”; and *Ch'iang-Han* or *Ta-Han*, the powerful or great Han (empire).

(2) *Ti-kuo*: A regime, country, or nation that uses military might, political maneuvering, or other means—generally referred to as “imperialist actions”—to seize, acquire, or control another sovereign state or a specific independent territory outside of or bordering its own territory for political, economic, religious, security, ideological, or nationalistic reasons. Earlier and Han terms that

express such actions include *t'ien-hsia*, unifying all under Heaven; *p'ing t'ien-hsia*, which means pacifying or harmonizing all under Heaven; *fu* (or *cheng*, *fa* or *cheng-fa*) *Ssu-i*, pacifying (or subjugating or conquering) the “barbarians” (noncivilized peoples) on the Four Borders (specifically and etymologically the term *Ssu-i* covers the Mans in the south, the Tis in the north, the Is in the east, and Jungs in the west, but here *Ssu-i* refers to barbarians in its general and later connotation); *fu Chiu-i*, pacifying all the barbarians in the world; and *sui-yuan*, bringing peace to or pacifying (conquering) distant lands. In ancient and Han times, terms equivalent to *ti-kuo* included *i-t'ung t'ien-hsia*, grand unification (unity) of all under Heaven; *wang t'ien hsia*, all under Heaven under one king; *Ssu-i fu*, subjugation of the “barbarians” on the Four Borders; or *Chiu-i fu*, pacification of the Nine Barbarians.

Imperialism

The ideology, policy, or action of constructing a *ti-kuo* as defined earlier: *Chiu-i fu* or *Ssu-i fu*; *i-t'ung t'ien-hsia* or *t'ien-hsia i-t'ung*; *wang t'ien-hsia*; *ch'en t'ien-hsia* (subjugation of all the peoples under Heaven); *sheng-wang* (sage kingship); *ta-t'ung* (grand unity of the world); *t'ai-p'ing shih* (World of Grand Peace and Order); and so forth.

Colonies

Shu-kuo (a dependent state) and *tu-wei kuo* (a state under the command of a chief commandant) in Han times. Such “states” were established by the Han Court for surrendered barbarians (*kuei-i* or *hsiang-hua man-i*, non-Han peoples that had seen the light of great culture and its ethical superiority). These states, though under Han rule, enjoyed for an extended period ethnic and social independence before their complete absorption into the Han lifestyle and system of political control.

State

Han Chinese *hsien-kuan*, a political (governmental) organization on a sovereign basis. Other terms include *Han-chia*, which refers to the state controlled by the Han ruling house (Liu), that is, the Han government; and *Han-t'ing*, the Han Court, which also refers to the Han government.

Nation

(1) Primarily a political body, a relatively large group of people organized under a single government without regard for their origins, religions, or other ethnic differences. An example is the term *Han-chia*, meaning the Han nation, empire, or state.

(2) Generally people who share common customs, origins, history, culture, and frequently language. An example is the Han-jen, the people of the Han empire or state before Han Wu-ti's expansion.

(3) A group of people who loosely share certain political, geographical, cultural (current), and linguistic (written) attributes. An example is the Han-jen, the people from or of the Han empire after Han Wu-ti's expansion. In ancient times (the eras of the Shang and predynastic Chou), *Shih-tsu* was closest in meaning to the English term *nation*.

Body politic

The population of a politically organized state. The terms *Han-jen* and *Chung-kuo jen* had this meaning in the Han era as discussed elsewhere in this section.

Country

A common translation of the Chinese term *kuo-chia*, which refers to the territory of a nation or empire. *Kuo-chia* in Han times prior to Wu-ti's expansion referred to the Han empire, state, or nation and occasionally the Han government, but eventually it came to refer to the emperor ([imperial] We, Your Majesty, or His Majesty). This usage continued in later periods such as the Chin dynasty, A.D. 265–420.

Nomads

A group of people who have in general no permanently fixed home and move from place to place in search of food, water, and grazing land but have some "settled areas" (in tents), command centers that are moved from place to place within recognized territorial boundaries according to the seasons. Han sources referred to this as *hsing-kuo*, "moving countries or nations" (see definition (1) of nation), with specific descriptions of their economies and lifestyles. An example is *sui ch'u mu chu shui-ts'ao pu t'ien-tso*, literally, "in search of water and grasses [grassland] with their animals and not engaged in farming." Some of the *hsing-kuo*, however, possessed seasonal farmland and maintained small sedentary communities.

Peasant societies

Translation of the Han terms *t'u-chu* (people attached to the land, sedentary), *chü-kuo* (sedentary state or nation [see definition (1) of nation]), and *ch'eng-kuo* (states with walled cities and walled nuclear settlements), all with *t'ien-tso* (agriculture) as the staple economy.

Race

Generally refers to the recognizable physical traits, stemming from a common ancestry, that succeeding generations have in common. In Ch'in-Han times, the term used was *jen*, as in the Ch'iang-jen (the Ch'iang people). *Jen* was also used to describe a group of people that occupied a particular territory or had established a nation, such as the Ch'iang. Note that at the time the commonly used term *tsu* (as in *min-tsu*) did not carry the connotation of a race, at least not

in the strict sense of the word as it is used in modern times. *Tsu* then referred only to a sib, a group of people possessing a common clan or sib name (a *hsing*, “patronym”), who were descended from a common male ancestor and were characterized by a feeling of relationship. It sometimes was equivalent to the term *tsung-tsu* (lineage).

Nationalism

The state of mind and well-defined feelings that make the nation (see definition (3) of nation) the cause of collective action or the fulfillment of an individual’s goal or the actualization of an individual’s perceived historical mission. The objectified representation of the “Chinese nation” after the Ch’in-Han expansion was generally a dynasty or regime and rarely a specific race. An exception occurred in late Imperial China following the Yuan dynasty.

Jen

A lineage, such as Shang-jen (the Shang lineage) or Chou-jen (the Chou lineage), to be distinguished from its common meaning, “human.” Sometimes it was equivalent to the term *tsung-tsu* in Hsia, Shang, and early Chou times. From Ch’un-ch’iu times on, the term usually referred to the people of and from a political-territorial unit (a state, region, or country of any type), such as the Chung-kuo jen, Ch’i-jen, Cheng-jen, Ch’u-jen, Ch’in-jen, and Han-jen. By extension, it came to mean “nation,” like the term *Han-jen* in later usage, and in that sense it acquired the meaning of a *tsu* when *tsu* was defined as “nation.”

Min and jen

In modern times, both words commonly mean “people,” “humans,” “human beings,” and so forth. That was not the case in ancient China until probably the sixth century B.C. In Shang times, and probably also in Hsia times, *jen* referred to members of the Shang lineage (and the Hsia lineage in Hsia times), not the common people. *Min* was used the same way by the Chou in their domain, meaning members of the Chou lineage. Sometimes *min* referred to unfree people(s) under the control of the Shang during the Shang dynasty (ca. seventeenth–eleventh centuries B.C.), and *jen* was used the same way during the Chou dynasty, which began in the eleventh century B.C. The boundary between the two words began to lose its rigidity after the eighth century B.C., although individual record keepers and writers still clung to their own preferences, shaped by their peculiar cultural, educational, and historical backgrounds. In Ch’in and Han times, the two words became interchangeable, but *jen* referred more commonly to a group of people (sometimes a nation), while *min* referred more generally to the subjects of or common masses in a state. *Min-tsu*, a modern compound meaning “nation,” never existed in Ch’in-Han times. The modern terms *Han min-tsu* and *Han-tsu*, meaning “Han nation” and “Han people,” are the equivalents of the term *Han-jen* in Han times.

Hu

A broad yet specific appellation designating the nomadic peoples that controlled the territories beyond or along the Han northern and northwestern borders and in Hsi-yü (the Western Regions, located in modern Sinkiang and Central Asia), specifically the Hsiung-nu and some of the peoples in the north and in Hsi-yü that were under their control.

Chung-kuo

The Center or Central State (kingdom), also known as the Middle Kingdom (or state), which referred in Han times to the interior north (generally the Yellow river valley regions from modern Shensi to Shantung) of the Han empire, sometimes synonymous with Chung-yuan (the Central Plain), which designated the home of the “great” Hua-Hsia (or Hsia-Shang-Chou) culture, implying superiority in cultural traditions. Such references were generally made only in Han-to-Han written or oral communications not in Han-to-foreigner communications. The term retained its usage in later periods, when China was divided between north and south, such as the period of the Three Kingdoms, A.D. 220–280, although cultural differences no longer followed geographical ones.

Chung-kuo jen

The people or peoples who resided in Chung-kuo, probably the earliest concept of “the Chinese” as a nation (see definition (3) of nation). Its meaning underwent changes with the changing conceptions of Chung-kuo in Ch’in-Han times.

Tsung-tsu

Lineage, people of many clans and groups with the same male or female mythological or legendary hero-founder. All members of a *tsung-tsu* had the same *hsing* (patronym).

Ch'in-tsu

Members (kin) of the same lineage; kinship group.

Hsing-tsu

A clan or sib of one patronym (*hsing*), generally that of the male legendary or mythological hero-founder, such as the Ssu of the Hsia dynasty, the Tzu of the Shang dynasty, the Chi of the Chou dynasty, and the Ying of the Ch'in dynasty.

Shih-tsu

A political group with a defined territory and a walled town or city (*i/yi*) as its center of command (*shih*). It includes one or many clans and/or independent or subjugated subgroups. *Shih* in this case designated a “locality.” Later it became

the secondary name (to *hsing*) of the people who controlled from that locality. Still later to mean “nation” or “state.”

Pi

The outskirts of an *i*.

Pu-luo

A tribe, also called *pu-tsu*.

I or *yi*

A walled town or city (*ta-i*) that serves as a center of command for control of a locality or for further development and expansion. The main center of a political-territorial unit or “state” was the “capital,” which was usually named after or represented that unit. Examples include Hsia (the capital of Hsia-kuo) and Shang or Yin or Ta-i Shang (the Shang or Shang-kuo). The term is also synonymous with *kuo* in certain contexts.

Kuo, *pang*

A state, chiefdom, or the like, depending on the context. Also called a *fang*, particularly in reference to less-developed peoples (generally nomadic or semi-nomadic) on the borders of a well-developed state in Hsia, Shang, and Chou times. In this sense, it sometimes referred to a tribe or chiefdom. The term is also synonymous with *i* or *yi* in certain contexts.

Yeh

The region outside the *i/yi* or the outskirts and suburban areas of a walled town or city.

Wai-kuo

Foreign countries or peoples outside the domain of the Han empire but under its control.

T'ien-tzu

The Son of Heaven, the emperor; also called, T'ien-wang (the Holy King), both of which were early Chou honorifics in the eleventh century B.C. The name Huang-ti, meaning “Your Majesty, His Majesty, or [imperial] We,” gained currency with the first emperor of the Ch'in dynasty, Shih huang-ti (Ying Cheng, r. 221–210 B.C.). In Han times, all three names designated the Han Emperor as the all-powerful ruler of a great, unified empire; acknowledged him as the ruler of all nations; and were used as forms of address by the leaders of non-Han groups (such as the Hsiung-nu or Wu-sun in modern eastern Central Asia) or officials outside Han territory at the time of speaking (e.g., in Wu-sun or in Hsiung-nu). Occasionally the Emperor used the name Huang-ti as a first-person

expression in a decree or edict. Sometimes Sheng T'ien-tzu (Your Holy or Wise Son of Heaven) was used in place of Pi-hsia (Your Majesty); occasionally it also meant "His Holy or Wise Son of Heaven" (i.e., His Majesty). In both cases, the term could be used inside the Han empire.

Feng-chien

Feudalism, a political-social-economic system in a generally factual or perceived domain or territory, where the overlord or king claims ownership of land and all who are born on it and allocates the control of geographical districts to territorial lords, who remain or pledge to become subject to his authority.

Pa

A hegemon, the leader of an alliance (*meng*) of many independent states against common enemies in pre-221 B.C. usage. In Ch'in and Han times, a ruler of one state who conquered other states by force or other means with a concrete plan to assimilate their peoples into a "civilized" world of peace, order, and prosperity. A related term is *ch'eng-pa* (hegemonic, to make hegemonic).

Nei-shu

Also *shih-Han*, an independent state outside the Han empire that has surrendered part of its sovereignty to the Han Court in return for military protection against possible enemies. A state of such status corresponds to the "protectorate" of modern times.

Li

Generally translated as "rites," "ceremonies," "propriety," "code of ethics," and the like. In Chou times, *li* referred to a political, institutional, cultural, and religious system that defined the salient traits and character of a dynasty or civilization. In the latter sense, a synonymous term is *li-yueh*.



INTRODUCTION

Scope, Sources, and Approaches

IN BROAD TERMS, this study traces the origins and evolution of the state in ancient and early Imperial China from the seventeenth century B.C. to the first century A.D. In more specific terms, it examines the critical role that the frontiers or peripheral zones played in shaping the course of Chinese history. The main body of the text, however, focuses on the territorial expansion and colonization of the frontier regions and the growth of the state and the empire in early Imperial China and how all that changed the worldview, the self-perception, and the conceptualization of a Chinese nation in the Chinese empire during its first four hundred years. In its thematic dimension, the work consists of five sections in two volumes: the larger issues about the evolution and models of the state, nation formation, and empire building; the origins and processes of military and territorial expansion; and the detailed organization and operational mechanics of the huge colonial and frontier systems. That being the case, I will give a special introduction to the question of how these themes and issues were interconnected in the history of the period under discussion and hence how this study is constructed and structured as a coherent whole.

THE MAIN SCOPE

The Ch'in (221–207 B.C.) and Han (202 B.C.–A.D. 8, 25–220) were the first two major dynasties of Imperial China. Not only did they lay down the institutional foundations of the political system of a centralized bureaucratic Chinese

empire, but they also defined the main territorial dimensions of that empire. Although the Ch'in regime, founded by the First Emperor (Shih huang-ti; Ying Cheng, 260/259–210 B.C., r. 221–210 B.C.), was short-lived, it initiated both structures. The Han, founded by Kao-ti (Liu Pang, 247–195 B.C., r. 202–195 B.C.), developed both to their maturity. But it took a long time for the Han to reach that stage. When the Han dynasty began in 202 B.C., it inherited an empire that was torn apart by six years of war and destruction between contending independent states after the collapse of the Ch'in in 207 B.C. For its first seventy years, the Han empire was plagued by both internal political instability and external foreign challenge. For the latter, the most threatening was the continuing Hsiung-nu attack on the northern and northwestern borders. The Hsiung-nu forces even marched twice to the vicinity of the imperial capital at Ch'ang-an and even made the survival of the Han empire doubtful for a period of time. But for a variety of reasons the Han was unable to make an effective counterattack, not until the reign of Han Wu-ti (Liu Ch'e, 156–87 B.C., r. 141–87 B.C.).

In Wu-ti's time, the Han initiated a massive attack on the Hsiung-nu and its allies, aiming to eliminate the threat once and for all. The Han forces then marched far into the Hsiung-nu strongholds in the north, in modern Inner and Outer Mongolia, and regained the territories lost to the Hsiung-nu during the six years of the Ch'in-Han transition, 208–202 B.C. In the northwest, the Han troops crossed the former westernmost boundary by the Yellow River under the Ch'in and advanced all the way to the western border of modern Kansu to gain control over all of the region of Ho-hsi (west of the Yellow River) and part of the western Ch'iang territory in the Huang river valley in modern Tsinghai and modern southern Ninghsia (now part of Inner Mongolia). And then they moved to modern Sinkiang, then called Hsi-yü (the Western Regions), and established colonies to command the thirty-eight (traditionally thirty-six) native states in the region. In 104–101 B.C., Han Wu-ti's army of over 70,000 soldiers, 100,000 oxen, and 30,000 horses marched over the Pamirs into Central Asia and reached as far as Ta-yuan (capital in Ferghana) and K'ang-chü (Sogdiana, capital in Maracanda [Samarkand]) in modern Uzbekistan. The Han military conquest in the west reached its zenith, and it secured the safety of the eastern section of the route of communication between Han China and Ta-Ch'in (the Roman Empire), later called the Silk Route, which extended for over 6,000 miles (4,200 miles in straight distance) from the Han capital in Ch'ang-an to Tyre (in Lebanon) on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea. In the many campaigns in these western regions (Ho-hsi, Ch'iang, and Hsi-yü) and the Hsiung-nu land, the Han sent a total force of over 1.2 million cavalymen, 800,000 foot soldiers, and 10.5 million men in support and logistic roles. The total area of land seized in Ho-hsi alone was 426,700 square kilome-

ters. In developing this region, the Han spent 100 billion in cash per year, compared to the regular annual government revenue of 12 billion. In the process, the Han government moved from the interior over 1 million people to populate and develop the Ho-hsi region. Thus, the Han conquest of the land west of the Yellow River was the greatest expansion in Chinese history, and the Han development of the Ho-hsi region was the grandest scheme of colonization in the annals of Imperial China.¹

The main focus of the present study is on the history, process, operational mechanics, administrative organization, physical structure, and far-reaching impact of the colonization of the Ho-hsi region and the Western Regions in Former Han times (202 B.C.–A.D. 8). It also examines the origins, causes, processes, and consequences of the Han westward expansion movement under Wu-ti, which influenced not only the Han empire itself but also the later course of Chinese history. It also traces the historical origins and theoretical framework of the Han frontier system, the structural base of the blueprint for the Han colonization of the Ho-hsi region. Finally, it looks into the question of how the Han employed their experience of frontier development in Ho-hsi to establish colonies in the Hsi-yü region in modern Sinkiang and other new frontier territories on the Han borders. The Han used its frontier structures as a critical component of empire building. The military expansion resulted in the acquisition of new land, but the complex frontier systems consolidated the new territories and turned them into permanent parts of the empire.

The Han expansion originated in its defense against the Hsiung-nu attacks, but in the end it turned the Han into a powerful imperial power. It also transformed the structure of the Chinese state. Therefore, the evolution of the Chinese state from its origins to Han Wu-ti's time must be reexamined to understand that transformation in its long historical context. In the same light, the far-reaching implications of Han Wu-ti's new empire and state for later dynasties, and even the modern era, are analyzed in both political and historical terms.

THE NEW SOURCES

Although the westward expansion was an important event in Han history, except for a few of its most important military operations, it received scarcely any systematic or detailed treatment in the literary records of the Han period. The structural details and operational mechanics of the development of the Ho-hsi region, Hsi-yü, and the Western Ch'iang territory find almost no mention at all. A page of critical importance in Chinese history was missing, and the historians of later dynasties were left with little knowledge with which to fill in this significant gap in the history of Imperial China. Only with the discovery of over

sixty thousand decipherable Han era documents on wood and bamboo in the old Han Ho-hsi, Hsi-yü, and Western Ch'iang regions in the last one hundred years has that lost page of Han history come to light. These are the daily records of the Han colonists and frontiersmen in these regions. They were written in Han script and cursive style on wood and bamboo strips of varying size, with a considerable number of them measuring about 22.1–24.8 cm long and about 3.0–4.5 cm wide. They date mostly from the late Wu-ti reign (141–87 B.C.) to the reign of Emperor Kuang-wu (A.D. 25–57) of the Latter or Eastern Han (A.D. 25–220), and a few are even as late as the mid-second century. The largest amount originated in the period of emperors Chao (87–74 B.C.) and Hsuan (74–49 B.C.). These documents, generally referred to as Han-chien, of varying forms and styles and both public and private in nature, contain much information about the frontier regions, including the structure of different frontier settlements, organization and construction of various military garrisons, geographical distribution of Han forces (military personnel), living conditions of both soldiers and civilians, local government administration, communication between local and central governments, the land system, population figures, local products and market prices, physical characteristics of servicemen and local inhabitants, family systems, slavery, aristocratic ranks, crimes and convicts, records of amnesties, imperial decrees, laws and statutes, household goods, local education, religious life, calendars, illness and medicine, official registers for various functions, physical and economic geography, and cultural activities.² Thus, they are in fact the archives of life on the Han frontier, and with them historians can examine in detail almost every aspect of the Han frontier system and the daily lives of the colonists and frontiersmen. The present study is such an attempt, a reconstitution of the Han frontier system and people's lives within it.

First, we must take a close look at the geographical distribution and dating of these Han wooden and bamboo documents.

1. The Chü-yen documents: Chü-yen is a region located in the northern part of the Ho-hsi region in modern northern Kansu and southern Ninghsia (now part of Inner Mongolia). In 1930–31, Folke Bergman of the Sino-Swedish Scientific Expedition discovered 10,529 documents of the Han period written on wood and bamboo. A large number of these slips range in date from 102 B.C. to A.D. 31, and a complete book roll of 78 slips is even dated as late as A.D. 93–95. From 1972 to 1976, the Chü-yen Archaeological Team organized by the Kansu Provincial Museum in Lanchow unearthed over 23,000 slips, of which 19,965 have decipherable writings and 1,222 have specific dates ranging from 102 B.C. to A.D. 31.³

2. The Tun-huang documents: The Tun-huang region is located on the western edge of the Han Ho-hsi region in modern western Kansu. In his three

Central Asian expeditions of 1900–1901, 1906–8, and 1913–16, Aurel Stein found over 3,000 documents on wood and bamboo, of which 2,000 are decipherable, with half of them dated to the Han dynasty, from 98 B.C. to A.D. 153. In 1940, Hsia Nai of Northwest Scientific Expedition discovered 48 Han era slips. In 1979, the Kansu Provincial Museum unearthed 1,217 slips in the western part of the region, ranging in date from 71 B.C. to A.D. 23. In 1981, the Tun-huang Culture Department found 76 Han documents on wood ranging from 80 B.C. to A.D. 23.⁴

3. The Chiu-ch'üan documents: Chiu-ch'üan is a region on the east of Tun-huang also in the western part of the Han Ho-hsi region in modern western Kansu. In 1977, the Institute of Cultural Relics of Chia-yü Kuan discovered 91 Han slips in the central part of Chiu-ch'üan, dating to the reigns of emperors Wu, Chao, and Hsuan.⁵

4. The Lop-nor documents: The Lop-nor area, called Yen-tse (Salt Lake) and P'u-ch'ang hai (Lake P'u-ch'ang) in Han times, is in modern eastern Sinkiang. In 1930 and 1934, Huang Wen-pi of the Sino-Swedish Expedition discovered 71 wooden documents of the Former Han period on the northern bank of the Lop-nor lake (also spelled Lob-nor or Lop Nor).⁶

5. The Ta-t'ung documents: Ta-t'ung is located in eastern Tsinghai; it was part of the western Ch'iang territory acquired by the Han forces. In 1978, the Archaeological Team of the Tsinghai Provincial Museum unearthed 400 documents, most of which date to the period of Emperor Hsuan.⁷

6. The Hsuan-ch'üan documents: Hsuan-ch'üan is in Wu-tung County of Tun-huang in western Kansu; it was known as Hsuan-ch'üan Station (Chih) in Hsiao-ku District in Tun-huang in Han times. From October 1990 to December 1992, the Excavation Team of the Institute of Archaeology of Kansu Province excavated the site and discovered over 35,000 Han era wooden and bamboo documents; 23,000 of them contain writing, of which 17,864 have been deciphered. The dating of these documents ranges from 111 B.C. to A.D. 107. While they provide information on almost all aspects of the lives of Han soldiers and colonists, the garrison structure, and governmental operations in the area and the Ho-si region, they contain special information about geopolitical organization and the garrison network, including the distance between major Han garrison settlements throughout the Ho-hsi region, and about Han operations in the Western Regions. The last three groups of documents make these new materials especially valuable.⁸

Han wooden and bamboo documents have been discovered in other parts of the Ho-hsi region in modern Kansu, such as Wu-wei, T'ien-shui, and Yung-teng (Ling-chü in Han times), but they bear almost no significant reference to our study of Han frontier development. They will be used for our study of Han life

and society in general and for comparative purposes. In the same light, the ten thousand Han wooden and bamboo documents found outside western China and in the old Han territory in modern Korea (such as Lolang) will also be consulted.⁹

A tremendous amount of archaeological work on Ch'in and Han China has been done since 1950.¹⁰ The new archaeological finds have become necessary sources for any study of the Ch'in and Han period. It was these extensive excavations and surveys that led to the discovery of more than fifty-three thousand new wooden and bamboo documents of the Han period in the old Han Ho-hsi and Hsi-yü regions. The archaeological records and fieldwork reports of the Han frontier settlements and other sites in these regions are a significant part of our primary sources for this study.

The third group of primary sources for this work is the literary records of the Han period that have survived to modern times, the most important of which are the *Shih-chi* (Historical Records) by Ssu-ma Ch'ien (145–86 B.C.); the *Han-shu* (History of the [Former] Han Dynasty) by Pan Ku (A.D. 32–92) and others; the *Yen-t'ieh lun* (Discourses on Salt and Iron) by Huan K'uan (fl. mid- to late first century B.C.); various encyclopedias, treatises, and reference works by Han scholars; collected writings and fragments by Han authors; and philosophical works by various Han thinkers and writers. Written works of later dynasties on the Han period are also considered primary sources in this monograph. Some of the most important writings in this category are the *Hou-Han shu* (History of the Latter Han Dynasty) by Fan Yeh (A.D. 398–446) and others; *Pu Han ping-chih* (Treatise on the Military of the Han Dynasty) by Ch'ien Wen-tzu (Sung); *Han-chih k'ao* (On Han Institutions) by Wang Ying-lin (1223–96); and *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien* (A Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government) by Ssu-ma Kuang (1019–86).

These three large groups of primary sources form the main source materials for our analysis and interpretation in the present study. These and other materials used in this work, however, are not devoid of contradictions and inconsistencies. All such issues will be compared in this study, and our preference for one version over the others will be explained. The many secondary studies by later and modern scholars sometimes compound the confusion that surrounds this era due to their different interpretations of some key readings.¹¹ All such problems will be examined.

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES

This book is the first study in any language on the history, structure, operational mechanics, and influence of a frontier region in Han China, although there have been numerous studies of some aspects of the Han frontier and the wooden

and bamboo documents in Chü-yen and other frontier regions. In fact, it is the first such study of a new frontier region in any period in Chinese history. (Although there are numerous studies of the frontier regions of the Chinese empire, these territories had been acquired by previous dynasties.) As such, this work follows a “comprehensive history” approach—a composite of many methodological and intellectual approaches, including political and military history, frontier studies, diplomatic history, demography, social and economic history, and anthropological and cultural analysis. Its discourse covers both humanistic and social-science approaches, but due to the nature of this work it places more weight on the latter. In its main thematic inquiry, this study addresses four questions. What motivated Han westward expansion under Wu-ti and his heirs? What was the course of action? What was achieved? And how did the expansion affect the Han dynasty and the later course of Chinese history? The core issue of this study is the development of frontier regions and colonies under the complex Han system and the transformation of such newly acquired territories into permanent Chinese lands under the regular Han administrative system. That is the question of how Han military expansion resulted in the acquisition of new land, how the development of the new land led to empire building and nation formation, and how the new Han empire changed the course of the Han dynasty and Chinese history.

THE NARRATIVE STRUCTURE

The discourse of this work mainly follows the critical connecting threads of these themes. The textual presentation goes through a narrative course in five sections: The first section, in one chapter (Prologue), introduces this study by relating it to the development of the state, the formation of the Chinese nation, and the evolution of empire building from high antiquity to the founding of the first centralized empire in 221 B.C. The second section, in three chapters, examines the origins, foundations, and processes of Han expansion and frontier development. The third section, in two chapters, treats the large issue of Han territorial expansion in Ho-hsi (in modern Kansu [Gansu], Tsinghai [Qinghai], and Suiyuan [western Inner Mongolia]), Hsi-yü (in modern Sinkiang [Xinjiang] and eastern Central Asia), and other areas and how that expansion transformed the Han empire into the largest imperialist power in Asia. The fourth section, in five chapters, analyzes the history, structure, and operation of the Han frontier system in Ho-hsi and Hsi-yü in general and Chü-yen (in northern Ho-hsi) in particular as a case study. The fifth section, in one chapter (Conclusion), reviews the results of the Ch'in and Han expansion movements from 221 B.C. to A.D. 8; examines their political, economic, social, military, intellectual, and cultural consequences; and relates this study to the enduring question of the

interaction between the frontier challenge and the pattern of empire building in Chinese history.

In its physical structure, this study, entitled *The Rise of the Chinese Empire*, is divided into two volumes. While sections 1, 2, 3, and 5 are in the first volume, subtitled *Nation, State, and Imperialism in Early China, ca. 1600 B.C.–A.D. 8*, section 4 constitutes the second volume, subtitled *Frontier, Immigration, and Empire in Han China, 130 B.C.–A.D. 157*. For the sake of coherence and the reader's convenience, parts of the first volume dealing with the acquisition, development, and historical significance of Ho-hsi and Hsi-yü in general and the Chü-yen region in particular are summarized in volume 2, though without the notes, in the introductory and concluding sections. Thus, although the two volumes can be read as one larger book, each volume can stand on its own and serve as a separate book for a separate readership.

The appendixes in volume 1 cover topics that are either too textually technical or too historically broad to be included in the main text but are necessary in making clear or understandable certain key issues and vital arguments in the main text, which, as required by the flow of the narrative stream, can only be presented in summary or passing fashion. Thus, they serve certain key roles in explicating the subject matter to which they are appended and need be viewed as such.

The sections on the sources used in this book consist of three parts: "Basic Sources" consists of the Han documents on wood and bamboo (Han-chien); "Abbreviations" includes some frequently cited materials; and the "Selected Bibliography" lists the main primary and secondary sources in Western, Japanese, and Chinese languages. With just three exceptions, the three groups do not duplicate each other. Because of their obvious difference in scholarly coverage and purposes as outlined above, volume 2 has all three sets of listings, while volume 1 has only "Basic Sources" and "Abbreviations." In all cases, the "Selected Bibliography" is up to date only to the end of 2001 and in a few cases to the middle of 2002.



PROLOGUE

FROM TRIBES TO EMPIRE

*An Anthropological Macrohistory
of the State in Early China*

THIS STUDY IS a detailed examination of the origins, processes, and impact of the great expansion movement that occurred under Han Wu-ti (Emperor Wu, r. 141–87 B.C.), the sixth ruler of the Han dynasty (202 B.C.–A.D. 8, 25–220). In the large historical perspective, the expansion transformed the shape of the Chinese empire in its territorial configuration, its racial-ethnic composition, its political culture, and its view of world order and the structure of the Chinese consciousness. The Chinese empire was still young when the Han dynasty was established in 202 B.C., and it remained so when Emperor Wu came to the throne at the age of sixteen (b. 156 B.C.). But when the emperor died in 87 B.C., the empire reached not only its full growth but one of the most glorious heights in its long history of some 2,230 years. The China that we know in history, and even in modern times, was fundamentally shaped by Wu-ti's military

For the sake of clarity and narrative coherence, the text in the prologue generally sums up only the major points of argument and synthesis of a given controversial issue or event, with the details of the analysis and the arguments of the different schools of thought presented in the notes. This explains why the notes are longer than the text itself. It should also be noted that all bibliographical items except a few standard references cited in the text are excluded from the "Selected Bibliography" in volume 2.

expeditions and his policies of expansion over the course of forty years (130–90 B.C.).

The Chinese empire was established in 221 B.C. by the First Emperor (Shih Huang-ti, r. 221–210 B.C.) of the Ch'in dynasty, 221–207 B.C. With it came a new China, a unified and centralized bureaucratic empire with a political system and administrative machinery, as well as a socioeconomic structure that was totally different from that of the previous Chou dynasty, which began in the eleventh century B.C. This marked the end of the ancient age, which began no later than 2000 B.C., and the beginning of the imperial age, which lasted until A.D. 1911. The First Emperor, however, did more than unify, through extensive military conquests, a divided China after the decline and fall of the Chou ruling house from the seventh to the third centuries B.C. He further enlarged the domain by extensive military expansion after unification in 221 B.C. The Ch'in empire had more than 2 million square miles within its territorial boundaries. Han Wu-ti's new empire, then, was really founded and built on the First Emperor's Ch'in empire but with a greatly expanded territory of over 3.5 million square miles. In the annals of the Chinese empire, the First Emperor, its founder, laid the foundation for its growth; Emperor Wu was the builder, who defined its configuration through his immense imperial enterprise. Emperor Wu also framed the concept of empire in such a way that it became an ideal of political culture in the Chinese mind and gradually fermented as part of the Chinese consciousness. Both the extraordinary kingship of Emperor Wu and the astonishing magnitude of the empire he built became the standards of measure for dynastic greatness and the ideal model of empire building in China. Thus, in the history of China, the founding of the Ch'in dynasty marked the birth of a new state, on one hand, and the parturition of the Chinese empire, hence Imperial China, on the other. The reign of Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty reframed the Ch'in state and restructured the Ch'in empire with new boundaries that defined the shapes of the state and the empire of Imperial China for the next two thousand years.

This study aims to examine the twin critical structures of the Chinese state and the Chinese empire from their formation in ancient and Ch'in China to their full growth in Han Wu-ti's China. The first line of inquiry is to trace the evolution of "political organization" in ancient China from its primitive stage of tribe to chiefdom to nation to state and then from what I term the feudal state to a centralized bureaucratic state—the empire. The second line of inquiry focuses on the origins, founding, and growth of the Chinese empire in Ch'in-Han times from the First Emperor of the Ch'in to Emperor Wu of the Han. For this study, the first line of inquiry is undertaken to provide background for an understanding of the second and serves as the guiding framework in the analysis of the development and structure of the Chinese empire. The latter is there-

fore the subject matter of the present intellectual endeavor. Although the former is the prologue to the latter, it is a requisite step in building a fundamental framework for any such analysis.

DEFINING THE FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS: SOME CRITICAL CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS

The history of political organization in ancient China is really the history of ancient China as a whole. Extensive studies of that nature have been undertaken both in China and abroad, but the more analysis is conducted the more complicated it becomes and the more questions and polemics it raises. For these studies have focused mostly on the details of the social structure and political-institutional organization and on a microscopic examination of historical currents. Mainly they have followed the general political, social, and economic approaches. They have generally overlooked the macroscopic overview of the central issue in ancient Chinese history, the state. Few have systematically employed the anthropological approach to trace the evolution of political organization as the central focus, except in the 1920s and 1930s, when some Chinese historian-anthropologists tried to read ancient Chinese texts of questionable authenticity with some sense of a hidden historical pattern unseen in the examination of more reliable primary sources. This study proposes to depart from that course of research. It attempts to examine the evolution of the state as the central issue in understanding ancient Chinese history and does it from an anthropological and macrohistorical perspective. By doing so, this study will focus on the evolution of a society's growth from band to clan to tribe to chiefdom to nation to state to empire.

In conducting such an inquiry, however, one needs first to clarify some of the key concepts employed. The specific terms used here are *nation*, *state*, *empire*, and *nationalism*. I will start with the last term, *nationalism*, which appeared latest in historical sequence in Chinese history and was closely linked with the rise of the Chinese empire in Ch'in and Han times. This has produced the most confusion in its meaning and use and also the most heated debate among scholars in recent decades. In a broad comparative perspective, nationalism is one of the most elusive and controversial concepts in modern historical analysis. The concept itself has acquired diverse connotations in equally diverse disciplines, such as political science, historical studies, sociology, anthropology, and postcolonial studies. Depending on the specific discipline and the user's peculiar ambitions, the term has come to carry the following conceptions and interpretations: an ideological vehicle for the mobilization for support for modernization; a tool to attract the masses to politics; a secular form of religion to achieve individual freedom and self-fulfillment by virtue of a unique national

identity; the cause or result of a cultural movement; and the result of a state's invention of the idea of "nation" and "national feelings" to achieve special political, racial, gender, and class goals. The term clearly defies a precise definition; any such attempt can and will easily end in infinite regress: the definitions must be further defined, since they always contain more terms that need to be defined. Therefore, each definition must be based on the operational demand of a specific context and a thorough understanding of the special connotations of the text with which an argument is framed. In other words, the framer of the definition of the word must be at once a historian, a linguistic deconstructionist, an etymologist, and a logician. And the results must only be understood as ad hoc "working definitions." As will become clear later in this study, in Chinese historical context the term *nationalism* was simply the actualization or objectification of an ideal in the fundamental composition of statecraft that was part of the long legacy of a political-ideological-cultural tradition deeply ingrained in the basic structure of the "philosophy of life" among the people in the Chinese empire since the Han dynasty.¹ Thus, the Chinese traditional notion of nationalism that prevailed before the nineteenth century was a by-product of the growth of the Chinese empire and the development of the state and a dynastic cultural complex since the Ch'in and Han dynasties and was closely connected to the great expansion movement during that period. It had almost nothing to do with the rise of the nation-state or the process of modernization or the end of colonialism, as was the case in Europe and other regions of the world such as Africa and Latin America.

In modern scholarship on China, the issue of defining the concept of nationalism has become more and more complicated and perplexing because the scholars interested in this inquiry have been mostly scholars of modern China, both in China and abroad; most lack a broad grounding in early Chinese history and historical literature and hence are unaware of the historical evolution of the concept of nationalism in China. They have often used Western models of nationalism to examine its development in China and have reached seemingly innovative but historically questionable conclusions, unintentionally falling into the trap of "orientalism" without an awareness of the root problems in their research and intellectual framework. They often have taken up the difficult task of matching corresponding Chinese terms with the established definitions of the Western term *nationalism*, a term whose origins in the West are questionable in the first place. Second, its precise meanings have never been conclusively defined, even among its most articulate framers.² Still, on the basis of limited sources these scholars have concluded that the Chinese term for nationalism, *min-tsu chu-i* (or *min-tsu kuan*, *ch'ing-chieh*, and so forth) is a modern conception resulting from Western influence and that China never had an idea of nationalism in traditional times because its root concept "nation," *min-*

tsu, was foreign and cannot be found in China before the modern times. This is, of course, a misconception because they have tried to find the modern term *min-tsu* in early Chinese sources without being aware of the fact that this term is a modern translation of the English word *nation* (and its different forms in other Western languages) made in 1902. Naturally they have gone through a “Catch-22” maze.³ One needs only to find that the *equivalents* of the chosen defined meaning of the two words (and concepts) “nation” and “nationalism” did exist in the Chinese tradition, and that, like their Western counterparts, they had their meanings changed with time and the political conditions of China. They did not always fully correspond to the modern meanings of the words *min* and *tsu*. For example, while *tsu* (sometimes termed *tsung-tsu*) meant “lineage,” *min* referred to only the members and nobilities of the Chou lineage (Chou *tsu*) and not ordinary humans in early and predynastic (pre-eleventh-century B.C.) Chou. But in the late Shang times, the fourteenth to the eleventh centuries B.C., the word *min* referred to unfree people or slaves, and the members and nobility of the Shang lineage (Shang *tsu*) were referred to as *jen* and *pai-hsing*, all meaning “ordinary people” in later and modern times. Nor did they correspond to the modern term *min-tsu*, a modern creation that incorrectly combines the words *min* and *tsu* to denote the questionable Western concept of “nation.” Any meaningful scholarly inquiry in this case therefore must start with an understanding of the essence of the working definitions of the Western terms *nation* and *nationalism* at a fixed time and location and then try to see their Chinese counterparts in the same historical context. And one should also be mindful of the fact that in the anthropological and hence historical sense the two terms or concepts cannot be meaningfully understood or defined without an understanding of the concepts of “tribe” (*pu-tsu*, *pu-luo*) and “state” (*kuo*), which, mostly in the Chinese case, were the result of a precondition for the rise of the “nation” and “nationalism,” respectively.⁴

To define the framework of analysis for this study, I will now work out a series of “operational definitions” of the key terms to be used as building bricks in this long work.

First, I will start with a working definition of the term *nation* in its ancient context. In modern scholarship on the issue of nation and nationalism, although scholars have differed on the wording of a precise definition of *nation*, they do agree on the range of essential attributes that define the essence of a nation in ancient and modern times, respectively. On the basis of their research on the development of the nation in history, I propose the following evolutionary process and structural essence of the nation in ancient times. The “primordial element” is naturally a group (or “class” in terms of formal logic) of people(s). The primary factor that grouped these people together in the beginning was common descent. Secondary factors were the common values (cul-

tural, religious, and ethical) shared by most of the members of the group, which grew out of communal living experience as one collective body; common communications media in their interpersonal relations; a common political consciousness that developed as they worked together as one organized group; and a geographical identity derived from the place where they grew and worked. In essence, these factors are race or kinship ties, a value system, language, political power, and territorial boundaries. These five elements would lead to a greater common bond, the “we-group consciousness,” which develops the inner consciousness of uniqueness within the group and the desire to protect its uniqueness by defending its territorial and political autonomy and integrity. As the population increases, its territory expands, and as a result the group gradually becomes a political unit occupying a relatively large territory. Then the group changes from a racial unit to a nation but still with the other three characteristics as part of its identity.⁵ This is essentially a “racial or ethnic nation” or “kinship nation.” I consider this type of nation to be the primary and the earliest type in historical time.

In ancient China, the evolution and growth of the nation can be traced this way. Take, for example, the two earliest “dynasties” (*ch’ao*), the Shang (trad. 1766–1122 B.C., modern dating, ca. 1600–1100 B.C.) and the Chou (trad. 1122–256 B.C., modern dating ca. 1100–256 B.C.) and trace their history of development. Based on both literary and archaeological sources, both dynasties followed a long line of growth. Both began, according to the “origin myths” of their respective traditions, with one family descended from a divine being. They were born to two women of two different tribal origins, Chien Ti of the Jung for the Shang and Chiang Yuan of the T’ai for the Chou, but both had so-called miracle births and were not sired by their human father, the legendary Ti K’u (Emperor[?] K’u). The man thus born became the first ancestor of each: Hsieh for the Shang, and Ch’i (Hou Chi) for the Chou. As time went on, each group increased in population and territory and in the course of time developed from a tribe to a nation and state. But the process lasted several hundred years. A recent study of the major stages of the prehistoric evolution of the two major cultures, Yangshao and Lungshan, in western, central, and eastern China (Ta-ti-wan in Kansu, the I and Lo river valleys in Honan, and Ta-wen-k’ou and Lung-shan in Shantung) has fully revealed the long process of development of human societies and state formation from about 6000 to 2000 B.C. through the advancement of culture and increases in the number and size of sites.⁶ Historically, in the long line of their development the Shang and both its predecessor, the Hsia (trad. 2200–1766 B.C., modern dating ca. 2000/1900–1600 B.C.), and its successor, the Chou, the evolution of the nation inevitably led to the stage of the state.

The state, however, has characteristic differences from the nation; it is

above all a political, territorial, and economic unit, not a kinship group or the collectivity of kinship-tied groups. First, the boundary of a state is defined by its clearly and centrally delimited territory; it has an authoritative political institution, be it an individual or an administrative organ, that imposes, either in theory or in practice, a central control, either directly or through a hierarchical system, over the entire territory or all the land within its defined boundary. The power of such a political institution is ontologically sanctioned by a source that is beyond the reach of any mere kinship relation. It has all the people residing and born upon its land, however distinct their natural or human-made characters, bound together by political and military means, not by a commonly shared ethnic or linguistic or historical identity, and it possesses a powerful war machine for both external and internal functions.⁷ Second, the state must have controllable economic resources and sources to support its members for subsistence and beyond. Otherwise a political system would not be necessary because it would not have a fixed and stable number of members to engender the need for state formation, nor the possibility for forming a defined territory. In my view, the state also went through different stages and forms: the feudal state, the centralized bureaucratic state, the imperial bureaucratic state, and the democratic state. This study will involve the first three, each of which will be defined in due time and context.

FROM TRIBE TO NATION TO STATE: THE RISE OF THE SHANG LINEAGE

Following this line of inquiry, we take the original and historical development of the Shang dynasty (state) as a starting point of this study. It is said in written sources, composed mostly during the seventh to fourth centuries B.C. based on long-transmitted ancient oral traditions and earlier but lost materials, that the mythological hero-founder Hsieh of the Shang, the earlier of the two dynasties whose mythological beginnings were discussed earlier, first occupied a walled town (*i* or *yi*) named Po on the northern tip of modern Anhui; a generation later, his son, Chao-ming, moved northward to the walled town of Shang in modern southeastern Honan. Chao-ming's son, Hsiang-t'u, expanded northward to the eastern part of modern Shantung, another walled town called Tung-tu, though later he went back to Shang.⁸ During the next four generations (Ch'ang-jo, Ts'ao-yü, Chi [also Ming], and Hai [also Chen]), the Shang continued to move northward and reached the I (Yi) river valley in central Hopei north of the Yellow River, which at that time flowed into the Pohai Sea at modern Tientsin, far north of its current course in modern Shantung. In examining the seven earliest generations of the Shang, one finds that only the last of the seven, Hai (Chen), was clearly recorded in the oracle bone and shell

inscriptions (*chia-ku wen*) of the Shang period unearthed in the twentieth century; two—Hsiang-t'u and Chi—were probably but not definitely recorded; and four—Hsieh, Chao-ming (Wang Wu?), Ch'ang-jo (Chih Jo), and Ts'ao-yü (Chih Ssu?)—have not been identified with certainty. The oracle bone and shell records have the names of a Wang Heng and a Kuei, but whether Wang Heng was indeed the Wang Heng in the literary sources remains a question. Furthermore, even if he was, he and Wang Hai still belonged to the same generation. The suggestion that Kuei was Ti K'u also has no clear confirmation. In any case, Ti K'u as the ancestor of the Shang was more of a myth and a later deification than a true historical fact. In written texts, the seven-generation line of the first stage of the Shang was only systematically constructed in the fourth century B.C., and only Hsiang-t'u and Hai clearly appeared in such earlier texts as the *Book of Change* (*I, I-ching*), *Book of Poetry* (*Shih, Shih-ching*), and probably also the *Tso-chuan* (Tso's Commentary or Tso's Commentary on the *Ch'un-ch'iu* [Spring and Autumn Annals]). Therefore, the first stage of Shang history was really a mixture of myth, legends, and oral traditions. On the other hand, the oral traditions did indicate that the Shang bases were all in an area extending from southern Anhui to eastern Honan to western Shantung and the south-eastern edge of Hopei, that is, the eastern part of China. All this was the territory of the I (Yi) people, of which, many modern scholars hold, the Shang were a part or were associated with. The frequent removals of settlement centers during these first seven generations also indicate that the Shang during this period, which is generally estimated to have lasted around two hundred years, were nomadic and lived together as one kinship group. Various sources further indicated that the third leader, Hsiang-t'u, introduced the domestication of horses for riding, and that the seventh, Hai (Chen), used cattle for transportation. Moreover, the Shang cattle and sheep at the time of Hai were the cause of conflict between the Shang and the Yu I (Yu Yi) group, during which the Yu Yi leader, Mien Ch'en, killed Hai and seized his animals. All this seems to indicate that at the latest in the time of Hai a possible transition of the Shang from a nomadic to a mixed nomadic and agricultural economy took place. The Yu Yi were eventually conquered by the Shang under the leader of the eighth generation, Chia (Hai's son), who, according to some accounts, was assisted by Hai's brother Heng, and this seems to have produced the first historical record of the Shang expansion. The story of the conquest of the Yu Yi also indicates that the Shang at this stage were an organized tribe with some military power.⁹

After Hai, the next six leaders of the Shang, named in succession Chia, I (Yi), Ping, Ting, Jen, and Kuei—all in the series known as the Ten Celestial Stems (*t'ien-kan* [*kan*] in the *kan-chih* system)—were recorded in the *chia-ku wen* and earlier written texts (as Wei or Shang Chia, Pao I, Pao Ping, Pao Ting, Chu Jen [Shih Jen], and Chu Kuei [Shih Kuei]).¹⁰ Their existence has been histori-

cally authenticated and their times, as marked by their names, also indicate a clear new stage in the history of the Shang people: that they developed from a simple tribal organization to a more complex society with a political system and developed religious institutions. They also stayed in the fixed territory in eastern China developed by their ancestors up to Hai's time. In anthropological terms, the Shang can be said to have progressed from a "band society" to a "classical segmentary tribe" in the first seven generations and to a "composite tribal society" in the next seven generations. In other words, in the first phase of their history the Shang grew from a group of people in bands descended from a common ancestor in a defined territorial unit, that is, all of them were of one lineage with a common sib name (patronym, *hsing*) Tzu, as informed by the written records. Then, as a result of increase in population and in territory, they became a more organized tribal society with a shared culture and a core of leadership based on kinship. Continuous territorial change in the time of the third to seventh generations can be seen as a search for richer land, the desire to avoid attack by more powerful external groups such as the Hsia kingdom (trad. 2200–1766 B.C.), the need for territorial expansion, or a combination of all these factors. Whatever the reason, these removals did not lead to the dispersal or even the conquest of the Shang people; rather, as later history clearly shows, they resulted in the growth and expansion of Shang power. That means that a strong sense of in-group sentiment and loyalty grew within the Shang kinsmen and strengthened their leadership position as they struggled for survival in the face of internal and external crises. Consequently, a more complex and efficient political organization and a larger and more effective military force should have developed, and in turn the Shang were able to conquer less powerful and smaller groups such as the Yu Yi, as happened in the eighth generation under the leader Shang Chia. The Shang then reached the stage of a composite tribe, a politically unequal agglomeration of different peoples of diverse origins and status, all under the political hegemony of the Shang kin.¹¹

The Shang expansion in population, territory, and political organization seems to have continued from Chia to Kuei, although no specific written texts or archaeological sources have provided any direct information about the process. However, one can reasonably assume that this was the case because, as all sources indicate, the Shang group that Kuei's successor T'ien-i (Ta-i [Ta-yi], Ch'eng T'ang, or T'ang) inherited was already a strong military force with a large population and extensive territory, so that he could start a series of extensive conquests and eventually march westward to conquer the Hsia kingdom. Moreover, the names Shang Chia, Yi, Ping, Ting, Jen, and Kuei all indicate that the Shang had developed a systematic language and a structured religion with stratified rituals. In the first few years of his leadership, T'ang continued and expanded the traditions that he inherited from his ancestors. A case in

point is the conquest of the Ko state (of the Ying clan), a close subordinate state under the hegemonic Hsia located northwest of the Shang center in southeastern Honan, which may be called the southeastern frontier of the Hsia; at the time, the Shang were also under its control. All sources indicate that the Ko were conquered by T'ang for religious and hence moral reasons, that it was done after all nonmilitary and moral persuasions had failed, and that the conquest was supported by all the other groups and their lords. Then he launched eleven more military conquests in adjacent regions and made all the other groups submit to Shang authority. These and all the other nonmilitary traits of the Shang that developed from Shang Chia to Kuei clearly indicate that as a group of people the Shang at that time had reached the stage of a nation as the term was defined at the beginning of this prologue. Thus, the Shang lineage, or clan if it can be traced to another lineage, became the Shang nation in the early fourteenth generation.

Early in his reign, T'ang also built up a wise administrative machinery of political talents (*hsien-ch'en*) with I Yin (I Chih) as chief administrator and Ju Chiu, Ju Fang, I Po, Chung Po, Chung Hui, and Chiu Shan in charge of different governmental functions. All of them were selected and appointed by T'ang for their talents, not their kinship ties, and some of these officials were not even of the Shang lineage. Therefore, the age-old principle of kinship ascription to leadership positions was replaced by a competitive power system. The Shang also refined an ideology of leadership, basing political legitimacy on the sanction of the Supreme God in Heaven (Shang-ti, Lord [Sovereign] on High); as the power of rulership had long been established, hereditary and all subordinate positions were appointed and under the control of T'ang, and T'ang began to possess the power to direct the life of his domain in a relatively arbitrary fashion. First, he so expanded his military force that he even called himself the Marshal King (*Wu-wang*). Thus, he was now a king (*wang*), equal to the title of the ruler of the hegemonic Hsia kingdom (dynasty), referred to by the Shang as Hsia-kuo, the supreme lord of all lords of the numerous groups and states (*kuo*) at that time.¹² This means that T'ang and the Shang had already advanced to the state of a "centralized chieftainship" in anthropological terms.¹³ In fact, T'ang was ready to launch his conquest of all the groups and states (*kuo*) in the then "China" and his drive to replace the Hsia king, Chieh, as the overlord of all lords in the territory extending from Anhui and Kiangsu in the south to Hopei in the north and from Shantung in the east to Shensi in the west. He coerced his people to follow him by reminding them of their moral responsibility and the protection of their own interests, then by evoking the order of the Supreme Lord in Heaven, and then by the intimidation of enslaving and killing after the people resisted the call of military adventure and complained that such collective mobilization would disrupt their farming and related agricultural

work. In the end, he was able to carry out his plan. In about ten years, he made twenty-seven more conquests, including the defeat of such strong states as Ku (of the Chi clan) and Wei (of the P'eng clan) in eastern Shantung and northern Honan, respectively, all to consolidate his control over the eastern region, his home base. Then he began his final march to defeat the Hsia in their capital of Yang-ch'eng (the modern Teng-feng area) in central Honan.¹⁴ First, his forces, including the Shang and their thirty-six allies, reached K'un-wu (of the Ssu clan in the modern Hsu-ch'ang area in Honan), a powerful subordinate state of the Hsia located just southwest of the Hsia capital and on the frontier between the Hsia and Shang; they conquered it and marched on to meet the forces in the Hsia capital. They defeated the Hsia and Chieh, and the Hsia king retreated with his forces northwest across the Yellow River to Ming-t'iao in the modern An-i area in western Honan, the Hsia's home base and first capital region (An-i, then located northeast of modern An-i in modern Hsia-hsien).¹⁵ The Shang forces also reached the area, and Chieh surrendered. Ch'eng T'ang then banished Chieh to Nan-ch'ao in central Anhui to be isolated far from his home base.¹⁶ The Shang forces then pushed farther westward across the Yellow River into southern Shansi and eastern Shensi in the Wei river valley. The Hsia dynasty ended with Chieh. Ch'eng T'ang established a new dynasty, the Shang, named after his clan. That was the seventeenth year of T'ang's reign as the leader of the Shang, which is traditionally dated around 1766 B.C. and in modern times dated from archaeological data around 1700 to 1600 B.C. But various parts of the Hsia territory and some regions controlled by its allies, such as the Tsung in modern eastern Shantung, still had not submitted to the Shang.¹⁷ It took T'ang three more years to bring all of them under his command. It is said that in the end about five hundred *kuo*, states and chiefdomlike groups, including the Ti and Ch'iang on the western and northwestern borders, all were either controlled by or nominally subordinated to the new Shang dynasty.¹⁸ The defined territory of the Shang dynasty included modern Honan, southern Shansi, eastern Shensi, central-northern Anhui, northern Kiansu, most of Shantung, and southern Hopei.¹⁹ T'ang still took Po, the Shang home base in northern Anhui, as the capital of his new dynasty.²⁰ But he instituted some new dynastic regalia and court rituals, including the selection of "white" as the dynastic color, the change of the time of court audiences to daytime (morning) rather than evening, and the regulation of the special form and size of the royal carriage to replace the old tradition of riding a horse associated with the nomadic lifestyle.²¹ With the founding of the dynasty, the Shang entered the stage of an advanced political system, the state. The Shang dynasty of Ch'eng T'ang of the Tzu clan functioned with an efficient and complex administrative machinery, possessed a powerful war machine, ruled agglomerations of peoples of diverse origins and cultures bound together by a single ruler in a large defined

territory, and invested almost all political, social, and economic powers in a single individual of one lineage. T'ang as the king also claimed that his power to rule was sanctioned by the Supreme God in Heaven (Shang-ti), not by tribal ties of kinship with his subjects; in reality, he ruled with military power strong enough to subjugate recalcitrants.²²

The practices of ruling the Shang state after the founding of the dynasty were scarcely recorded in reliable early sources. But a few institutions seem to have been commonly accepted in these sources and can be authenticated in later archaeological sources such as the oracle records of the last three hundred years or so of the Shang dynasty. First, regulations and laws for ruling the state were constituted and decreed. Second, in the Shang territory T'ang had control over territorial lords, then called *chu-hou*, and could even depose them if they failed in their duties.²³ Third, for political reasons and as a result of population increase and colonization of new territories, the Shang royal clan (Tzu clan) sent its own people out to establish their own units by giving them pieces of land with a walled town as their command center and assigned them new names (*shih*) to designate their new polities in addition to their original clan name (*hsing*) Tzu. The institution was known as *fen-feng I-kuo wei-hsing*, and there were at least ten such cases in the early times: Yin Shih, Lai Shih, Sung Shih, K'ung-tung Shih, Chih Shih, Mu-I Shih, Mao Shih, Shih Shih, Hsiao Shih, and Li Shih.²⁴ This practice was also extended to court officials. Each of these polities was called a *kuo*, which may be translated as "walled-town state" or "chiefdom" depending on the territorial and population size, each of which was ruled by a lord invested by the Shang king in a stratified ritual befitting the lord's political and territorial status. One may reasonably assume that the aforementioned five hundred *kuo*, which formerly were under the Hsia overlord but accepted T'ang as their ruler after the founding of the Shang dynasty, largely belonged to this category, with a number of them being mere powerful chiefdoms or tribes.²⁵ In any case, there seems to be little doubt about the existence of such a system, which became the structural network of the Shang governmental machinery of the new kingdom. This system is what has been termed "feudalism" in later times. The Shang state, then, was really a "feudal state." I created this term because as a political entity the Shang was a state but its institutional structure was fundamentally feudal: while the king claimed ownership of the land and all who were born upon it, he also allocated the control of geographical districts to territorial lords, who remained or pledged to be responsible to his authority. Shang society as a whole was a hereditary, stratified class system.

In tracing the rise of the Shang from a presumably independent band to clan to tribe to nation to feudal state, from the legendary hero-founder Hsieh to the military conqueror T'ang, we have outlined the history of one group of people—a lineage—which constituted the middle part of the chain of the first

stage of historic China after the Neolithic Age (ca. 10000–2000 B.C.). That stage has been referred to as San-tai, the earliest “Three Dynasties” in Chinese history: Hsia, Shang, and Chou. The term *San-tai* contains several points of reference: historical process, cultural progress, political evolution, national (or ethnic) formation, and linguistic family. The san-tai period, generally 2200/2000–221 B.C., has been one of the focal points in modern archaeology. One of the most critical tasks was the reconstruction of the Hsia and the first half of the Shang because direct evidence, contemporary written records, of the Hsia and the Shang before King P’an Keng—that is, the six hundred years from ca. 2000 to 1400 B.C.—is still missing. Therefore, the existence of the Hsia can only be surmised by means of post-Shang written texts, whose dating is either unknown or uncertain, and on archaeological inference based on the characteristics of unearthed objects and sites that are presumably or theoretically defined to be those of the unknown Hsia. The same situation is also true for the pre-P’an Keng and predynastic Shang, but the post-P’an Keng oracle records do provide some limited information with which we can check the validity of certain critical political-social, cultural-religious, and military institutions contained in the post-Shang written texts. In the end, after more than eighty years of extensive field work and intensive research by modern scholars on all of the five critical areas in San-tai studies, the existence of the Hsia still remains unproved, and the predynastic and pre-P’an Keng Shang remains either legendary or mostly unclear. Thus, for the first six hundred years of historic China, research must be done in a new direction and make its conclusions tentative to await further archaeological discoveries for confirmation or rejection. This study of the rise of the Shang from Hsieh to T’ang is such an exercise.

This is a study primarily based on early written texts, with archaeological sources as supplementary and complementary materials. It is done this way because on the one hand the other approaches, as just discussed, have not been able to produce any valid results for various reasons and on the other because the oracle records unearthed in modern times have reinforced the degree of reliability of early written texts such as Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s account of the royal lineage of the Shang in the *Shih-chi* (Historical Records). Early Shang was chosen to start this prologue because it is midway between the dynasties: Chou, the dynasty with full documentary evidence; and Hsia, with no reliable authentic written documentation. At the same time, the latter half of the Shang, since King P’an Keng, has both archaeological and literary sources for comparing and checking the validity of the various fragments of early Shang events as attended to or described in the written texts in Chou times. With such sources in use, the theoretical framework of this account follows anthropological and comparative approaches: anthropological because the account follows the anthropological line of the evolution of human society from bands to clan to tribe to chiefdom

to nation to state;²⁶ and comparative because the account uses the development of both the later Chou and other societies as practical models for comparison to go with the conceptual building blocks of anthropological knowledge. The result is the reconstruction of the history of the early Shang from its hero-founder to the beginning of the dynastic period in the form of a feudal state.

FROM NATION TO THE FEUDAL STATE: THE RISE OF THE CHOU DYNASTY

Now we return to the series of the San-tai and try to see the pattern of the evolution of the Chou lineage from its hero-founder Chi (Hou Chi) to the founding of dynastic Chou by King Wen and his son and successor King Wu, who ended the Shang dynasty in about the eleventh century B.C. In this light, we will see how the early Shang reconstruction based on "secondary" sources written long after its time compares to the early Chou reconstruction based on sources composed directly by the Chou heirs almost immediately after its time and by the last generations of the predynastic Chou.

Interestingly, parallel to the pattern of the early Shang story is the evolution of the Chou lineage in the predynastic period, although it was not in terms of the number and length of generations. First of all, it took about twenty-five generations for the Chou people to rise from their mythological beginning to the founding of the Chou dynasty, which was at least eleven generations longer than the Shang.²⁷ However, the issue is much more complicated than that if we attempt to explain and count the twenty-five generations. First, according to the *Shih-chi*, by Ssu-ma Ch'ien (154–86 B.C.), who in writing the grand work tended to sum up and organize into a structured system the sources written from the eleventh century B.C., when the Chou dynasty began, to the third century B.C., when it ended, the fourteen Chou lords after Ch'i were Pu K'u (second), Chü (known as Chü T'ao in another source, third), Kung Liu (fourth), Ch'ing-chieh (fifth), Huang P'u (sixth), Ch'ai-fu (seventh), Hui-yü (Wei Yü in another source, eighth), Kung Fei (ninth), Kao-yü (tenth), Ya-yü (eleventh), Kung-shu Tsu-lei (Kung Tsu-lei, twelfth), Ku Kung T'an-fu (T'ai-wang T'an-fu or Tan-fu, thirteenth), Kung Chi (Chi-li, fourteenth, later Wang Chi), and Hsi-po (Ch'ang, fifteenth, later King Wen).²⁸ Second, in the system itself, Hsi-po (Lord of the West) of the Chou, though respected as the dynastic founder by his heirs, did not actually conquer the Shang; he only started the process. His son Fa completed the task after his death. But Ssu-ma Ch'ien's account of the fourteen lords before Ch'ang (Hsi-po) does raise a fundamental question of time. Since he set Ch'i's time to the legendary sage-king Yao, who ruled about twenty-three hundred years before Ch'ang, it is simply impossible that each of the thirteen predynastic Chou lords lived for an average of one hundred years.

Furthermore, the great historian Pan Ku (A.D. 32–92), of the Later (Latter) Han dynasty (A.D. 25–220), presented in the *Han-shu* (History of the Han Dynasty) three more Chou lords between Kung Fei and T'ai Kung: Pi-fang after Kung Fei, I-chi (Yi-chi) after Kao Yü, and Yun-tu after Ya Yü (Ya Yü's younger brother, not his son).²⁹ Still more puzzling, Ssu-ma Ch'ien listed Kung Liu as the fourth Chou lord from Ch'i (Hou Chi), but Liu Ching, who lived in the last decades of the Warring States (Chan-kuo) period (403–221 B.C.), stated in 202 B.C. that there were actually more than ten generations from Ch'i to Kung Liu.³⁰ Since early times, all of these questions have raised serious doubts about the reliability of the line of succession and of the actual number of generations of predynastic Chou lords in Ssu-ma's account. Thus, it seems reasonable to look in a different direction.

If we accept Liu Ching's words and try to look at the larger stages of societal evolution of the Chou, then the Shang and Chou seem to have been more comparable in their predynastic development. As mentioned earlier, the Chou, according to Chou tradition in the classical literary sources, started with a mythological hero-founder, Ch'i, who was ascribed the God-given gift of growing or expanding existing crops, thus his noble title, Hou Chi, the "Lord of Millet," millet (*chi*) being the subject of this honor because that was the first domesticated crop in North China according to both literary sources and archaeological data.³¹ The story in both the *Shih-chi* and *Han-shu* says that Ch'i showed that talent in the legendary sage-king Shun's time and saved the people from famine. He was rewarded with a walled-town "fief," T'ai (west of Wu-kung in modern central Shensi) and thus was granted the *shih* (the name of a specific locality) Chi as his *hsing* (or the original name of a lineage or clan). It is also said that Ch'i was a contemporary of Hsieh, the Shang mythological hero-founder, who stood out in irrigation expertise and was endowed by God with special educational and moral virtues. In addition, their common "miracle birth" aside, according to various Chou and Han sources they were the children of Ti K'u (Emperor K'u) of Kao-hsin, the great-grandson of the legendary Yellow Emperor (Huang-ti), whose "first wife" (*yuan-fei*) was Chiang-yuan and "secondary wife" (*tz'u-fei*) was Chien-ti. Thus, the Chou lineage (*hsing* Chi) and the Shang lineage (*hsing* Tzu) started at the same time, with all being the descendants of the Yellow Emperor (Huang-ti, named Hsuan-yuan). Such glorification of the legendary hero-founder of a clan through a lineage identification with the Yellow Emperor, along with deification, was a long-standing process among Chinese ruling houses in ancient times. It was also a standard means of establishing or reinforcing a ruling house's political legitimacy. In the ancient Chinese account, all the peoples on Earth are descended from a single ancestor, Shao-tien, the Yellow Emperor's father.³²

With this anthropological premise set in the Chinese cultural context, the

origins and later development of the Chou lineage can be meaningfully and sensibly reconstructed based on the complex ancient literary texts and the numerous recent archaeological investigations and excavations of the many prehistoric and predynastic Chou centers of settlement in the agriculturally rich regions of the Yellow, Lo, Ching, Wei, and Yung river valleys in Shensi and Shansi.³³ First, mythology aside, the story of Hou Chi seems to indicate some seeds of the origin of the Chou people: (1) although they moved to northern Shansi later, the Chou probably started in western China in the Wei river valley in Shensi, then one of the most fertile lands in China; (2) the Chou ancestors benefited from that agriculturally rich environment and in some way developed improved farming techniques; and (3) by being tied through kinship to the legendary sage-kings Yao, Shun, and Yü, all distant descendants of the Yellow Emperor, they tried to identify themselves as part of the “Chinese” kin group that came from this common ancestor, who was the symbol of the “chosen people” and the creator of an advanced civilization and high moral culture. Above all, these advanced characteristics of civilization in the Chou were clearly later creations for political purposes and not the true facts of the beginning of the Chou lineage. The miracle birth of Ch’i to Chiang Yuan probably stands alone in showing the real story of the Chou origins—they started with one family in a matrilineal stage of societal development in prehistoric times.

After Chi, the next outstanding Chou lord, as most literary sources indicate, was Pu K’u. But his time, as already noted, was incorrectly dated to the second generation of the Chou lineage. It should be somewhat more than ten generations later, as Liu Ching stated in 202 B.C.³⁴ Pu K’u was said to have lived among Jung and Ti nomads, and, as his name implies, he did not dwell in caves. It seems that in Pu K’u’s time the Chou were still nomads, moving around in the northwestern Shensi region. They were probably in the stage of a clan in their long process of evolution as an ethnic group. The Chou began to change in Kung Liu’s time. He was the tribal leader of the Chou and led them to a transformation of lifestyle. Having left the Jung and Ti groups, he moved his people eastward across the Tu River (in modern Lin-yu *hsien* in western Shensi) and the upper Ch’i-Chü River and crossed the northern edge of the Wei river valley to the Ching river valley in modern Pin *hsien* in north-central Shensi. This was an area of plentiful forests, abundant mineral deposits, extensive fertile land, and crosscutting river irrigation channels. With the rich natural resources in the area, they built a walled town called Pin (east of the Ching River between modern Pin and Hsun-i *hsien*) and adopted a sedentary life. With Pin as the center, Kung Liu led his people to open fields for farming, established storage barns, and began some form of commercial activity by using certain mediums of exchange (*huo*). Kung Liu also led his people to expand their territory by opening more fields and extending their boundaries. He then instituted

a land system and collected taxes (*ch'e*) in kind (grain) from the people who worked on the land. He also organized a force of able men—one adult from every three of a family—for military purposes and public works. His military forces were armed with such weapons as spears (*kan*), daggers, halberds, battle-axes, axes, and bows and arrows. And they went on to control the huge P'u Plain (P'u Yuan) south of the central Pin Plain (Pin Yuan). Kung Liu and his men then surveyed the whole region and selected plots for farming and areas for building houses for new settlements outside the command center of Pin, which eventually grew to flank both sides of the Ch'i River and its surrounding water sources. At the same time, the walled town of Pin was greatly enlarged. The Chou territory and land thus expanded, and population increased by natural growth and by having attracted more people from other nomadic groups. The Chou group under Kung Liu now controlled a defined land of a relatively large size, contiguous settlements within it, a population of a good size, a well-organized economy, and a functional military force. All this produced a society of considerable complexity quite different from life among the Jung and Ti in the west. Consequently, while the society was still kinship based, for maintenance of social order and coordination of the region's development the leadership expanded both in size and in organizational structure. A class of special leaders as advisers to Kung Liu and administrators (*ch'ün-ch'en*) in hierarchical status (*tsung-pei yu-hsu*) emerged in the Chou community. Kung Liu reigned (*chün-chih*) and his officials and the people followed (*ts'ung-chih*). Kung Liu seems, at least according to the epics in the *Book of Poetry*, to have led the Chou people for a very long time, so long that his reign fundamentally transformed the Chou society from nomadic to agricultural, and in the line of social and political evolution it also transformed the Chou lineage from clan to tribe to nation and, at the late stage of that long reign, probably to the earlier stage of chiefdom. Kung Liu's successor, his son Ch'ing-chieh, clearly showed that the Chou had reached that stage of evolution. He established the Chou as a *kuo* (polity) with Pin as its capital. *Kuo* in ancient Chinese usually referred to a group of people, as a nation, with political institutions as their basic organizational structure, beyond the mere traditional kinship ties. A *kuo* had its defined domain, military power, administrative machinery, a well-organized economic system, and a ruling apparatus headed by a hereditary ruler, who was assisted by a ruling class that shared kinship ties with one another. The examples before the Chou are Hsia-*kuo*, as referred to by the Shang, and the Shang-*kuo* (also the Yin-*kuo*), as referred to by the Chou. That means that the Chou reached at least the full stage of a chiefdom in Ch'ing-chieh's time.³⁵

About ten generations later, in the time of Ku Kung T'an-fu, the Chou clearly reached another major turn in its long history of evolution. It was on its way to becoming a state. As military confrontation developed between the

Chou and their northern and northeastern neighbors, the Hsun-yü (Hsien-yun) groups of Jung and Ti, and direct attack from these Jung and Ti groups grew to threaten the Pin area, Ku Kung T'an-fu decided to lead his people to retreat southward to a safe region. They crossed the Ch'i River to the west, passed Mount Liang to the south, then crossed the Ch'i-Chü River to the west, and finally reached a rich, larger plain by the Mount Ch'i in the center of the middle Wei river valley between the Ch'i-Chü River in the north and east and the main course of the Wei River in the south.³⁶ The area, centered in modern Ch'i-shan *hsien*, was just south of T'ai, the walled-city territory his ancestor was said to have received as a fief from the sage-king Shun. That area, sometimes broadly referred to as Chou-yuan (Chou Home Base or Chou Plain), was the base for the later rise of the Chou as the powerful state that conquered the Shang. This was a larger and richer land than the Pin region; it was also by the Wei River and one could easily sail downstream to the eastern Shang border and follow the Yellow River to the heart of the Shang kingdom (dynasty) in central Honan.³⁷

The move to and settlement of the Chou Plain marked some new phases in the evolution of the Chou people. First, the Chou made a complete transformation to sedentary living in walled communities (*ch'eng-kuo*) with houses and other similar living and activities quarters (*shih-wu*, *shih-chia*). And they instituted a systematic land system by counting the cultivated fields using a unit of measure termed a *mou* (acre). Second, they set up well-measured and clearly delimited (*chiang-li*) territorial boundary lines for all Chou-controlled land. And they began to use "Chou" as their national-geographical identity (*Chou-*jen**) and as the marker of their state (political) identification (*Chou-kuo*). Before this change, they were called or referred to only by the name of the place where they were centered, such as Pin. Third, as the Chou all followed their leader Ku Kung T'an-fu to the new territory and went through the difficult stage of hardship as new settlers when they first moved to an unexplored land, they showed a strong mark of loyalty to their hereditary reigning clan leader, Lord T'an-fu, and to the idea of a cohesive Chou nation. In addition, other, non-Chou groups (*p'ang-kuo*) came to join T'an-fu later, and that made the Chou a "multinational" unit. Fourth, a ruling hierarchy was established, as symbolized by the well-designed construction of a capital city and palace quarters for the Chou lord and by the organization of a functioning power structure of officials sharing a defined division of responsibilities (*wu kuan yu ssu*), such as offices of works, lands (cultivation, management, and distribution), religious ceremonies and related matters, justice and related legal affairs, and military and war. Fifth, a religious system with a clear theological conception of the "other world" ruled by a supreme god and its connection with the human world became well developed, as manifested by the construction of an ancestral temple, the *she* (*chung-*

t'u, for the worship of the God of Soil by the people), sacrifices to high mountains, and the use of turtle-shell divination (*kuei-pu*).³⁸ Sixth, the Chou under T'an-fu developed a certain moral fabric in regulating human relationships.³⁹ Seventh, militarily they became an aggressive power: they defeated and seized the land of the Hun-I (part of the Jung [Ch'iang], also known as Ch'üan Jung), who occupied the northern border areas of Chou-yuan.⁴⁰ Looking at these seven areas of Chou development under T'an-fu in the Chou-yuan region, it is clear that the Chou reached the first stage of a state. In that respect, the Chou probably began to receive some Shang influence, at least in the area of political organization, and some religious rituals, but no concrete evidence in this area has been found. It is true that plastromancy was practiced, but that religious institution probably originated in the region; besides, the Chou practice and method of divination were different from the well-known Shang system. According to some early sources, there were three thousand households in T'an-fu's first year in the Ch'i region, and the population reached fifteen thousand households in three years.⁴¹ If there were three to four persons in each household, then there were forty-five to sixty thousand persons in the Chou territory, and they were linked by the possession of a shared cultural, linguistic, and genetic heritage of at least twenty-two generations. With all this and the seven new or developed aspects of its society, the Chou certainly had possessed a state as the term was defined earlier.

Ku Kung T'an-fu's dates cannot be known, but they can be generally estimated. His son and successor, Chi-li, was recorded to have gone to the court of the Shang king Wu-I in the thirty-fourth year of the latter's reign. King Wu-I was the twenty-seventh ruler of the Shang dynasty, the third from the last reign of King Hsin (Shou, also known as Chou in history). While the dating of the Shang dynasty varies with different scholars or schools of thought, by one school's estimate it began in 1751 B.C. and ended in 1111 B.C. and Wu-I's reign lasted from 1226 to 1192 B.C.⁴² Therefore, Chi-li came to the Shang Court in 1193 B.C. In that case, T'an-fu's rule must have occurred around 1200 B.C., less than one hundred years before the end of the Shang dynasty. If we follow a different school in estimating the Shang dating, from 1579 to 1028 or 1027 B.C., Wu-I's date of reign is 1129–1095 B.C.⁴³ In that case, Chi-li must have come to the Shang Court around 1094 B.C., and T'an-fu's time of reign was also around 1100 B.C., about seventy to eighty years before the demise of the Shang dynasty. One source also indicates that T'an-fu moved to the Ch'i region in the first year of King Wu-I's reign, about 1226 B.C. or 1129 B.C. by the two counts given earlier, received King Wu-I's title of Lord of Chou in Ch'i Land in the king's third year (about 1224 or 1127 B.C.), and died in the twenty-first year of King Wu-I's reign, that is, about 1205 or 1109 B.C.⁴⁴ In either case, the Chou started to rise under T'an-fu in the Ch'i area around seventy to one

hundred years prior to the end of the Shang dynasty in the hands of his grandson Ch'ang (later King Wen) and great-grandson Fa (later King Wu). While T'an-fu laid down the foundation of the Chou state and guided it in its early stage of development during this period, the next two Chou leaders guided the Chou to the stage of a full state of conquest and expansion, so strong that it directly challenged the Shang dynasty in the east.

The first such Chou leader was Chi-li, later referred to as Wang Chi (King Chi). As a political and military leader, he was evidently no less gifted and skilled than his father, although they each manifested their talents in different ways to command and organize their people to achieve well-constructed goals—the father by following established tradition and custom and the son by coercive power. Only three years after his ascendancy, Chi-li marched his forces east to conquer the sedentary Jung group Ch'eng in modern Hsien-yang region with the central walled-town Pi (just northeast of Hsien-yang city). Six years later he turned his men west to campaign against the nomadic Jung group I-ch'ü (in modern northern Shensi and eastern Kansu, with its central area of control in Ch'ing-yang District in Kansu) and captured the chieftain (*chiün*) of that group. All of these conquests greatly expanded the Chou territory, on one hand, and gave the Chou the power to deal with the western region on the other. To solidify and legitimize the Chou position, Chi-li then appeased the great power of the Shang by going to the Shang Court to acknowledge the latter's superiority and the Shang king's position as the Supreme Lord of All Lords in the land of what was then China. That happened in the thirty-fourth year of King Wu-I's reign. The king then awarded him a large piece of land (some thirty *li* [miles] in length), ten pairs of jade pieces, and eight horses. It seemed to mark the beginning of significant Shang cultural and institutional influence upon the Chou, although there was a possibility of earlier Shang-Chou contact. Chi-li's contact with the Shang was further proved by recently discovered oracle records in the Chou-yuan region. The Shang-Chou contact was mutually necessary: on the one hand the Chou established its legitimacy, an essential condition for its further expansion and development; on the other, by "granting" official titles and material goods to the Chou leader the Shang king asserted his position as the Supreme Lord (Overlord) of All Lords, thus affirming the order of hierarchy—representation of his supreme power—in the Shang Court structure and within the broadly defined Shang land.

With the new acquisition of legitimacy and the support of the Shang, in the next year Chi-li led his military forces to campaign against the Kuei Jung of Hsi-lo on the northwestern borders of the Shang (in modern northern Shensi, Suiyuan, and northern Shansi) and captured twenty chieftains (called *wang*) of its southern branch, the Ti group, in modern Shansi. Thus, not only did he recover the lands that the Jung had seized from his father, T'an-fu, but he

expanded into the lands northeast of the Pin region. The next year he moved his forces farther northeast to conquer the Jung of Mount Yen-ching along the Fen River in modern central and northern Shansi but suffered a serious defeat. Two years later, however, he subdued the sedentary Jung of Yü-wu, who occupied the land south of the Jung of Yen-ching in central and eastern Shansi and on the western border of the Shang. To further recognize Chou power, the Shang king, Wen Ting (also Wen-wu Ting, T'ai-Ting, Wen-wu ti), Wu-I's successor, granted him the honorific title Mu-shih, literally "Master of Horses" but really meaning "Head Lord of Lords" or head minister of the royal court. With that title (also called Po), the Shang king recognized Chi-li as the leader of all lords of the "states" and groups (tribes and the like) that pledged their allegiance (real and token) to the Shang king and respected him as the Supreme Lord of All under Heaven (in what was then China). It was so-called because horses at that time were the most powerful weapons and hence the most valuable possessions of a state. With his new authority and actual power, the next year Chi-li moved his home base from Ch'i farther west to the Ch'eng land and built a new walled center of command (capital), Ch'eng.⁴⁵ Three years later Chi-li subjugated the Jung of Shih-hu. Another four years later he conquered some of the Jung of I-t'u and captured three chiefs of this group. When Chi-li presented the three captives to the Shang Court to boast of his power, King Wen-Ting felt threatened and conspired to have him killed.⁴⁶ That event, recorded in many early sources, took place in the Shang king's eleventh year on the throne (about 1212 or 1084 B.C.).

Chi-li had been the Chou leader for twenty-five years. Under his reign, the Chou rose to a position of power second only to that of the Shang. The Chou accepted that fact and referred to the Shang as *ta-kuo* or *ta-pang* (the big [supreme] state) while recognizing itself as *hsiao-pang* or *hsiao-kuo* (the little [subordinate] state).⁴⁷ The Chou territory was also greatly expanded from the Chou-yuan of the Ch'i area to reach the former Pin region, to the Ch'eng region in western Shensi, and also beyond its western, northern, and southern borders. By subjugating so many Jung and other groups in his twenty-five-year reign, Chi-li also turned the Chou into a "conquest state," a state that is formed by the conquest and subordination of one or many neighboring peoples in the form of a state, in less-organized chiefdoms, or even as an agglomeration of complex composite tribes. Furthermore, Chi-li's territorial expansion through military conquest also earned the Chou formal recognition by the Shang as the leader of its subordinate states and the center of power in the west. The Chou also established a marriage alliance with the state of Chih (of the Jen clan, in Ju-yang District in central Honan), well within the royal domain of the Shang. Chi-li married the second daughter (called Ta [T'ai] Jen in Chou) of the Chih lord. His son, Ch'ang (the Hsi-po or Lord of the West) also married the daugh-

ter (called Ta [T'ai] Ssu in Chou) of the lord of Hsin (*hsing* Ssu), a clan of the Hsia lineage but at the time a Shang subordinate state on its western border (in modern east-central Shensi on the Ho river plain flanked by the Lo and Wei rivers).⁴⁸ Thus, with the eastward removal of the Chou capital to Ch'eng, Chi-li advanced one step closer to his final goal: the conquest of the Shang in the east and his ascension as the Supreme Lord of All Lords in what was then China.

Chi-li had advanced the Chou to a militarily well-powered state. But it was still a less politically structured state and was yet to conquer the supreme state of the Shang. His son and successor, Ch'ang (later Hsi-po and King Wen), transformed the Chou into a state of that fabrication. Various early texts indicate that Ch'ang was in his forties when he became the Chou leader. In his personality, he was a mature man, the father of several children. As a leader, he had been well trained for his role under two masters with different leadership styles, his grandfather Ku-kung T'an-fu and his father Chi-li. Upon his ascendancy, he aspired to follow both leadership styles and in the process created a new one.⁴⁹ Ch'ang first reinforced the moral fabric of Chou society, a marker of civilization at that time. He strengthened the family order by emphasizing the authority and responsibility of the elders and the obedience and loyalty of the junior members. He then enlarged and invigorated the governing machinery and its ruling effectiveness by recruiting a number of good political and military minds, including T'ai Tien, Hung Yao, Nan-kung Kua, San I-sheng (also mistakenly read as San-I Sheng or San-I-sheng), Yü Tzu, Hsin Chia, Shih I, and Chiang Wang (Lü Wang, T'ai-kung Wang). Ch'ang then launched systematic expansion to strengthen his state. In a span of six years, the Chou seized more land from the Ch'üan-Jung in northwest (modern northern Shensi and north-eastern Kansu) and from Mi-su in the west (modern eastern Kansu), conquered Ch'i in the east (eastern Shensi), accepted the submission of the Jui, Yü, and some other states farther east from southern Shansi to north-central Honan, and moved southward to the rich land south of the Wei River by subjugating the Ch'ung state (with its central city in modern Hu district). The Chou territory, and hence its influence, thus extended from eastern Kansu to Shensi to Shansi to central Honan, and some branches of the Chou may even have moved gradually to control parts of northern Hupei and Kiangsi.⁵⁰ During his lifetime, however, Ch'ang did not try to overcome the Shang but still tended to appease, through various means, the Shang king I and then his son King Shou (Ti Hsin). After a six-year imprisonment by the latter, he accepted officially the title Hsi-po, Lord of the West (under the Shang), as the ranking lord under the overlord King Shou, and he ceded land to the Shang king.⁵¹ He evidently resolved first to make the Chou a territorially large, militarily powerful, economically strong, and politically well-organized state before taking decisive

action to overcome the Shang. He moved his capital city from Ch'eng to Feng, southwest of the Wei River and west of the Feng River, in the former land of Ch'ung, which he had conquered earlier. Feng (east of modern Hu District) was built as a larger walled city than the other Chou "capitals," Ch'i and Ch'eng, and militarily safer, as the Wei River served as a natural defense against the Jung in the north and the increasing military threat of the Shang in the east, as shown by the Shang king's *ta-sou* (grand military maneuvers) and various "hunting [military] exercises" (*I-[Wang]-t'ien*), as recorded both in the literary texts and in the newly discovered oracle records. The city was also solidly fortified with thicker walls and other stronger defense measures, as recorded in literary texts and revealed by recent extensive archaeological excavations.⁵² Hsi-po also sent his son Fa, later King Wu, to build another walled city, Hao, east of Feng and the Feng River, as a further defense measure against possible Shang attack from the east along the river.⁵³

In institutional structure, Hsi-po established a more elaborate system of government and ruling, including a hierarchy of officials: the highest layer of chief administrators, "high ministers," such as *ch'ang-jen* (in charge of personnel and administration, chief administrator, later called *t'ien-kuan* [*chung-tsai*]), *po* or *mu* (in charge of civil affairs, education, and religious matters, later *ssu-t'u* and *tsung-po*), *hu-pen* or *hu-pen kuan* (in charge of the military, later *ssu-ma*), *chun-jen* (in charge of legal affairs, later *ssu-k'ou*), *ssu-t'u* (in charge of land and public works, later partially *ssu-k'ung* and partially *tung-kuan* [*kung-kuan*]); a layer of departments headed by administrators (*chu-chieh*) below the above ministers; chief military personnel, including *shih* (commander in chief of divisions, later *chiin*), *ya-lü* (senior divisional commanders), and *shih-shih* (commander of the capital guards), and under them such subordinates as *ch'ien-fu chang* (chief of one thousand) and *pai-fu chang* (chief of one hundred). By the end of his reign, the Chou had built a force of sixty thousand men (six *shih*), three thousand men of superior fighting skills (mostly royal guardsmen), and six hundred chariots (the most powerful weapon in ancient times). Hsi-po made Chiang Wang his commander in chief of all Chou forces (*shih shang-fu*).⁵⁴

Ch'ang also instituted Chou-type religious sacrifices and rituals (Chou *she*, *ho*, and so forth), an educational system, a calendar (*cheng-so*), special ritual paraphernalia and regalia, and court protocols and ethics. In the end, a Chou culture seems to have been groomed to stand out in its emphasis on the moral fabric of society and on the rules of human behavior, as well as in its deemphasis on the control of human daily life by divine supernatural forces, although he still employed Divine Power (Shang-ti and so forth) as a means of political control. It is in these political, social, and cultural developments that the Chou characterized its difference from the Shang, from which it learned and borrowed. As the Chou emerged as a powerful and cultured state, over forty neigh-

boring and nearby *kuo* (states and groups [chiefdoms, tribes, and the like]) in the west came to pledge their allegiance (*ch'ao*) to the Chou Court. Claiming that he had "been granted" (*Shou*) the Great Mandate (Ta-Ming)—the Mandate of Heaven ([T'ien-]Ming or [Ti-]Ming)—Ch'ang finally assumed the supreme title *wang*, the King or Overlord of All Lords, making him the equal of the Shang king Shou in the east. He also bestowed the posthumous title of *wang* upon his grandfather, T'an-fu as T'ai-wang (Founding King), and his father, Chi-li as Wang Chi (King Chi), marking their founding achievements in leading and guiding the Chou development.⁵⁵ Ch'ang thus made the Chou politically, militarily, economically, institutionally, culturally, and religiously a powerful and fully developed state, called Chou-kuo, next only to the Shang-kuo at the time. Just like its rival Shang in the east, the Chou as a larger territorial and political unit consisted of different ethnic, cultural, and national states and groups, a large number of which maintained their semi-independent status or merely acknowledged the Chou king Ch'ang (King Wen) as *wang* of the land and commander of their allegiance in times of military crisis. In that structure, the Chou state was also, like the Shang, a feudal state. The Chou Court and its governmental system remained the central ruling apparatus within the Chou lands, either contiguous or disjoined, but they were not necessarily effective in or accepted by the other states and groups.

Seven years, or nine in a different account, after his assumption of the title *wang*, Ch'ang died. He did not accomplish his final goal, the conquest of the Shang, though he was very close to it. His successor and son Fa completed that task. In the fifth year of his reign, Fa conquered the Shang. In the spring of that year, he gathered a force of allies in the West (Hsi-t'u), including states and groups from northern Hupei to Szechwan to Kansu and the Ordos region, which included peoples such as the Ch'iang, Jung, and so forth. The Chou forces marched eastward, first along the Wei River and then along the Yellow River, and finally turned northwest in central Honan (in the Ch'eng-kao area) and crossed the river to reach the vicinity of the Yin. In a place called Mu-yeh, southwest of the last Shang capital at Ch'ao-ko (south of modern Ch'i hsien in northern Honan), the Chou forces defeated King Hsin's forces, and the Shang king was killed. In the Shang capital, in front of Shang *she*, a symbolic religious representation of the Shang dynastic line, in a highly solemn religious ceremony, the victor, Fa, prayed to the Supreme God Shang-ti (Lord on High or God on High) and proclaimed the end of the Mandate of the Yin—thus the end of the Shang line of *she*. He thus founded a new dynasty, the Chou, and received the mandate to be the new overlord and king of what was then China. As indicated earlier, the exact year of this event, though a turning point in Chinese history, was not recorded in the early literary texts, hence making it a subject of endless scholarly investigation, speculation, and controversy. Through-

out the ages, more than twenty-six different proposals (or suggestions), within the range of 1127–1016 B.C., have been made in China and abroad. The most frequently cited (or debated) ones are 1122 B.C., 1111 B.C., 1106 B.C., 1075 B.C., 1070 B.C., 1057 B.C., 1050 B.C., 1046 B.C., 1045 B.C., 1027 B.C., and 1016 B.C. I venture to suggest that 1057–1027 B.C. is the most plausible range, without choosing a specific year.⁵⁶ Most scholars, however, have accepted the earlier texts about the length of King Wen's reign, fifty years, but are divided on the length of time between Fa's year of succession and the year of his Shang conquest, with a discrepancy ranging from four to ten years. Thus, it took the Chou about sixty years and two rulers to complete the task of conquering the Shang, a task that was left unfinished by Chi-li (Wang Chi) after he was killed by the Shang king Wen-Ting, coincidentally the third from the last king of the Shang dynasty, who could also have foreseen in Chi-li's person the ultimate ambition of the Chou.

If we follow the suggestion that, as discussed earlier, there were twenty-four or twenty-five leaders of the Chou from their mythological hero-founder Ch'i to King Wen and that, as in the case of Chi-li, each of these leaders led the Chou for about twenty-five years on average, there were then 600 to 625 years from Ch'i to King Wen, and about 660 years from Ch'i to the founding of the Chou dynasty. If so, the Chou lineage probably began in the last decades of the Hsia dynasty and almost contemporary with the Shang dynasty founder T'ang. While this chronology cannot be confirmed in written texts, recent archaeological work has revealed that numerous areas in the early Chou home bases from T'ai to Pin to P'u to Ch'i in the agriculturally rich Yellow, Lo, and Wei valleys contained well-developed settlements in around 1700–1600 B.C., much as is described in the Chou epics in literary texts such as the *Book of Poetry* and the *Book of History*. But, unlike T'ang, the founder of the Chou dynasty, Fa did not really complete the conquest of the ruling dynasty.⁵⁷

Some early Western Chou sources indicate that Fa's Shang conquest resulted in the killing and wounding of 177,779 men, the capture of 310,231 men, the destruction of 99 recalcitrant *kuo* (states, chiefdoms, and so forth), and the willing submission of 652 *kuo*.⁵⁸ It was certainly a bloody military conquest, but even so the Chou had to accept the former status of 652 so-called *kuo*. One can also assume that the 40-plus *kuo* that had joined the Chou during King Wen's time would not have changed their preconquest status. While the Chou-controlled land expanded by 99 *kuo*, the Chou as a large territorial and political unit—that is, the Chou core region plus the 652 newly submitted *kuo* and the forty-plus *kuo* of old allies—remained unchanged from its preconquest structure as a feudal state, although the Chou now became larger than ever before in its territorial claims. Thus, with the fall of the Shang Court and its close allies (or subordinate *kuo*), the Chou dynasty replaced the Shang with a

new Chou Court at Hao (the new capital, also called Tsung Chou); a new core region as the center of command; and a new overlord, King Wu (Fa). But the structure of the political landscape changed very little. In fact, the structure was even looser than under the Shang. On the one hand, King Wu set up new *kuo* in the lands that the Chou conquered for various purposes: as rewards for his allies, relatives, and assistants; as safeguards for protection; and as assurances of political legitimacy and support from historically prominent clans and people such as the descendants of Shen-nung (the Holy Farmer) and the sage-kings Yao, Shun, and Yü.⁵⁹ On the other hand, the Chou conquest of Shang was essentially partial. The military forces reached only part of the eastern region of Shang China and stopped at east-central Honan. Large territories in the east (particularly Shantung and northern Kiangsu), the south (central Kiangsu, Anhui, and Hupei), and the north (Hopei and beyond), remained independent or only nominally submitted to Chou authority. A Chou dynasty ruling the China of the old Shang dynasty was yet to be achieved. That was eventually accomplished by King Wu's younger brother and closest adviser, Tan, the Duke of Chou.⁶⁰

Two years after his conquest of the Shang, King Wu died. His son, Hsun, succeeded him as King Ch'eng. Hsun was too young to deal with the complex and unstable new situation. His uncle Tan became the chief regent in charge of the new court. Two years later, the new Chou kingdom faced its first test of survival when seventeen *kuo* in the east and other critical regions rebelled. The Duke of Chou assumed the position of "temporary king," in place of his nephew Hsun and remobilized the core Chou forces and its western allies to campaign in the east again. This time it took four years of extensive military action to gain control of those regions that had remained beyond the reach of the Chou forces in the first conquest. In the process, another seventy-some *kuo* in those regions were eliminated by the Chou. Now the Chou dynasty encompassed, at least in name, a territory that extended west to east from eastern Kansu to Shantung by the seacoast and north to south from Hopei-Shansi-Shensi to Kiangsu-Anhui-Hupei-Szechwan. This was a China considerably larger than that of the Shang.⁶¹ This China as a territorial unit generally remained the same, except for some insignificant alterations, for the next eight hundred years or so.

The Chou goal of taking China from the Shang was finally achieved in three generations of development and struggle, from Chi-li (King Chi) to his son Ch'ang (King Wen) to his grandson Fa (King Wu) and Fa's brother Tan (the Duke of Chou). When Chou China came into being, the Chou Court also brought the Chou system of culture, religion, society, and government to the land of the new dynasty. But, while the Chou made significant changes in the religious and cultural systems and important revisions in the social structure, it made few changes in the large apparatus that ruled the "kingdom." The Chou,

for example, revised the *kuo* system: over the immense land under Chou direct control, the court set up more than seventy new *kuo*, of which fifteen were in the hands of the Duke of Chou's brothers and another fifty were in the hands of members of the Chou lineage (*hsing*, clan name Chi).⁶² Other old *kuo* and groups that had existed before the conquest and were Chou allies or were established by King Wu immediately after the conquest remained, although some of them had not survived the four war years or had been annexed by their stronger neighbors before the war. Nor do the records indicate any fundamental changes in the internal structure within these *kuo*, although a center of command, called Lo-I (the Lo capital, Ch'eng Chou, in the modern Loyang area), was established in central Honan. As a political unit, the victorious Chou dynasty remained unchanged from the defeated Shang dynasty. The Chou conquest, however, resulted in a larger number of ethnic groups and clans, which were subjugated when they lost their independent *kuo* or territorial units to the victors. For example, after their defeat, thirteen clans of the Shang lineage were granted newly established *kuo* as "peoples in subjugation" by the Chou Court, and a large number of Shang nobles and officials were removed to the Feng-Hao area and later to the new Lo capital region. But these groups of people were in general allowed to retain their ethnic identities (by means of special appellations such as *kuo-jen* or *kuo-min* and *yeh-jen*), their religious beliefs and practices (such as the *she* [god of soil] institution [e.g., Po She of the Shang people]), and most of their customs and lifestyles, except for the fact that they had to serve the victors in certain ways and reside in designated areas outside the walled centers (town or city) or in the "suburban" areas (*pi*).⁶³ In this sense, the dynasty was an amalgamation of numerous single-clan *kuo* and groups, which may be termed as *hsing-tsu* units, and a large number of multiclan *kuo* and groups, each centered in a walled town or city (*i* [yi] or *ta-i* [yi])—mostly having the same name as that *kuo* or group—and populated by clans of diverse origins and status, each of which was a *shih-tsu* (political-local) unit. In geopolitical terms, the core areas of control or central nuclear settlements were called *kuo*, and those outside such domains were referred to as *yeh*.⁶⁴ Thus, the Chou after the final military conquest under the Duke of Chou retained the political landscape it had adopted after King Wu's first conquest; only the size had changed. As a single territorial unit, the Chou dynasty was therefore a "conquest state," but as a political unit it remained a feudal state. Its political structure remained the same. Power was delegated based on kinship ties, personal relationships, and political expediency; the people were attached to the land; government offices were hereditary; and the social structure remained unchanged, with class and station based on birth rather than merit and ability. If the peripheral *kuo* and groups are left aside, the many Chou *kuo* in the core of the Chou dynasty really formed a confederation headed by the overlord Chou king (*wang*) or T'ien-tzu

(Son of Heaven), who had his own *kuo* in the center as the *wang-chi* (king's domain), commonly referred to as the royal domain.⁶⁵ China basically retained that structure until the rise of a "centralized bureaucratic state" more than eight hundred years later. And the process of this change epitomized the process of the birth and gradual evolution of a new China, ending the ancient or classical phase.

The Chou dynasty did produce a major geopolitical change, one that sowed the seeds of the bureaucratic state to come. It is true that, like the Shang, the Chou remained a feudal state after the successful completion of the final conquest under the Duke of Chou, but, unlike the Shang, its domain of direct control was greatly enlarged. It now firmly controlled the land in the central part of Shensi along the Wei River from east along the Shansi-Honan line all the way west to the Kansu border, the southern two-thirds of Shansi, all of Honan, the southern tip of Hopei, the southern two-thirds of Shantung all the way to the seacoast in the east, the northern one-third of Kiangsu, and the northern tips of Anhui and Hupei bordering Kiangsu and Honan to the north. This area under the direct control by the Chou Court, hereafter referred to as the Chou Central Region, was almost three times larger than the area that had been under the firm control of the Shang. Within that large Central Region, there were the Chou people, the clans of Chou relatives such as the Chiang, the longtime Chou allies, the descendants of the core groups of the Hsia and Shang lineages, and other historically important clans such as those kinship lines of the legendary Yellow Emperor and the sage-kings. The Chou Court exercised strong and forceful military and political control over the region. Within the region, to assure that the control was effective, the Chou Court further imposed institutional uniformity, such as the standardization of weights and measures (*tu-liang*) and the practice of using the aristocratic-rank system (*wu-teng chueh* and similar systems) as a standard measure of status and power—thus standardizing the communications and exchange systems, as well as institutionalized symbols and the distribution of power, the class system, and the meanings of political, economic, and social relations and events. The region also experienced vertical economic integration around a common system of agriculture and related production technology. Within the region, the Chou cultural views, written language, religious practices, organizational frames of social structure, and ethical standards—all broadly referred to as *li-yueh*—were "hegemonic," while the same realms of life among the other ethnic groups—those in subjugation—gradually became moribund or slowly acculturated if they were different at the early stage of the new dynasty.

Chou religious beliefs and practices represent a revolutionary step in the development of the state in its relationship with religion in Chinese history. Under the Shang system of state and religion, the affairs of both "this world"

(the human realm) and the “other world” (the suprahuman realm) were in the hands of one ruler, usually referred to as Shang-ti (the God on High or Lord on High, the Supreme God of All) or Ti (God, the Lesser God as the deceased ancestors of the king), with the ruler of this world referred to as the *wang* (king), *wang-ti* (godlike king), or *ti* (ruler, used only late in the dynasty), reduced to being his obedient and submissive descendant. There was really one world, in which this world was the subrealm of the other world. The Shang also held the belief that Shang-ti was the ultimate ancestor of the Shang people. Essentially the core of the Shang religion was a system of ancestor worship whose origin can be traced back to prehistoric times. Thus the Shang-ti and Ti represented the sacralization of a certain charismatic hero-founder or founders of the Shang, that is, K’u in the origin myth. Land or “Mother Nature” was another Shang deity because it was the land, or specifically the soil, that nourished and nurtured the people and possessed the power to make humans die or live and by the same token to control the fate of a dynasty. So the Shang, following an old religion of prehistoric origin, worshiped certain earthen mounds as the divine soil symbolic of its dynastic lifeline and called them She, the God of Soil or God of Earth. But She was still one of the multiple deities under the Shang-ti in the Shang religious system. In any case, Shang-ti was recognized as the Supreme God (of all affairs) in Heaven and on Earth. God was the measure of everything (*shen-tao*), and religion was the center of all Shang activities on Earth, and every facet of Shang life was constituted according to religious beliefs, including all state measures. Thus, the Shang polity was a theocracy. The Chou followed the Shang system in its early stages in order to appease the Shang and for lack of a better system. But Ch’ang, the Lord of the West (Hsi-po), began to initiate a revolutionary change, a “rebellious” religious measure against the Shang tradition. He began to worship T’ien, “Heaven,” as the real Supreme God, a substitute for the Shang-ti of the Shang; at the same time, he elevated She, God of Soil, as a somewhat independent deity on Earth equal to T’ien above. T’ien was a deity in the Shang world but represented only the larger world of nature in an abstract sense, one not much concerned with the world of real life and therefore not the subject of daily religious practices. The Lord of the West, however, never made his religious “rebellion” open for fear of the Shang king’s military retaliation. In fact, when his son Fa (the later King Wu) succeeded him after his death, he dared not do it either, a fact that was recorded in an inscription on a bronze vessel dated to the first years of Fa’s reign. After the conquest of the Shang and the later consolidation of the eastern regions, the Chou Court under the guidance of the Duke of Chou, finally defined the new religious system. The Chou recognized T’ien as the Supreme God of All and thus the ultimate source of power, including the granting of the dynastic mandate and control of the fate of all living creatures, but She was recognized as the God of Earth, with inde-

pendent authority over all earthly affairs. The Chou also sacralized their hero-founder, Chi, as the She god. Thus, the Chou, without drawing a clear line of division, made the universe of religion into a Heaven and Earth division, a philosophically ambiguous dichotomy of divine powers. In this new religious realm, T'ien was the ultimate ancestor of the Chou people through the creation of the miracle birth myth but, unlike the Shang practice, was never sacralized and hence remained an impersonal and transcendent entity. T'ien granted the mandate to the Chou ruling house, but, while he held the divine right to rule, the Chou king had to earn it or otherwise lose it. Therefore, the king had to cultivate, educate, and discipline himself to produce well-being among his people and earn divine sanction for his royal power. The source of power in reality was, then, She, a god of Earth, rather than T'ien, a more remote supreme god in Heaven. Religion, in the minds of the early Chou leaders, became an institutionalized system of rituals and ceremonials that served certain political purposes and axiomatic ethical ideals. Religion was no longer the guiding philosophical frame behind the structure of the state; it was now the political, educational, and ethical agent of the state, as the Chou king employed it to maintain his "divine right" (the Mandate of Heaven) to rule. In essence, man is the measure of everything (*jen-tao*). Thus, the Chou polity was a secular state with sacred guidance from the above and on Earth, and it was in fact a world of an ambiguous separation of religion and state. In religious perspective, the Shang ruler's worship of ancestors was really a cult of ancestors based on feeling and deep emotional perception, not rationality. It was a personal relationship connecting the human and suprahuman worlds as one world without temporal cognition. The Chou tripartite division of T'ien, She, and humans, on the other hand, was a revolutionary step in the evolution of Chinese religion, although its epistemological foundation is the common cognition of "Heaven, Earth, and man" and "father, mother, and offspring." With this simple yet profound cognition of the axiomatic superstructure of the connection between the sacred and the profane, the Chou thinkers (noble leaders) rationalized the origin myth and then institutionalized the relationship between Heaven (father, "the above," "the world of beyond") and the ruler (son) on Earth (She, "Mother Nature"). The result was the recognition of the three as independent entities each with separate value systems and domains of power and responsibilities, while the ambiguous acceptance of Heaven as the Supreme God of all was never compromised. Then all the rituals and ceremonials and associated codes of conduct and ethics and writing for all three were broadly referred to as *li* or *li-yueh*, the defined universe of Chou culture and institutions. In the end, the ruler's power base of divine charismatic authority in Shang times was skillfully transformed into the king's rule by human institutionalized authority in the Chou world.⁶⁶

In the large system of ruling, the Chou Central Region still had the feudal

state structure of a conquest state type; its constituent members were still clan (*hsing-tsu* or *tsu*) and political-local (*shih-tsu*) units; power was still, by rule, based on kinship ties; and officeholding regularly followed long-established traditions and customs. But the particular efficacy of Chou cultural dominance and political-military control in that region rapidly grew to possess a strong sense of political, institutional, cultural, and ethical uniformity and a strong demand for conformity. Thus, it anticipated the eventual development in the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. of that region into one geographical unit called Chung-yuan (the Central or Center Plain), one cultural entity of confluent Hsia-Shang-Chou elements called Hua-Hsia, one geopolitical region called Chung-kuo (the Central or Middle Kingdom, the Center Country; later China), and one ethnic group (*tsu*) broadly called Hua-Hsia (or Hua) *jen* or Chung-kuo (*chih*) *jen* (people of or from Chung-kuo, later Chinese).⁶⁷ The Chou conquest turned one huge region into a new land that fermented the creation of a new geopolitical region, and that region eventually groomed a culture, broadly labeled “Chinese culture”; a new nation, broadly called “Chinese”; and a new ethical-spiritual consciousness, broadly referred to as Chineseness or the Chinese character. In this long historical perspective, the Chou dynasty, founded and built on the heritage of the Hsia and Shang dynasties, was a turning point in Chinese history.

In the evolution of the state, the Chou thus set the stage for the centralized bureaucratic state in Chinese history. Although the Chou dynasty was the apex of the feudal state, it also planted the seeds of the bureaucratic state, for it created a unified geopolitical region inducible for such a development. Looking from the Ch'in-Han vantage point, earlier political control, institutional uniformity, and religious (ideological) unity were necessary conditions for the rise of a bureaucratic system, the rationalization of social and administrative systems from the long-established bonds of kinship and tradition was the first step toward the establishment of a bureaucracy, and a regular military system was the essential instrument for the initial growth of a centralized governmental command in an empire. All of these elemental conditions that would engender the transformation from the feudal to bureaucratic state were either present in their initial stages or readily anticipated in the Central Region of the new Chou dynasty, a region that saw the territorial strip extend along the line of the Wei and Yellow river valleys to cover over 130 *kuo* spread over the area, with each having at least one walled town or city as its major center of command. The entire region was guarded from the two centers of command, the Hao capital (Tsung Chou) in the west (Hsi-t'u) and the Lo capital (Ch'eng Chou, also the eastern capital [Tung-tu]) in the east (Tung-t'u). Within this Central Region, the walled towns and cities served as the points of control, and connecting these broadly distributed points of command into one network had formed a

huge area of land under the close control of the Chou Court from the capitals Tsung Chou and Ch'eng Chou. Compared to other peripheral regions of the Chou dynasty, which included some fifty to sixty *kuo* and countless chiefdoms, this region was a more tightly controlled and institutionally closely tied domain and hence was really a Chou state within the larger Chou political-territorial unit that was broadly referred to as the Chou kingdom. The larger Chou dynasty therefore included both this region and the extensive peripheral regions, with a population of over 3.5 million.⁶⁸ But with so many diverse and complex components the larger Chou dynasty was really a state of multiple constituents. On the other hand, within that Central Region a certain uniformity existed in many areas of political and institutional culture, and that uniformity under one Chou king and court induced an unexpected path of political-social-economic development, a development that actually broke down the Chou dynasty eventually and in its place gave rise to a new and different political structure.

The long Chou history of eight hundred years was the long process of the transition of this Central Region from a feudal state structure to a bureaucratic state empire. The first half saw the transition of the feudal state from full growth at its apex to the beginning of its decline; the second half transformed the failing feudal state into a new bureaucratic state. In the process, the Chou dynasty broke apart, but, unlike what happened in previous times at the end of the Hsia and Shang, the Chou dynasty was not immediately replaced. Instead, in the Chou territory the peoples and their cultures gradually became acculturated, the social system was restructured, political ideology was reframed, and the nature of political culture was fundamentally changed. While the first half of this long period was really an extension of the earlier development of the state, the second half is the subject matter of our examination.

THE IMPERIAL STATE: THE RISE OF THE BUREAUCRATIC EMPIRE IN CHUNG-KUO

The Chou dynasty lasted until 256 B.C., but it had existed virtually only in name since 403 B.C., when almost all of the structural constitutions of the Chou political culture and religious institutions created by King Wen, King Wu, and the Duke of Chou ceased to function the way they were originally designed to. In 256 B.C., a former feudal lord under the Chou, the leader of the Ch'in in the northwest, wiped out the last survivor of the Chou royal line.

That same feudal state unified China thirty-five years later, by conquering all but one feudal state in 221 B.C. (the insignificant Wei state in modern Hopei was officially eliminated in 209 B.C.). A new unified regime was established after 550 years of disunity and division—nominal from 770 to 404 B.C. and complete from 403 to 222 B.C.

Thus, we can use 770 B.C. as a line of demarcation in the long history of the Chou feudal empire. The pre-770 B.C. period, when the capital was in Hao in the west, was one of consolidation, growth, and change. The post-770 B.C. period, when the capital was moved to the eastern city of Lo-i, was one of decline, disintegration, and demise. The first period was later referred to as the Western Chou and the latter as the Eastern Chou. As a theme in the study of the political system, the Western Chou period has less interest because the period mainly saw the consolidation, expansion, and maturity of the feudal system developed in the late Shang and the beginning of the Chou. But in the Eastern Chou period, that feudal state system slowly collapsed and was gradually replaced by a centralized bureaucratic system. The Chinese political system was fundamentally transformed, and the superstructure of the new system remained in China until A.D. 1911. The development, growth, and final formulation of the framework of China's new bureaucratic system in the Eastern Chou period thus constitute the central issue in this inquiry.

While certain challenges and problems persisted within the Chou dynasty after its founding, the first critical challenge to the Chou Court developed in the 830s, about two hundred years after its founding, and the second took place in the 760s. Both led to the fall of the king—the first in 841 B.C. (King Li, r. 852(?)–841 B.C.) and the second in 771 B.C. (King Yu, r. 781–771 B.C.). Both falls were engineered by Chou nobles and feudal lords. That fact shows that the fall of the Western Chou was rooted in the internal structure of the Chou feudal state system, an intrinsic problem or weakness that was bound to cause its own demise. Unless it could maintain a powerful military force and a strong economic base, one of its lords would, as did the Chou itself, rise to challenge his overlord. And that was what happened in 771 B.C., when Lord Shen, the king's father-in-law, allied himself with the lords of Lü and Tseng and a Jung group to kill King Yu. That ended the Western Chou period.⁶⁹

When King Yu's son ascended the throne as King P'ing (r. 770–720 B.C.), he was forced to move the capital to Lo-i, as the western capital region had been lost to the many feudal lords, Jung Ti groups, and other non-Shang-Chou chiefdoms and tribes. King P'ing's royal domain now was the eastern capital region, with a much smaller area of land and population than the Chou original home base in the west; thus, he had fewer economic resources and less military manpower—in fact, less than several of the king's feudal lords in the east. From 770 B.C. onward, the king often depended on the support of these feudal lords to maintain the dignity of his court and even to ensure his own survival. Under the circumstances, the Chou king's command gradually lost its persuasiveness and authority, and the feudal lords gradually became *de facto* independent or lost their independence to other more powerful lords. The Chou feudal system was on its way to disintegration, and its formal collapse came under King Wei-

lieh (r. 425–401 B.C.) in 403 B.C., when the king broke the one single, cardinal bond of constitution by granting three illegitimate lords official recognition. Thereafter, the Chou king's status as "overlord" disappeared and different feudal lords officially declared their independence and began to use the title *wang* (king). That reduced the Chou to but one of several weak contending states until 256 B.C., when the entity of Chou, under King Nan (r. 314–256 B.C.), was finally eliminated by the Ch'in under King Chao (also known as Chao-hsiang, r. 307/306–251 B.C.), one of the Chou's former feudal lords, who took over both the Chou's former home base in the west and the domain in the east.

Reviewing the decline and fall of the Chou as the overlord in its feudal state system from 770 to 403 B.C. certainly confirms our earlier understanding that the two necessary conditions for sustaining such an overlordship are economic and military power. The "Eastern Removal" (Tung-ch'ien) by King P'ing in 770 B.C. markedly reduced the Chou superiority in both, and the Chou never recovered from that change. Its fall was sealed in that removal and the transfer to a relatively meager economic geography. It clearly indicates that the feudal state system had too narrow a base to survive as a fixed form of the state in human history; it could only serve as a bridge to the rise of the bureaucratic state, which added the third and broadest condition—the political element—to the structure of the state system.

The history of the Eastern Chou from 770 to 221 B.C. reflected and marked this change. The long period was characterized by three major developments: military action and destruction, the search for new economic resources, and the reformulation of the state system. The first resulted in losses of human life and the independence of states; the second in reforms in the land and tax systems and territorial expansion; and the third in a new class structure, reorganization of the population, and the emergence of a bureaucracy. We will now examine some characteristic cases in all the three categories of change.

In the 770s B.C., the Chou Court controlled about 1,200 *kuo* (states, chiefdoms, and so forth), but by the early 300s B.C. only about three dozen of those states survived; the others had all become the victims of annexation and war. Some contemporary sources recorded that 116 states were annexed in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C.: 35 by Ch'i, 19 by Chin, 42 by Ch'u, and 20 by Ch'in. Other sources recorded that some 104 states had earlier been removed from their original locations and later disappeared during the same period.⁷⁰ All this fundamentally altered the nature and structure of the polity of Shang-Chou China under the confederation of a feudal state system of hundreds of subordinate states with one overlord. Now only a handful of "independent" contending states were left, and all aimed to demolish the others—anticipating a China of one state only. That indeed happened only about one hundred years later, during the birth of a "one-state China" after the Ch'in conquest of all states under

Ying Cheng (260/259–210 B.C.; king of Ch'in, 247–221 B.C.; later Shih Huang-ti, the First Emperor, 221–210 B.C.), from 230 to 221 B.C., established Ch'in rule over a unified China.

Ying Cheng ruled a unified China for eleven years, from 221 to 210 B.C., and transformed it into a new system of state.⁷¹

1. He established the imperial system with the ruler, now called the *huang-ti* (emperor), as the absolute monarch. The emperor reigned over a huge, complex bureaucracy appointed on the basis of merit, evaluation, and specialization, which under a hierarchy of authority followed written rules in the form of laws and administrative handbooks and guides to govern both national and local affairs. Under the *huang-ti*, the *ch'eng-hsiang* (chancellor, prime minister, or chief minister) headed the official hierarchy of a sophisticated civil bureaucratic structure, and he was assisted by a deputy, the *ch'eng-hsiang*; the *t'ai-wei* or *kuo-wei* (grand commandant or grand general) was in charge of the huge military administration, the massive armed forces. For both the imperial institution and the administrative bureaucracy (civil and military), a new system of nomenclature—titles, terms, offices, documentary language, rituals, and court rules—was set up to govern political conduct and everyday routine.

2. He abolished the feudal system—no *kuo* (states and the like) were allowed to exist. The whole of China now was divided into administrative units of varying sizes: first the *chün* (commandery or province), then *hsien* (district), then *hsiang* (county), then *li* (wards or hundred-family units).

3. All common people (*min*) were registered as *ch'ien-shou* (the black turbaned) on a specific form. With the new identity of *ch'ien-shou*, the people of the new Ch'in empire could no longer be identified or referred to by their native region or the former feudal state, such as Ch'u-jen (a person from or of the Ch'u region or Ch'u state). They were now uniformly and universally registered and referred to as *ch'ien-shou*, the subjects of one Ch'in empire. *Ch'ien-shou* were then divided into *wu* (five-family units) and *shih* (ten-family units). Interregional or regional migrations were prohibited; travel without government-issued permits was forbidden. The Ch'in also introduced a policy of compulsory interregional relocation of populations—moving southerners to the north and northerners to the south, easterners to the west, westerners to the east, interior people to the frontiers, and vice versa. All people were thus uprooted and resettled on new land.

4. Private landownership replaced the old feudal system, and a universal land tax was instituted.

5. A universal draft system was introduced for all adult men (aged twenty to fifty-six or sixty) for at least two years of military service and for labor service of one month every year at local level (for men aged seventeen to sixty [*sui*]).

6. Written language, legal codes, currency (round copper coins—*pan-liang*), weights and measures, roads, cart sizes, and dress codes were standardized.

7. The old feudal aristocratic ranks and nobility were abolished. The only nobles in the empire were now members of the royal family. Twenty new aristocratic ranks were instituted as rewards for military merit, achievements, and contributions to the state, but they were not hereditary nor always for a lifetime. This was the new measure of social stratification.

8. A Long Wall (*ch'ang-ch'eng*, the Great Wall) was built along China's northern frontier, extending from modern North Korea to central Kansu (over three thousand miles) to define the border between the barbarian lands and the civilized nation of the Ch'in (Chinese) empire.

9. Legalism was established as the state-endorsed ideology; all other schools of thought were banned.

10. A complex administrative machinery was instituted to govern the empire under the direction of the emperor. This was a huge hierarchical bureaucracy covering both central and local governments all the way to the county level. All personnel—high and low—were appointed on the basis of merit or examinations, with a fixed period of tenure (generally three years). They carried out their highly specialized duties by following complex administrative laws and legal codes.

In essence, the new Ch'in system can be summed up as (1) depersonalizing the political action and institution, separating the personal and public issues and concerns; (2) basing power on merit, not hereditary rights, and hence transforming the old regime, which was ruled by the hereditary nobles into a new bureaucratic state that was *administered* by the “administrative elite,” following written and standardized laws and rules; (3) severing ownership of land from the connections of kinship and social station; (4) restructuring society by separating the people from the land and kinship ties; (5) making people directly governed by the state; (6) replacing the code of ethics and tradition with a code of law for both officeholders and the common people; (7) standardizing all operational and organizational systems in the empire; and (8) establishing a state-endorsed ideology.

Thus, the First Emperor (Ying Cheng) remade the China of the Shang-Chou confederation and the later Eastern Chou disunity into a unified land with one language, one legal system, one communications system, and one standardized monetary and weights and measures system—all under the superstructure of a complex bureaucracy guided by one exclusive ideology and functioning in accordance with one system of written laws and rules under the direction of an absolute ruler. The China of the Ch'in empire, Chung-kuo, entered a new stage, the “centralized bureaucratic state” in the history of the state in China.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE EVOLUTION
OF THE CHINESE STATE: CREATING AND
REINVENTING TRADITIONS

The First Emperor and advisers such as Li Ssu (280–208 B.C.) have been historically credited with creating the first centralized bureaucratic empire in Chinese history. However, almost all of the measures of unification just mentioned can be traced back to earlier times. First, as was discussed earlier, the policy of forced migration of populations went back to the beginning of the Chou dynasty. Second, the reorganization of population of a whole state started with the Ch'i (eastern state) under the Duke of Huan (r. 685–643 B.C.) and his chief minister Kuan Chung (fl. 685–645 B.C.). For military mobilization and administrative control, Ch'i then organized its entire population of 2.25 million people into *hsiang* (units of two thousand families), *lien* (two hundred families), *li* (fifty families), and *kuei* (five families) units. The system was referred to as the *hsiang-kuei* reform. It was later referred to as *pien-hu ch'i-min* (reorganization of the family system and registration of the population). Following Kuan Chung, as indicated in a recently discovered document—a set of ordinances and laws (about state institutes)—Ch'i may have instituted in the early fourth century B.C. a new administrative system of population registration and organization: *hsien* to *hsiang* (five thousand families) to *chou* (five hundred families) to *li* (fifty families), with “large *hsien*” having twenty thousand families, “middle *hsien*” having fifteen thousand, and “small *hsien*” having ten thousand. Influenced by the new state system of Ch'i, a major rival of the Ch'in state, Duke Hsien (r. 384–362 B.C.) of Ch'in began registration and reorganization of households and initiated the institution of the *wu* (five-family unit) as the basic local organizational unit in 378–375 B.C.⁷² Third, the new land distribution together with the tax system began in the state of Lu (eastern state) in 594 B.C. and was then reformed in 483 B.C. Ch'in adopted it in 408 B.C. and reformed it in 348 B.C.⁷³ Fourth, the standardization and issuance of legal codes could go back first to the ninth century B.C. under the Western Chou, then to 536 B.C. in the state of Cheng under Tzu Ch'an (ca. 580–522 B.C.), and then to the late fifth century B.C. in Li K'uei's *Fa-ching* (Book of Law) in six parts in the state of Wei.⁷⁴ Fifth, on the rise of the *chün* and *hsien* administrative system, the *hsien* system was introduced in the southern state of Ch'u in modern Hupei in the late eighth century B.C. and then in Chin (in the Central Plain region) in 589 B.C. The states of Ch'i and Ch'in and others gradually turned new conquests in other states and chiefdoms into *hsien* administrative units, but the *chün* units first appeared in 493 B.C. in the state of Chao (northern state) in 493 B.C. and was adopted by other states, such as Ch'in in 328 B.C. The term *ch'ien-shou*

probably first appeared in the late fourth century B.C. and became commonplace in the middle of the third century B.C. when Ying Cheng commenced his reign as the king of the Ch'in state. But the term had varying meanings and referents from its beginning, the most common of which referred to the common people or the people who were not of the class of the nobility. Perhaps it was from this last connotation that Ying Cheng as the emperor of the Ch'in cunningly utilized the term as an effective and powerful political device to eliminate the inherent regionalism and cultural divisiveness in his new empire.⁷⁵

Sixth, the unique military system and mystic prowess of the Ch'in army also had a long history. In ancient China up to the late seventh century B.C., Chinese society could not distinguish war (*wu*) and peace (*wen*); military affairs were part of everyday life. In such a society, as is discussed elsewhere in this book, only the ruling class, the noblemen, the majority of whom were called *shih*, could bear arms, and the art of warfare—archery and chariot driving—was part of the basic curriculum, the six arts (*liu-i*), in the education of every nobleman, along with rites, music, arithmetic, and writing. Military affairs (*jung*, warfare and related matters), along with sacrifice and rituals (*ssu*, religion), were taken as the essence of a state's noble and fundamental concerns as late as 574 B.C., for the two were the essential manifestation of the elemental structure of human life (*ming*). There existed no difference between civil and military office, as both were held by the same person. It was by such understanding that the earlier written word about warfare was considered part of *li*, the code of conduct and etiquette among the noblemen, since at the time warfare and religion, like other human activities, could be reduced to a set of principles of proper conduct. The fourth-century B.C. compilation of earlier Chou views on and rules of warfare in the Office of the Ssu-ma (Office of the Minister of Military Affairs), the *Ssu-ma Fa* (Records of the Office of the Ssu-ma), was one example. It was classified, and rightly so, in the category of *li* in the earliest Chinese bibliography in the first century B.C., although the book has been mistakenly attributed to one of the compilers whose family (clan) name happened to be Ssu-ma, Ssu-ma Jang-chü (fl. 356–320 B.C.). However, this tradition, like other important traditions of the Chou dynasty, which began in the eleventh century B.C., began to disintegrate in the late seventh century B.C. when war became a more “professional” human activity in both strategic and manpower terms: in strategic terms because the old rules of warfare were no longer observed; and in manpower terms because commoners and others were recruited to the military forces as war became more frequent and casualties drastically increased and hence depleted the traditional sources of manpower, the noblemen. In fact, the very nature of war changed. In the early Chou period, before the sixth century B.C., warfare followed a long-established protocol, with both parties informed about the date of the encounter, the bat-

tlefield formation, and relative military strength, and it was played out as a game and not as an instrument of destruction. But in that new era, after the seventh century B.C., the nature, process, and tactics of warfare all were changed—war was fought to win and destroy at any cost. As a result, specialized books and treatises on warfare, or the best strategy and stratagem with which to win a war, began to appear and then flourished. From the sixth to the end of the third century B.C., 186 such books, treatises, and tracts were compiled by as many authors or specialists. On the other hand, the most critical issue in winning power was the mobilization of manpower. From the seventh century B.C. on, the various states began to increase their military forces, breaking the long-established rule that each feudal state had a fixed number of chariots and soldiers for war under the Chou overlordship. The Chin state, for example, could only have five hundred chariots and 37,500 men when it first became a feudal state under the Chou in 678 B.C. But war and the struggle for survival forced Chin to enlarge its army in 661, 633, 629, 588, and 529 B.C., eventually reaching four thousand chariots and 300,000 men. In the process, Chin had to open military service to common men by special means of recruitment and eventually changed its old military system of noblemen only to a new universal draft system of common men in 550 B.C. Other states, such as Ch'i in the east, Ch'u and Wu and Yueh in the south, and Ch'in also started to draft or recruit commoners to fight from the seventh to the fifth century B.C. By the third century B.C., each of the contending Seven States had built up a huge army: the Ch'in army had 600,000 to 800,000 (and possibly 1 million) men, Ch'i had over 400,000, Yen had over 310,000, Ch'u had 800,000 to 1 million, Wei had over 400,000, Chao had over 450,000, and Han had over 300,000. Thus, the draft system gradually became universal among all states in the Warring States period (403–221 B.C.). Cavalry was introduced as a regular component of the armed forces of the northern and northwestern states in the late fourth century B.C., although it had made its first appearance as a fighting force long before that. But cavalry never played a major role in the military; massive numbers of infantrymen were the prime instrument of war. In the state of Chao, where it was first made a regular component in the army in 304 B.C. under King Wu-ling (r. 325–299 B.C.), the cavalry was only about 8 percent of the army in the mid-third century; in Yen, another northern state, it was about 2 percent; and in Ch'in it was 1 to 2 percent (1 percent earlier and increased to 2 percent). Thus, it was massive numbers of infantrymen conscripted through a universal draft system with a different training and education from the old system of noblemen and a different function and method of war that started to revolutionize the Chinese art of warfare and, from late Spring and Autumn period to the Warring States period, to separate the military (*wu*) from the larger society (*wen*). Although the military was not professionalized yet, even if

some soldiers were professional, the art of warfare was specialized. War became brutal, with its sole purpose that of destruction. States could not survive without adapting to the new cruel reality of struggle. Ch'in was one of the states that led the way. Starting in 364 B.C., Ch'in reorganized its military force under Duke Hsien (r. 384–362 B.C.), and its new army began to win brutal wars. In nineteen battles from 364 to 256 B.C., it killed, in various violent ways that ranged from beheading to burying alive, more than 1.723 million men in the forces of Wei, Han, Ch'u, Chao, Ch'i, and Yen. In one battle in 260 B.C., over 400,000 Chao soldiers were buried alive in a valley by the Ch'in army.⁷⁶

Seventh, the idea of an almighty *ti*, on which the title *huang-ti* (literally the “august *ti*” or the “almighty almighty *ti*” [redundant expression!]) was based—the *huang-ti* (emperor) system—was not a new creation. It was a fourth-century B.C. development. After centuries of war and destruction among the many states, at that time there grew a strong voice (really a hope) for unification of the multistate world among the intellectuals and thinkers. With Tsou Yen (305–240 B.C.) as their leader, they articulated the ideology of *wang t'ien-hsia* (to rule over the whole world, All under Heaven), which was based on the ideas of such earlier thinkers as Mo Ti (Mo Tzu, fl. 479–400 B.C.), Mencius (Meng Tzu, Meng K'o, ca. 371–289 B.C.), Shen Pu-hai (fl. 355–d. 337 B.C.), and Shang Yang (also Wei Yang, 390–338 B.C.). The new ruler of All under Heaven, then, should be titled *ti* (emperor), the title by which, according to tradition and legend, the Shang rulers and earlier semidivine or sage or mighty rulers were addressed. Later the kings of Ch'i (the great power in the east and potentially a unifier) and Ch'in (the great power in the west, which was also positioned to unify all) were the first to call themselves *ti* in 288 B.C.—King Min (r. 300–284 B.C.) of Ch'i as Tung Ti (the Eastern Emperor) and King Chao-hsiang (r. 306–251 B.C.) of Ch'in as Hsi Ti (the Western Emperor).⁷⁷ Neither of the two was able to unify China, but they established the *ti* tradition.

Eighth, the standardized written language during Ying Cheng's reign in Ch'in from 247 B.C. on was the *hsiao-chuan* (small seal) script. Although the exact origin of this writing cannot be clearly and firmly traced, it was definitely developed from the *ta-chuan* (great seal) script used in the Western Chou and Ch'un-ch'iu periods. Gradually, in the Warring States period, the Six States in the east and south began to develop their own scripts with the *ta-chuan*, but the Ch'in, being in the west and the old Chou home base, continued using the Chou script, *ta-chuan*, with gradual changes—the strokes were thinner and straighter and the general shape of character was squarer than in the *ta-chuan*. The new form of *ta-chuan* was referred to as Chou-wen (Chou script) and after further minor changes it was referred to as *hsiao-chuan* (small seal) script after Ying Cheng's unification of China in 221 B.C. Shang Yang's reforms in the mid-fourth century B.C. made no reference to standardizing scripts, which

means that the Ch'in state was already using only one written language and no such reform was necessary at all. In fact, a bronze square measure, a *sheng* (a pint, with a capacity of 202.15 cm³), dated 344 B.C. (the eighteenth year of Duke Hsiao's reign, 361–338 B.C.), has the inscriptions of 344 and 221 B.C. The former is a text about the capacity of this *sheng* and the occasion for which it was made—as part of Shang Yang's law for standardization of weights and measures. The latter was the famous edict of Shih Huang-ti that ordered the standardization of weights and measures throughout the newly unified empire. The scripts in both inscriptions show very little difference. Clearly the small seal script was already in use in Shang Yang's time.⁷⁸ The recent archaeological discovery of a decree by the Ch'in king Wu (r. 310/311–307 B.C.) in Ch'ing-ch'uan in Szechwan further indicates that in 309 B.C., only thirty years after Shang Yang's death in 338 B.C., the small seal script had already become the standard written language in official documents. Up to the time of Shih Huang-ti, these scripts underwent few basic changes. To prove this, one need only compare these writings to those inscribed on the various instruments of weights and measures that the First Emperor decreed to be the standard units in 221 B.C.⁷⁹

Ninth, the office of the *ch'eng-hsiang* (chancellor) was instituted in Ch'in by King Wu in the second year of his reign, 309 B.C. Under the supreme rule of the king, the chancellor headed the entire official hierarchy, a symbol of the centralization of political and administrative power under the sovereign. It marked the end of the collective leadership system under a ruler, a common practice in the Eastern Chou period.⁸⁰

Tenth, the most comprehensive blueprint for Ying Cheng's measures of unification for a centralized bureaucratic empire came from his own state, the historic Shang Yang Reform under Duke Hsiao of Ch'in. In 359–340 B.C., Shang Yang instituted the most drastic reforms at the time in the Ch'in state. They included the following measures.⁸¹

1. Abolition of the feudal system in the state.
2. Institution of a political system with a universal administrative hierarchy of central and local governmental structures filled with personnel appointed on the basis of merit and for high-ranking positions with a limited tenure and other restrictions.
3. Establishment of the *hsien* (later *chün*) system (now thirty-one *hsien* only) in the entire state as the highest local administrative units.
4. Introduction of private landownership.
5. Reorganization and registration of the population by five-family (*wu*) and ten-family (*shih*) units.
6. Establishment of the “collective responsibility” system (*lien-tso*). In

essence, it ordered the members of a *wu* unit to spy on one another. If one knew that someone had committed a crime and did not report him, he received the same punishment; if he reported the crime, he was given half of the criminal's estate and possessions or special rewards.

7. Prohibition of local, domestic, and external travel without government approval.
8. Standardization of legal codes, weights and measures.
9. Elimination of the old aristocratic ranks. Only military exploits were rewarded with special ranks in twenty orders, and with each rank a certain amount of land (for both production and residence) was granted (*ming t'ien chai*).
10. Establishment of farming as the "primary occupation" (*pen-yeh*) and commerce as a "nonessential" occupation (*mo-yeh*), with the former being "valued" in society and the latter registered as "mean." People in these occupations were treated accordingly by law.
11. Discouragement of large households. Adult or married children living with their parents were required to pay a double tax.
12. Banning and burning of writings such as the *Shih* (Book of Poetry) and *Shu* (Book of History), which contained views that possibly contradicted the reforms and new laws.
13. Introduction of a decree that all legal and administrative rules must be written and standardized to ensure their continuity and universality.

These reforms became permanent in the state of Ch'in after the time of Duke Hsiao and Shang Yang. Moreover, the next Ch'in ruler, King Hui (also known as Hui-wen, r. 338–311 B.C.), made round copper coins—*pan-liang* (half-ounce or half-*liang* coins containing 7.625 grams of copper)—the standardized currency for the entire state in 318 B.C.⁸² That, too, became a permanent feature of the state system of the Ch'in. In A.D. 1979–80, in a tomb in Ch'ing-ch'uan District in Szechwan Province dated to 306 B.C., a Ch'in "land law" (*t'ien-lü*) written on a wooden strip and *pan-liang* coins were discovered. Since it was in 316 B.C. that the Ch'in conquered the Shu region (mainly in modern western Szechwan) and imported ten thousand families (about fifty thousand persons) to develop the new land, this helps prove that a new land law was decreed in the second year of King Wu of the Ch'in (309 B.C.), which served as a revision of one of the land laws in Shang Yang's reforms, and that the *pan-liang* coins were minted locally based on King Hui's new system of coinage, instituted in 318 B.C. It also reveals that following a military conquest the Ch'in customarily imposed its new state system on its new land and brought in massive numbers of

immigrants. Thus, by the time of the Ch'in unification of the Warring States, China had already begun standardizing its currency and land system under King Hui, and its state system was the one framed and implemented by the Ch'in, although the king ordered Shang Yang's death in 338 B.C.⁸³ As outlined earlier, Shang Yang's state system brought forth the complete formation of the centralized bureaucratic state to replace the old Chou feudal order. The details of its construction were not fully recorded in ancient and contemporary authentic literary texts, and hence the magnitude and the actual administration and effectiveness of Shang Yang's reforms, and even the event itself, was long open to question. In December 1975, critical parts of the Ch'in Codes were unearthed in a tomb dated 217 B.C. in modern Shui-hu-ti of Yun-meng District in Hupei Province. Written on over 581 bamboo tablets, these include Ch'in civil, criminal, administrative, military, land, currency, business, granary, prison, and trial laws. Most important, internal evidence has proved that they include Shang Yang's original articles of reform in all twelve categories and later interpretations of these articles after Shang Yang's time. These legal, administrative, social, and military rules show the minute details of Shang Yang's reform schemes and the meticulously crafted measures to enforce them, which by themselves certainly assured Shang Yang's effectiveness and success in reframing the Ch'in state system and reconstituting Ch'in society as a whole. Yun-meng was in the territory of Nan *chün*, which King Chao (also known as Chao-hsiang, r. 306/307–251 B.C.) of Ch'in established in 278 B.C. after his military conquered the land from the state of Ch'u in the south. It also reveals that the Ch'in imposed its state system over a region of new conquest.⁸⁴

Shang Yang's reforms are a complex set of policies that aimed to reconstitute the Ch'in state, society, and interpersonal relationships. They all were rationally framed, clearly written, and forcefully declared in legal articles, which as a whole are equivalent to what we call a constitution in modern times. It is truly a body of legally conceptualized, cardinal principles with which to control the decisions, conduct, and actions of the state, society, and the individual in the state of Ch'in. It was referred to as *fa* or *ta-fa* as defined by Han Fei (280?–233 B.C.).⁸⁵ The *fa* in this construct was the instrument of a charismatic ruler who wished to transform the feudal state into a centralized bureaucratic state capable of creating various means or techniques (*shu*) to engender the most effective administrative system to organize and mobilize economic resources and military manpower (*fu-kuo ch'iang-ping*). The final goal of such a state system, then, to Shang Yang and ultimately Duke Hsiao, was to conquer the other Six States and unify All under Heaven. In this, Shang Yang's new *fa* gradually but firmly succeeded. In the five reigns before Ying Cheng after Shang Yang's death (338–247 B.C.), the Ch'in seized land from seven states—Chou, Pa, Shu, Han, Chao, Wei, and Ch'u—and established at least twelve *chün*. The

Ch'in land encompassed either part or the whole of modern Shensi, Kansu, Shansi, Honan, Szechwan, Hunan, Hupei, and Ning-hsia provinces. The Ch'in imposed Shang Yang's new state system in all its territories and in most cases removed the local natives to a Ch'in-controlled region and brought in Ch'in people to populate and develop the new land. Ying Cheng ascended the throne in 247 B.C., following the death of his father, King Chuang-hsiang (r. 249–247 B.C.). In the next 25 years, the Ch'in systematically conquered the six contending states—Han, Chao, Wei, Ch'u, Yen, and Ch'i—and set up twenty-three new *chün* by extending its territory over Suiyuan, Jehol, Chahar, Shantung, Kiangsu, Anhwei, Chekiang, Fukien, Kiangsi, Liaoning, and the Liaotung region. Since these new *chün* were established over an extended period, never more than five *chün* in one year, the Ch'in had enough time to impose its state system over the new land and complete the removal of natives and importation of Ch'in people. Thus, by the time King Cheng (Ying Cheng) unified all of China in thirty-six *chün* under the Ch'in empire, the Ch'in state system—Shang Yang's "constitution" and changes and additions made by later rulers such as Kings Hui, Wu, and Chao before King Cheng—was in place at the same time in all the land under Ch'in control.⁸⁶ Ch'in officials and generals were sent to govern and protect the new lands. In the 117 years from 338 to 221 B.C., Shang Yang's reforms with later additions and revisions had led to the unification of China as an empire with one legal system, one language, one land, and one nation under one centralized bureaucratic imperial system under the control of one charismatic, all-powerful emperor (*huang-ti*). This was China's first centralized bureaucratic empire.

It is clear from the preceding discussions that the First Emperor did not *create* the new Chinese empire and state system under the advisers such as Li Ssu. Both issues have commanded persistent and exclusive followings since the end of the Ch'in dynasty in 206 B.C. But viewed from the vantage point of the *longue durée* of the Chinese empire, Ying Cheng was indeed the "unifier" of China after the long division in the Eastern Chou. First, it is true that at the time of Ying Cheng's ascension to the throne in the state of Ch'in in 247 B.C. the Ch'in already controlled one-third of the later unified Ch'in empire, fourteen of the thirty-six *chün* in 221 B.C. But twenty-two *chün* were added by Ying Cheng through military conquest from 247 to 221 B.C. The new *chün* cover the land extending from Hopei and Honan to the eastern coast (by the Yellow Sea) and northern Korea and from Hupei, Hunan, and Szechwan to the east coast (by the East Sea) covering modern Anhui, Kiangsi, Kiangsu, Chekiang, and northern Fukien. In addition, in 215–214 B.C. Shih huang-ti sent more than three hundred thousand troops to seize the Hsiung-nu land in modern Ning-hsia, Suiyuan, and the Jung land in the west and set up forty-four new districts (*ch'u-hsien*) under Chiu-yuan *chün*.⁸⁷ In 221 B.C., he sent five hundred thou-

sand troops under Commander T'u Sui to conquer the remaining forces of the Yueh in the south—from southern Fukien to Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and northern Vietnam. But the expedition achieved only limited success: they reached southern Fukien, took over P'an-yü (modern Kwangchow), and controlled Kuei-lin (modern Kuei-lin in Kwangsi) but failed to reach northern Vietnam as originally planned. Sometime after 219 B.C., the Ch'in army suffered a devastating defeat in a surprise Yueh attack, and its commander, T'u Sui, was killed. But at the time Shih Huang-ti's attention was on the further consolidation and development of north China against possible attack by the rising Hsiung-nu forces under Tou-man *Shan-yü* (?–d. 209 B.C.) on the Ch'in northern border, he did not launch a new expedition to the south as the Ch'in army temporarily withheld their forward march to southern Kwangsi and northern Vietnam. Then in 214 B.C. the emperor sent large reinforcements together under the command of Jen Hsiao and Chao T'uo (under Jen Hsiao) with desperadoes, men who were married to their wives' households, and traders; and the Ch'in army finally conquered these regions and set up three *chün*.⁸⁸ Thus the Ch'in empire's territory now extended in the north to the north of the Ordos region over the Yellow River bend and in the south to the coast of the South Sea and northern Vietnam (slightly over Hanoi in the south). The total added by Ying Cheng in the first 34 years of his reign amounted to the eastern two thirds, in twenty-six *chün*, of the Ch'in empire. Contemporary records and recent archaeological discoveries also indicate that after each conquest Shih Huang-ti underwent traditional Ch'in population removals and imposed the Ch'in state system over the new land.⁸⁹ Thus Shih Huang-ti unified the China of his time in a physical sense and imposed the extended Ch'in state system to the entire nation as it was defined above—from the Gobi Desert in the north to the South Sea and Vietnam in the south and from the East Sea and Korea in the east to the Yellow River bend and the foot of the Tibetan Plateau in the west, over a territory of 1.95 to 2 million square miles.⁹⁰ Thus, as the ruler of the newly unified China, Shih Huang-ti had transformed the nation with a new political system, a centralized bureaucratic state, as Shang Yang did to the state of Ch'in more than 120 years earlier.

To consolidate the transformation, Shih Huang-ti took up several measures in postunification Ch'in China, the Ch'in empire. First, he continued to employ the long-established "population removal" policy as a means of political control. From 221 to 213 B.C., based on the records with approximate numbers only, he removed over 2.3 million people to populate new political centers and territorial acquisitions, to reduce likelihood of regional uprisings against the regime, and to punish those who did not adopt the centralized state system. For example, in 221 B.C. the emperor removed 120,000 households of "magnates" from the old strongholds of the conquered Six States to the capital region to

eliminate their potential for revolt on one hand and to transfer their wealth to the control of the central government on the other. Second, the emperor ordered that an extensive communications network be set up, which required the removal of physical and other man-made obstructions such as walls (local “great walls”), canals, and large moats, so as to facilitate the Imperial Court’s control and expedite the process of empirewide communication, thereby strengthening the means of centralization and reducing the growth of local power in isolated regions. The major projects of these concerns were four.

1. Massive building of imperial highways (*chih-tao*, *ch’ih-tao*) of uniform size connecting all key political, economic, and military centers in the empire. Such highways ranged from main (imperial and military) trunk roads, which were 69.0 meters wide and lined with trees and protective outer walls, to numerous secondary roads, which were 34.5 meters wide, and countless lesser roads, which were 11.5 meters wide. The main imperial highways extended from the hub at the imperial capital of Hsien-yang (northwest of modern Sian in Shensi) westward to central Kansu; eastward to the coastal regions by the Po Sea, Yellow Sea, and East Sea; northward to modern Inner Mongolia and northern Korea near modern Pyongyang; and southward to the coast of the South Sea—Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and northern Vietnam. These major imperial highways alone totaled over 5,200 miles in length. The secondary links branched out from these main roads to cities of lesser strategic and economic importance, and lesser roads further fanned out to reach such remote frontier regions as those in modern Kueichow and Yunnan. The Ch’in empire of 2 million square miles was thus bound together as one region by this enormous communications network.

2. Standardization of the size of carts and other means of transportation (1.92 meters wide for all carts). Thus, the transportation system was unified throughout the whole empire.

3. Post stations or stations called *yu*, *chuan* (*chih*), and *t’ing* (larger ones called *tu-t’ing*) along the highways to facilitate communication and travel. These stations in varying sizes were set up at a fixed distance—2.6, 5.2, 8.0, 13.0, and 20.0 miles between each, depending on the size, function, and location—along the major and secondary roads and provided lodging, food, and transportation by means of horses, carts, and donkeys.

4. The complete destruction of the numerous regional “great walls,” canals, and moats constructed by the defunct Six States as local protective and defensive measures to impede enemy attacks and obstruct the movement of hostile troops.

Third, the emperor ordered that all privately owned weapons be collected and transported to the seat of the central government and that the populace henceforth be prohibited from possessing arms of any kind. Fourth, the emperor decreed that standardized currency (the *pan-liang* money) and weights and mea-

asures be used in all transactions and in everyday life throughout the entire empire. The instruments of measurement were inscribed with Shih Huang-ti's edict of 221 B.C. ordering that all weights and measures be standardized. After the death of the emperor, his successor, Erh-shih (the Second Emperor, r. 210–207 B.C.), issued an edict in 209 B.C. reiterating the First Emperor's edict of standardization and ordering the local officials to inscribe his edict on all such instruments for measurement alongside the original edict of the First Emperor. Numerous such instruments have been unearthed in various regions of China, from modern Inner Mongolia, Jehol, Chahar, Liaoning, and Chilin, in the north to Chekiang and Kwangtung in the south and from Kansu and Szechwan in the west to the seacoast in Shantung in the east. A comparison of the capacity of these instruments with that of the known standardized instruments of Shang Yang shows that they are identical. It has also been found that the *pan-liang* money found in the Ch'ing-ch'uan tomb of 306 B.C. and the *pan-liang* coins of Shih Huang-ti's time are identical in both form and weight. Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that the standardized weights, measures, and currency in the unified Ch'in empire all followed the earlier system in the state of Ch'in instituted by Shang Yang and the kings Hui and Wu in the fourth century B.C. In some cases, the instruments devised by Shang Yang actually continued in use in the Ch'in empire after 222 B.C., and some had both the First Emperor's and the Second Emperor's edicts inscribed on them. The bronze square *sheng* of 343 B.C., mentioned earlier, is a telling example.⁹¹

To personally assess the success and practice of the Ch'in state system in the many regions outside the capital domain, the First Emperor made regular tours to distant regions during his reign of eleven years (221–210 B.C.): in 220, 219, 218, 215, and 210. His five grand inspection tours took him to Kansu, Szechwan, Honan (twice), Shantung (three times), Hunan (two times), Hupei (two times), Kiangsu (two times), Kiangsi, Anhui, Chekiang, Shansi, Suiyuan, Chahar, Jehol, and Hopei (two times), where he died on the road in 210 B.C. In the south, he ascended the mystic K'uai-chi Mountain (south of Shao-hsing, Chekiang); in the north he reached the top of the Sacred T'ai Mountain (in east-central Shantung) and performed sacrifices to the gods (spirits) of all these legendary sacred mountains. He also ascended Mount I (in southern Shantung), a sacred mountain of lesser status. Three times his tours led him to the coasts of the modern Po Sea and Yellow Sea in Hopei and Shantung at Chieh-shih (in eastern Hopei) and Lang-ya (in eastern Shantung by the Yellow Sea). At the three sacred mountains—T'ai, K'uai-chi, and I—and the two landmarks that symbolized the Ch'in empire's metaphoric boundaries at the East Sea coastline, Chieh-shih and Lang-ya, he ordered that stone monuments be set up and inscribed with edicts iterating his historical achievements, his great measures of unification, his ideals for new social and moral orders, and his policy of

agricultural supremacy. From all this and the magnitude and status of local officials' involvement in these grand inspection tours, two of which were so grand that they included all the high-ranking court officials and important family members, so that the whole entourage resembled a mobile palace, it was clear that the Ch'in state and administrative systems were thoroughly established in all regions that the emperor had inspected them or at least passed through.⁹²

Another significant development under the First Emperor had unexpectedly strengthened the bond of the people in the Ch'in empire as one nation. These were the military campaigns and related projects such as the building of the Ch'ang-ch'eng (Great Wall). In the two grand military campaigns under the First Emperor, more than nine hundred thousand troops were mobilized: three hundred thousand in the campaigns against the Hsiung-nu in the north from 215 to 214 B.C. and about six hundred thousand in the campaigns against the Yueh in the south from 214 to 213 B.C. All of these soldiers were draftees, mostly mean people and convicts from almost all regions of the empire. When they were fighting and their lives were bound together, their cultural, regional, ethnic, and historical identities would give way to the common identity of Ch'in soldiers fighting for survival in face of fearful and ferocious common enemies. They were no longer southerners, northerners, Ch'u men, Ch'i men, Pa men, Chao men, and so forth; they were just soldiers of the Ch'in empire or comrades whose individual fates and futures were linked. They were of one nation under one commander fighting to survive. Regionalism, ethnicity, race, and culture were all sublimed under the large mark of a new national identity, the Ch'in nation, commonly referred to as Ch'in-jen (Ch'in people) at the time.

Similar conditions faced the people who were drafted from all the regions and ethnic groups to build the Great Wall. Traditional and modern views have long held that the Ch'in Great Wall built under Shih Huang-ti was mainly the work of connecting earlier walls built by the Ch'in under King Chao and by the kings of the Chao and Yen states (mostly the Chao king Wu-ling; and the Yen king Chao, r. 311–279 B.C.) before the Ch'in unification in 221 B.C., and that it was not a project as difficult as it has been in the imaginations of historians and common appreciators. And it was thought or misunderstood to have taken only a little over two years to complete, from 214 to 213 B.C. Recent studies and field investigations have shown that the Great Wall built under Shih Huang-ti indeed begins in Min-hsien in central Kansu (Lin-t'ao in Ch'in times) and that this part was built over walls constructed earlier by King Chao of Ch'in. But as it went northward to the Yellow River region, the Great Wall did not follow the old Ch'in walls to the northeast into Shensi and Shansi but turned northward along the T'ao River to the Lanchow area (in central Kansu)

and along the Yellow River northward through the Ordos region and passing through eastern Ninghsia all the way to the north of the Yellow River bend to the modern Lang-shan region in western Suiyuan and then turned eastward, passing north of modern Ku-yang, Wu-ch'uan, and T'ao-lin in central and eastern Suiyuan; K'ai-p'ing and Tuo-lun in eastern Chahar; Wei-ch'ang, Ch'ih-feng, and Hsiao-yen-ho in central Jehol; Ch'ang-t'u in southern Liao-pei; Huai-tien in southern Kirin; turned southward to Lin-chiang in southern Antung on the border with Korea; and finally crossed the Yalu River (Ma-tzu River in Ch'in and Han times) southward to the east of modern Pyongyang and ended at Mount Chieh-shih of Sui-ch'eng south of Pyongyang. With the exception of a few short segments, the line of the Ch'in Great Wall is much farther north than the old Chao and Yen walls, in some areas as far north as two or three hundred miles. The total length of the wall is over 3,100 miles (in Han times it was generally but incorrectly referred to as being over 10,000 Ch'in *li*). It is true that the building of the Great Wall began in 214 B.C., but, contrary to common understanding, it was not completed until after Shih huang-ti's death. A comparison of the remains of the Ch'in wall and those of the Ming Great Wall, which was mostly built in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries A.D. in Kansu, clearly shows that the Ch'in wall was much grander in both size and structure. Some remains of the Ch'in wall, based on my own investigations, are still over 4.50 meters (14.63 feet) high while the remains of the Ming walls are much lower, about 1.00 meter high on average. Judging from its magnitude and length, it has been variously estimated that the construction of the Great Wall under Shih huang-ti from 214 B.C. to 210 B.C. employed at least 1.0 to 1.5 million men. It is also recorded that these Ch'in Great Wall builders came from different regions, social and cultural backgrounds, and ethnic and racial origins under the huge new empire.⁹³ But as they worked in teams to construct their assigned segments and meet fixed deadlines, they labored together with a common goal regardless of their diverse backgrounds. Thus, the special circumstances of time and environment bound these men together as comrades without consideration of their own geographic, cultural, and ethnic differences. As a result, a sense of national identity grew unexpectedly among them as they lived and worked together. Thus, for the military campaigns in both north and south and the building of the Great Wall, a total of 1.9 million men were engaged under Shih huang-ti. In addition, one Han dynasty source indicates that another 200,000 men were sent to guard the Great Wall against the Hsiung-nu, probably stationed on the eastern sections.⁹⁴ The total would then have been 2.1 million men.

Shih huang-ti, as mentioned earlier, also moved a huge number of people to populate the southern and northern frontier regions, land acquired through military campaigns from the Hsiung-nu and the Yueh, respectively. To colonize the

forty-four *hsien* (districts) in the Ordos region, about 320,000 people were moved from the interior and other regions under the system used by the Ch'in to populate similar "newly established districts" (*ch'u-hsien*). In 211 B.C., 150,000 people from the interior were moved to Yü-chung and Pei-ho (northern Ordos and north over the Yellow River bend in modern west-central Suiyuan). To the south, in three compulsory migrations from 213 B.C. to 210 B.C., over 600,000 people from the interior were moved to settle in the Yueh land and mixed with the Yueh people.⁹⁵ Thus, from 213 to 210 B.C., Shih Huang-ti moved 470,000 people to consolidate the northern frontiers and over 600,000 to colonize the southern frontier regions, a total of 1,070,000. These people were from various regions and had diverse social, economic, cultural, ethnic, and racial backgrounds, from rich to poor and from convicts and dismissed officials to free commoners. These new immigrants or colonists also faced a new world in a new land and urgently felt the need to be bound together voluntarily or involuntarily for survival. In the process, they formed a new "we-group" national consciousness regardless of their original backgrounds and origins.

If we add up all the Ch'in troops and colonists and immigrants in both north and south, the total is 3.17 million. This is a significant segment of the Ch'in population, whose life experience extended from that of a small region to an empirewide world of national consciousness. The Ch'in regime was to collapse in a few years, and a large number of these men and women would not even live to see that happen, but the new national consciousness forged by the survivors would remain. Since these people were the most physically and mentally active of the time, many of them were to become leaders after the fall of the Ch'in and in early Han China. The unintended Ch'in legacy of a new national consciousness could be part of the reason why Han China remained a unified nation instead of reverting to a decentralized feudal state.

In the end, Shih Huang-ti's military conquests in the south and the north, the building of the Great Wall, and the massive population removals to the new frontier regions all defined the borders of the new Ch'in empire. They did so by directly transforming the frontier into a land of Ch'in people from the interior, no longer the land of the non-Ch'in people. In the north, the 1.97 million immigrants from the interior formed a new frontier line of Ch'in colonists, and this was also the case with the 1.2 million new immigrants in the south, who turned the land of the Yueh people into the land of the Ch'in people and made the original natives a minority under the control of the newcomers. Thus, the Ch'in empire's four new boundaries were the East Sea in the east, the western part of the Yellow River bend in the west—two borders already defined by the Ch'in unification in 221 B.C.—and the northern and southern borders newly formed by the massive immigration from 215 to 213 B.C. Within the four borders, as discussed earlier, the entire population of the Ch'in empire had already

gone through extensive relocations during the Ch'in conquest. In a way, almost every region was populated by some new immigrants, and every person was either an uprooted immigrant or lived with strangers. The uprooting was so thorough that the Ch'in government had to let the people claim their own land in their new home regions from 216 B.C. on to avoid having the land go unattended and become barren.⁹⁶ In addition, there were over a million convicts of different status under the control of the central government in the capital region. They were naturally uprooted, too.⁹⁷ Thus, by uprooting and moving the people of the new empire, Shih Huang-ti and his ancestors made almost the entire population of the former seven contending states lose their original racial, ethnic, geographic, cultural, social, or linguistic identities and assume a new national identity, that of the Ch'in nation. And they were ruled and governed by the Ch'in state system of *chün-hsien* that had been formulated and developed from the days of Lord Shang Yang to the reign of Shih Huang-ti. A unified new land was defined, a new nation was molded and forged, a new centralized bureaucratic empire was created, and a new state system was put into practice in all corners of the new empire from the East Sea coast to the Yellow River bend and from the southern edge of the Gobi Desert to the South Sea coast.

The Ch'in empire so defined was not created by Ying Cheng in 221 B.C., nor by another individual or individuals in a year or a short period. It was gradually built by the five Ch'in rulers and their advisers from 359 to 247 B.C. and then completed under Ying Cheng's reign from 247 to 213 B.C. When Ying Cheng came to the throne in 247 B.C., the Ch'in already controlled a domain of fourteen *chün* with a territory extending from Kansu in the west to Honan in the east and from Shansi and the Yellow River bend in the north to Szechwan, Hupei, and Hunan in the south. Then from 247 to 234 B.C. Ying Cheng added three more *chün* to that empire, extending its new boundary to Hopei, western Shantung, Suiyuan, Jehol, and Chahar. The Ch'in now controlled two-thirds of the later Ch'in unified empire. Since the Ch'in state imposed its centralized bureaucratic system in all of its new conquests, the Ch'in empire of 234 B.C. had been operating under this system for the past 110 years or so. As a result of the grand conquest of the Six States from 230 to 221 B.C., nineteen *chün* were set up, but they actually covered only the land of eastern Shantung, Kiangsu, Anhui, Chekiang, and northern Fukien. Thus, of the thirty-six *chün* of the Ch'in empire in 221 B.C., only the five regions just mentioned had experienced the Ch'in centralized bureaucratic system for less than ten years. Still, as evidenced by the First Emperor's extended inspection tours in all of these regions in 215–210 B.C., even these regions had thoroughly implemented the Ch'in state system. Furthermore, the political careers of Han founders such as Liu Pang, Hsiao Ho (ca. 238–193 B.C.), and Ts'ao Ts'an (ca. 236–190 B.C.) clearly

reflected the Ch'in bureaucratic system as it was practiced in these regions. Liu Pang, the future founder of the Han dynasty, and Hsiao Ho and Ts'ao, the first two Han chancellors (*ch'eng-hsiang*) under Liu Pang and his son (Emperor Hui, r. 195–188 B.C.), took the “examinations” for law and administration and then were appointed as low-ranking officers: police chief for Liu, clerk for Hsiao, and warden for Ts'ao. All three men went through the same level of examination as did the official Hsi in 246 B.C., as was recorded in the Yun-meng bamboo documents dated 217 B.C. that were unearthed in Hsi's tomb in 1975.⁹⁸

The regions that spent the least time under Ch'in rule were in the three *chün* that extended from the land of the Yueh in the far south to the coastline by the South Sea. They were Nan-hai, Kuei-lin, and Hsiang *chün* in modern southern Fukien, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and northern Vietnam. Established in 214 B.C., the three *chün* were under Ch'in rule for only about four years when the First Emperor died in 210 B.C. Naturally the actual implementation of the Ch'in state system in these regions is in question. But the recent opening in 1983 of the mausoleum of 122–120 B.C. of the second king of Nan-yueh (South Yueh) provided a huge amount of official documents and bronze, ceramic, lacquer, wood, silk, glass, and stone artifacts and articles dating to the time of Chao T'uo (ca. 239–137 B.C.), one of the three commanders who led the Ch'in army that conquered the region in 214 B.C. He remained there as magistrate of Lung-ch'uan District (*hsien* in modern northeast Kwangtung) and then was appointed in 209 B.C. the chief commandant (*tu-wei*) of Nan-hai *chün* in charge of all affairs. He enthroned himself as the emperor of Nan-yueh in 203 B.C. These documents and other materials have provided details of the administrative apparatus and organization of the local bureaucratic system and everyday life, all of which clearly show that the Ch'in state system, together with the language, weights and measures, and road systems (*hsin-tao*), all had been thoroughly implemented and practiced in the Nan-yueh region.⁹⁹

With the last question resolved, it can be firmly concluded that the Ch'in empire from 221 to 207 B.C. was a centralized bureaucratic state from central to local governments throughout the entire empire. But that state system had taken more than 140 years to develop to maturity and to expand to all regions of the China under the rule of the Ch'in dynasty, with Ying Cheng as its first sovereign ruler (*huang-ti*). Thus, Ying Cheng, and his advisers such as Li Ssu, Wang Wan, and Wang Pen for that matter, were never the creators or inventors of a centralized bureaucratic state system in China, as almost all historians and scholars (especially political essayists) have argued and debated since the fall of the Ch'in dynasty in 207 B.C. Ying Cheng did unify China physically in that he added one-third of the traditionally perceived Chinese territory controlled by the six independent states to a unified domain under one ruling regime, the house of Ch'in at this time as the successor to the house of Chou,

and he extended the Ch'in state system to that new one-third of the Ch'in empire, commonly referred to by Ying Cheng as T'ien-hsia (All under Heaven) in his edicts. As the *huang-ti* of T'ien-hsia, however, he succeeded in adding more land to it with the military conquest of the Nan-yueh in the south and the defeat of the Hsiung-nu in the north. He also initiated several critical measures intended to strengthen the political centralization and efficiency of the empire's bureaucratic system. Originally only a defense measure against the Hsiung-nu attacks, his Great Wall actually served to define the territorial boundary of his T'ien-hsia. For the first time in Chinese history, the real boundary of China as defined by a dynasty or ruling house matched the metaphoric boundary of China, T'ien-hsia, in political and rhetorical writings. The Great Wall, extending over 3,100 miles, marked the perceived dividing line between agricultural civilization and nomadic barbarism. And, as discussed earlier, there developed a new national identity for all the people who lived in the land south of the wall, north of the South Sea, and west of the East Sea. China under the reign of the First Emperor was thus its first centralized bureaucratic empire, with one nation, one language, one unified land, and one exclusive ideological belief system (Legalism).

In the long historical perspective of the state in early China, the Ch'in system was a revolution. It represented a drastic change in both political philosophy and organizational structure. But, contrary to its commonly assumed connotation, this revolution did not come suddenly, since it involved the gradual formulation and reconstitution of the established paradigm of the subject in question. As discussed earlier, the basic philosophy and fundamental elements of the new Ch'in paradigm came from the political, social, and military changes that occurred during the long Eastern Chou period from 770 to 360 B.C. when Shang Yang's reforms began.¹⁰⁰ Then that paradigm, first formulated by Shang Yang, still took another hundred years of evolution—revisions and additions—to reach the stage of full implementation throughout the Chinese empire. The revolution was then complete, and so was the transformation of China from a feudal to a centralized bureaucratic state.

The revolution not only brought about a new system of governance, but it redefined the very nature of the state. The feudal Chou regime ruled its kingdom by virtue of tradition, institutions, and military power. Its goal was to sustain the continuity of its own rule, that is, the longevity of the Mandate of Heaven (T'ien-ming); its means of reaching that end was to maintain or expand its tradition-sanctioned power; and its mechanism to do both was its inherited, long-established institutions. This enterprise concerned only a small segment of the population—the Chou ruler, the royal house, the leading and lesser feudal lords, and the nobility—and paid no attention to the mass of commoners and other lower classes because these people did not have economic


power (being attached to the lords' land without owning any), intellectual power (no right to receive education or other technical training), or the power of the sword (they were forbidden to bear arms). In this situation, the state existed for only a very small segment of the population. And its cardinal concerns were in essence only religion (*ssu*) and the military (*jun*).¹⁰¹ This was a state without a people. There was no governance but only rule by long-established tradition and the code of conduct defined by the royal clan and its supporting nobles. In short, it was a state without a true political administration.¹⁰² On the other hand, it is true that the Ch'in state system at its full development under Shih huang-ti also functioned by means of tradition and inherited power, but the old apparatus of ruling—the institutional structure—was transformed through rationalization and reinvention into a complex administrative system operated with salaried bureaucrats selected by merit and other nonhereditary means. In addition, the new bureaucratic system was constructed on the principle of the division of labor (hierarchy), guided by written technical rules and norms and filled with officeholders regulated by fixed tenure and periodical evaluations. The head of the entire state system was the *huang-ti* (emperor), the sovereign ruler, whose position was hereditary in normal succession or won through military or nonmilitary means. Thus, the failure or success, or the continuation or breakup, of a dynasty depended on the efficiency of the administrative apparatus in meeting the needs and concerns of all the people in the regime's domain, even if the dynasty's fate was nominally or ideologically dependent on the presumed blessing of a supernatural being from above—the Mandate of Heaven. But the domain of the people under the new system was drastically different from that under a feudal state. It included not only a smaller group of nobility and people with high social status but the masses (commoners and members of the other lower classes) because they now could own land, bear arms, receive education, enjoy mobility (both social and geographic), and become officeholders. The masses had gained such privileges as the old feudal order gradually disintegrated from the seventh to the third centuries B.C. The long process of the crumbling of the Chou feudal system was characteristically marked by Kuan Chung's reforms in the state of Ch'i, the waves of reforms in all the states (Ch'in, Ch'u, Yen, Wei, Chao, Yen, Wu, Yueh, and others) thereafter, and the Ch'in reforms introduced by Duke Hsiao and Lord Shang Yang, later Ch'in rulers, and finally Ying Cheng himself.¹⁰³ Furthermore, in order to maintain order and stability, another crucial factor that could affect the fate of a dynasty, a ruler must keep strict control over his state by means of a strong military force and an effective civil bureaucracy. To do this, he would need unusual personal charisma above his inherited position as *huang-ti* or *wang* (king) or the presumed Mandate of Heaven. Thus, the new state—the centralized bureaucratic state—manifested a very different superstructure than did the

feudal one. Mencius defined the state as an entity composed of a ruler (of different categories) as head, land (*t'u-ti*), people (*jen-min*, of all classes and status), and administration (*cheng-shih*, both civil and military).¹⁰⁴ Such a view definitely reflected the new significance of the royal leadership, the critical role of an administrative structure in a state, and, most important, the growth of the power of the masses. At times, Mencius even placed the importance of the people above that of the land or even the ruler.¹⁰⁵ The last point is the core of this revolutionary reformation of the paradigm of the state in Chinese history. As the common people came to be valued even higher than Heaven, they became the most important element of the state. Ruling, then, was no longer just for the sake of prolonging one dynasty's rule; it was now a complex art of governance—skillful and balanced administration of competing interests, diverse life concerns, conflicting ambitions, and disparate sacred and profane demands between the rulers and the ruled in the state.¹⁰⁶ This condition resulted in a revolutionary change in the very nature of the state and hence the birth and full development of the centralized bureaucratic state, which in this study is collectively referred to as the Ch'in state system. The components of that system were not all born in the state of Ch'in, but they gained full development in a form of holistic synthesis in it; they were put into practice in the state of Ch'in and later in the whole Ch'in empire under the First Emperor.

The First Emperor possessed, among other political skills and special talents, one most crucial and necessary element needed to achieve that task, personal charisma. He has been characterized, in both historical accounts and modern studies, as having an imposing physical appearance, unyielding willpower and determination, unmatched intellectual brilliance, extraordinary vision, an unpredictable and brutal temper with an overshadowing fearful air, self-proclaimed divine power, and a vigorous and supremely self-confident personality. He also formulated his own system of social and moral philosophy, which, unlike his political philosophy—strict Legalism—was basically Confucian, contrary to long-established assumption. He divided his subjects into two groups by moral standards: the good and the bad. The former included those whose everyday behavior never went beyond the long-established moral bonds of filial piety, chastity, loyalty, faithfulness, trustworthiness, diligence, and kindness; the latter were those who were evil-minded, sexually licentious, profit making (merchants), greedy, lacking in occupational devotion, lazy, treacherous, and unlawful. The cardinal responsibility of a ruler and his government was to protect, promote, and reward the good and to control, educate, and make “practical use” of the bad, which included military duties, building the Great Wall, constructing the highways, and laboring on other state projects. Much like the great Confucian masters Confucius and Mencius, Ying Cheng further emphasized the primacy of agriculture in a state and elucidated the moral imperatives for

advancing social well-being. He held that government was a matter of ethics. The foundation of governance was *jen* (benevolence) and *i* (justice), and its basic principle of ruling was to instruct the people with *li* (civilized rules of conduct) and *yueh* (musical cultivation). An enlightened ruler should always improve himself by studying the ancient classics (*ching*) and aim at producing well-being for his subjects so as to actualize the ancient noble ideal of “sage rule” (*sheng-cheng*). A wise king should also guide his government with reference to the great *tao* (the Way) and exhort his officials to follow the path of *te* (moral virtue). Oddly enough, despite the discordance of two antagonistic schools of political and social thought (Legalism and Confucianism) and contrary to his long-established and enduring historical image, in the end Shih Huang-ti created a unified land of over 2 million square miles; molded a new nation within that land; controlled a huge population of 27 to 28 million that had been systematically uprooted, registered, and organized; imposed one written language, size of cart, standardized highway, system of weights and measures, legal code, and political system; and commanded an enormous and effective civil and military administration of more than 90,000 bureaucrats and 1.2 million soldiers, with more than a million convicts as reserves.¹⁰⁷ This was China’s first nation-state empire. Ying Cheng, then, was rightly titled the “First Emperor” of the Ch’in empire and Imperial China.

As this prologue has briefly examined the general evolution and major developmental stages of the state in China from about 1400 to 210 B.C., it has become clear that the state in China gradually evolved through critical creations and reinventions of time-honored traditions from its primitive stage to the centralized bureaucratic state in the reign of Ch’in Shih Huang-ti. As history has shown, that model paradigm remained the fundamental form of the Chinese state not only in Imperial China up to A.D. 1911 but also thereafter in the Republic period. However, as the tradition goes, a major restructuring and significant refinements of the state system were engendered in the reign of Han Wu-ti (Emperor Wu, 141–87 B.C.), the sixth ruler of the Han dynasty, founded in 202 B.C., the heir to the Ch’in dynasty. Much like Shih Huang-ti, Han Wu-ti reconfigured the land and remolded the nation by means of extensive military expansion and huge territorial acquisitions from 129 to 90 B.C. This new empire, with a restructured state system and Confucianism as its endorsed ideology, added over 1.6 million square miles to the empire and redefined the consciousness of the Han nation, which became the defining structure of the Chinese empire for the next two thousand years.



FROM REBELS TO IMPERIALISTS

THE ORIGINS,
FOUNDATIONS,
AND PROCESS OF
HAN EXPANSION





I

HAN WU-TI'S NEW EMPIRE

*The Political, Social, Economic,
and Ideological Foundations of Han
Expansion and Frontier Development*

UNDER THE REIGN OF Han Wu-ti (Emperor Wu; Liu Ch'e, 156–87 B.C., r. 141–87 B.C.), an expansion of extraordinary magnitude took place. In the long span from 138 to 90 B.C., twenty-nine military expeditions were sent out in all directions to fight and conquer peoples in distant regions and countries. The Han soldiers marched to Hainan Island, Vietnam, and Sikang in the south and southwest; Korea in the northeast; the northern edge of the Gobi Desert in the north and northwest; and Sogdiana, Ferghana (Farghana), and other Central Asian regions in the west. Altogether twenty-five new *chün* (prefectures or provinces) were established as a result of the expansion. The newly acquired and consolidated regions amounted to over 1.6 million square miles. Consequently, the Chinese territorial boundaries were virtually shaped and defined at this time.¹ The expansion was indeed the greatest in the annals of Chinese history in terms of its territorial acquisitions and its long, intensive military and colonial engagements.

Han Wu-ti's expansion was in many respects a turning point in Chinese history. In broad perspective, China emerged for the first time as an international imperialist power on the Asian continent, as the Chinese soldiers marched deep

into Vietnam, Korea, the Gobi Desert, and Central Asia. Although the troops of the First Emperor (Shih huang-ti) of the Ch'in empire (221–207 B.C.) also marched into the north, south, and southwest—conquering territories as far away as modern North Korea and North Vietnam, in the west they never crossed the Yellow River, which was then China's western border (in the eastern part of modern Kansu). The range of Ch'in influence was limited to the western part of what is modern East Asia. On the other hand, it was through the Han expansion that China made its first contacts with peoples outside of the traditional Chinese sphere. As Han Wu-ti's emissaries reached as far as Parthia (in modern Iran), China developed its earliest firsthand knowledge and understanding of other—particularly Western—cultural worlds. Second, the triumphant military expeditions implanted the Middle Kingdom idea firmly and visibly in the Chinese worldview of international relations, in which China was the center and superpower of the world and other peoples and countries were referred to only in tributary and subordinate terms. This replaced the conception of multination equality that had gradually formed through the preexpansion Han-Hsiung-nu relations from 200 to 133 B.C. Third, through the martial merits of Emperor Wu, empire building and its accompanying military expansion became in Imperial China a permanent part of the dual criteria of historical judgment of an emperor: *wen-chih* (civil and cultural merit) and *wu-kung* (martial achievements). Without *wu-kung*, *wen-chih* was not enough to make an emperor stand out in history. Many emperors actually became prisoners of such a concept and unwisely tried too hard to fit the pattern, only to ruin themselves and their empires. Furthermore, in institutional realms Han Wu-ti's many new political organizations, intellectual and economic innovations, and legal measures, which were all instituted to meet needs created by military expansion, remained as permanent features of traditional China, and some even survive today.

In dynastic terms, Emperor Wu's reign reached a peak in the Western Han. His long military expeditions and colonial efforts eventually exhausted the nation's economic resources and manpower, and hence affected, and even broke in some cases, the established political, economic, and intellectual balance and stability of the Western Han empire. In long-range terms, it was Wu-ti's great expansion that eventually precipitated the decline of the Western Han dynasty.

Han Wu-ti and his new empire have been a highly controversial topic in Chinese history. On the one hand, many regarded the emperor as a model ruler and empire builder. But others considered him the personification of pretentiousness, ruthlessness, and selfishness and his great empire a project of self-destruction and a symbol of the misery of the common people. This controversy dates even to Wu-ti's own time. Among his notable contemporary critics were

Chu-fu Yen, Ti Shan, and Kung-sun Hung. Each petitioned the emperor, on different occasions and for different reasons, to warn of the severe economic and political consequences of his military campaigns. As a matter of fact, the emperor became his own most worst critic of expansion in the last years of his life. In 89 B.C., he issued an edict deploring his expansionist adventures and expressing his regret about the sufferings they had inflicted on the people.² All of this has increased the complexity and variations in historical discourses on the origins, development, and consequences of Emperor Wu's new empire.

The aim of this chapter is to analyze one aspect of this: the origins of the great expansion in Wu-ti's reign. It sets out to examine the special conditions of Han society that made expansion possible. It inquires into the developmental stages of the Han society, from the founding of the Han empire in 202 B.C. to the first years of Wu-ti's reign in the 130s B.C. The chapter argues in the end that, while the expansion was a result of the historically timely interaction of many complex factors,³ it was in the final analysis the natural course of action for a great empire after long, intensive, and extensive changes in Han society in social, political, economic, ideological, military, and leadership terms. The political and social factors will be examined first.

A NEW ERA OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CONTROL

The high degree of centralization in the Han government contributed to the internal stability necessary for the Han Court to mobilize large military campaigns. From the time Kao-ti (Liu Pang, r. 202–195 B.C.; temple name: Kao-tsu) ascended the imperial throne in 202 to the end of his reign in 195 B.C., practically every year the Han Court was threatened by the rebellions of feudal states. These states controlled almost two-thirds of the Han territory, and some of them were extremely large and powerful. The Ch'i kingdom controlled six provinces (*chiün*) with seventy-three districts (*hsien*), the Tai kingdom three provinces with fifty-three districts, the Ch'u kingdom three provinces with thirty-six districts, and the Wu kingdom three provinces with fifty-three districts. These kingdoms were virtually independent in every aspect. Furthermore, they had their own royal courts and governing systems, independent economic resources and financial institutions, and, most important, independent armies. The Wu, for example, had an army of over five hundred thousand men, with an additional three hundred thousand from its ally Nan-yueh in the south. Moreover, the powerful generals who helped Liu Pang (the later Kao-ti) create the empire also constituted a threat to the court.⁴ The reign of Emperor Hui (Liu Ying) lasted only seven years (195–188 B.C.). The emperor was young, and Empress Lü (Lü Chih, 241–180 B.C.) held the real power. Even though this was

a period of consolidation of Han rule, the struggle for power between the Lü clan and the imperial family (Liu clan) was already under way. In the next period, under the reign of Empress Lü (187–180 B.C.), this struggle reached its zenith. The empress ruled through members of her own family; the important members of the imperial clan were in their distant kingdoms and marquisesates. At the same time, the threat of the powerful generals continued. The court was in a state of great tension. After Empress Lü's death in 180 B.C., the whole Lü clan was massacred by a joint force of members of the imperial family and Kao-tsu's old loyal henchmen. Emperor Wen (Wen-ti, Liu Heng, 180–157 B.C.) was enthroned, although he had not been the heir apparent. He was the oldest living son of Kao-tsu and had been the king of Tai (mainly Shansi) before being chosen emperor. Moreover, as he stated in an edict in the first year of his reign, at this time the king of Ch'u (Liu Chiao, Kiangsu) was his youngest uncle, the king of Wu (Liu P'i, Kiangsu and Chekiang) was his brother (actually a cousin), and the king of Huai-nan (Liu Chang, Anhui) was his younger brother. There were other strong kingdoms of the Liu clan in outlying regions of the empire. At one time, he was even reluctant to accept the throne under these circumstances.⁵ The emperor was not in a position to deal effectively with these feudal states, and tensions certainly existed between the states and the Imperial Court. Some of these kings disregarded the orders of the court and plotted rebellion against the emperor.⁶ At least two feudal kings openly rebelled against him:⁷ the king of Chi-pei (Liu Hsing-chü, in Shantung) in 177 B.C. and the king of Huai-nan in 175 B.C. By the beginning of the reign of Emperor Ching (Ching-ti, Liu Ch'i, r. 157–141 B.C.), the conflict between the feudal kings and the Han Court had reached a climax. While the imperial government was preparing to curtail the power of the various feudal kings, a rebellion of seven of the strongest kingdoms—Wu, Ch'u, Chiao-hsi, Chiao-tung, Tzu-ch'uan, Chi-nan, and Chao—broke out in 154 B.C. It was the most serious revolt during the former Han period. It lasted several months and was finally suppressed by the imperial forces under the generals Chou Ya-fu and Tou Ying, which killed more than 130,000 rebel troops.⁸ The kings of the seven rebel states all were forced to commit suicide or killed by the imperial forces.

It is clear that during the period from 202 to 154 B.C. the Han empire was not politically stable. The court was frequently threatened by various unruly groups and rebellions. It was impossible for the court to concentrate on external problems or launch all-out military campaigns against the Hsiung-nu and others while the constant threat of internal rebellions continued. For instance, during the reign of Emperor Wen the Hsiung-nu menace became more serious, and so did the threat of the feudal kings. In 177 B.C., the Hsiung-nu's Worthy (Wise) King of the Right invaded the regions south of the Yellow River and northern Pei-ti (in modern Ninghsia). But when Emperor Wen went to Tai (in

northern Hopei) and prepared to lead a campaign against the Hsiung-nu the king of Chi-pei (in southern Shantung) immediately took the opportunity afforded by the emperor's absence from the capital to start a rebellion. The emperor was forced to call off the expedition and order his forces to attack the rebellious king.⁹

After 154 B.C., the feudal kingdoms were never again a major threat to the Han Court. From this year to the last quarter of the second century B.C., the Han Court used various means to render the existence of feudal kingdoms merely nominal, and its effort to eliminate more feudal kingdoms continued: three more were destroyed early in Wu-ti's reign.¹⁰ After the Rebellion of the Seven Kingdoms, Emperor Ching also undertook special measures to change the structure of the feudal kingdoms. First, he took away the independence of their political system. He eliminated the position of *yü-shih tai-fu* (the imperial secretary or deputy chancellor in the royal court) in 147 B.C. and degraded the status of the chancellor in the royal court by changing its title from *ch'eng-hsiang* to *hsiang* (chief adviser) in 145 B.C. The next year he changed the governing system in the kingdoms by drastically reducing the number of officials and assigning new titles to them, showing their inferior status compared to officials in the central government. To further eliminate any possible regional division, the emperor even ordered in 142 B.C. all marquises (*ch'e-hou*) not to assume their posts in their respective marquisesates. Second, starting in 147 B.C. the emperor gradually eliminated the feudal kings' economic independence by nationalizing mintage and the currency system and imposing a monopoly on various essential material goods. Third, Emperor Ching broadened the base of entrance into officialdom to include the common people in order to reduce the monopoly of official positions by the hereditary aristocrats and their wealthy followers. In 142 B.C., he reduced the long-established financial requirement for official appointments by 60 percent, from one hundred thousand to forty thousand in cash (copper coins). In the same year, he decreed that merchants, who were usually required to register with the government and were the allies and supporters of the ambitious feudal kings, be prohibited to serve as officials either by merit or by open purchase. With all these aggressive measures, the possibility of any successful challenge to the Imperial Court by the feudal kingdoms and their local supporters was almost completely eradicated under Emperor Ching.

At the same time, there were conscious efforts to transfer the administrative power from regular cabinet members to officials close to the emperor, as symbolized by the rise of the Inner Court (*Nei-t'ing* or *Nei-ch'ao*) to usurp the power of the Chancellery and the Imperial Secretariat. All these measures plus other formal and informal means of control and inspection brought fundamental changes in the power structure and distribution of the Han government. The

power of the emperor and the centralization of the government reached their highest degree during the reign of Emperor Wu. The long struggle for power between such powerful pressure groups as the imperial in-laws, the imperial family, and those who were instrumental in the founding of the empire was finally ended during Wu-ti's reign.¹¹

Basic changes in relationship between the central political power and local society also took place. Before Emperor Wu, the monarchy was without real and close ties to local society. Kao-ti, founder of the dynasty, followed a Ch'in practice of moving the rich local elites and the powerful aristocratic families, which numbered more than one hundred thousand, from the eastern regions to the Kuan-chung area (Shensi) under the direct supervision of the central government so that these people could not induce tension and disturbances with their wealth and influence.¹² At the same time, families of his meritorious assistants, who were given high-ranking positions in the government, were moved to the district where his tomb was constructed, which was hence named Ch'ang-ling.¹³ Following this latter practice, succeeding rulers moved the families of officials with an annual salary of 2,000 bushels (*shih*) of grain and local rich elites, merchants and stalwarts to districts and towns of their tombs (*ling-i*), located in the capital area and constructed in their own times. This measure evidently combined the control of certain potentially dangerous segments of population—in the case of local elites and stalwarts—and the traditional system of hostage taking—in the case of high-ranking officials.¹⁴ All of these practices, however, were not strictly enforced on a large scale until Wu-ti's time.¹⁵ Moreover, even if they were, they would have achieved only one goal—social stability through population control—and that alone would not be effective enough to enable the central government to fully mobilize the massive manpower and economic resources needed for long and large-scale military expeditions against the Hsiung-nu.

Two basic measures were undertaken in the early period of Wu-ti's long reign. The first was the reinforcement of the practice of population migration. In 139 B.C., the second year of his reign, the emperor first established his tomb in Mou County, which was later called Mou-ling. Next year, for the sake of positive encouragement, he granted to those who moved to Mou-ling two hundred thousand *ch'ien* in cash to each household and 200 *mu* (or *mou*, Han acres) of land. In 127 B.C., two years after his new military offensives had begun, Emperor Wu ordered that stalwarts from provinces and kingdoms and those whose property was worth 3 million *ch'ien* in cash or more be moved to Mou-ling. The purpose was to "increase the population of the capital area and at the same time prevent the spread of evil and vicious elements in the provinces and kingdoms."¹⁶ The second measure that Emperor Wu undertook to exert thorough control over local conditions was to gradually incorporate leaders of local

pressure groups not moved to the capital area into governmental institutions as bureaucrats. This policy was usually carried out by the provincial governors. But their efforts were directed and controlled by the central government.¹⁷

Another measure in the imperial government's quest for internal political and social control and stability was the use of "harsh officials" (*k'u-li*). These officials believed in strict legal order as the basis of good government, in the use of cruel measures against unlawful conduct, and in the equality of all people—commoners, noblemen and officials—before the law. They held positions of various types and ranks, such as governor (*t'ai-shou* or *chiün-shou*), regional military commandant (*tu-wei* or *chiün-wei*, chief commandant), capital commandant (*chung-wei*), prefect or governor of the capital (*nei-shih*), palace counselor (*chung ta-fu*), commandant of justice (*t'ing-wei*), general, clerks in offices of different levels, and others. They often employed tricky and vicious investigators to look for unlawful activities. Their main targets of investigation and persecution were members of the rich elite, the nobility, corrupt officials, stalwarts and men of evil influence, and racketeers and vicious merchants. With only one exception in Kao-ti's time, officials with such political and legal philosophies did not gain influence and prominence until late in Ching-ti's reign—after the Rebellion of the Seven Kingdoms was crushed in 154 B.C. Emperor Ching was the first Han ruler to send an official with a "harsh" reputation to a specific region. In about 151–150 B.C., the famous Chih Tu was appointed governor of Chi-nan (in central Shantung) to restrain the Hsien clan. This clan consisted of over three hundred households and was so notorious for its power and lawlessness that none of the two thousand officials in the area could do anything to control it. Chi executed the worst offenders of the Hsien clan, along with their families, and the rest were overwhelmed with fear. After a year or so under Chih Tu's rule, no one in the province dared even to pick up belongings that had been dropped on the streets and roads.¹⁸ Other harsh officials operated in much the same way and at times employed even harsher measures. Among the people they arrested, prosecuted, and executed in the provinces and kingdoms, as well as in the capital area, were court ladies, feudal kings, high-ranking officials, local elites, rich merchants, and commoners. Such officials became more dominant early in Wu-ti's reign. They reached the highest echelon of the bureaucracy, and their measures became even more cruel. The governor of Ting-hsiang (in southern Suiyuan) executed four hundred people in one day. The governor of Ho-nei (eastern Honan) executed over one thousand families. Their blood is said to have flowed over ten *li* (Han miles). In the inquest of conspiracy for rebellion conducted by the feudal kings of Huai-nan (mainly Anhui), Heng-shan (in Anhui), and Chiang-tu (central Kiangsu), Chang T'ang—the most influential harsh official of early Han times—was in charge of investigations and judgments. He put to death tens of thousands, at times

merely on circumstantial evidence. These officials became so notorious that they were given such nicknames as Vicious Hawk, Vicious Killer, and the like.¹⁹ Furthermore, in 130 B.C. Chao Yü and Chang T'ang, two of the most notorious and influential harsh officials at the time, were empowered by Emperor Wu to draw up various new statutes and ordinances. Among these were the laws that anyone who knowingly allowed a criminal act to go unreported was as guilty as the criminal and that officials could be prosecuted for the offenses of their inferiors or superiors in the same bureau. From this time on, the laws became more complicated, and they were applied with increasing strictness. This was a pronounced departure from earlier Han practice, which in general stressed simpler laws and lenient applications. In the earlier reigns of Emperors Kao and Hui and Empress Lü, as recently discovered Han era documents show, there were only twenty-eight sets of statutes and ordinances and a number of cases and precedents for reference and comparison. The principal legal philosophy was "following the established tradition."²⁰ The clear intent of this change was to impose strict political and social order by means of harsh legal institutions and enforcement. Small wonder, then, that of the fifteen notorious harsh officials of Former Han times whose biographies appear in the *Shih-chi* (Historical Records) and *Han-shu* (History of the Former Han Dynasty), ten flourished in Wu-ti's time. All were extremely influential in decision making at the highest level, and a majority of them were instrumental in the formulation of the most important new political and economic measures undertaken during Wu-ti's reign.²¹

To sum up, the political centralization and social stability that enabled Wu-ti to commence and continue his military campaigns was a result of many interacting political and institutional changes that either climaxed or were initiated early in Wu-ti's reign. In a broader sense, these changes marked the end of the old regime, which was built on the strength of the foundations laid down by the dynastic founder Kao-ti and his loyal followers, and at the same time commenced enormous political and social changes that were to characterize the Han heritage. In short, it was with these changes that the state—strictly speaking, the monarch—brought all of the society under its strict control. The earlier Han duality of state versus society disappeared during the reign of Wu-ti.

ECONOMIC RESOURCES AND EXPANSION

The costly military campaigns and colonization of new territories acquired during them would have been impossible without the backing of a strong economy. The *Treatise on Food and Money* (*Shih-huo chih*) in the *Han-shu*, for example, shows that 20 billion in cash was expended for the colonization and defense of So-fang (south Suiyuan and Ninghsia).²² The cost of the colonization of the Ho-hsi region (western Kansu and Ninghsia) and the military expeditions that

led to its acquisition, as I have estimated elsewhere in this book, amounted to about 100 billion in cash. In the campaigns of 124–123 B.C., merely the rewards granted to General Wei Ch'ing's officers and soldiers who had cut off heads of the Hsiung-nu or captured some of them amounted to more than two hundred thousand catties of gold—that is, 2 billion in cash—over and above the regular expenses of these expeditions.²³

The Han economy, however, had a long way to go to meet such an enormous challenge. At the beginning of the dynasty, after so many years of constant warfare, resources were quite scarce. The *Han-shu* describes its conditions as follows.²⁴

When the House of Han arose, it inherited the evils [left] by the Ch'in. [Former] feudal lords all at the same time started [rebellions], and the people lost their means of livelihood. Hence, there was a widespread dearth of supplies in both grains and vegetables. Generally, [the price of] husked grain was five thousand [cash] a bushel.²⁵ People ate human flesh, and more than half [of the population] died. Kao-tsu [Kao-ti] thereupon ordered that the people be allowed to sell their children and to migrate to Shu and Han[-chung] for food. When the regime was stabilized, the people lacked [supplies] either to conceal or to store. From the Son of Heaven, who was unable [even] to equip himself with a team of four horses of the same color [for the imperial equipage], down to the generals of the army and first ministers [of the empire and the fiefs], all at times had to ride in the ox-drawn carts.

The *Shih-chi*, in addition, indicates that a horse then fetched a hundred catties of gold—equivalent to 1 million in cash.²⁶

During the seven years of the Ch'in-Han transition from 208 to 202 B.C., the main force of production in the economy, the population of able bodies, was drastically reduced because of the continuing war destruction and carnage. There were at least eighty large-scale battles and over one hundred fifty of lesser scale. However, the casualties in each of these bloody conflicts ranged from several thousands to tens of thousands and even hundreds of thousands. In 207 B.C., for example, over two hundred thousand Ch'in soldiers were buried alive by the rebel leader Hsiang Yü (232–202 B.C.) in Hsin-an (east of modern Mien-ch'ih in western Honan). Overall, the Chinese population at the beginning of the Han dynasty was reduced to less than one-half of the former Ch'in figure of 28 million by the end of the dynasty. In many regions, the loss was even greater. Chü-ni District (in Hopei), for example, had only one-sixth of the Ch'in era population left, down from thirty thousand households to five thousand.²⁷ The large cities generally, retained only 20 to 30 percent of their former

populations due to war deaths and flight.²⁸ The great T'ang historian Tu Yu (A.D. 735–812) estimated that the population of the Han dynasty at its founding was less than one-third of the population of China in the Warring States period (404–222 B.C.). The modern scholar Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (1873–1929) estimated the Han population in Emperor Kao-tsu's time at only about 5 or 6 million, but more recently others have estimated it to have been in the range of 8.8 to 18 million; my own estimate is 12 to 16 million.²⁹

The founders of the Han took special measures to revitalize the bleak economic and social conditions. The government first instituted a general policy of economic relaxation and reduction of governmental spending. The theory was that government should interfere in the people's lives as little as possible. This was intended to correct the Ch'in policy of working the people so hard in public works and military expeditions that they eventually rebelled. At the same time, the Han Court also initiated various measures for economic recovery in different realms of concern.

1. *Tax Reforms and the Agricultural Sector*

The first and most essential step in stimulating the economy was to make full use of the land, most of which had been left barren during the six years of war and destruction from 207 to 202 B.C. On this issue, the Han routinely followed the well-designed and successfully crafted Ch'in land law, which had been instituted by Lord Shang Yang (ca. 390–338 B.C.) and then gradually refined by other Ch'in rulers in the fourth century B.C. As seen in the land law of 186 B.C., unearthed in a Han tomb in south-central Hupei in 1983, the Han government allotted land to everyone except slaves and hardened criminals. First, it classed the recipients into three groups: (1) aristocratic rank holders in twenty orders; (2) free commoners, soldiers, and former rank holders; and (3) pardoned and harmless convicts under government control. Then each such group was apportioned land for cultivation by a systematic and well-designed schedule in the amount of *mu* (0.1139 acre).

1. Aristocratic Rank Holders (twentieth being the highest)

	<i>Rank Order</i>	<i>Land for Cultivation</i>
20th	Ch'e-hou	Special schedule
19th	Kuan-nei hou	9,500 <i>mu</i>
18th	Ta shu-chang	9,000
17th	Ssu-chü shu-chang	8,800
16th	Ta shang-tsao	8,600

15th	Shao shang-tsao	8,400
14th	Yu-keng	8,200
13th	Chung-keng	8,000
12th	Tso-keng	7,800
11th	Yu shu-chang	7,600
10th	Tso shu-chang	7,400
9th	Wu tai-fu	2,500
8th	Kung-ch'eng	2,000
7th	Kung tai-fu	900
6th	Kuan tai-fu	700
5th	Tai-fu	500
4th	Pu-keng	400
3rd	Tsan-niao	300
2nd	Shang-tsao	200
1st	Kung-shih	150

2. Soldiers, commoners, and former rank holders: land for cultivation: 100 *mu*.
3. Pardoned and harmless convicts under government control: land for cultivation: 50 *mu*.

It should be pointed out that the allotment system granted almost the same amount of land for a residence and that the land in both categories was allotted to the recipient by the household (*hu*) of which he was the head or a member and not to every individual in the whole empire. To increase the manpower devoted to agricultural work, the court freed a large number of domestic slaves, who had lost their freedom because of war, disorder, or poverty during the transition period from 208 to 202 B.C. In addition, many sections of the army were dismantled so that the soldiers could go back to their homes to till their assigned land.³⁰

This system of universal land distribution is believed to have begun during the reign of Kao-ti (202–195 B.C.). It represented a massive assignment of land to almost every able individual in the population, which numbered at least 12 million at the beginning of the Han dynasty. The barren land in the new empire was to become arable productive fields. And the Han economic recovery began.

The second most effective step taken to stimulate the agricultural economy was to lessen the burden of the land tax, which had become extremely high—at one time even amounting to two-thirds of the produce of the land—under the Ch'in. At the beginning of Kao-ti's reign, the land tax was set at one-fifteenth of the produce. Later it was lightened to none. Under Hui-ti's reign, the land tax was restored to one-fifteenth, where it remained until the thir-

teenth year of Wen-ti's reign (167 B.C.), when it was again abolished. Emperor Ching reset the land tax at one-thirtieth in the first year of his reign (156 B.C.), and that rate remained standard thereafter. Other taxes for regular households under the administration of the central government included the *suan-fu* (poll tax) on people from their fifteenth to fifty-sixth year (inclusive). The amount was 120 cash per year, but it was reduced to 40 under Emperor Wen. Children from their sixth to thirteenth year (seven to fourteen *sui*) were required to pay the *k'ou-ch'ien* (tax on children) at the annual rate of 20 cash.³¹ Male adults from their twenty-third to their fifty-sixth year were required to render one month of labor service (*keng*) per year to the local (district) government, but this could be commuted by a payment of 300 cash, a provision that later became a permanent feature of taxation known as *keng-fu*.³²

Loopholes aside, before Emperor Wu increased the existing taxes and initiated new ones to support military expenses in the course of great expansion, taxation—particularly land taxes—levied by the Han empire on its subjects was generally considered to be among the lightest of all eras. This point was clearly recognized and at times employed as a “historical force” against high taxation by scholars and political critics throughout Chinese history.³³

In addition, Emperor Ching changed the *mu* (acreage) system in 155 B.C., the second year of his reign. This measure, designed to reduce the economic burden of the farmers, was instituted after he reset the land tax from one-fifteenth to one-thirtieth of the produce of the land. The pre-155 B.C. Han acre, following the old Chou system, contained an area 1 *pu* (pace) wide and 100 *pu* long. The new acre, adopted from the Ch'in system that originated in Lord Shang Yang's reforms in the mid-fourth century B.C., had an area 1 *pu* wide but 240 *pu* long, or an increase from 0.04746 to 0.11391 English acre. While the Chinese “acre,” or *mu*, was enlarged by 2.4 times, the rate of the land tax remained unchanged, that is, it was still based on the old acreage. In other words, based on 240-pace *mu* units the farmers now paid 41.66 percent of the old land-tax rate.³⁴ Furthermore, various emperors often cut the regular national taxes and granted complete exemption to certain special regions. Emperor Wen, for instance, twice reduced the rate of the land tax by half, once in 178 B.C. and again in 168 B.C.³⁵ He also lightened the annual labor service to one month every three years.³⁶

All of these innovative measures were aimed at encouraging farming and stimulating growth in the vital agricultural sector of the Han economy.

At the same time, farming techniques and conditions were considerably improved by the advancement of certain new agricultural technologies and the refinement and expansion of existing ones. Iron, which came into practical use for tool making in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. in China and began to be cast for agricultural tools in the fifth century B.C., now became a profitable

industrial enterprise and was widely used for farming tools.³⁷ Iron tools were sharper and more durable and hence increased farming efficiency. Several relatively large, effective tools for removing earth and plowing were developed. The process of seeding and fertilizing was also improved considerably. In addition, the use of oxen to draw plows with iron shares now became widespread, although such knowledge had existed in China long before the Han dynasty. It gradually revolutionized the farming process by greatly increasing its speed.³⁸

Irrigation by means of dikes and canals was widely practiced in early Former Han China. The most famous large-scale irrigation projects were Liu Hsin's work in the Shu-ch'eng area (in modern Anhui), which was completed during Kao-ti's reign, and Wen Weng's work in Shu (in modern Szechwan), which was completed during Wen-ti's reign. The former irrigated an area of 2 million *mu* and the latter 170,000 *mu*. Each was a tremendous project that benefited not only the local residents but the whole empire as well. In many areas, wealthy people constructed irrigation projects of different sizes and forms. More often than not, the control of irrigated land was a source as well as a measure of personal wealth.³⁹ There were sound reasons for this, for at the time, as a result of more land coming under cultivation and improved farming techniques, the average annual yield per 240-pace *mu* was 3 to 4 *shih* (Han bushels) of unhusked grain, although under the old system a 100-pace *mu* yielded 1 to 1.5 *shih* a year. With irrigation, which usually brought up to 30 percent mud into the fields if the water came through canals, the most favored method of irrigation at the time, the average yield per 240-pace *mu* was as high as 6.4 to 10 *shih*, for an average of 8.2 *shih*.⁴⁰ With these increases, the produce of the land watered by Liu Hsin's irrigation canal alone would have amounted to 12.8 million to 20 million *shih* (or an average of 16.4 million *shih*). This is about 42.67 to 66.67 (or an average of 54.67) times the total annual grain revenue of the central government from the east, which was said to be several hundred thousand (generally meaning 200,000 to 300,000) *shih* at this time. The benefits of irrigation were indeed tremendous. Small wonder that the government had special offices to supervise and coordinate the numerous irrigation projects in the empire. The main ones were the *tu-shui* offices (Bureaus of Waters) under the office of the *Chih-su nei-shih* (Clerk of the Capital for Grain Supplies)—later changed to *Ta-nung-ling* (Grand Chief of Agriculture) in 143 B.C.—who was in charge of state revenue and disbursement under the *Shao-fu* (Privy or Small Treasury), which managed the private finances of the imperial house. These offices were headed by chief superintendents (*chang*) and were served by a number of assistant superintendents (*ch'eng*) and officials of other capacities and ranks. Together with their numerous regional branches in the provinces and kingdoms, these offices took charge of the construction and maintenance of canals, dikes, and the like; the distribution and proper use of water; and all other matters pertaining to irrigation.

These developments in irrigation, together with the fact that the rich agricultural resources derived from irrigation projects in the Kuan-chung and Shu regions provided the economic basis for the Ch'in conquest of the Six States and the rise of the Han dynasty, had a far-reaching impact on Wu-ti's later economy and military campaigns. Realizing the full potential of the benefits of irrigation, in 132 B.C. Emperor Wu and his ministers and advisers began to undertake large-scale irrigation projects to increase agricultural output. During the height of the expansion, because of the proven success of irrigation and the severe economic strain resulting from expensive military campaigns and colonizations, the emperor greatly increased the number of irrigation projects. Six of Wu-ti's projects stand out as the most famous. The work force and irrigated acreage of four of these were recorded or can be accurately estimated. Together they employed 70,000 to 100,000 men and watered more than 3 million *mu*. Both the *Shih-chi* and the *Han-shu* mention eight other notable irrigation projects, each of which covered an area of more than 1 million *mu*. Assuming that each 10,000-*mu* unit had taken a work force of 20,000 to 30,000 men to complete, as had the other four projects, the total labor force of the eight would have required the labor of 160,000 to 240,000 men. Putting all these cases together, Wu-ti's irrigation projects must have employed 230,000 to 340,000 men and watered about 11 million *mu* (1,254,000 English acres). Assuming an average yield of 8.2 *shih* per *mu* for such irrigated land, the total annual yield of the watered acreage would be about 90,200,000 *shih* (50,963,000 U.S. bushels). This was about three hundred times the annual amount of grain produced in the east in the preexpansion period and about fifteen times the annual amount supplied from the east—6 million *shih* (3,390,000 U.S. bushels)—in the heyday of Wu-ti's expansion venture. It must be borne in mind that these irrigation projects are only the most famous ones undertaken during Wu-ti's reign. Irrigation benefits clearly played a vital part in Wu-ti's economy.⁴¹

2. Monetary Stability

The Han monetary system was gradually improved and stabilized during the preexpansion period. The standard medium of exchange was the *ch'ien* (cash, a round copper coin with a square hole in the middle). Kao-ti discontinued the *pan-liang* coin of the Ch'in (which weighed half an ounce or 12 *shu*, 7.625 grams) because it was too heavy for practical use. He also found unacceptable the Ch'in practice of government monopoly of coinage. Thus, he permitted the use of private mints and coins of lighter weight. The result was a decrease in the size and weight of coins to such a degree that they were like elm pods (*yü-chia*), even though they were still inscribed as *pan-liang* coins. The devaluation con-

tributed considerably to inflation, and the private mints added to the monetary confusion in the first years of the Han dynasty. As a result, Emperor Hui made laws to control private mintage in 192 B.C., though these were unsuccessful. Consequently, in 186 B.C., Empress Lü prohibited private coinage and minted a *pan-liang* coin weighing 8 *shu*—two-thirds of its nominal weight. Still too heavy, it was replaced in 183 B.C. by the *wu-fen* coin weighing one-fifth of the nominal weight of the *pan-liang*, 2.4 *shu*. Emperor Wen considered the *wu-fen* coin too light and in 175 B.C. issued a 4-*shu* coin weighing one-third of the nominal weight of the *pan-liang*. The 4-*shu* coin circulated for thirty-five years, until 140 B.C., when Emperor Wu issued the 3-*shu* coin (1.91 grams).⁴² This thirty-five-year period of monetary stability covered the reigns of Emperor Wen and his successor Emperor Ching. This fact has critical importance because it was during this period that the Han economy experienced its greatest recovery and growth.

3. *Industrial and Commercial Growth and the Cities*

During the early Former Han, industrial and commercial growth was noticeable. But Han industry and commerce did not begin their full development in the first three reigns, 202–180 B.C., of the new dynasty, since the primary concern of the Han leaders then was full recovery of the agricultural sector. As it was in the Ch'in dynasty, the main economic concern of the Han founders was agriculturalism (*nung-pen*), with commerce and industry being regarded as “nonessential” economic pursuits (*mo-yeh*). During the reigns of Emperors Wen and Ching, 180–141 B.C., commerce and industry gradually achieved significant growth, as the empire's agricultural production had reached a very high level, population had increased by four times, and living standards (consumption of goods) had risen significantly. On the average, the minimum annual rate of business profits was 20 percent and higher. In fact, the profits of certain industries and businesses were so huge that later in the next reign, Han Wu-ti's time, they were channeled into a well-organized new system of government monopolies in order to finance the large-scale military campaigns and eliminate the economic threat to the imperial government posed by the tremendous wealth of the industrialists and merchants.⁴³

There were, according to Ssu-ma Ch'ien (145–86 B.C.), forty-six notable types of commodities of great value—major sources of industrial and commercial wealth—in market towns and commercial metropolises, and twenty-two of these were produced through industrial processes of varying degrees of sophistication. Regional specialization emerged and with it the rise of prosperous inter-regional trade. Major industrial enterprises were those of iron, salt, and textiles. The centers of the textile and clothing industries (silks, silken fabrics, textiles

made of vegetable fibers, and so on) were mainly in Ch'i and Lu (modern Shantung), Ch'en-liu (in modern Honan), and Shu (in modern Szechwan). Lin-tzu (Lin-tse) of Ch'i and Hsiang-i of Ch'en-liu were the two largest centers. Lin-tse was famous for garments and Hsiang-i for fine embroideries. The speciality of Shu was hemp cloth. Information on the size of these industries in early Former Han times is not available. But in 48 B.C. each of the three government garments offices (*San-fu*) in Ch'i alone generally employed two to three thousand men. Together with the fact that textiles were a major source of industrial and commercial wealth, this leads us to assume that a large preexpansion textile factory could easily have employed over a thousand men.⁴⁴

The iron and salt industries were spread over various regions of the empire, with the largest centers located in what are modern Shantung, Szechwan, Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhui, and Hopei. From 120 to 110 B.C., the Han government reorganized its system of salt and iron monopolies. It established special offices for supervision and management in areas where salt and iron production and profits were concentrated. In early Han times, there were forty iron offices in forty *chün* (provinces) and *kuo* (feudal kingdoms), and thirty-eight salt offices in thirty *chün* and *kuo*. Excluding regions that were acquired during Wu-ti's expansion, forty-five iron offices and thirty-one salt offices were in Han regions of the preexpansion period. These regions most likely were centers—or, in some cases potential centers—of salt and iron production in the preexpansion period. The *chün* and *kuo* where these Han offices were located are listed in table 1, together with their modern geographical locations.⁴⁵ The wide geographical range of salt and iron production is clearly shown in the table.

Information on the total work force of salt and iron laborers in the early Former Han period is not available. But certain sources indicate that salt and iron magnates often employed more than a thousand men to manufacture salt and process iron.⁴⁶ Kung Yü (123–43 B.C.) observed in 44 B.C. that the various iron offices employed an annual work force of over one hundred thousand men, mainly slaves, to gather iron and copper.⁴⁷ It seems that the salt and iron monopoly implemented in the years 120–110 B.C. was mainly a new attempt to control these businesses, not a rapid expansion of the existing enterprises.⁴⁸ Judging from our examination of salt and iron offices, about 88 percent of the production facilities of salt and iron probably existed in the preexpansion period. If this is the case, then very likely the total annual work force of salt and iron laborers in the early Former Han was around eighty-eight thousand men.

Salt and iron businesses were evidently the most profitable enterprises in early Former Han times. They produced such wealthy and powerful families as the Cho and Cheng of Shu, the K'ung of Wan (in modern Honan), and the Ping of Ts'ao (in modern Shantung), all in the iron enterprise; and the Tiao Hsien of Ch'i in the salt enterprise. The Chos and Chengs grew so rich that

TABLE 1. Salt and Iron Centers in Early Former Han China

Location	Modern Provinces	Number of Offices for Iron	Number of Offices for Salt
<i>Chün</i>			
Ching-chao	Shensi	1	
Tso-p'ing-i	Shensi	1	
Yu-fu-feng	Shensi	2	
Shang	Shensi		2
Han-chung	Shensi, Hupei	1	
Tai-yuan	Shansi	1	1
Ho-tung	Shansi	4	1
Yen-men	Shansi		1
Ch'ang-shan	Hopei	1	
Cho	Hopei	1	
Ch'ü-lu	Hopei		1
Yo-yang	Hopei	1	1
Po-hai	Hopei		1
Yu-pei-p'ing	Hopei	1	
Shan-yang	Shantung	2	
Ch'ien-sheng	Shantung	2	1
Ch'i	Shantung	1	
Tung-hai	Shantung	2	
Tung-lai	Shantung	1	5
Chi-nan	Shantung	2	
T'ai-shan	Shantung	1	
Lang-yeh	Shantung	1	3
Pei-hai	Shantung		2
Hsi-ho	Suiyüan		1
Wu-yüan	Suiyüan		1
Liao-tung	Liaoning	1	1
Liao-hsi	Liaoning		1
An-ting	Kansu		1
Lung-hsi	Kansu	1	1
Pei-ti	Kansu		1
Ho-nei	Honan	1	
Ho-nan	Honan	1	
Ying-ch'uan	Honan	1	
Ju-nan	Honan	1	
Wei	Honan	1	
Nan-yang	Honan, Hupei	1	
Lu-chiang	Anhui	1	
Lin-huai	Anhui	2	
Nan	Hupei		1
Pa	Szechwan		1
Shu	Szechwan	1	1
K'uai-chi	Kiangsu, Chekiang		1
<i>Kuo</i>			
Chiao-tung	Shantung	1	
Lu	Shantung	1	
Tung-p'ing	Shantung	1	1
Ch'eng-yang	Shantung	1	
Chung-shan	Hopei	1	
Ch'u	Kiangsu	1	
Kuang-ling	Kiangsu	1	
<i>Total</i>		45	31

they each owned a thousand young slaves. Their pleasures in possessing lands and in fishing, archery, and hunting were comparable to those of great feudal lords. The K'ung family's fortune reached several thousand catties of gold, and its head resembled the young men of princely rank in his behavior, disposition, and activities. The wealth of the Ping family amounted to 100 million in cash. The Tiao Hsien's wealth grew to several tens of millions in cash. Needless to say, all of these families engaged in diverse trading and other commercial activities and employed every possible means—including lending money, skillful use of slaves, and political contacts with feudal lords, provincial governors, and prime ministers of feudal kingdoms—to increase their fortunes. Their wealth and power exerted great influence on the lifestyles and thinking of people in various walks of life. The traders in Nan-yang (modern Hopei) all imitated the K'ung family's lordly and openhanded ways. In Tsou and Lu (in modern Shantung), many people abandoned scholarly pursuits and, following the model of the Ping family, turned to the quest for profits. Perhaps a popular saying in Ch'i says it all. Referring to the magic of the wealth of the Tiao Hsien, it asks: "Who would rather have aristocratic rank than [the fortune of] Tiao Hsien?"⁴⁹

Various feudal states, particularly Wu in the south and Chao (in Hopei) in the north, engaged in the production of iron and salt for huge profits and at times became the largest producers of these commodities. In fact, the tremendous financial strength derived from iron and salt production enabled these states to threaten the central government and invited it to take them over.⁵⁰

Copper, the source of coins, was another profitable industry. It usually went with iron manufacture. A considerable number of the iron manufacturers also engaged in copper mining and casting. Shu and Tan-yang (in modern Anhui) and part of the Wu kingdom (the lower Yangtze Valley), among others, were the well-known copper-producing regions. At the time of the emperors Wen and Ching (180–141 B.C.), the two most productive copper mines were located in mountains in Yen-tao of Shu (modern Jung-ching of Szechwan) and Ch'ang-shan of Yü-chang (modern An-chi of Chekiang). The former was granted to the high official Teng T'ung by Emperor Wen; the latter was in the territory of the king of Wu (Liu P'i, 213–154 B.C.). Both Teng and the king of Wu minted coins from copper mined from the two mountains by tremendous numbers of workers. The result was that the coins of Wu and of Teng spread all over the empire. Teng accumulated wealth that exceeded that of a vassal king. For the king of Wu, the mintage of coins, together with his salt enterprise, produced so much revenue that he not only dispensed with taxation but was economically confident enough to start a rebellion against the imperial government.⁵¹

Other important mining and metal industries included gold, silver, and lead. These enterprises were mainly located in Kuei-yang (in modern Hunan), Yü-chang, Ying-ch'uan (Honan), Nan-yang (Honan/Hupei), Ho-nan

(Honan), Ho-nei (Honan), Chi-nan (Shantung), T'ai-shan (Shantung), and Shu and Kuang-Han (Szechwan). In addition, shipbuilding, weaponry, and lumber were profitable industries, particularly in regions such as Lu-chiang, Nan (Hupei), and Shu. Animal husbandry was an important enterprise in northern and northwestern border territories. Pottery and lacquerware also were prosperous industries in certain regions.⁵²

With these commercial and industrial developments, the cities rapidly expanded. In Wu-ti's time, there were twenty Han cities with populations ranging from 50,000 to 650,000 people, and sixty cities of 20,000 to 50,000. The two largest cities in population were Ch'ang-an, the imperial capital built only in Hui-ti's reign (especially in 192–189 B.C.), and Lin-tzu (in Shantung); the former had a population over 500,000 in a walled city of 13.5 square miles, and the latter had 650,000 in a walled city of 9.31 square miles. The next five largest were Yuan (in Nan-yang, Honan), with 400,000; Ch'eng-tu (in Chengtu, Szechwan), with 380,000; Han-tan (Han-tan, Hopei), with 270,000; Lo-yang (Loyang, Honan), with 260,000; and Lu (Ch'ü-fu, southern Shantung), with 230,000. These seven cities were the major Han commercial and industrial hubs and were located in the key economic regions in the west, central, northeast, east, and southwest. They were the distribution centers of special regional products such as iron, gold, copper, textiles, lacquerware, and agricultural goods. In essence, they were the nerve centers of the Han economic and business world. The cities were naturally the centers of political command and economic and military mobilization to support longtime war efforts. Considering the fact that at the beginning of the Han dynasty these major urban centers had only 20 to 30 percent of the surviving Ch'in population, their tremendous growth and size certainly informed the stupendous increase of the Han population in the sixty some years before Wu-ti's reign. At the same time, it was also recorded that all earlier Han reigns had made special and aggressive efforts to promote population growth. Emperor Kao, for example, decreed in 200 B.C. that all taxes be forgiven for a family with a newborn baby. Under Emperor Hui, the court even ordered that a woman's whole family be levied taxes five times higher than normal if she was not married by the age of twenty-nine (thirty *sui*). Under these aggressive population policies and favorable economic conditions, it is reasonable to assume that the population would have increased over time. In fact, the Han population is estimated, in different primary sources and later references, to have reached the range of 40 to 50 million before 150 B.C. and increased to the range of 50 million by Wu-ti's early reign, almost five times the early Han total.⁵³

By examining the availability of the Han economic sources and resources and the strength of the Han military, modern scholars have estimated that in Wu-ti's time the Han government revenue was about 12 billion in cash (plus 1

million *shih* of grain), and another 8 billion in cash from the Privy Treasury. The total number of men eligible for the military draft was in the range of 13 to 15 million (corresponding to about 30 percent of the total population), and there was a standing army of 400,000 men in Wu-ti's early reign. Most important, as will be discussed later, at least 80,000 to 100,000 of the Han soldiers were cavalymen—the future primary weapon of the Hsiung-nu campaigns—and that number grew to 200,000 to 250,000 before 124 B.C. Afterward the total Han standing army would number 600,000 to 700,000 men, including about 300,000 cavalymen, of which over 400,000 were professional soldiers, who had replaced the conscripts. It has been estimated that in Han Wu-ti's time the average annual cost of supporting an infantryman (foot soldier) was about 10,000 in cash and of a cavalryman (horse soldier) with his fighting horse about 87,000 cash, which included all the clothing, weapons, protective equipment, and feed for the horse except the grain provisions for the soldier, which were estimated at an average of 36 *shih* a year. Following these estimates, if the Han standing army in the 120s B.C. contained 600,000 men (with 300,000 foot soldiers and 300,000 horse soldiers) the total annual cost would be 29.1 billion in cash. If it contained 700,000 men (with 400,000 foot soldiers and 300,000 horse soldiers), the total annual cost would be at 40.1 billion. And if the combination was 600,000 men with 400,000 foot soldiers and 200,000 horse soldiers, the total annual cost would be 21.4 billion. Comparing these totals of the Han annual cost of keeping its standing army to its annual cash revenue of 12 billion, the cost is 2.43, 3.35, and 1.78 times the annual revenue, respectively. If the 8 billion revenue of Privy Treasury is counted as part of the government revenue (for a total of 20 billion), then the ratios would still be 1.46, 2.00, and 1.07. On the other hand, the figures of average annual cost represent mere annual spending on the maintenance of a national standing army; they do not reflect the costs of a military campaign. In that case, the cost per soldier in actual combat in an army composed predominantly of infantrymen would have been over 36,500 cash a year, as was estimated by Chu-fu Yen (ca. 180–122 B.C.), an adviser of Han Wu-ti in the 120s B.C. For an expeditionary cavalry force, the cost would have been prohibitively high—about 150,000 in cash per soldier. Thus, it became clear to the emperor and his close economic advisers, such as Sang Hung-yang (Sang Hung-hsiang, 152–80 B.C.) and others, that, although the empire was militarily ready to resolve the Hsiung-nu challenge early in his reign, economically it was not—not ready for the cost of extended military operations and not ready for the extraordinarily high cost of large-scale colonization of new territories acquired from the Hsiung-nu and their allies. Special and extraordinary measures intended to provide economic and financial support for these undertakings would have to be contrived to meet the challenge. This is exactly what Wu-ti did before and during his grand military campaigns and

colonial ventures, which began in 129 B.C. and lasted for forty years. He first initiated the sale of specially designed military aristocratic ranks (*wu-kung chueh*), and then in 119 B.C. he recruited two extraordinary financial talents, Tung-kuo Hsien-yang, a salt tycoon from Ch'i, and K'ung Chin, an iron baron from Nan-yang, to join Sang Hung-yang, a brilliant financial mind from a billionaire merchant family of Lo-yang (Honan) who had served as a court attendant since 140 B.C. at the age of twelve (thirteen *sui*), to devise unusual economic plans and financial policies and implement extraordinary tax and market schemes to meet the military expenses. These included the following.

- 123 B.C. Instituted *Wu-kung chueh* (Aristocratic Ranks for Military Merit) for sale at a range of prices in gold, as shown in table 2.

TABLE 2. Prices of Aristocratic Ranks for Military Merit

	Aristocratic Rank Order (low to high)	Price (in catties of gold)
First	Tsao-shih	170,000
Second	Hsien-yü wei	190,000
Third	Liang-shih	210,000
Fourth	Yuan-jung-shih	230,000
Fifth	Kuan-shou	250,000
Sixth	Ping-tuo	270,000
Seventh	Ch'ien-fu	290,000
Eighth	Yueh-ch'ing	310,000
Ninth	Chih-jung	330,000
Tenth	Cheng-li shu-chang	350,000
Eleventh	Chün-wei	370,000

- 119 B.C. (?) Instituted a new "tax on children under seven" (*k'ou-ch'ien*), which required children of two to five years (three to six *sui*) to pay a tax of three coins every year.
- 119 B.C. Instituted an income tax at 2 percent, estate tax at 1 percent, commercial tax at 2 percent, capital tax at 3 percent, loan tax at 6 percent, rental tax at 2 percent, special taxes on merchants' property at 2 percent, handicraft tax at 2 percent, luxury taxes on expensive carriages (2 percent for general public and 4 percent for merchants) and a tax on boats of longer than 5 *chang* (about 39 feet) at 2 percent.
- 119 B.C. Imposed a government monopoly over salt and iron.
- 118 B.C. Standardized *wu-shu* coins (3.175 grams) as a monetary unit.

- 115 B.C. Imposed monopoly on coinage by central government only; all local governments were forbidden to mint coins.
- 115 B.C. Established the Office of Standardization of Prices by Tax Substitutes (*chün-shu*), which required taxpayers to offer special local products needed by the government instead of cash or grain so that the government could control the market prices of such products.
- 115 B.C. Established the Office of Equalization of Prices through Transportation (*p'ing-chun*) to standardize prices by selling commodities in the possession of the state in times of high market prices and by purchasing commodities in times of low market prices.
- 114 B.C. Instituted a tax on livestock (2 percent of total value annually).
- 98 B.C. Imposed a government monopoly over wine (liquor).

In addition, the government required people to contribute oxen for frontier agricultural enterprises, it started to control sea and mountain products, and it increased the land tax from one-thirtieth to one-fifteenth of total value. Furthermore, the government began to increase the sale of regular aristocratic ranks and allowed criminals and slaves to purchase their freedom in either cash or grain. Evidently, all of these schemes were successful. The annual grain revenue from the east alone increased to 6 million *shih*, and the government reserve of silk in the *chün-shu* system increased by 5 million *p'i* (30.5 feet). But the most compelling proof was the fact that almost all of Wu-ti's grand expansion and colonization projects enjoyed unprecedented levels of success for over forty years.⁵⁴ The magnitude of the financial and human costs, however, was truly beyond the historical parameters of human imagination.

Han Wu-ti thus created a new Chinese empire, but it was the social and economic growth of the seventy years that preceded his reign, from Emperor Kao to his father Emperor Ching and the first ten years of his reign that made his grand military campaigns and territorial expansions possible.

NEW LEADER, NEW IDEOLOGY, AND NEW SOCIETY

Although the Han succeeded the Ch'in in dynastic and institutional terms, the two ruling houses came from different worlds. The Ch'in was an old Chou feudal state and became the ruler of the Chinese empire by conquering all the others. But the Han founder Liu Pang, from the Ch'u region, was a commoner, of no aristocratic pedigree; although he was able to defeat other contenders and

the powerful Ch'u aristocrat Hsiang Yü (232–202 B.C.) to become the founder of a new dynasty, he had no experience in ruling an empire and could not control it without making compromises and concessions to other power groups. It took decades, as discussed earlier, for the Han to consolidate its control of the new empire. In 141 B.C., when Liu Ch'e became the emperor at the age of fifteen (sixteen *sui*), he still faced four major issues for the Han empire: (1) the reformation of Chinese social structure under the Han imperial system; (2) the long-range direction of the Han empire after sixty years of successful reconstruction since 202 B.C.; (3) the formulation of a new state ideology to replace the Ch'in practice of harsh Legalism and the early Han Huang-Lao doctrines as the ideological guidance for the future development of the Han state; and (4) the molding of a new paradigm of imperial leadership to establish the Han ritual and historical legitimacy, to govern the state and its huge centralized bureaucracy, and to care for All under Heaven. Of the four, the last was the most critical, for unless he was an imperial leader with Heaven's mandate he could not engineer the other three.

YOUNG PRINCE LIU CH'E

Liu Ch'e ("Liu, the Quick-Minded"; original name Liu Chih, "Liu, the Mild-Minded") was the tenth son of Ching-ti, and at the time of his birth he seemed to have no chance to become Ch'ing-ti's successor.⁵⁵ By the long-established rule of imperial succession, an emperor's successor must be his eldest son by his official wife (*ti*, the empress or queen) if she had a son. In Liu Ch'e's case, his mother, Wang Chih, was only a concubine, generally referred to by the title *fu-jen* (lady), and ranked fifth out of the fourteen grades of the palace ladies, specifically titled *mei-jen* (elegant lady), corresponding to the position of a governor, with an annual salary of 2,000 *shih* while a Lady of the first grade was equal to the position of a prime minister, with an annual salary of 10,000 *shih*.⁵⁶ Furthermore, before her admittance to the palace Lady Wang had been married to a man named Chin Wang-sun and given birth to a daughter named Chin Su. However, once she was in the palace, her problematic personal background had not prevented Wang Chih from scheming to become Ching-ti's empress. She gave birth to a son in the summer of 156 B.C. when Ching-ti was in the first year of his twenty-three-year reign. She conspired with Ching-ti's elder sister, the grand princess of Kuan-t'ao (Liu P'iao) and promised her son's marriage to her daughter Ch'en A-chiao. In early 150 B.C., she schemed with Emperor Ching to disgrace her main rival, Lady Li, the mother of the imperial heir apparent (*huang t'ai-tzu*), Liu Jung, established in 153 B.C. since the official empress, Po, established in 156 B.C., had no son, had lost the emperor's favor, and was dismissed in 151 B.C. The established heir apparent (Liu Jung) was dismissed in

early March 150 B.C. Three months later, on June 6, Lady Wang was installed as the new empress. Her son Liu Ch'e was established, at seven *sui* (six years of age), as the new imperial heir apparent twelve days later. Nine years later, Liu Ch'e ascended the imperial throne, to become Wu-ti (Emperor Wu), when Emperor Ching died on March 10, 141 B.C. Wu ruled China for the next fifty-four years, the longest imperial reign in Chinese history until the Manchu Ch'ing dynasty (A.D. 1644–1911).

Thus, in the first seven years of his life Liu Ch'e had lived with daily palace intrigues, continuing conspiracies, and collusion between his scheming and combative mother and her allies on one side and their rivals on the other; hidden, life-threatening cabals among the princes, who aspired to the imperial succession; and a distant father, who saw him infrequently and showed no affection. This was the environment of Liu Ch'e's childhood, and those experiences were to shape in significant ways his character as a man. Almost all contemporary sources recorded that Liu Ch'e was born quick-minded and strong-willed and with an unusual mental faculty for memorization. This is his natural or inherent character, but what he learned and observed in his childhood formed his other character traits. In Liu Ch'e's mind, his life experiences had taught him that in protecting his own life he could never be too suspicious or brutal; that besides his mother no one, especially those in high places, could be trusted; that the virtue of a woman, and for that matter all humans, has nothing to do with social and educational background, his mother being his manifest model; that his father was not interested in him because he had other ladies and children to care for; and that, as his father demonstrated, a ruler's power is absolute and arbitrary. These traits began to manifest themselves in Liu Ch'e's imperial leadership after he ascended the throne. First, he honored his mother's agreement with his aunt, the grand princess of Kuan-t'ao, and made her daughter, Ch'en A-chiao, his empress, although he never liked her. To show his deep affection for his mother, he surprised her by bringing his half sister Chin Su to the palace, ignoring the possible moral implications of his actions, which would openly acknowledge his mother's first marriage. Furthermore, in 139 B.C. the young emperor also demonstrated his total obedience to Grand Empress Dowager Tou (T'ai-huang t'ai-hou, ca. 208–135 B.C.), his father's mother, even at the expense of sacrificing his two most trusted Confucian tutors and political confidants, Chao Wan (ca. 200–139 B.C.) and Wang Tsang (ca. 210–139 B.C.). When the young emperor began his reign in November 141 B.C., he had appointed a new cabinet whose high-ranking ministers were all devoted Confucianists and sympathizers or followers of high Confucian political ideals with emphasis on the primacy of people's livelihood and mutual respect between the ruler and his ministers and officials. This marked a departure from the cabinet of his father, who under the tutelage of his mother, Empress Dowager Tou, a

devoted follower of the Huang-Lao doctrines, had generally followed the principles of Huang-Lao political doctrines, which placed emphasis on a passive and noninterventionist government (*ch'ing-ching wu-wei*) on one hand and Legalist administrative practices (*hsing-ming*) on the other. The leading advocates of the newly instituted political ideology were Wang Tsang and Chao Wan. The latter memorialized the emperor, in December 141 B.C., to ban the poisonous teachings of Legalism (*fa-chia*), Huang-Lao doctrines, and the Eclecticism (*tsa-chia*) and again advised, in November 139 B.C., that the emperor, now at the age of eighteen *sui*, should no longer refer government matters to grand Empress Dowager Tou. This triggered the inevitable. The grand empress dowager ordered that Wang and Chao be imprisoned and killed (by way of committing suicide) and that Chancellor Tou Ying (ca. 200–131 B.C.), her cousin, and Grand Commandant T'ien Fen (ca. 185–131 B.C.), her half brother by her mother Tsang Erh's second marriage and Emperor Wu's uncle, be dismissed. To all this, Emperor Wu raised no voice of disagreement, just acting as a filially pious and obedient grandson. In fact, for the next five years his reign remained under the shadow of the grand empress dowager and never revived its Confucianist political and administrative enterprise. On June 29, 135 B.C., the grand empress dowager died, and Emperor Wu immediately restored his Confucianist administrative undertaking by reappointing T'ien Fen as chancellor and ordering local officials to recommend Confucianists, known as men of filial piety (*hsiao*) and incorruptibility (*lien*), to the court as candidates for offices. As a result, several hundred such men were recommended and appointed to appropriate offices. Upon T'ien Fen's advice, Emperor Wu banned the teaching of Huang-Lao doctrines and other non-Confucian schools of thought. A new era of the dominance of Confucianism began. Thus, Emperor Wu's ambitions in advancing Confucian political ideals never abated during the five years from 139 to 135 B.C. He just "temporarily" repressed them in face of Grand Empress Dowager Tou's opposition. This action clearly shows how Emperor Wu's character was conditioned in his childhood: his unusual affection for female elders, his sense of insecurity in the face of severe challenges, and his obedience and loyalty to older females in close relationships. In the same light, after the death of Grand Empress Dowager Tou he remained the utmost affectionate, obedient, and devoted son to his mother, who exerted tremendous influence on Han politics until her death in 126 B.C. For instance, it was through her protection that the incompetent, vicious, and corrupt T'ien Fen remained in the position of chancellor while rivals such as Tou Ying suffered beheading as a result of his slander.

Liu Ch'e's inability to stand up to his beloved but awesome female elders perhaps placed undue psychological pressure on his inner psyche, so great that he gradually became bisexual. Among his many attractive male partners, the

most famous were Han Yen, the illegitimate great-grandson of King Han Hsin under Emperor Kao; and Li Yen-nien, a castrated singer and Lady Li's brother. Contemporary sources recorded that starting in his mid-twenties Emperor Wu regularly slept with Han and after Han's death with Li. And he rewarded both lavishly: Han, a military and learned man, was granted the title Senior Grand Master (*shang ta-fu*), a rank with one of the highest annual salaries; and Li, an unusually gifted popular musician, was granted the rank of "two thousand bushels of grain" (*erh-ch'ien shih*), equal to that of a high minister next only to the state chancellor (*ch'eng-hsiang*). But in the end Wu's mother, Empress Dowager Wang, killed Han, despite the emperor's pleas for his life. Later Emperor Wu killed Li and his family out of jealousy over Li's sexual encounters with palace ladies. Emperor Wu's mental predicament under two strong-willed and powerful women was much like what happened to his great-grandfather, Liu Pang (Emperor Kao), the founder of the Han dynasty; and his granduncle, Liu Ying (Emperor Hui), the second emperor of the Han dynasty, who were under the dominance of a shrewd, ambitious, and brutal woman, Lü Chih (Empress Lü), Emperor Kao's wife and Emperor Hui's mother, and the third ruler of the Han dynasty. Although Liu Pang and his son Liu Ying were two drastically different characters and under different psychological circumstances, both had male sex partners and openly required their most regular intimate male lovers, Chi Ju and Hung Ju, respectively, to wear makeup (*chih-fen*, cosmetics) in the palace. Emperor Hui's case was most like Emperor Wu's, for he ascended the throne at the age of sixteen (seventeen *sui*) under the total dominance of his mother, Empress Lü, and enjoyed no independence in either political and marital affairs. At twenty-two (twenty-three *sui*) he died of mental depression, the result of psychological frustration and sexual anxiety. But Emperor Wu's strong will and early experience with palace struggles won out, and he survived his mother, who died in 126 B.C., to achieve greatness in the next forty years of his fifty-four-year reign. Although there had been a tradition of female dominance in the Han Court since the time of Empress Lü and seven of the ten adult male official rulers of the Western Han dynasty were bisexual, none but Emperor Wu went on to reshape the structure and territory of the empire and change the course of history. In the long historical perspective, he is the only great ruler in Chinese history in whom sex, gender, politics, and empire had become so intertwined that they had a great impact on Chinese history and civilization.

Emperor Wu's sentimental and emotional identification with his mother perhaps went beyond filial obedience and fear of elder female relatives. In his life, he had six palace ladies as his wives—including his first empress, Ch'en Achiao; his second empress, Wei Tzu-fu; and the Ladies Li, Wang, Yin, and Chao. All but one, Empress Ch'en, came from peasant families and lowly *ch'ang*

(entertainers) class. As was pointed out earlier, Empress Ch'en was his aunt's daughter and the marriage was part of the political deal made by his mother. But she never had the love of the emperor and was dismissed in 130 B.C., following a witchcraft and black magic scandal, without having produced a male heir.⁵⁷ Of the five commoners, two ladies, Wei and Li, were actually lowly singers. Not since the reign of the founder, Emperor Kao, who started as a peasant rebel, had nearly all the court ladies been of common descent. Little is known about Ladies Wang and Yin, who both died young without any record of their relations with the Emperor. Lady Chao, whose official title was *chieh-yü* (favorite beauty, lady of the second rank, marchioness, equivalent of marquis in nobility), also known as Lady Kou-i, arrived in the emperor's last years in 90 B.C. and was condemned by him and died in 88 B.C. Wei and Li were the two women with whom the emperor was truly romantically involved. Lady Wei was made an empress in 128 B.C. and lived for another thirty-eight years. Lady Li died very young, soon after her encounter with the emperor, but it was for her that the emperor composed the immortal and emotional lyrics and poems with such profound musical refinement to record their lasting love and deepest feelings, all marking his deep cultivation and talent in music and his poetic genius and sensibilities about life and its transience and inconstancy. Emperor Wu's expression of human affection and attachment was so deep and moving that it seems to show that the lady temporarily became a displacement of his mother in love and sentimental attachment. In his love for both Wei and Li, the emperor seems to have gone all the way to prove that social background and traditional ethical standards were irrelevant to the nobility and placement of a woman, as had been proved by his own mother, so as to erase all sense of the shame and humiliation that his mother had suffered in her early days in the palace of the imperial heir apparent, Liu Ch'i, the later Emperor Ching.

On the other hand, Emperor Wu's cold relations with his father in his childhood affected his conduct as a young emperor. For instance, all Han emperors before him had made special efforts to compose official laudatory glorifications of their predecessors upon their ascension to the throne, such as Emperor Hui to Emperor Kao, Emperor Wen to Emperor Kao, and Emperor Ching to Emperor Wen. But upon his succession Emperor Wu made no mention of his father's achievements. This was an unusual departure from past imperial family traditions, and even his son, Emperor Chao (Liu Fu-ling, r. 87–74 B.C.), took exception. The lack of close relations with his father also deprived him of the necessary guidance for proper conduct with other men, including ruler-minister relations. At the same time, as a child in the palace he saw the danger of the brutal struggle among imperial princes and observed his father's exercise of arbitrary power in punishing, dismissing, and even killing imperial princes and court ladies at the slightest hint of improper conduct or scandalous involve-

ments, such as the cases of Empress P'o, Lady Li, and the imperial heir apparent Li (Liu Ch'ü, his son). All this grew in him the most harmful character traits. In his early reign, this character of his—arrogant, aggressive, and brutal—seems to have been effectively restrained under the guidance of two strong-willed and powerful women, his grandmother, Grand Empress Dowager Tou, and his mother, Empress Dowager Wang, but after their deaths (Tou in 135 B.C. and Wang in 126 B.C.), at the age of thirty *sui*, the age of independence in traditional Chinese life, he lost the sense of security and the invisible force of restraint as well. He was on his way to becoming the most brutal and neurotic ruler in Chinese history (legendary figures excluded). For instance, from 124 B.C., when he appointed the first chancellor after his mother's death, to 90 B.C., when he began to experience periodic mental breakdowns, he had in his service seven chancellors, five of whom were killed on his orders, one by cutting the body in half and four by forced suicide either in prison or at home: Li Ts'ai (four years in the post, 121–118 B.C.), Yen Ch'ing-ti (four years, 118–115 B.C.), Chao Chou (four years, 115–112 B.C.), Kung-sun Ho (thirteen years, 103–90 B.C.), and Liu Ch'ü-li (eleven months, 91–90 B.C.). The two luckiest ones died in office because of old age, the first Kung-sun Hung (four years in the post, 124–121 B.C.) at the age of seventy-nine *sui* (200–121 B.C.), and the second Shih Ch'ing (nine years, 112–103 B.C.) at eighty-three *sui* (ca. 183–103 B.C.).⁵⁸

Of all the character traits developed during Wu-ti's childhood in the palace, none was more disastrous than his sense of insecurity and neurotic anxiety about possible palace conspiracies aimed at seizing the imperial throne from a vested imperial power, be it the throne itself or its pathway, the position of heir apparent. In his later years, this anxiety began to haunt him beyond reason. In the summer and autumn of 91 B.C., an incident involving witchcraft and black magic took place, a long-established superstitious belief in the palace often used by helpless palace ladies in the futile effort to eliminate rivals by means of magic powers. It occurred in the early reign of Emperor Wu, in 130 B.C., and led to the fall of Empress Ch'en and the killing of more than three hundred people. But this time it was provoked by the emperor's paranoia and insecurity-induced anxiety over a suspected coup d'état by his imperial heir apparent of thirty-one years, his beloved Empress Wei of thirty-eight years, and his daughters Princess of Chu-i and Princess Yang-shih by Wei. In the end, the heir apparent, the empress, and the princesses all died, together with the killing of thirty thousand others and many high-ranking officials, including the imperial secretary (vice chancellor) P'u Sheng-chih (committed suicide) and the imperial director of uprightness T'ien Jen (body cut in half). This was clearly the greatest dynastic disaster and personal tragedy in the emperor's life. It happened when he was sixty-seven *sui* (sixty-six years), and he never recovered. Three years later, in 87

B.C., he died, but not before he had ordered in 88 B.C. the killing of Lady Chao, the mother of his six-year-old son, Fu-ling, the future Emperor Chao (r. 87–74 B.C.).

In review, the experiences of child prince Liu Ch'e shaped his primary character traits, which were to shape the conduct of Emperor Wu in human relations and sensibilities and interpersonal interactions. But the formation and growth of Emperor Wu's personality would be largely determined by education with a special curriculum. The process started when he was chosen as the imperial heir apparent in 150 B.C. at seven *sui* and lasted at least until 141 B.C., when he was enthroned as his father's successor. In those ten years he had defined what he wanted to be as an emperor in the context of the larger world that he was to rule and in view of his inherent mental and physical endowments, psychic energy, and conditioned character traits in childhood. He had also defined his preferences, aspirations, and ultimate goal in life as the ruler of the Han empire. As Liu Ch'e grew up as the imperial heir apparent, he could not but be alarmed to see that his Han world was under continuing threat from the Hsiung-nu in the north, and that his father, the emperor of the great Han, had been forced to send imperial princesses with food of various kinds and other valuable materials to buy peace with the Hsiung-nu under the system of *ho-ch'in* (peace treaty by marriage). But the Hsiung-nu continued to raid along the Han borders. Liu Ch'e was also taught that the *ho-ch'in* system had originated with the founder of the Han empire, his great-grandfather Emperor Kao, after he was defeated and shamed at P'ing-ch'eng (northeast of Ta-t'ung, Shansi) by the Hsiung-nu leader Mo-tun (Modun or Modu, 209–174 B.C.) in January of 200 B.C. In his proud young mind, Liu Ch'e felt that this was the greatest shame for his ancestor and the Han nation. As he later declared so forcefully, he vowed to avenge Emperor Kao for the Han empire and Chinese civilization.⁵⁹

As imperial heir apparent, Liu Ch'e was tutored by masters of Huang-Lao doctrines and Confucianism, by scholars who were versed in Han laws and the art of administration, and by specially selected literary talents. After considerable education in these political ideologies and ideals, he was influenced most by the Confucian ideals of "universal kingship" (*sheng-wang*) and harmonious "interaction between Heaven and man" (*T'ien-jen chih-ho*), such as those noble political, ethical, and cultural visions personified by the model rules of such sage-kings as Yao (T'ang), Shun (Yü), Yü (Hsia), T'ang (Shang), and Wen and Wu (Chou) in the past. All of them had achieved in Chung-kuo (China), so said the legends, sage rule through practice of the highest ethical and cultural ideas and principles (*nei-sheng, li-i*) and by transforming the mental constitution and temper of the people through the use of elegant music (*yueh*); they also extended their high culture and civilized lifestyle by means of their profound compassion and noble sense of humanity (*jen* and *te*) to the unfortunate "bar-

barians" beyond the borders of Chung-kuo and attached them to the great "world empire" of a new China.⁶⁰

Liu Ch'e's primary vision of imperial leadership in identifying himself with the great legendary and Chou sage-kings represents a break with the past Han rulers such as his grandfather Emperor Wen and his father Emperor Ching. Not only did he want to avenge the shame of his great-grandfather Emperor Kao's defeat in P'ing-ch'eng, but he also wanted to conquer the barbarians outside the established boundaries of China (the Han empire proper). The young prince thus set the grand plan for his coming long reign with all the confidence and arrogance of his imperial personality. He set out to personify the noble and ambitious Confucian ideal of "universal kingship" and even to outshine the great achievements of the past sage-kings and his secret role model, the First Emperor of the Ch'in (Shih huang-ti, 221–210 B.C.).

But first he needed a specific ideological framework within which to reach his goal of universal kingship. He had to select the theoretical foundational elements of his imperial ideal from the many schools of thought passed down to him from Ch'in and pre-Ch'in times (pre-221 B.C.) and the early reigns of his own dynasty.

THE INTELLECTUAL HERITAGE

As they were primarily concerned with political consolidation and economic recovery, the early Han rulers could devote little attention to the issue of state ideology and intellectual revival after the devastating years of war and destruction during the Ch'in-Han transition (208–202 B.C.). However, as the Han founder Liu Pang (Emperor Kao) and his advisers adopted Ch'in political and legal institutions and social and economic systems, with modifications of various sorts, they naturally inherited the philosophies, ideas, and ideological doctrines that had induced and fermented these institutions and systems—in essence, centralization, bureaucratization, imperial authoritarianism, and agriculturalism, that is, a centralized state with a strict bureaucratic administrative system and a highly organized and controlled agricultural society. But political and economic conditions at the beginning of the new Han regime had forced the Han leaders to modify the harshness of the Ch'in legal instruments and to institute a limited feudal system (*wang-kuo*, *chu-hou wang*) to protect the interests of the ruling house from possible regional hegemony and to satisfy the demands of Liu Pang's chief assistants and major allies, who had helped him found the new dynasty. In the end, ideologically the Han Emperor did not remove the infamous ban on non-Legalist schools of thought and the order of "burning books" instituted in 213 B.C., not until his son Emperor Hui did it ten years later in 191 B.C.; economically and socially, he had made a special effort

to promote agriculturalism by distributing land to the populace and officials of all classes; and in its general administrative and governing policy the Han Court advanced a hands-off, noninterventionist, laissez-faire approach—generally referred to in Han times as *yü-min hsiu-hsi*, “let the people recover (from war and destruction) without government interference.”⁶¹ In the larger contour of the ideological structure in the first reigns of the Han dynasty, the hidden picture of the Han system seems to manifest the working of three intellectual lines: Legalism (institutions and practical administration), Confucianism (moral and ritual order, agricultural primacy), and Taoism (the noninterventionist overall policy of Han rule), and, as history shows, the three ideological lines had operated together to deliver great success to the first phase, reconstruction, of the new Han regime under its first ruler.⁶² But as time went on the new dynasty would need new and more clearly formulated ideological guidelines to meet the growing foreign challenges from the Hsiung-nu in the north and to direct its domestic economic growth and social restructuring. The Han had a great wealth of intellectual sources and talented thinkers for advanced development of a new ideological structure of the Han state and the Han empire as well.

When the Ch'in empire was founded under the First Emperor (Shih Huang-ti) in 221 B.C., it inherited a world of the richest and most diverse philosophies and thoughts on state, society, economics, culture, and the military in Chinese history. This was the world, from the seventh to the third centuries B.C., commonly and variously referred to as the Golden Age of Chinese Thought, the Era of One Hundred Schools of Thought, or the Age of the Various Great Philosophers and One Hundred Schools (*chu-tzu pai-chia*). In the large domain of political philosophy and ideals, the various schools in pre-Ch'in (pre-221 B.C.) times included nine major groups conveniently and misleadingly designated in Han times, in about 100 B.C., as *Ju* (Confucianism), *Mo* (Mohism), *Tao* (Taoism), *Fa* (Legalism), *Ming* (Nominalism, the Logicians, Debaters, Dialecticians), *Ping* (Military Science), *Nung* (Agriculturalism), *Tsa* (Eclecticism or Encyclopedism) and *Tsung-heng* (Sophism; Strategists, Diplomatic Orators, Essayists, Court Advisers).⁶³ Regarding the nature, functions, and purposes of the state and its main arm of operation, the government, the various groups offer different starting points.

First, we will examine the Confucians.⁶⁴ With its long intellectual traditions going back to the late Shang and the Western Chou, Confucianism had its first intellectual framework of statecraft formulated by Confucius (K'ung fu-tzu, K'ung Tzu; K'ung Ch'iu, 551–479 B.C.) and then was revised by Mencius (Meng Tzu, Meng fu-tzu; Meng K'o, ca. 372–289 B.C.) and Hsun Tzu (Hsun Ch'ing, Sun Ch'ing, or Hsun K'uang, ca. 313–235 B.C.). Confucius placed the *raison d'être* of government, whatever its origin and form, at establishing and maintaining a well-structured political and social order for a state. This order

was achieved through a hierarchy of blood and nonblood relationships, which defined the obligations and responsibilities as well as the rights and privileges of members in the loop of this hierarchy of relationships. For a practical understanding of this theory, one can look at the hierarchical structure of the series of father and son, parents and children, elders and juniors in kin and blood relationships and the series of ruler-subjects, ruler-ministers, husband and wife, and teacher-students in nonblood relationships. Each of the hierarchical pairs defines the models of obligations versus privileges and responsibilities versus rights. Under such a cardinal conceptual structure, Confucius advanced his basic principles of statecraft and social order. To Confucius, while the authority and power of a government could be traced to political traditions and cultural and institutional superstructures (*li*, *li-yueh*) of the past, such as the Hsia-Shang and early Chou enterprises in the case of Eastern Chou, the maintenance and advancement of that authority and power for promoting order, peace, and welfare for the people (*ai-jen*) under its rule would depend almost exclusively on the upholding and full actualization of the set hierarchy of relationships in question. The instrument for actualizing the purposes and ambitions of this hierarchy was, as articulated by Confucius, *cheng-ming*, or “ratification of names (or labels),” the measure employed to achieve the proper correspondence between *name* (appellation) and *reality* (content). The name defines the place where a member in a set hierarchy stands and the reality fixes the domain of that member’s obligations and responsibilities (functions and duties) and privileges and rights (expectant results). In practical political terms, the name is one’s official title for an officeholder and the reality is what the office entails in privileges and obligations (duties) and, above all, how that officeholder should function properly and truthfully. Such hierarchical structures of relationships would extend from individual families to groups of families (society) to the state and groups of states (T’ien-hsia, All under Heaven). The rules that define the correct and proper conduct of such groups and the model behavior of the members within them are collectively termed *li*. The clearest manifestations of the *li* in any group are institutional structures and ritual and ceremonial performances that are designed to characterize and reflect the distinctions in position and station (*ming-fen*, *fen*) among the members of a group. The ultimate goal for such a system is to bring order and prosperity to the state and welfare and well-being to the people. This action is generalized ideally as *jen-cheng* (benevolent and conscientious rule). Confucius also held that the actualization of such a noble ideal should be in the hands of the ruler and his ruling groups of “superior men” (*chün-tzu*, literally, “sons of aristocrats”) with inherited status and station. A common man could become a superior man through education but only rarely did so. What, then, would give the rulers the political conscience to carry out *jen-cheng*? For this, Confucius seems to have appealed by implication to an a

priori assumption that humans are born with a natural moral conscience of goodness (*hsing-shan*), even though he never declared that this is so. This most basic concept and axiomatic assumption in Confucianism was first eloquently argued and formulated by Confucius's most important follower, Mencius, more than one hundred years later.

Having turned Confucius's implicit conception of innate goodness in human nature into a verified universal truth, Mencius, tremendously influenced by his age of political disorder, social change, and destructive wars, moved to define the central agents of achieving the *jen-cheng* enterprise by reason of his new conceptualization of human nature as possessing an innate goodness so perfect that everyone is gifted with the moral ability to become Yao and Shun, legendary sage-kings, the personification of perfect moral sagehood. Based on Confucius's cardinal understanding of moral innate goodness as the primary fountain of all virtues (*hsien*) and abilities (*neng*), he argued that all humans are born equal in this context, thus inferring that being virtuous, talented, and able was not connected to a person's inherited status and station by birth and that a commoner should be equally capable of becoming the agent of *jen-cheng* if he is given the correct political education and specialized training in the technical skills needed for an assigned task. To Mencius, the agents required to induce and promote *jen-cheng* should include both the hereditary *chün-tzu* and commoners with special qualifications since all humans are born with moral innate goodness. In fact, he argued that a state could not survive in his time of wars and conquests if the ruler did not make an effort to advance, without consideration of hereditary status, the talented and able to offices and positions of service. When necessary, the ruler should choose a specially qualified commoner over a less qualified hereditary *chün-tzu* for an important office. Mencius, however, stopped short of putting up the noble and bold theory that, whereas moral virtue is innate for all humans, talent, ability, and other virtues have nothing to do with an individual's birth and hereditary status or class background. Instead, he advised rulers about the primacy of the people (*min*, the populace) in a state, and in his case *min* clearly meant commoners. He further held that the constitution of a state is defined by three critical elements (people, land, and government); that in a state the people are of first importance, gods and their worship rank next, and the ruler comes last; and that a state cannot survive without the loyal allegiance of the people. Therefore, Mencius stressed that the primary responsibility of a ruler is the advancement of the well-being of the people and that a ruler can achieve this goal by following the principles of *jen-cheng*: lighter taxation (*po shui-shu*), a reduction in legal punishments (*sheng hsing-fa*), promotion of agriculture (*shen-keng i-nou*), and encouragement of artisans and merchants to produce necessary nonagricultural products and distribute and exchange regional and specialized agricultural goods (*t'ung-kung i-shih*). Men-

cius then advanced the political idea that the ruler alone cannot reach the goal of *jen-cheng*. He must operate within a hierarchy of power distributed among a special group of people. In other words, he must delegate his power and authority among a class of ruling elite, including the existing aristocrats and newly elevated talented, worthy, and able commoners. The composition of the ruling elite would consist of educated people with special virtues, talents, and skills who characteristically work with the mind (*lao-hsin*) and are empowered with ordered grades and positions by the ruler to govern and guide the rest of the people in the state such as food producers and providers of labor and other types of services who characteristically work with their hands (*lao-li*). Although Mencius's "mind class" includes commoners and aristocrats, all the members of this ruling class function in a hierarchical structure: first, they all are under the authority of the ruler, the final arbiter of power and authority; and, second, within a class individuals or members of subclasses all work under the principle of superior-subordinate relationships to perform their appropriately assigned duties and receive their appropriately measured rewards (salaries and privileges). For all intents and purposes, the government system so construed is a bureaucracy, or at least a partial bureaucracy, based largely on the principle of meritocracy. In promoting this idea, Mencius chose to deviate from the basic precepts of Confucius's statecraft, whose ultimate goal was the restoration of the disintegrating Chou political-social order. What Mencius proposed was the establishment of a new class structure and a government system based on the principle of meritocracy. In a way, he "modernized" the original Confucian framework of statecraft, which no longer made sense in the new political world of the fourth century B.C., a time of political chaos, military destruction and conquest, and greater social mobility.

In his new theory of statecraft, Mencius also made the two domains of nonkin/blood and kin/blood relationships into two separate categories of political, social, and ethical concern: the former is the "public domain" (*kung*) and the latter the "private domain" (*ssu*). This was another departure from Confucius's original touchstone of statecraft, and it broke down the structural framework of the old Chou feudal order, which had taken "familial" relationships as its primary foundation of all principles and precepts directing and guiding its political, economic, social, military, and religious functions. Under such a system, there exists no line of division between public and private undertakings and affairs. Furthermore, Mencius also advanced the theory of "mutual respect" as the operational guideline for the class of nonkin/blood relationships (the public domain). In his view, quite different from Confucius's, this class of relationships would still be based on the principle of hierarchy—such as senior/junior, ruler/ministers, and ruler/subjects—but the superiors and subordinates must have mutual respect in addition to the assumed ordered relation-

ships. For example, if a ruler failed to grant the due respect to his ministers, officials, or subjects, then the latter had no responsibility to respect the ruler and could be accorded by historical tradition the natural rights to overthrow him, such as happened with King T'ang of the Shang over King Chieh of the Hsia and King Wu of the Chou over King Chou (Hsin) of the Shang. As will be discussed later, this Mencian view clearly was influenced by Mo Ti's (ca. 479–438 B.C.) theory of the "social covenant" about a century before. In this view, Mencius anticipated the later "social contract theory" by almost twenty-one hundred years.⁶⁵ The state to Mencius was no longer a huge aggregate of families governed by historical traditions and long-established principles (private domain); it was now defined as a group of people governed under a well-organized administrative and governing apparatus within a fixed territory. The ruler and the ruled thus worked together on the premise of a "contractual relationship," at least for the constituency of commoners. To achieve this end, there must first of all be "harmony" (*ho*) among the classes and within each class. Mencius believed that the practice of "mutual respect" was the first principle to follow; only through this ethical verity could members of the classes and a society at large observe Confucius's ultimate touchstone of *li*—*chung*, (loyalty) and *shu* (compassionate understanding and forgiveness). In addition, he voiced the principle of *i* (justice and fairness) as the fundamental rule in dealing with horizontal and vertical human relations in both state and family affairs. To Mencius, the highest verity in all human affairs, the noble and divine *tao*, consists of the twin ethical precepts *jen* and *i*, which would be the primary guiding ethical precepts for any government practicing *jen-cheng*.

Unlike Confucius, Mencius further held that the ultimate measure of a great ruler is not the restoration of an old political order of the past, such as that of the Western Chou, but the creation of a new world order by unifying all states of the T'ien-hsia, All under Heaven, through moral persuasions of *jen*, *i*, and *li*—the main force of cultural and social transformation in his new statecraft—and the support of the people. Never by any military means would a ruler who accomplished this noble goal deserve to be respected as a *sheng-wang*, sage-king—the ultimate aspiration of all great kings of the past, present, and future.⁶⁶

Hsun Tzu, the third architect of Confucianism, lived in the third century B.C.—an age of increasing social mobility, pressures for the unification of all T'ien-hsia, and growing bureaucratization of government.⁶⁷ Reflecting the influence of his age, Hsun Tzu advanced his theory of statecraft by modifying, clarifying, and refining Mencius's basic precepts and arguments, which were themselves revisions of Confucius's principal premises and fundamental tenets. First, Hsun Tzu upheld the ideal assumptions that the rulers and the government exist solely to promote the well-being of the people and that in a society the "mind class" especially should strive for the good of the class of the governed

(the “hands class”). He also argued rigorously that an individual’s talents and abilities have no connection with one’s birth and invested or inherited social station. The ruler should appoint only those individuals with appropriate talents and abilities to government positions and should evaluate them for promotion, demotion, or dismissal on the basis of their merits and demerits only. To Hsun Tzu, the most effective governing, *jen-cheng* in a state can be achieved by the practice of bureaucracy in the administrative system. He, too, held the firm belief that enlightened ruling and good governing depend on the active functioning of the high moral conscience of the individuals in power—the ruler and the senior constituent in the hierarchy of relationships in the established Confucian political and social structure. Moral conscience, to both Mencius and Hsun Tzu, consists of the total subjective ethical vision of *sheng*: compassion for and commitment to humanity (*jen*), absolute devotion to fairness and justice (*i*), specially gifted wisdom (*chih*), and instantaneous consciousness of the distinction between right and wrong in human conduct (*li*). But humans are born, Hsun Tzu believed, with natural emotions, feelings, and desires for things that are the antithesis of the ethical values of *sheng*. In other words, humans are born with an “innate evil nature” (*hsing-o*) and are not capable of making objective and just decisions that follow the dictates of *sheng* morality. Then Hsun Tzu advanced the political idea that objective rules (*fa*) are to be upheld through the specific legal means of rewards and punishments (*shang fa*), the values of *sheng* virtue. These rules are the codifications of what Hsun Tzu called *li i* (*yi*) or *li*, referring to all the established conventions and traditions of Chinese culture, institutions, and value systems molded and shaped by the enlightened teachings and just judgments of the wise kings and great sages (*hou-wang* and *hsien-sheng*) of the Hsia, Shang, and early Chou dynasties. Under this impersonal *fa* system, objective judgments and decisions could be made and justice could be achieved rather than compromised by intrinsic personal weaknesses. For the *fa* would function by assigning each form of existence, both real or imagined and concrete or abstract, a special name (*ming*) and with it the defined contents (*shih*). All judgments and decisions—as to what is correct or incorrect, right or wrong, proper or improper, ethical or unethical, and meritorious or not—would be rendered by examining the matching of *ming* and *shih*, or *cheng-ming* (rectification of names) in Confucius’s original concept. In political and social terms, each name would determine an individual’s earned distinctions (*fen*) in the society and government such as social status, government positions, and ranks in kinship networks. And one’s *fen* (a particular and defined distinction) would define one’s rights and responsibilities or privileges and duties in a particular hierarchy of political or social relationships (*ch’ün*). Adherence to or deviation from one’s *fen* in one’s conduct would also decide the apportionment of rewards or punishments by the established *fa*. However, unlike the Legalists of the time, Hsun

Tzu did not take the *fa* to be the sole means of achieving wise rule and good governance. He believed that moral persuasion (*sheng*) alone would be unable to produce *jen-cheng* because of intrinsic weaknesses in human nature; it must be assisted by another design of human mental control, the *fa*. In short, the *sheng* virtue was considered the primary means and the *fa* design the secondary. And the people should be educated by the *li i* system first to explore their potential and rectify their innate weaknesses and then to internalize the most critical components of the honored and essential values, moral standards, ideals, and ideas of their society and culture. Only when that failed or became inapplicable, could *fa* be utilized. But for every action the final goal is the actualization of the noble political ideal of *jen-cheng*.

Both Confucius and Mencius believed that Heaven (T'ien) and the supernatural world are religious entities and can affect the human world in visible and invisible ways. But Hsun Tzu believed that Heaven is just heaven, a form of concrete physical existence, never divine or sacred, and that there is no religious or metaphysical correspondence between the cosmos and the human world. Therefore, humans must assume responsibility for their actions, and the only way to actualize the Confucian *jen-cheng* ideal is by human efforts to carry out the *li i*. Hsun Tzu further held that since the goal of *jen-cheng* is to benefit as large a territory and as many people as possible it is the natural moral calling of a *sheng-wang*, a wise king with *sheng* virtues, to extend it to the whole of T'ien-hsia, the known world at the time in Hsun Tzu's conception. And that is *raison d'être* for the building of a powerful unified empire.⁶⁸

In review, the central philosophical assumptions in Confucian statecraft are that the ruler and government exist to produce order, prosperity, and security for the people and that the core of all political and socioeconomic concerns is the achievement of *jen-cheng*, whose final goal is the unification of T'ien-hsia as one empire. The basic instruments required to reach that goal include the division of human society into two domains, the public and private spheres, with each sphere functioning under the established principles of the hierarchy of relationships. The hierarchy in the public sphere is defined by an individual's talents and abilities, that is, a form of meritocracy; whereas the private sphere follows the principle of inheritance based on the order and degree in the connection and network of kin and blood relationships. Thus, the place or role of each individual in the society will be defined either by merit (in the former group) or inheritance (in the latter group), and thereby one's rights, privileges, duties, and responsibilities are determined. To make the system function properly and effectively, each individual is to be educated and cultivated in the *li* or *li i* system to play his role to its fullest extent, and if that fails the *fa* will be applied to rectify any possible deviations. The theory and construction of this Confucian system of statecraft had been gradually developed from Confucius to

Mencius and Hsun Tzu in three different centuries—the sixth, fourth, and third centuries B.C.—and reflected and informed the tremendous political, socio-economic, and intellectual changes and transformations in these centuries. By the end of the third century, the basic framework and principal ideas and ideals of Confucian statecraft had been advanced. The concrete specifics and procedures of implementation were elaborated by Hsun Tzu. Looking ahead, the Ch'in and mainly the Han put into practice the system in their T'ien-hsia, but with some additions of semireligious and ideological justifications and persuasions on its fringes—such as the formulation of the theory of correlative cosmology in affirming the divine powers of the ruler and constraining the growth of arbitrary power of the monarch—and the adoption of technical administrative and governing skills—such as effective personnel management, profitable economic and financial operations, and a fair taxation system—from other schools of political thought that prevailed of the same era.

One such school is Mohism. The first great figure of this school was Mo Ti (Mo Tzu), who lived from about 479 to 400 B.C., between Confucius and Mencius. He began his intellectual career as a follower of Confucianism.⁶⁹ Born with no aristocratic background, Mo Ti firmly held that government exists to serve the people by devoting every effort to producing the greatest good for them, including making the poor rich, the endangered secure, disorder order, and the minority equal of the majority. For the practice of governing, Mo Tzu advanced the theory of full meritocracy, in which all positions and rewards are to be made on the basis of one factor only, merit—virtue, talent, ability, and so forth—and class distinctions are to be given no role in such matters so that society can reach full equality. In a society, there should be only classification according to profession, such as artisans, farmers, and merchants, and no social stratification according to power and inheritance. He uttered this bold thought because he believed that human beings are born with no innate dispositions of any special kind and everyone is equal. Human nature is shaped by and in postbirth conditions. And he advanced an innovative theory to interpret the origin of human inequality. It starts with the foundation of the institution of the state. He contended that human society started from a primitive chaotic state in which every human being was self-centered and self-interested and engaged in fighting for his own benefits since there existed no law or government. Then the need for order and peace for collective survival led to the selection of a leader, who possessed the heavenly endowed talent to do that. Once such a leader is selected on the basis of his ability, he commands the unquestioning obedience of the people who selected him and agreed to surrender their natural rights to him. He in turn establishes a political system to maintain political order and social stability and peace and to produce welfare for people from the top to the bottom levels of the entire state. The leader, as an enlightened king or absolute sovereign,

in turn has to select men of talent (*hsien-jen*) to hold offices, so as to share the responsibilities to govern and service people. These offices are in a hierarchy of power distribution and are in rank order, from the highest three lord (*san-kung*) to the lowest ward head (*li-chang*). But all such appointments and the attendant evaluation system and process, such as the differential degrees of merits and demerits, promotion and demotion, and transfer and dismissal, have to be based on objective universal standards of virtue and ability. In the end, the state is to create a society with clearly defined distinctions of rank and position, though none is hereditary. It is Mo Ti's conception of an ideal state over a truly egalitarian society. In such society, he contends, the hungry will be fed and the cold clothed, the disturbed will have order and the old without wives or children will have means of support, and the young and weak will receive care and education. To make the idealized system of government and society work, Mo Ti and his followers, contemporary and later, such as Ch'in Ku-li (ca. 470–400 B.C.), Sung Hsing (fl. 360–290 B.C.) and Yin Wen (fl. 350–270 B.C.), devised several innovative intellectual and ideological schemes. First, there was a new definition of the Confucian term *cheng-ming* (ratification of names) and the formulation of its political and social applications to objectify the uniform standards of evaluation of human talent and worth. For each government position (office) and every rank (grade), which also served as measures of distinction in society, a specific title is given and its corresponding assigned duty is precisely spelled out. The former (specific term) is the name (*ming*), and the latter is the content (concrete object) or form or shape (*shih* or *hsing*). Such a *ming/hsing* or *ming/shih* correspondence extends to all kinds of terminology and nomenclature; that is, for every term and name there is a precise definition of its semantic connotation consisting of substance, shape, and boundary. There can be no ambiguity about the clear one-to-one correspondence between a given term or name and its referent. The Mohists also made the verification of the correspondence (*chien-hsing*) of *ming* and *hsing* (*shih*) the required measure of any action in government and society (*ming-fen*). The second most important premise is the Mohist contention that a leader's command of the loyalty and obedience of his followers is absolute (*shang-t'ung*), just as Heaven is over all the people in this world, a ruler over his subjects, superiors over subordinates, and seniors over juniors. In a way, this principle buttresses political absolutism and authoritarianism, and hence it endorsed the autocracy of the state. Third, Mo Ti's theory of statecraft and social order also postulates the coloring of his presumed blank human nature without any disposition at birth. To achieve peace and order in the world, humans, he posits, have to be taught the principle of "universal love" (*chien-ai*)—to love all human beings equally without any degree of differentiation; the teaching of pacifism—to condemn any offensive war (*fei-kung*); and the ethics of "mutual benefit" for all (*chiao-li*)—to devote selfless effort and

make self-sacrifice to produce the greatest good for all men. And all this would lead to a world of order and peace in which the hungry will be fed, the cold will be clothed, the disturbed will have order, the old without wives or children will have means of support, and the young and weak will have the care and education to grow up. Mo Ti's utopian world was what the Confucians of the third century B.C. called *ta-t'ung* (Grand Unity or One World). Finally, for the economic prosperity of the state Mo Ti proposes that moderation and austerity in expenditures should be the basic guiding principle in economic life and that every effort should be made to eliminate wastefulness and excess in life such as elaborate funerals (*chieh-tsang*), useless performances of music (*fei-yueh*), and meaningless rites and rituals.

Mo Ti lived in an age of stormy and fundamental political and social change. He advanced his theory of statecraft to follow the Confucian themes and ideals for reestablishing order and stability in his disintegrating society. Much like Confucius, he based his theory on the political traditions of the legendary sage rule of Kings Yao and Shun and cultural assumptions of the past, "the former kings" (*hsien-wang*), such as the advent of benevolence and justice in governing (*jen-cheng* in Confucian terms), the critical function of the "men of talent" (*hsien-jen*) in government and society, and the actualization of the concepts of *ming* and *shih* (*cheng-ming*). But in the end the political theory of Mo Ti and his followers surprisingly contains some elements of modern political and social thought, such as meritocracy, utilitarianism, political egalitarianism, authoritarianism, the theory of the "social covenant," pacifism, and even logical analysis and semantics. While most of these ideas and propositions did not prevail as predominant political thought and ideals in later ages, they did affect generations of political thinkers and made a strong impact on the Confucianists and thinkers of other schools in their formulation of new and innovative theories of statecraft in the third century B.C. and Ch'in-Han times. Mo Ti's theory of the social covenant particularly stands out in many profound ways in the history of political thought and in the philosophy of history as well. First, in his construction of the origins of human society, he posited that the evolution of human society from primitive chaotic state to structured organization was a wholly secular and atomistic process. Second, by that assumption he directly asserted the "free will" of human beings. Third, his premise of the selection of a leader by the people by means of a covenant in a society, and thereby the sovereign of a state by inference, indirectly rejected the long-established concept of "the divine right of kings" and the organic community. Thus, all these views were truly revolutionary in his time. Furthermore, although both Mencius and Hsun Tzu were Mo Ti's harsh critics, they each followed some of his most innovative ideas for the construction of their own intellectual and political systems. Hsun Tzu, for instance, employed Mo Ti's concept of *cheng-ming* as the founda-

tion of his legal structure in achieving political egalitarianism and educating the people to follow the *li* traditions. Mencius boldly adapted Mo Ti's assumption of the social covenant in the origins of the state to a new social contract theory by adding his supposition of "mutual respect," thus laying the theoretical grounds for a "legitimate" challenge to political absolutism, and hence he also created the ideological base for social and political egalitarianism.⁷⁰ Mencius also followed Mo Ti's idea of the primacy of the "man of talent" (man of virtue and ability) in advancing the political ideal that only merit and worth should be employed as the basis for granting social status and political position. Hsun Tzu then explored the ideal further to formulate his theory of full meritocracy.

Perhaps most ironically, the thinkers that benefited most from Mohist views were those who were referred to later as Legalists. They were the severest critics of some of Mo Ti's most fundamental teachings and stood squarely on the extreme opposite of Mohist political thought and social philosophy.⁷¹ There was, however, no *Fa-chia* (Legalism) as such in pre-Ch'in times. Legalism as a term for a school of thought was developed by Ssu-ma T'an (ca. 179–110 B.C.) and his son Ssu-ma Ch'ien (145–86 B.C.) in a treatise on the pre-Ch'in schools of thought, entitled *Liu-chia* (*chih*) *yao-chih* (Basic Tenets of the Six Schools [of Thought]), probably written in about 100 B.C. Legalism as a school of thought was defined by Han Fei (Han Fei Tzu, b. between 298 and 280 B.C. and d. 233 B.C.); he did so by systematizing the works of many political theorists before his time, which advanced certain basic elements of thought that later became components of Legalism. Among these forerunners of Legalism were Kuan Chung (Kuan Tzu, fl. 685–645 B.C.) of the state of Ch'i; Tzu Ch'an (Kung-sun Ch'iao, ca. 580–522 B.C.) of Cheng; Fan Li (fl. 510–454 B.C.) of Yueh; Li K'uei (ca. 455–395 B.C.) of Wei; Wu Ch'i (ca. 461–380 B.C.) of Wei and Ch'u; Shen Pu-hai (ca. 400–337 B.C.) of Han; Shen Tao (fl. 360–275 B.C.) of Ch'i; and Shang Yang (Wei Yang, Kung-sun Yang, ca. 390–338 B.C.) of Ch'in. None of these precursors, however, left any systematic or coherent treatises on what was later called Legalism. The books bearing their names were either composed by their later followers or admirers or plagiarized by scholars at a much later time, mostly between 300 and 100 B.C. However, based on contemporary sources and pre-Ch'in writings, their major ideas and intellectual views and speculations can be traced and refreshed in the broad perspective of Legalism.⁷² Much like Confucius and Mo Ti, these thinkers took as their primary intellectual and political concerns the restoration or reestablishment of order and prosperity in their state and society, which had been disintegrating since 771 B.C. But unlike Confucius and Mo Ti, all but one of them, Shen Tao, were high-ranking chief ministers or influential advisers in the states in which their careers reached their apex. We learned about their political thought mainly through their political policies and administrative measures. Furthermore, since we have none of their complete

political treatises for direct analysis, we can focus our endeavor only on their theories of statecraft, rulership, and social organization. First, starting with Kuan Chung, they all advocated a government of law (*fa*). For them, only the rule of law could bring about an administration of justice and integrity and hence result in stability and order in a state. Second, starting with Tzu Ch'an, they all contended that the law should be written and made public in a state. The first such enterprise was undertaken by Tzu Ch'an in his state (Cheng) in 536 B.C. Tzu Ch'an also began to divide the word *fa* into two semantic domains: *fa* as the rules that govern the constitution, structure, and operation of the state and society; and *fa* as the rules that serve as legal agents in promoting and maintaining progress, order, and stability in the state and society. In its second meaning, the word *fa* has been broadly referred to as *li* (law) and *hsing* (punishments). This second meaning of the word *fa*, tradition holds, was first made in the tenth century B.C. under King Mu of the Western Chou. In the fifth century B.C., following this second usage of *fa*, Li K'uei composed in the state of Wei the first book of *fa*, the *Fa-ching* (Book of Laws, or Book of Legal Statutes) in six parts. Third, the earlier Legalists of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. had gradually come to hold that to make it effective in reaching its designated goal the law must be applied universally and equally to all the people in a state. And, starting with Tzu Ch'an, they also advanced the administrative practice that failure to obey and follow the law will be subject to severe consequences, mostly "heavy punishments" (*yen-hsing*). In the fourth century B.C., Shang Yang in the state of Ch'in declared that "reward and punishment" (*shang fa*) would be a legal instrument in advancing the effective application of the law. Fourth, in the actual governing of the state, all earlier Legalists advanced the theory of the absolute power and superiority of the ruler (*kuo-chün*) in a state. Thus, the ruler commands the utmost obedience of all his ministers and subjects, and he is to uphold this authority and command by means of his power (*shih*), which is based on the explicit or implicit implications of his position, as argued by Shen Tao; on special and clever political and administrative techniques (*shu*), as argued by Shen Pu-hai in Han; or in the force of declared Legalist instruments (*fa*), as instituted by Shang Yang in Ch'in. The same order of distinctions—superiors over inferiors (*tsun/pei*), seniors over juniors (*shang/hsia*), and superiors over subordinates (*chang/shao*)—should be strictly maintained in all hierarchies of relationships in government and society. Fifth, beginning with Wu Ch'i in Ch'u, the Legalists openly advocated the elimination of special privileges by birth and associated with blood relations and the establishment of a meritocracy to replace the old aristocracy in government positions and the new class system in society. This new political and social system was eventually constructed in Ch'in by Shang Yang through his reforms from the 350s to 330s, in which the old aristocracy was formally abolished and

a new statewide, merit-based, bureaucratic and class system was forcefully put into practice. Thus, the final and highest goal of a government system was a centralized bureaucracy with the ruler as an autocratic sovereign. Sixth, all the Legalists placed the strongest emphasis on the critical role of the military in preserving order and security in the state and exhorted rulers to take the building and maintaining of the strongest armed forces possible as their primary task for survival. Following this basic premise, they urged the rulers to reorganize the commoner population through new classifications and registration, which they considered to be the elemental source of military strength. The reforms of Kuan Chung in Ch'i and of Shang Yang in Ch'in, both examined earlier, are examples of this movement, which symbolized most clearly the end of the old Chou feudal system by shifting the privileges of bearing arms from the hereditary aristocratic class to the large mass of commoners, thereby hastening the elimination of one of the twin bases—monopoly of the military and education—of power and control by the aristocrats in a feudal society. At the same time, such a revolutionary measure would ready a state for mass mobilization to engage in “total war” for survival in the age of incessant warfare from the sixth to fourth centuries B.C., then for the conquest of other states, and finally for the unification of China in the next stage (fourth to third centuries B.C.). Seventh, taking land as the most valued source of economic strength and wealth, all earlier Legalists had promoted agriculturalism (*chung-nung*) as their exclusive economic policy. After the fifth century B.C., when artisans and merchants gained full independence from government regulation and control in all states, a tradition that went back to the Shang dynasty, the Legalists of central and western states from Han to Ch'in advanced the *pen-mo* policy of reform, in which farming would be declared by the state as *pen-yeh*, the “primary profession,” and commerce and related pursuits as *mo-yeh*, “nonessential professions.” The former would be “valued” in society and the latter considered “mean” (*chien*). The people in these professions—merchants, artisans, and the like—would be treated accordingly by law, that is, the farmers would be respected and valued and the merchants and artisans despised and oppressed. The fact that Shang Yang's reforms in the mid-fourth century B.C. included this measure is a clear manifestation of the legalization of this political theory. Eighth, on the more superstructural level, the political ideals of earlier Legalists, most of which had been put into practice through reforms, included the design of “thought control,” the theory of “correspondence of name and reality” (*hsun-ming tse-shih*, *ming/shih*, *hsing/ming*), the political ideal of *pa* (hegemony), the theoretical construct of *wang T'ien-hsia* (universal kingship), and the concept of change and the philosophy of history. The design of thought control as a political means to achieve national unity in times of crisis was first advanced by Wu Ch'i in Wu in the fifth century B.C. His argument is that diverse opinions and views on state

affairs, especially those raised by ambitious political aspirants, led to confusion and misunderstanding of the national purpose, which in turn greatly weakened the national unity behind a state's major political enterprise. In the mid-fourth century B.C., Shang Yang institutionalized this argument in his reforms by banning such ancient classics as *The Book of Poetry* (*Shih*) and *The Book of History* (*Shu*) because people could find in such classics perceived political views and ethical ideas that contradicted the spirit and goals of his drastic reforms. Both Shang Yang and Shen Pu-hai applied the *ming/shih* theory to their political programs in their respective states, Ch'in and Han, in the mid-fourth century B.C. As previously discussed, this theory has its origin in Confucius's *cheng-ming* (ratification of names) principle, and later went by various names (such as *hsing/ming* and *ming/shih*), with broad political, social, and intellectual ramifications and implications in measuring the validity or correctness of a specific decision. The early Legalists, however, applied it only as a technique for making political and legal decisions. Theoretically, they held that the correctness of all legal and political measures could be reduced to a validity test by way of an investigation of the one-to-one correspondence between *ming* (name) and *shih* (reality), a process that has been termed variously as *ts'an yen* (reality checking by comparison through full investigation), *shen ho hsing ming* (checking the correspondence between name and form), *hsun-ming tse-shih* (holding the actuality in accordance with the name), and the like. Specifically, in legal decisions the punishment (*fa*) must fit the name of the crime (*tsui*). In political and administrative decisions, an office can be awarded only in accordance with its responsibilities (*yin-jen shou-kuan*), a promotion or demotion (*chiang, chih*) must correspond to the actual merits (*kung, lao*) or demerits (*tsui, kuo, shih*), a ranking evaluation must be based on the specified grade of objective standards of performance, and the awarding of a special order of aristocratic rank must be in congruity with the declared type or specified quantity of merit (*yin-kung shou-chueh*).⁷³

On the larger concerns of international relations, the nature of human society, and the pattern of history, the statecraft of the early Legalists presents, though not systematically or uniformly, different philosophical and political perspectives. First, the Legalists promoted military power and conquest as the most essential and effective instruments to achieve and preserve international order and peace. Following the late Shang tradition of the twelfth century B.C., Kuan Chung, as discussed earlier, designed in the seventh century B.C. the system of *pa* as an effective construct to achieve those objectives among states in bitter conflict and under constant fear of annihilation. Under this system, the most powerful state and several willing and relatively weaker states formed an alliance (*meng*); the former served as its head state, *pa* (hegemon) and its nominal head as *pai* (also *pa*), "overlord or lord protector," and the latter served as

member states. Such an alliance generally functioned like a modern-day league of states, with all its defined missions and responsibilities for upholding international peace, order, and justice. In the fourth century, the Legalists, especially Shang Yang in the Ch'in state, having long abandoned the *pa* ideal, actively furthered the political ideal of *wang T'ien-hsia*, "to unify the All under Heaven," the world then known to the Chinese, by military conquest. This was the guiding ideology for the future unified empire.

To justify his revolutionary political programs in Ch'in, the first comprehensive statement of the foundational elements of early Legalist doctrines, Shang Yang advanced the linear theory of history, by which he holds, on the basis of the history of past dynasties, such as the Hsia, Shang, and Chou, that human history advances with linear progress in every direction and each generation has its own values, ambitions, and desires, with no reference to the traditions, culture, rules and laws, morals, teachings, and institutions of the ancients (*pu fa-ku*). The present ruler of a state thus should make reforms for new programs, not revive or follow old *li* (cultural traditions and rules and laws of the past) since the world is in a state of constant change and the survival of any individual or state will depend on the ability to change to meet new challenges, an idea that is much like the modern theory of "survival of the fittest."

It is clear from this that almost all of the most critical and important concepts of Legalism had been advanced and even put into practice in various states by different Legalist minds at different times. But there was no single, comprehensive, synthetic statement of the theoretical framework, logical basis, structure, tenets, and functional implications of Legalism as one independent and self-contained school of thought until the last decades of the third century B.C. In about 239 B.C., Han Fei completed a massive volume on Legalism, in fifty-five chapters, known as *Han Fei Tzu*. He put together all the early Legalist doctrines and concepts and placed them in one coherent philosophical construct. He also reformulated and rationalized each Legalist concept and theory with Confucian, Mohist, or Taoist cosmological or intellectual frames of exposition to make them seem more appealing, convincing, and logically sound to the rulers and learned readers of the time. For example, in his emphasis on the ultimate importance of "rule by law" (*fa-chih*) through the principle of "reward and punishment" (*shang-fa, hsing-shang*), having followed his Confucian teacher Hsun Ch'ing's negative view of human nature as innately evil and selfish (*ssu-li*), he contends that humans cannot change *hsing* and *ming* (evil nature and destiny), two of the most difficult foundational concepts in Confucianism, given by T'ien or Heaven ("nature" in his philosophical doctrines). Therefore, it is futile to teach humans such cardinal Confucian moral virtues as *jen*, *i*, *chih*, *chung*, *li*, and *hsin* in the hope of transforming them into good (*shan*) persons, as futile as trying to use cosmetics (*chih-fen*) to turn an ugly girl into a beauty. The argu-

ment is presented in Confucian language, but the conclusion is pure Legalism. The same is true of his argument concerning the function of Confucius's concept of *cheng-ming* (ratification of names), and he ends with the Legalist thesis that *cheng-ming* is the best instrument with which to make the bureaucracy totally centralized through strict but skillful personnel management and to make the ruler an absolute autocrat, all for the good of the people, who are yearning for peace, order, and prosperity. For the promotion of autocracy, Han Fei also reinforced his argument by the virtue of Mo Ti's theory of *shang-t'ung*.

To further increase the mystique and mysterious power of the ruler, Han Fei then utilized Taoist ideas of *tao* (the primordial truth and force for all), *wu-wei* (nonaction), and *ching* (quietness or stillness to imply and manifest sternness and perceptiveness). He advised rulers to act without visible action and to control their anger with an air of majestic quietness and divine balance, so that their ministers would never know their temper and weakness or their intention and the direction of their moves. At the same time, since the Later Taoists employ *ch'i-sheng chü-chih* (renouncing sagehood and discarding knowledge) to attain the *tao*, he argued that the rulers should keep their subjects ignorant to follow the natural Tao, so that they would be easier to control and enslave for political purposes. In a more philosophical perspective, in his elaborate discourse about his views on the nature and pattern of history Han Fei employed Mo Ti's theory of "social covenant" and his teacher Hsun Tzu's theory of *fa hou-wang* (follow the tradition and culture of the recent kings and dynasties such as Kings Wen and Wu of the Chou) and thus forcefully set out to affirm Shang Yang's theory of *pu fa-ku*, taking human history as a process of linear progress and the human world as being in a constant process of change for producing challenge and improvement. He further advanced his theory in the evolution of human society and history: First he divided human history into three major stages—Ancient (*shang-ku*), Medieval or Middle ages (*chung-shih*), and the Modern and Contemporary Times (*chin-shih*). Then he characterized the predominant driving forces in the three stages: "moral virtue" in stage 1, "strategic skills" in stage 2, and "force and power" in stage 3. Thus the ruler of the current times, called *hsin-sheng* (the New Sage-[Ruler]) and *ming-chu* (the Enlightened Ruler), who was the Confucian equivalent of *sheng-wang* (the sage-king), must use matchless military power to conquer and rule over all. Strong armed forces depend on an abundant supply of manpower, and hence there is the necessity to grow a large population in a state. Therefore he advanced his special population policy by voicing the following principles: (1) the state provides and upholds safety, security, and stability for the people through military, legal, and economic means; (2) the government orders that all girls be married no later than age fourteen (fifteen *sui*); (3) the state takes responsibility for educating its subjects; and (4) the government assures and ensures that every such subject be

employed meaningfully, properly, and protectively. This was Han Fei's idea of the Confucian benevolent statecraft of *jen-cheng*, a Legalist twist of the rule of *sheng-wang* (the sage-king) so earnestly advanced by his teacher Hsun Tzu and the two earlier Confucian masters Confucius and Mencius.

Taoism stands at the extreme end of the philosophical spectrum of Legalism. In early Han times, there were actually two schools of mainstream Taoism: (1) the Earlier Taoism (*Hsien Tao-chia*) formulated before 300 B.C. but later than 350 B.C. and (2) the Later Taoism (*Hou Tao-chia*) formulated before 250 B.C. and probably in the 290s to 280s B.C.; and still later the mislabeled Taoism known by the popular label of Huang-Lao *shu* (doctrines). Ssu-ma T'an's (ca. 179–110 B.C.) school of Taoism (*Tao-chia*) misleadingly mixed all three together as one Taoism. The first two strands of mainstream Taoism differ greatly in their philosophical tenets, and the "Taoism" of the Huang-Lao doctrines is much like a *Tsa* school—an eclectic structure of many schools, such as Taoism (first two), Confucianism, Yin-yang, Legalism, Mohism, and other doctrines, in order of the quantity of components selected into the system. And Huang-Lao doctrines and the school of eclecticism are almost identical if only the strand of political thought is under consideration. Here we will discuss the Earlier Taoism first and then the Later Taoism.⁷⁴ Huang-Lao "Taoism" will be examined in the next section.

Two philosophers essentially articulate Earlier Taoism: Lao Tan (Lao Tzu, ca. late sixth–early fifth century B.C.) and Chuang Chou (Chuang Tzu, ca. 396–286 B.C.). But these philosophers are not theoreticians of government, nor are they at all interested in the study of statecraft. Lao Tzu lived in Confucius's and Mo Ti's times but before Chuang Tzu and was not the author of the popular book *Tao-te-ching* (The Classic of the Way and Its Virtue), which was composed no earlier than the fourth century B.C. and not known by that title until the late second or early third century A.D. but indeed contains some of his philosophical theses. He takes the Tao as the absolute truth and ultimate structure as well as the primordial origin of the cosmos, and its manifestation is the mysterious and all-embracing *T'ai-i* (The Ultimate One). He then advances the view that the interaction of nonbeing and being and of male and female defines the process of the creation and life of every form of existence. Thus the universe and everything in it are going through a constant process of change, and that change follows the dialectical laws; that is, the growth of life leads only to eventual destruction, the attainment of success brings failure, the achievement of happiness only ends in sadness and sorrow, and success in governing begins disaster. All actions and efforts would eventually lead to sad results and serve no positive purpose. The question of why we humans should be engaged in any action of any sort for any purpose at all—that is the philosophy of *wu-wei* (non-action). Under it, humans should strive to maintain *ching* (quietness, no

motion, or avoidance of action), *hsu* (emptiness, tranquility, no solidity or fullness), and *jo* (weakness, not strength). But humans cannot achieve this unless they are kept “ignorant” and void of ambitions and desires; hence the formulation of Lao Tzu’s principle of *chueh-chih ch’i-pien* (renouncing knowledge and discarding wisdom). In Lao Tzu’s intellectual undertaking there is no room for statecraft.

Chuang Chou was generally in congruity with Lao Tzu’s philosophy but also held that the latter’s philosophy did not go far enough to eliminate the roots of all human concerns and miseries. He then advanced a theory of the total equality of all creatures, all forms of existence, and all types of experiences, because he saw the misconception of categorical distinctions and uniqueness among all creatures and types of perceptions as the root cause of human concerns and miseries. Thus, in Chuang Tzu’s philosophy there is no difference between good and bad, success and failure, ups and downs, happiness and sadness, beginning and ending, and even life and death, and one should ignore all such distinctions. Individuals should strive to experience the *tao* through a sense of identification with it. That would eliminate all the sources of and reasons for action and thinking, such as competition, confrontation, struggle, scheming, and so forth. Naturally, concern with government would not make sense, and statecraft would be meaningless.

Lao Tan and Chuang Chou represented the two mainstream schools of Taoist philosophy in pre-Ch’in times. There were other approaches and theories. Kuan Yin (Yin Hsi: Hsi, the director of border pass), a contemporary of Lao Tan, also advanced the theory that the absolute and original ontological object is the Tao and its manifestation is the *T’ai-i*. Then he advised that to avoid concerns and miseries, humans should be without any assumptions and any intentions for active motions and should strive to be tranquil and emotionless and to be eternally agreeable and laggards in life. The guiding philosophy of thinking and living is to remember that every thing and every system are built upon “nonbeing” following a natural process. Shen Tao, Sung Hsing (Hsing is also misspelled as Bing and P’ien), and P’eng Meng (ca. 370–310 B.C.), on the other hand, held that the root cause of human concerns and miseries was “selfishness” and hence the solution was the renunciation of the “self” to eliminate “selfishness,” which could not be done without first discarding knowledge. Thus, all these Taoist ideas also run contrary to any deliberate formulation of government and statecraft. Originating in the Ch’u region, Earlier Taoist philosophy, as seen in recently discovered pre-300 B.C. texts (editions) of the book *Lao Tzu*, was interested in the issue of the cosmos (Tao and Heaven, Earth, and the natural universe, e.g., *t’ien*, *ti*, and *tzu-jan*) and the philosophy of life and living (*ch’ing*, *ching*, *wu-wei*, *hsu*, and *jo* as foundational precepts) and not only in statecraft. Flourishing first in the mid-third century B.C. in the

eastern region of Ch'i, the Later Taoism that constituted the major part of the book known as *Lao Tzu* from the mid-third century up to the Han period, however, turned more to the political theory, such as the principles of rulership and administrative philosophy, for practical reasons, as a response to the needs of the times and the challenge of Legalism. The theories of statecraft and political intrigues and schemes in this Later Taoism all were retained and articulated in the still later version of the book *Lao Tzu* known as the *Tao-te ching*.

In contrast to the Earlier Taoist views on, or lack of views on, government and political life, the Yin-yang school, led by Tsou Yen (ca. 350–240 B.C.) of Ch'i, stressed the primary importance of government in human society. But it also added a religious and mystical dimension by positing the existence of a correspondence and correlative relationship between the natural world and human affairs and, more philosophically, between T'ien (Heaven) and humans (*t'ien-jen ho-i*), a theory that was advanced by Fan Li (fl. 510–454 B.C., a native of Ch'u) in the state Yueh (in modern Chekiang and southern Kiangsu) in the late sixth century B.C. Thus, there is a cosmological, divine reason for every event in the human world. For survival, humans, and particularly the ruler, must abide by the Way of Heaven and observe the manifestations of Heaven such as the four seasons to construct and maintain the proper order of all human and worldly affairs. Furthermore, Tsou Yen also held that the bounds of the physical world on Earth were much larger than the world known to the Chinese of his time, in fact, eighty-one times larger by his imaginative calculation using a complex methodology of inductive inference based on comparative studies and investigations. He then advised the rulers of his China, called Shen-chou, the Divine Land, to extend their domains to cover the entire world to reach "the grand unification of the larger All under Heaven" (*ta i-t'ung*). That perhaps opened the door, though unintentionally, for great military expansions in Ch'in and Han times. On the basis of the fundamental ideas about the cosmos and the human world, the thinkers of the Yin-yang school also advanced a theory of history by analyzing the history of the state through a combined framework of metaphysical and theological approaches. Developed long before Tsou Yen's time, at least no later than the fifth century B.C., the theory posits human history as a depiction of the Way of Heaven through certain prefixed patterns, each of which is a manifestation of a theological concept that consists of five fundamental elements (*wu-heng*, later usually pronounced as *wu-hsing*). But it was Tsou Yen and his followers who defined the *wu-heng* as *chin* (metal), *mu* (wood), *shui* (water), *huo* (fire), and *t'u* (earth), classifications that existed long before Tsou's time. Under the basic guiding principle of the interaction of yin and yang being the genesis of all forms of existence and the primordial source of all actions, the five elements (*te*) serve then as agents or powers to cause mutual growth and destruction by a fixed pattern: for growth, it is the cycle of wood to

fire to earth to metal to water to wood; for destruction, the cycle consists of water to (end) fire to metal to wood to earth to water. Then the Yin-yang thinkers (really philosopher-theologians) of the late third century B.C. proceeded to assign each of the five elements (*te*) to a past historical phase—a dynasty by a specific ruling house: earth phase to the Yellow Emperor, wood to the Hsia, metal to the Shang, fire to the Chou, and water to the Ch'in. That explained the rise and fall of the great dynasties and hence the pattern of history in progress. In order to prolong the life of each phase, a dynasty must set up special religious observances and institutions; ritual rules; the time of the first month (*cheng-so* or *cheng-suo*) in the official calendars; and the rules of daily life, such as the color of clothing and styles of hats. Failing to follow these rules would lead to the loss of dynastic legitimacy and the shortening of the life of a dynasty.

Besides the Yin-yang school, all other minor schools did not articulate systematic or original theories of statecraft. They offered only means to improve government and administration or at most a special emphasis on the priority of national policy. The *Ming* thinkers, led first by Teng Hsi (fl. 545–501 B.C.) with later explorations by Yin Wen (fl. 350–285 B.C.), Hui Shih (ca. 370–310 B.C.), and Kung-sun Lung (ca. 320–250 B.C.), focused on the methodology of thought and epistemological inquiry and the connection between language, thought, and logic. The Agriculturalists were interested only in the economic structure and lifestyle in a state. The Military Scientists, represented by Fan Li, Wu Ch'i (fl. 461–380 B.C.), Sun Wu (fl. 514–453 B.C.), and Sun Pin (fl. 380–316 B.C.), had a relatively broader range of interests, such as the socioeconomic-political foundations of military action, the philosophy of warfare, the legal framework of military organization and wars, staffing and psychological issues in military affairs, and history and war, but their intentions and attention were aimed at improving and refining the art of warfare, and they offered no commentary on the theory and practice of statecraft. The *Tsung-heng* specialists, led by Su Ch'in (fl. 360–317 B.C.) and Chang I (fl. 360–309 B.C.), concentrated all their intellectual endeavor on the art of argument and the power of oratorical suasion and their attention on the condition and development of current political affairs and geopolitics. The *Tsa* specialists, such as Wei Liao (fl. 370–319 B.C.), Lü Pu-wei (fl. 290–235 B.C.), Ho-kuan Tzu (fl. late third century B.C.), and Wen Tzu (fl. late third century B.C.), devoted their efforts to anthologizing, interpreting, and commenting on the writings and views of other schools, such as Confucianism, Mohism, Legalism, Yin-yang, Taoism, and *Ming-chia* (Nominalists), and most of their works were from the collaboration of many known and unknown authors. However, Lü's political thought was more a combination of Yin-yang and Legalism; Wei's was more a combination of

Legalism, Later Taoism, and military arts; and Wen Tzu's and Ho-kuan Tzu's was more a combination of Later Taoism or Huang-Lao doctrines.⁷⁵

Following the development of the various schools of thought, new religious thought also advanced toward a new stage in the pre-Ch'in times. As discussed in the preceding chapter the structure of the religious belief systems under the Western Chou was a unified construction through the redefinition of the divine domains and responsibilities of T'ien (Heaven, Supreme God) and Hou-t'u (God of Earth). As time went on, more progress in the rationalization and institutionalization of cults, worship, and myths was made. The placements, rankings, and functions of various deities, particularly household and local ones such as the door gods and the god of fire (Chu Jung), were formalized. Sacred objects such as the ancestral tablets (*chu*, *tsu*, all from the Shang tradition) and complex liturgical systems were standardized. Systematic and informative writings such as the many tracts and books on rites and ceremonials were produced. But with the gradual disintegration of a unified "feudal" empire under the Chou Son of Heaven (Chou T'ien-tzu) in the central region Chung-kuo, the unified religious system gradually became divided again along the lines of political affiliation and geographic region. Essentially, in the Warring States period (403–222 B.C.) each of the states worshipped the ruler's ancestor as the head god. For example, the White God (Pai-ti) in Ch'in, the Fire God (Yen-ti) in Ch'u, and the Yellow Emperor (Huang Ti) and his descendants in Ch'i and several central states all were symbolic of political autonomy and superiority. But various local deities were also sacrificed to according to regional traditions and customs. Thus, religion became more regionalized and localized after the collapse of the Chou feudal empire. But the rationale for religion still remained functional and imagined actualization of human hopes and aspirations.

The wealth, diversity, and innovativeness of the pre-Ch'in schools of thought certainly presented the most dynamic and comprehensive intellectual and ideological challenges to the Ch'in when it unified the states of China and created the first imperial dynasty in 221 B.C. For all its presumed and traditionally perceived Legalist reputation of being a reign of tyranny and a regime with an absolute and brutal autocracy, the Ch'in polity under Shih Huang-ti (the First Emperor) had been open to a complex array of bold and innovative theories of statecraft and political philosophies until 213 B.C., when the infamous "burning of books" was decreed. Documents and writings of the Ch'in period recently unearthed from tombs, such as the previously discussed Ch'in Code of Laws from Yun-meng of Hupeh, show that although they strongly favored Legalism by tradition, the First Emperor and his government did allow Confucianism, Mohism, Taoism, and Yin-yang thought to prevail and accorded the practitioners of each school a certain number of *po-shih* (erudites), a senior

official post at a lower grade but with the privileges to participate in the ever-important decision-making institution of court conference (*t'ing-i*) and to advise on state affairs and policies. Of the Confucian *po-shih*, three—Li K'o, Shu-sun T'ung (ca. 246–163 B.C.), and Fu Sheng (ca. 260–160 B.C.)—continued to have important influence in the Han dynasty. It is said that a Confucian descendant of the eighth generation, K'ung Chia (ca. 265–209 B.C.), had more than two hundred followers and Shu-sun T'ung over one hundred disciples under the Ch'in. As already discussed in the prologue, the Ch'in official policy in ruling the empire as pronounced in Ch'in era documents also stressed the importance of moral order such as *li*, *i* (*yi*), and *sheng*; the value of peace, order, and prosperity; the respect for historical tradition; and the primacy of family harmony and the observance of the Way of Heaven. All of this clearly indicated that the superstructure of the political mind of the Ch'in ruler, the First Emperor, included some characteristic concepts and ideals of schools of thought other than just the pronounced Ch'in state ideology of Legalism. Thus, the Ch'in world of political ideals was not as closed as it traditionally has been portrayed. In fact, it manifested the first synthesis of the complex strands of political thought advanced by many pre-Ch'in schools of thought both in the south (mainly the Ch'u type as represented by Taoism and the Yin-yang school) and in the north (mainly in the old Central Plain states and Ch'i and Lu as represented by Confucianism and Legalism). A new paradigm of Chinese theory of statecraft was thus formed, which was fully manifested in the *Han Fei Tzu*, the *Lü shih ch'un-ch'iu*, the stone inscriptions of Shih Huang-ti, the Yun-meng documents, and the strict Legalism in the state of Ch'u as recorded in the recently unearthed E-chün *chieh* (Lord E's Tally) and similar archaeological evidence.⁷⁶

RISE OF THE HAN ECLECTICISM: THE HUANG-LAOISM AND NEW CONFUCIANISM

When the Han dynasty was established by Liu Pang (Kao-ti) in 202 B.C. after seven years of incessant warfare and carnage in the Ch'in-Han transition, it was in no condition to establish a state ideology or to pay attention to the issue of intellectual revival. The Han Court, however, let all schools of thought flourish, even though the political and economic conditions favored the Earlier Taoism strand. Most of the high officials of the early Han times, in fact, were eclectics, that is, Legalist, Taoist, Confucianist, Mohist, *Tsung-heng* specialists, and Yin-yang theorists all at the same time, although one intellectual label usually stood out better than others. This point becomes clear if one looks closely at the backgrounds of such officials as K'uai T'ung (ca. 275–195 B.C.), Lu Chia (ca. 250–175 B.C.), Liu Ching (fl. 223–180 B.C.), Chang Ts'ang (259–152

B.C.), Shu-sun T'ung and Ts'ao Ts'an (ca. 234–190 B.C.), Ch'en P'ing (ca. 245–178 B.C.), and Chang Shu (ca. 205–120 B.C.). Even the Han Court itself selected different components of a specific school of thought for certain special institutional or ideological functions. For example, it embraced Confucianism's cultural and ritual ideals and tradition-honored knowledge of institutional and court structures. The Han Court system of protocols and ceremonial procedures all had been designed and structured by Shu-sun T'ung and his disciples, even though some of these protocols and procedures were actually based on the Ch'in system. From Legalism, the Han leaders adopted administrative principles, Legalist views on the rules and missions of government, and the Ch'in governmental system based on Legalist views. From Mohism, the theory that the state is an unchallengeable ontological unit and hence demands absolute submission of all subjects for their own benefit loomed large in the formulation of the Han dynastic legitimacy by Liu Pang's theoreticians of government, such as Chang Ts'ang, Liu Ching, Lu Chia, and Shu-sun T'ung. The Han utilized the Yin-yang school's cosmological theory of dynastic cycle of the "five phases" based on the five-element theory as Liu Pang (now Emperor Kao) adopted as his new regime's dynastic symbols: water (*te*), the color black (*se*, *fu-se*), the number six (*shu-liu*), and an official calendar with the tenth month as the beginning of the New Year (*cheng-so*). From Earlier Taoism, the Han Court instituted its original idea of *wu-wei* as official political policy and its nonintervention policy in governing the populace. This was the large intellectual and ideological template of the Han dynasty during the first three reigns, Emperors Kao and Hui and Empress Lü. Representative classics in these schools of thought constituted the required readings in the education of the imperial princes in the palace, and masters of these schools, such as Lu Chia, K'uai T'ung, Shu-sun T'ung, Ch'en P'ing, and Chang Ts'ang all served as imperial tutors.

The Han Court under Emperors Wen and Ching (180–141 B.C.) gradually started to move in a new direction. It became partial toward a relatively new school of political doctrines called "Huang-Lao," an amalgam of elements of statecraft selected mainly from Confucianism, Taoism, Legalism, Mohism, Yin-yang thought, and the Military Science school. For convenience of discourse this school is referred to hereafter as Huang-Laoism or the Huang-Lao school. In reality, this refers to the art of statecraft of two legendary figures, Huang Ti (the Yellow Emperor) and Lao Tzu, which was referred to as the "Huang Ti and Lao Tzu *shu*" or "Huang-Lao *shu*" (Lao Tzu in this case being the ascribed author of the later *Tao-te ching*). The basic tenets of Huang-Laoism consist of ten major categories of ideas and concepts. First, it takes the *min* (all the people and subjects) as the center and foundation of any dialogue on and about the state, a supposition intrinsic to all the schools of thought but particularly articulated by the earlier masters of Confucianism, Taoism (especially Shen Tao and his fol-

lowers), Legalism, Mohism, and Agriculturalism. Second, it holds that a state must be ruled on the basis of written law (*fa*) in its large constitutional structure and its governing must be based on a legal system. The law and its legal manifestations all must be constructed in the natural and objective way by following the great all-embacing Tao, which is the fundamental rule in Huang-Laoism as is laid out in the recently discovered Huang-Lao cardinal canon *Ching-fa* (The Book of the Way) of the late third or early second century B.C. That is, it cleverly placed a fundamental concept of Legalism, *fa*, under the noble but indefinable garb of Taoism. Third, following Confucianism (the Hsun Tzu branch only), Mohism, and Legalism, it asserts the absolute authority and power of the ruler who receives the mandate from Heaven (*T'ien-ming*) and the submission of all under his rule in a state as concretely defined in the Ch'in imperial system. It further contends that good government depends upon effective bureaucracy and effective bureaucracy depends upon a systematic and fair system of selection and evaluation—that is, meritocracy at its best. Fourth, in carrying out the political administrative policy the state should consider moral suasion first before the force of legal punishments, particularly in educating and controlling the populace, that is, the application of Hsun Tzu's principle of *te-hsing*, “morals before law.” It is then the state's responsibility to educate and transform its subjects with moral and ethical principles such as the Confucian *jen*, *i*, *li*, *chung*, and *hsin*. Fifth, the *ming/shih* (name/reality) principle is to be followed in all political and legal practices and decisions, a principle that was explored by Confucius as *cheng-ming* (ratification of names) and then followed by the thinkers of almost all schools of thought, such as the Mohists, Legalists, Logicians, Sophists, and even Taoists. Sixth, the best and most effective principle for a ruler to control his officials and subjects is the Taoist ideal of *wu-wei*, *hsu* (emptiness in self-consciousness) and *wu* (holding nothing in presumptive views) by Han Fei's definition, that is, control through skillful and invisible manifestation of power by position and implied consequences. Seventh, the ruler must follow the teachings of the Yin-yang cosmology to observe the changes of the natural world, such as the principle of yin and yang interaction and the changes in the four seasons, must direct his government to function by following the great Way of Heaven, and must understand the correspondence between Heaven and man so as to prolong the special phase of life of his regime. Eighth, the ruler should make an effort to educate the subjects to have understanding, devotion, and compassion for fellow humans (*chien-ai*) so that the people can become selfless and public minded (*wu-ssu*). Ninth, a ruler should avoid engaging in aggressive warfare and greedy military conquest, which may lead to unexpected disasters. And tenth, a ruler should be open minded, take pride in learning from others, and respect and benefit from learned and wise advice. The last three categories of ideas and ideals show clearly the

eclectic nature of the Huang-Lao doctrines—a mixture and twisted amalgam of seemingly contradictory elements from four major schools, Confucianism, Taoism, Mohism, and the Military Science school's views on warfare. The main tenets of the so-called Huang-Lao school as thus outlined are really an amalgam of the suitable and essential elements of almost all major schools of thought, and the school's central structure is based on the philosophy of Han Fei and Hsun Tzu, with a metaphysical cover of presumed Huang Ti's Yin-yang thought and Lao Tzu's mysterious principles of *tao* and *wu-wei*. In essence, the Huang-Lao school is in effect a *Tsa-chia*, although it has been mistakenly called a branch of Taoism or New Taoism simply because the name Lao Tzu is part of the term. To that end, it is another paradigm of statecraft based on a synthesis of the prevailing schools of thought developed in the third and early second centuries B.C. Little wonder that in 67 B.C. the Han emperor Hsuan (r. 74–49 B.C.), a great grandson of Emperor Wu, directly referred to the Han political philosophy and practice as a whole since Emperor Wen as *Tsa wang pa*, a twisted eclectic of the Confucian political ideal of *wang* (*sheng-wang*, universal sage-kingship by *li* or *i-li*) and Legalist statecraft of *pa* (hegemony by power).

The term *Huang-Lao* actually also represents an interesting mixture of two seemingly incompatible but equally complementary schools of political thought that have been generally misinterpreted and construed as one school by Ssu-ma T'an (ca. 179–110 B.C.) and his son Ssu-ma Ch'ien (145–86 B.C.) and have been eagerly followed without any further rational analysis by modern scholars. First, the word *Lao* in the term was clearly indicated to mean Lao Tzu in contemporaneous Han sources, Lao Tzu in this case referring only to the person, not to the book that was later called *Tao-te ching*. That book, up to Ssu-ma Ch'ien's end time (the first century B.C.) or even much later (probably about the end of the first century A.D.), was called only *Te* or *Te p'ien* (later *Te-ching*) and *Tao* or *Tao p'ien* (later *Tao-ching*), which were two separate parts of a book called *Lao Tzu* or *Lao Tzu shu* (Lao Tzu Book), that is, the book written by (really attributed to) the person Lao Tzu (identified as Lao Tan in the earlier *Chuang Tzu* and the later work by Lü Pu-wei and others). The book *Lao Tzu* in Huang-Lao thought, however, was an early third century B.C. work of Taoist philosophy that contains practical but intriguing political theory and some artful statecraft much closer to *earlier* Legalism; it provided inspiration and foundational precepts to Han Fei's Legalism as revealed in Han Fei's lengthy exposition of Lao Tzu in "Chieh-Lao" (Commentaries on Lao Tzu's Teachings), "Yü-Lao" (Illustrations on Lao Tzu's Teachings), and "Nan-San" (Criticisms of the Ancients) in his own work (*Han Fei Tzu*). The earlier ideas of Lao Tzu as discussed earlier, however, were also included and explicated in this work (*Lao Tzu shu*), and at the same time the primordial concept *Tao* was made less mysterious and less indefinable and became more a matter of naturalness—for

example, Tao was considered the producer of water, the mother of all natural and living forms of existence. The primordial theory of *T'ai-i sheng-shui* (The Ultimate One from the Tao Produces Water) is explored in a piece of exegesis and commentary on an earlier Lao Tzu work that was discovered in 1993 in Ching-men, Hupei Province. In any case, the Taoism in the book *Lao Tzu* is a Ch'u work, and as such its philosophical tenor shows a southern temper and spirit marked by high imagination, a mysterious tone, indefinable but heartfelt and seemingly tangible precepts, and lofty ideas with a strong religious flavor. Perhaps it is this part of the new canonized Taoism in the *Lao Tzu*, more than its elemental theory on statecraft, that was chosen to complement the newly risen political doctrines ascribed to Huang Ti in the north that articulated the practical and realistic ideals and actualities in ruling and governing a state and society. And so the coinage of the term *Huang-Lao*. Huang Ti (the Yellow Emperor) was a legendary figure in Chinese history, construed as the greatest savior of the Chinese people of the third millennium B.C. The story of Huang Ti was much like the "Mosaic revolutionary myth" in the West. The name "Huang Ti" and tales of Huang Ti's assumed moral deeds and sage-kingship never appeared before the fourth century B.C. Huang Ti had been construed as extraordinarily talented in warfare in treatises on the art of warfare in the late sixth and early fifth centuries B.C. that appeared in the Ch'i and Ch'u regions in the east and south China. Only in the mid-fourth century B.C. did Huang Ti appear for the first time as a real human being recorded (recognized) as an ancestor of King Wei (r. 356–320 B.C.) on a bronze vessel *tui* (often misread as *tun*) in the state of Ch'i, which was dated 356 B.C. No textually reliable writings before this date can be found containing any mention of Huang Ti of this nature. The making of Huang Ti as a paragon of an almighty sage-ruler and a creator of the first utopian golden age in Chinese history seems to have originated with two seemingly incompatible developments in China of the early third century B.C., the political ideology of *ti*, a supreme ruler controlling a unified *t'ien-hsia* (All under Heaven, i.e., all the warring states since the fifth century B.C.) in the west, in 288 B.C. at the latest, and the Yin-yang cosmological system in the east, also in about 280 B.C., both of which were the broad sacred garb of the almighty T'ien (Heaven), the mysterious Supreme God in early Chinese theology. In the states of Han, Chao, and Wei and eastern Ch'i (the main parts of modern Honan, Shansi, southern Hopei, Shantung, and eastern Shensi), the bastion of earlier Hua-Hsia culture, Huang Ti gradually emerged as the ancestor and greatest "culture hero" of this genealogical line. Thus by advancing the claim of being the heir to the original home of the Chinese culture, the four states had legitimized their individual ultimate political ambitions to unify the divided empire.

Huang-Lao thought began to form in the fourth century B.C. and continued

to grow during the Ch'in-Han transition in the Ch'i and Ch'u regions, with the Chi-hsia Academy in Ch'i as the major center. In earlier times, under Emperor Kao's reign the Huang-Lao school continued to have its following in the modern eastern Shantung area. It started to become an open political precept in the Han imperial government when Ts'ao Ts'an, an admirer of the venerable Huang-Lao thinker Kuo (261–195 B.C.), became the imperial chancellor in 193 B.C. under Emperor Hui's reign (195–188 B.C.). Under the reign of Empress Lü (187–180 B.C.), Huang-Lao thought continued to prevail while the court was engaged in a bitter internal power struggle and carried out its national policy of economic recovery through *wu-wei* administrative philosophy. It became a predominant political ideology during the reign of Emperors Wen and Ching (180–141 B.C.). But the statecraft of the Huang-Lao doctrines provides no large ideological and philosophical dimensions to the direction of the Han empire and in fact advises against the pursuit of universal kingship (*sheng-wang* for “conquest by power” in Legalist intent covered by the noble label), a theory that was painstakingly articulated in its canons such as the *Ching-fa* (The Book of the Way) and *Shun-tao* (Following the Way), thus becoming inadequate in Han Wu-ti's times. New ideologies of kingship were badly needed for the next stage of the Han empire. And that became the most urgent task and most important historical mission for the young and ambitious Emperor Wu and his equally ambitious and glory-hungry scholars, advisers, and ministers after the death of Grand Empress Dowager Tou in 135 B.C., the last, strongest, and most powerful follower and guardian of the Huang-Lao doctrines since the reign of Emperor Wen. And then came the reformulated Confucianism.⁷⁷

When the Huang-Lao school reached the peak stage of its development toward the end of the third century B.C., Confucianism also began a new stage of reformation. Challenged and inspired by the rising influence of Taoism and Legalism in the south, Huang-Laoism and Yin-yang thought in the east, and Legalism in the west, Confucianism with its stronghold in the Central Plain states and the Ch'i-Lu region started to go through a reformation for survival. Unlike Legalism, Yin-yang thought, or Huang-Lao doctrines, Confucianism as a political ideology was never put into practice as a state policy in a state. Clearly as a political ideology the Confucianism of Confucius and Mencius provided high moral principles for political action but lacked the large theoretical framework and systematic practical institutional design to be the blueprint for any political structure or map for political action. These critical shortcomings were in part compensated for by Hsun Tzu's practical political ideals, concrete institutional plans, and innovative intellectual designs for political actions. But to become a viable and practical political ideology, Confucianism still needed an all-embracing religious superstructure, a well-developed philosophy of history, high political idealism, and sophisticated yet practical precepts for gov-

erning. A reformation of Confucianism was thus begun. First, the pristine moral and ethical precepts advanced by Confucius and Mencius still served as the highest code of conduct in society. Second, a set of canonized books—later called the Six Classics: *I* (Change), *Shih* (Poetry), *Shu* (History), *Yueh* (Music), *Li* (Rites and Code of Ethics and Conduct), and *Ch'un-ch'iu* (Spring and Autumn Annals)—as the source of Confucianism's primordial doctrines and historical guidance was established from the ancient writings originally shared by all schools of thought with no particular intellectual labels. Third, reconstruction of the history of the Hua-Hsia culture and its leading creators from the Yellow Emperor; to the Sage-Kings Yao, Shun, and Yü; to Kings Wen and Wu; to Confucius and Mencius was achieved through writing major historical works, such as the *Ti-hsi* (The Genealogical Records of the Ancient Rulers), *Wu-ti te* (The Model Virtues of the Sage-Rulers), *Shih-pen* (Genealogical Records of the Ancient Rulers), *Wen-wang kuan-jen* (King Wen on Human Character and Ability), *Wu-wang chien-tso* (King Wu on Mandate of Heaven and Royal Virtue), *Tso-chuan* (Tso's Commentary), *Kuo-yü* (Discourses of the States), and *San-ch'ao chi* (Confucius on History and Statecraft). These writings all focus on and create the great traditions, achievements (in both spiritual and material cultures), and sage-heroes (both legendary and historical) of Confucianism. Fourth, the precept was put forth that a ruler should model his rule and governing after the ancient sage-kings (*hsien-wang*) but should also take the more recent historical lessons for reform and planning the future (*fa-ku wei-hsin*). Fifth, a religious superstructure was constructed to explain the correspondence between Heaven and man. The T'ien was worshipped as the Shang-ti (also titled as T'ai-i [the Ultimate One], T'ai-chi [the Ultimate], and other honored terms), the Supreme God; next to Shang-ti were the Five Gods (*wu-ti*), and then a pantheon of deities in Heaven and on Earth categorized in hierarchy was structured. The ranking of gods and deities was classified by the grade and class of rituals and forms of sacrifices. Sixth, a systematic interpretation of human history, the philosophy of history, and the issue of race and nation was then perceived through the commentary on the *Ch'un-ch'iu* attributed to Confucius, such as the Three Ages (*san-shih*) theory by Kung-yang Kao (fl. early third century B.C.), that is, the human process of progress—from disorder to order to great peace and prosperity. The Kung-yang school also held that race in All under Heaven was a matter of culture, not that of physical structure: a barbarian who accepted Chinese culture was a Chinese while a Chinese who followed barbarian culture was a barbarian. Seventh, based on the idealist worldview of Mo Tzu, the theory of *ta-t'ung* (Grand Unity) utopia was construed. Eighth, full meritocracy became the universal standard for selection of men of talent to serve the society and the state. Ninth, the cultivation of a model Confucian personality through a common understanding of human intellectual growth was

set as follows: an individual should first try to understand the world by investigating the physical world (*ko-wu*) to acquire knowledge (*chih-chih*) and then to rectify his mind (*cheng-hsin*) and then to make his will always sincere and then to attain all the cardinal Confucian virtues, thus completing the moral cultivation of the self. Tenth, then the individual is set to accomplish his process of statesmanship as the highest ideal of life through the following ordered steps: first to harmonize his family, then to govern or serve the state well, and then to bring the world to grand peace and prosperity. Eleventh, a ruler should set the principle of ruler-subject relation in the superior-inferior hierarchy; he should utilize the art of control by power and strategic influence such as the appointment-dismissal, promotion and demotion, and "reward-punishment" principles; and he should be ready to apply all possible legal means to rule over his officials and to govern his state. Twelfth, a Yin-yang interpretation of the natural world and human affairs is adopted to guide daily life. Thirteenth, "universal kingship" is set as the highest ideal for becoming a sage-king, with the final goal of "transforming" (conquering) the barbarians to civilization.

The masters of this reformation were both high officials and devoted scholars, such as Kung-yang Kao, Ku-liang Ch'ih (fl. early third century B.C.), Shu-sun T'ung, Chang Ts'ang, K'ung Chia, Lu Chia, Chia I (201/200–168 B.C.), Ch'ao Ts'o (ca. 200–154 B.C.), and Liu Teh (fl. 155–130 B.C.), Liu An (179–122 B.C.), Yuan Ku (ca. 221–129 B.C.), Fu Sheng and Shen P'ei (ca. 221–135 B.C.), Pao Ch'iu (fl. 220–135), Han Ying (ca. 210–104 B.C.), T'ien Ho (fl. 198–190 B.C.), Ting K'uan (fl. 175–100 B.C.?), Kao-t'ang Po-jen (fl. 180–90 B.C.?), Hu-wu Tzu-tu (fl. 185–100 B.C.?), Tung Chung-shu (ca. 179–104 B.C.), Chao Wan, Wang Tsang, and Ssu-ma Hsiang-ju (ca. 179–122 B.C.). Although not in any organized or concerted way, they together and collectively engendered the new Confucianism from the early third to the mid-second centuries B.C., with newly established canons; a new set of doctrines; and generations of dedicated, devoted disciples. This new Confucianism represented a new synthesis of the pre-Ch'in thought that, unlike the first Ch'in synthesis or the Huang-Lao doctrines, was to make a tremendous and lasting impact upon the course of Imperial China.

From the new Confucianism also emerged a new theory of statecraft, a synthesis of the political thought of all schools of the pre-Ch'in period and early Han times.

- I. Superstructure: Heaven as the Supreme God and the emperor as his son on Earth. The universe is guided by the all-embracing T'ai-i with yin and yang as its two primary agents. Unification of all religious beliefs and all deities under Heaven. The God of Earth still rules the world on Earth to share the power and duties with Heaven.

- II. The Ruler: The Ruler is the ultimate authority on Earth to whom all people must submit. As the Son of Heaven with a special mandate from Heaven, he rules All under Heaven. But he should observe the Way of Heaven and nourish and teach all people in All under Heaven.
- III. The Wisdom of Governing: Taking guidance and inspiration from history and from the canonized books (later the Classics); following advice from the sages and the ancients; learning from the patterns of order and disorder, poverty and prosperity in the past; following the Yin-yang school to observe the Way of Heaven and to establish the dynastic symbols for political legitimacy; attaining moral transformation of the individual and the harmony of family as the basis of the state.
- IV. The Goal of the State: Attainment of the highest political ideal (*chih-shan*, perfection): *jen-cheng* (benevolent and just government); that is, to follow the legendary sage-rulers Yao, Shun, Yü, T'ang (Shang), Kings Wen and Wu (Chou), and the Duke of Chou to create peace, order, and prosperity for the people; and then to reach the Mohist utopian world of *ta-t'ung* (Grand Unity).
- V. The Art of Imperial Rule: Rule by *tao* and *te*; *jen* (humanity and fairness), *i* (justice and fairness), and *li* (propriety); assisted by "men of talent" (meritocracy); but effective application of the Legalist, Huang-Lao, and Mohist principles of *chün-tsung ch'en-pei* (superior ruler and inferior subordinates—ministers and other officials), *hsun-ming tse-shih* (assuring the correspondence of name and reality), *hsing-ching chih-hsu* (indifference in expression and inscrutable intentions), *wu-wei erh pu-wei* (achieving everything without action), *ming shang-fa* (effective use of "reward and punishment" control skills); full use of the Legalist techniques of control by position power (*shih*), special control techniques (*shu*), and legal means (*fa*).
- VI. Structure of Society: Division of the two classes, the "mind" and "hands" classes; promotion of agriculturalism; and advancement of education to transform the common people into the eight virtues: *jen* (humanity and fairness), *i* (justice and righteousness), *li* (propriety or observation of established rules), *chih* (wisdom), *hsin* (faithfulness), *hsiao* (filial piety), *chung* (loyalty), and *yung* (courage).
- VII. Ultimate Goal of Empire: Attainment of "universal kingship" (*sheng-wang*) or "successful transformation of barbarians into civilization without military means."

The reformation of Confucianism really led to the formation of a new paradigm of the Confucian theory of statecraft by absorbing all the practical and idealist elements in the political thought of the Legalist, Huang-Lao, Later Taoist, Mohist, Yin-yang, and Military Science schools while retaining the pristine ideas of earlier Confucianism and Hsun Tzu's Confucianism. In the end, unlike the previous state ideology of Legalism under the Ch'in by the First Emperor since 213 B.C, which was too exclusive to last long, the new syncretic Confucianism emerged as the most acceptable and all-embracing ideology for a new political regime and the least exclusive doctrine and the most ambitious paradigm of statecraft. In fact, it was to be the state-endorsed ideology in the Chinese empire for most of the next two thousand years, though many new reforms had to be made for its survival in changing times. But it was in the hands of Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty that this long-lasting political ideology was first put into practice.

In review, the new Han Confucianism is really a syncretism of the regional and intellectual differences and varieties of the hundred schools of thought in China's golden age of thought from about 650 to 200 B.C. After the end of the age, there were, as discussed in the Han writings, four major schools of thought: Confucianism, Taoism, Mohism, and Legalism; six other schools of less influence and prominence—*Ming* (nominalism), *Tsa* (Eclecticism), Yin-yang, *Ping* (the Military Science school), *Nung* (Agriculturalism), and *Tsung-heng* (Sophism), but none became predominant because they lacked critical elements for such development: syncretism in content and broadness in appeal. The new Confucianism broke through that limit by absorbing the most essential ideas and ideals from other schools while leaving room to accept other elements from these schools and other possible future new schools of thought and religions. The new Confucianism's all-embracing nature was probably the main feature that induced Emperor Wu to endorse it as the state ideology and to skillfully employ it as the ideological driving force to mobilize a whole nation to launch his massive empire building by expansive military engagements.⁷⁸

THE FORMATION OF THE IDEOLOGY OF KINGSHIP AND EMPIRE

Emperor Wu inherited a strong empire in political, economic, population, and military terms. He was ready to take the Han empire to a different stage, a stage of power, glory, and lasting impact upon the course of Chinese history, as did the First Emperor of the Ch'in some eighty years before. As a determined, ambitious, and talented prince, he set his vision for his new empire in his first five years of reign by putting the new Confucianism into practice. But his grandmother Empress Dowager Tou and her followers, such as Chi An, Yuan An, and

Han An-kuo, had dominated the Han Court, and they dealt a disastrous blow to his aggressive plans of action based on the new Confucianism in the first years of his reign. After Empress Dowager Tou died in 135 B.C., the young emperor immediately issued edicts to call for suggestions for new policy and direction for the empire from the learned, talented, and virtuous. In the edicts, he articulated his vision as the new emperor: first, he asserted his unquestionable authority and power as the Son of Heaven, as the Han house was the recipient of the mandate of Heaven; second, he determined to transform the lives of his subjects and the customs of his society; third, he desired to be one of the greatest rulers in history, the mythical and mystic *sheng-wang*; and finally, he wanted to achieve universal rule over the whole world. Over a hundred responded, but one man, Tung Chung-shu, had the emperor's ear. Tung's views were as follows.

1. Heaven is the highest god, and the emperor is Heaven's representative on Earth to command and to care for all the people under Heaven.
2. All human affairs and natural phenomena, good and bad, are Heaven's messages to the Son of Heaven on Earth.
3. The emperor must follow the great Way (*tao*) to rule, and moral values and ethical ideals, rites, and music are tools for such rule.
4. A great king must educate the people and transform society by moral virtues. And now it is time for the emperor to act.
5. In transforming society, the king must delimit the hierarchies of values, social order, social classes, and human relations. First, he must propagate and advance such Confucian values as *jen* (kindness), *i* (righteousness), *li* (propriety), *chih* (wisdom and knowledge), *hsin* (truthfulness, faithfulness, honesty), *chung* (loyalty), *shu* (forgiveness), and *ching* (respect) and cause human relations to be guided by these cardinal moral values. The king also must define the ruling class as those educated and talented and virtuous, who work with their minds and the class of the ruled, the masses, as who work with their hands. Then he must also make farming the essential and primary occupation (*pen-yeh*), which is to be valued, and make commerce and industry the nonessential occupation (*mo-yeh*), which is to be controlled.
6. Officials and administrators are to be respected and valued but are not permitted to engage in any profit-making ventures.
7. The emperor is to endorse Confucianism as the state ideology and ban all other schools of thought.
8. The king must take humans as the measure of everything.

9. The king's rule is universal—all under Heaven must be transformed, and peoples outside the Han borders should be made, by various means, to submit themselves to the authority of the Han Court.
10. Only by achieving all the above could the king be ranked among the great ones in history.

Tung Chung-shu was a learned and well-known Confucianist who specialized in the Kung-yang tradition of the *Ch'un-ch'iu* (Spring and Autumn Annals), which then was believed to be the work of Confucius. His ideas were the essence of the statecraft and kingship of the New Confucianism outlined above. In his view on "universal kingship," Tung seems to reflect the climate of opinion among the leading Confucian thinkers of the time. Ssu-ma Hsiang-ju, for example, even held in 130 B.C. that the "transformation of the barbarians into civilization" was the Heaven-mandated divine responsibility of a great ruler, because, as he put it, the "poor, backward, and uncultured barbarians" were eager to be rescued and guided to light, and "they would be so grateful and moved as to cry when they are transformed to the great Chinese culture of *jen* and *i*!" And he further exhorted that all the people of the empire should make all the sacrifices necessary to help the emperor transform the barbarians so to achieve this historic and noblest mission (*chueh-yeh*), to turn China to a new age of "Universal Empire under a sage-king" (*hung-yeh*). Thus, together Tung and Ssu-ma had defined the main parts and guiding principles of Wu-ti's course of action for the next fifty years.⁷⁹ For the main part, what they had suggested intentionally or unintentionally, particularly the jingoistic imperialism, very nicely met Wu-ti's ideological needs and empire-building ambitions at that time, and the emperor selected those elements in the list as the intellectual and ideological foundations to reshape his society and remake the Han empire. He then declared "Confucianism" in its newly created ideological garb the state ideology and banned all other schools of thought. He further decreed that an imperial college be established and that Confucian canonized books officially sanctioned as eternal sacred classics be taught in the imperial college, with the students given full fellowships and government positions after graduation. Han Wu-ti thus unified Chinese thought by political means and ended the pluralistic universe of Chinese thought that had existed since the seventh century B.C. Confucianism as the state ideology then continued, with some brief exceptions, as the principal guide to Chinese civilization until the end of Imperial China in 1911. Having achieved the unification and standardization of Chinese thought, Emperor Wu then started to restructure the Han society, and in 129 B.C. he began to launch his massive military campaigns, thus commencing the long process of creating his historic new universal empire.

In restructuring the Han society, Emperor Wu also set out to standardize the core institution in Chinese society, the religious belief system. He did so probably because he realized the “divine” function of religion for consolidating the legitimacy of his dynasty, for increasing and mystifying his own commanding power, for releasing his own fears for his future, for finding a way to relieve his psychological insecurity, and for providing him with control over his officials and subjects. Much like modern sociologists and anthropologists, the emperor saw religion as the sacralization of cultural traditions and individual patterned behavioral orientations and the worship of society. In any case, he followed the new Confucianism and the Yin-yang school to rationalize the hierarchy of T’ien (Shang-ti, T’ai-i), the Five Gods, the God of Earth (Hou-t’u), and numerous national and regional deities from 133 to 104 B.C. He did this by officially differentiating and standardizing the grading of temples and rituals and ceremonials, the location of worship, the correspondence of social and political status and the grade of deity for worship, and by performing the tradition-honored mythical *feng* and *shan* sacrifices at the sacred T’ai Mountain (in modern Shantung), on the top of which the emperor was said to see the Supreme God and receive divine instructions and messages; he also composed special hymns on each of the special occasions of ceremonies, over ten of which were recorded and survived. And in 104 B.C. he officially started the new calendar (*cheng-so*) of the Han dynasty with the first month as the New Year and made the phase (*te*) earth, the color yellow, and the number five the official dynastic symbols. Thus he followed the Way of Heaven to secure and prolong the life of his dynasty as prescribed by the Yin-yang thinkers.⁸⁰ Next, he was to reform the Han social structure.

When Emperor Kao (Kao-ti) first established the Han dynasty, he followed the Ch’in social structure based on the twenty orders of noble aristocratic ranks for social classes.⁸¹ In the Ch’in system, holders of high orders of aristocratic rank (*kao-chueh*) were granted special privileges to make them different from the low-ranking holders and the mass of nonranking commoners. These included an exemption from poll taxes and labor and military services for those with the ninth rank (*wu ta-fu*, fivefold grandee) or higher. But in 202 B.C. Emperor Kao extended such privileges to all rank holders below the seventh rank (*ch’i ta-fu*, grandee) and their family members and let all the holders of the seventh rank and above be given the revenue of estates, a special privilege that was granted only to the highest rank holders, *ch’e-hou* (marquises, later called *lieh-hou*), in the Ch’in system. He further decreed that the seventh and the eighth ranks, *kung-ch’eng* (public chariot), and above be treated as “high ranks” (*kao-chueh*). This was evidently Emperor Kao’s generous policy to reward his followers and win the allegiance of the established elite in the early days of his

new regime. However, as time progressed the system became further restricted, and under his successor, Emperor Hui (Hui-ti, 195–188 B.C.), it reverted (in 194 B.C.) to the Ch'in system by resetting the ninth rank as the mark of "high rank."⁸² As the system was followed in later reigns, the Han Court under Emperors Wen and Ching (180–141 B.C.) further narrowed the range of the class of the ruling elite to only those with the tenth rank and above. This was the result of the political reforms aimed at strengthening the Imperial Court's power by narrowing the size of the class of the ruling elite, as had been urged by such forceful political theorists and strategists as Chia I, Ch'ao Ts'o, and the like.⁸³

Emperor Wu, however, employed a different measure to restructure the political and social base of the Han Court's power. He extended the high-rank privileges to the ninth rank again and to the eighth rank and above later. He also granted high rank to many recipients by various means and for economic reasons expanded the sale of noble ranks, a practice that had already been in use in earlier reigns. The standard prices for purchasing the first eleven orders from the first rank, *kung-shih* (gentleman), to the eleventh, *yu shu-chang* (right chief of the multitude), in *shih* units of grain are listed in table 3.⁸⁴

The table shows that Wu-ti made four orders with high-rank privileges (eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh) available for wider sale. In addition, as discussed earlier, in 123 B.C. he also instituted a new category, the Aristocratic Ranks for Military Merit (*wu-kung chueh*), whose ranks were also for sale. It had eleven orders, with each higher by two orders in a twenty-two-order system. For example, the seventh rank, *ch'ien-fu* (chief of one thousand), in the new system was equivalent to the ninth rank, *wu ta-fu*, in the old system. All rank holders in the *wu-kung chueh* system enjoyed high privileges. Thus, intentionally or unintentionally, the emperor greatly expanded the ruling class in Han society

TABLE 3. Prices of Aristocratic Ranks under Wu-ti

Rank Order	Price (in <i>shih</i> of grain)
First	300
Second	600
Third	1,100
Fourth	1,600
Fifth	2,100
Sixth	2,600
Seventh	3,100
Eighth	3,600
Ninth	4,000
Tenth	4,500
Eleventh	5,000

and started to redefine the shape of the Chinese class structure, which both his forebears and the Ch'in rulers had been unable to undertake after the fall of the old Chou feudal social system because of pressing political and economic concerns.

Emperor Wu also granted, following the Ch'in practice, the *shih-wu* class—people who had lost their aristocratic ranks for different reasons—some legal privileges. That again created a large social class between the low rank holders and the rankless commoners.⁸⁵

The emperor also expanded the base of recommendations and examinations for candidacy for official appointment. He eliminated the economic prerequisite for such selections, a requirement that dated back to Ch'in times, and decreed that every administrator of a local region was required to recommend one such candidate every year for every unit with a population of two hundred thousand under his jurisdiction.⁸⁶ He also added *mao-ts'ai* (flourishing talent) as a new category of recommendation to the long-established system of *lang* (court gentlemen) system as a channel for recruiting and training young officers and low-level officials. In addition, for consideration of both political and military manpower in the 120s B.C. he appointed all *ch'ien-fu* and *wu ta-fu* rank holders as low-rank officials (*li*). Evidently, he followed the Ch'in political system in initiating this measure.⁸⁷ In doing so, he greatly broadened the path to success for local talents.

Emperor Wu's various measures were intended to enlarge the range of the privileged and the channel of opportunities for men of talent, learning, virtue, merit, or wealth in Han society. He employed intellectual expertise (education, both ideological and technical), economic power (wealth), and military achievements (management of violence) to define and shape the ruling elite in Han society. The Han social structure shaped by Wu-ti can be summed up in the following classification.

- I. The Ruling Elite: Aristocratic Rank Holders
 1. High rank holders: highest legal privileges and power positions.
 2. Middle rank holders: moderate legal privileges and low power positions.
 3. Low rank holders: limited legal privileges and very low or no power positions.
- II. Transitory Class
 1. *Shih-wu*: some legal privileges and no power positions but can be elevated to class I.
 2. Merchants and artisans: oppressed in theory but can buy their way into class I.

- III. Commoners: peasants and other free men who work with their hands, the masses in Han society. Commoners generally remained in the same social station for generations, though special circumstances might allow them to ascend to class I.
- IV. Slaves: hereditary or temporary. Slaves could buy their freedom and in some rare situations moved to higher classes.

Needless to say, there were still many variations (subclasses and subgroups) within each of the four classes. But the general pattern of Chinese social stratification took on a definite shape, and an administrative elite as the power center was to be firmly rooted in Han society, in place for Wu-ti's coming political and military ventures. That was Han Wu-ti's new society, and that society was so vibrant and productive in producing and opening new opportunities for its members that it eventually led to the emergence of a generation of intellectual, political, legal, financial, diplomatic, and military leaders. These new and mostly young elites included the men with special expertise and views: great generals such as Wei Ch'ing and Huo Ch'ü-ping, who were well versed in the art of war, and their protégés, who considered themselves to be professional soldiers, no longer privileged aristocrats; Sang Hung-yang, Tung-kuo Hsien-yang, and K'ung Chin, merchants who became financial officials and no longer valued only agriculturalism but zealously promoted a market-oriented economy; Chang T'ang, Chao Yü, Chou Yang, Wang Wen-shu, Tu Chou, Yang Mien, and tens of their followers, who reformed and changed the legal system to assure political and economic stability in the empire during the years of great military expansion; Chang Ch'ien, Su Wu, Ch'ang Hui, and Jen Li-cheng, who used different diplomatic strategies and tactics to solidify Han control over the large numbers of colonies and the empire's relationship with other superpowers; and Tung Chung-shu, Ssu-ma Hsiang-ju, and their protégés and followers, who articulated the mission of the Han empire and the theory of universal kingship (imperialism).⁸⁸ These new leaders and emerging talents helped Wu-ti create a new Han empire and in a large historical perspective a new Chinese empire, too.

Tung Chung-shu's conception of a universal king for All under Heaven, the personification of the *sheng-wang* ideal, provided the ideological justification of Wu-ti's ambition of creating a new Han empire, although his greater ambitions were military defeat and conquest of all peoples outside the Han borders, particularly the Hsiung-nu. For, as it will be shown later, he quoted the Confucian *Ch'un-ch'iu* to morally justify his campaigns against the Hsiung-nu as a means of avenging the national shame the Hsiung-nu leader Modun (Modu, Mo-tun) had inflicted on his great-grandfather Kao-ti (Liu Pang) at P'ing-ch'eng, and he

considered himself the messianic savior of the “Chinese” of Chung-kuo. He wanted to create a new empire far beyond the Han borders in all directions by subduing all peoples in the north, the south, the southwest, and the far west, so that the Han empire would reach into lands that had never heard of it. It would be the largest empire ever, much larger than that of the Ch’in First Emperor, his shadow hero, mentor, and role model. In the 130s B.C., the Han society, economic sources, human resources, and bureaucratic machinery were indeed ready for that historic venture.



2

WAR AND PEACE WITH THE
HSIUNG-NU IN
EARLY HAN CHINA

*The Hsiung-nu Challenge and the Origins
of Han Wu-ti's Military Expansion*

AFTER ITS FOUNDING IN 202 B.C., the Han dynasty took some seventy years to attain its international security. During this early stage of the Former Han period, the Han empire was severely endangered by the military challenge of the Hsiung-nu on the northern and northwestern borders. Only through skillful but humiliating diplomatic stratagems and treaties, through the Hsiung-nu's reluctance to move completely southward, and through political weaknesses generated by the nomadic lifestyle of the Hsiung-nu was the Han empire saved from disastrous military defeats and even conquest. Even so, the Hsiung-nu horde marched twice to the vicinity of the Han imperial capital at Ch'ang-an, and the empire as a whole was terrorized by the constant Hsiung-nu raids in the northern and northwestern regions.

The external challenge was not the only serious problem the new empire had been facing. Political instability and poverty were others. Mainly because of these, and factors derived from them, the Han empire lacked the offensive capability to deal with the Hsiung-nu challenge effectively.

As we discussed earlier, early Former Han China to the beginning of Wu-ti's long reign experienced fundamental changes in its social and political organization and practice as well as in its economic structure and development. As a result, the Han society, state, and economy were firmly consolidated and the Chinese empire became more powerful than ever before. With this foundation, Wu-ti began his large-scale military campaigns against the Hsiung-nu. He was determined to solve the Hsiung-nu problem once and for all. His quest for a new empire made China, for the first time, an international imperialist power in Asia.

The origin of this transition clearly was the ever-present Hsiung-nu challenge. Answering this challenge had become an urgent national purpose in early Former Han times. Wu-ti thus channeled all the resources of the empire into extensive and intensive military campaigns and colonial measures to eliminate the Hsiung-nu menace. This chapter focuses on the development of the Hsiung-nu problem from its beginning in 200 B.C. to the start of Wu-ti's new military adventure in 133 B.C. It examines all diplomatic and domestic issues in Han relations with the Hsiung-nu during that period and the various institutional and military measures that the Han government instituted to meet the Hsiung-nu challenge. To a certain extent, it shows the early Former Han mind and political institutions at work. Finally, it analyzes the unique character and changes of these early Former Han institutions and ideological conceptions.

THE HO-CH'IN POLICY AT WORK

Beginning with the P'ing-ch'eng episode of 200 B.C., in which Kao-ti was besieged for seven days by the Hsiung-nu on Mount Po-teng (near P'ing-ch'eng, Northern Shansi), and continuing down to Emperor Wu's reign, the Han Court based its policy toward the Hsiung-nu on the institution of *ho-ch'in*, the establishment and maintenance of a peace agreement between two nations according to certain specific terms. While this policy, as well as the continuous efforts to maintain it, characterized Han-Hsiung-nu relations during much of the period 198–135 B.C., it was also employed by the Han in dealing with barbarians of the Western Regions (Hsi-yü) during the Former Han period. The motives behind this policy are clear in the original proposal submitted by Liu Ching (fl. 223–188 B.C.) in 198 B.C.¹

The empire has only just been pacified and the officers and soldiers are weary of fighting. Therefore, it is not possible at this time to make the Hsiung-nu submit by force of arms. Moreover, Mo-tun [Modun] acquired [in 209 B.C.] the position of *shan-yü* by murdering his father and taking his father's concubines as wives, relying solely on force to maintain his

rule. Such a man can never be swayed by appealing to benevolence and righteousness. Therefore, I can only suggest a plan whereby in time Mo-tun's descendants can be made subjects of the Han. . . . If your Majesty could send your eldest daughter by the empress to be the consort of Mo-tun, accompanied by a generous dowry and presents, then Mo-tun . . . would make her his legitimate consort, and if she had a son he would make him heir apparent. . . . Why would he do this? Because of his greed for Han treasures and gifts. Your Majesty might well inquire after his health and send presents of those things the Han have in abundance and the Hsiung-nu lack. At the same time, you could dispatch rhetoricians to begin tactfully expounding to the Hsiung-nu the principles of etiquette and moral behavior. As long as Mo-tun is alive, he will of course be your son-in-law, and when he dies your grandson by your daughter will succeed him as *shan-yü*. Whoever heard of a grandson trying to treat his grandfather as an equal? Thus, your soldiers need fight no battles, and yet the Hsiung-nu will gradually become your subjects.

It is clear that the *ho-ch'in* policy was based on the idea that the military approach to the Hsiung-nu problem was not practicable at that time. The Hsiung-nu had a different way of life and possessed formidable military power based on a nomadic cavalry.² Liu Ching expected that the establishment of a marriage relationship would induce the Hsiung-nu to adopt the Chinese ethical viewpoint; they would gradually change their nomadic way of life by accepting Chinese codes of etiquette and moral behavior and adopting features of Chinese material civilization, exemplified by gifts and other valuable goods received from the Han. Thus, *ho-ch'in* may be called a long-range plan to sinicize the Hsiung-nu. This proposal was immediately adopted by Kao-ti, and its implementation in the following years led to a variety of incidents that clearly illustrate the operation of this policy.

1. The ninth year of Kao-ti (198 B.C.): Kao-ti dispatched Liu Ching to present a princess of the imperial family to the *shan-yü* as his consort. The Han further agreed to send an annual gift of specified quantities of silk floss and cloth, wine, husked grain, and other foodstuffs. The two nations also agreed to act as brothers.³

2. The third year of Emperor Hui (192 B.C.): The *shan-yü*, Mo-tun, sent an insulting letter to Empress Lü (r. 187–180 B.C.), asking her to marry him. She sought to launch a campaign against him, but Chi Pu and other generals reminded the empress that even Kao-ti, with all his wisdom and bravery, was still besieged by the Hsiung-nu in P'ing-ch'eng, and Empress Lü was finally persuaded to give up her idea. In the spring of 192 B.C., a girl of the imperial house was made a princess and given in marriage to the *shan-yü*.⁴

3. The first six years of Emperor Wen (180–174 B.C.): When he came to the throne, Emperor Wen (r. 179–157 B.C.) renewed *ho-ch'in* with the Hsiung-nu. Three years later Shan-yü Mo-tun wrote Emperor Wen a letter in response to one of his entreaties, part of which reads as follows.⁵

Formerly the emperor broached the topic of *ho-ch'in*, and I was most happy to comply with the intentions expressed in that letter. . . . I now wish . . . to forget that recent affair [i.e., the border conflict between the two nations in the preceding year] and restore our old agreement. . . . So I have dispatched my palace attendant, Hsi-hu-ch'ien, bearing this letter. At the same time, I beg to present one camel, two riding horses, and eight carriage horses.

After careful deliberation with high-ranking ministers, the Han Court decided to adopt *ho-ch'in* with Mo-tun. In the sixth year of his reign (174 B.C.) the emperor sent envoys to the Hsiung-nu with a letter, which reads in part:⁶

The Han have made a pact of brotherhood with the Hsiung-nu, and for this reason we have sent generous gifts to you, but it is your people who have often violated the pact and ruptured the bonds of brotherhood. . . . Nevertheless, We are sending you from Our own wardrobe an embroidered robe lined with patterned damask, an embroidered and lined underrobe, and a brocaded coat. [Furthermore, We send you] one comb, one sash with gold ornaments, one gold-ornamented leather belt, ten rolls of embroidery, thirty rolls of brocade, and forty rolls each of heavy red silk and light green silk, which shall be delivered to you by Our Palace Grandee I and Master Internuncio Chien.

4. The sixth year of Emperor Wen (174 B.C.): Shan-yü Mo-tun died, and his son, Chi-yü, succeeded him with the title Shan-yü Lao-shang. At this time Emperor Wen again sent a princess of the imperial house to be Lao-shang's consort and dispatched a eunuch from Yen named Chung-hang Yueh to accompany her as her tutor.⁷

5. The second year of Emperor Wen's Hou-yuan reign (162 B.C.): In the fourteenth year of Emperor Wen (166 B.C.), the Hsiung-nu marched within sight of the Han capital, Ch'ang-an, and Shan-yü Lao-shang remained within the borders of the Han empire for over one month. From this time forward, the Hsiung-nu grew more arrogant day by day and every year violated the border, killing many inhabitants and robbing them of goods and animals. Consequently, the Han Court sent an envoy with a letter of protest to the Hsiung-nu, citing their violations of the peace pact between the two peoples. The *shan-yü*

in turn dispatched one of his household administrators to apologize and request a renewal of *ho-ch'in*. In 162 B.C., Emperor Wen again sent an envoy with the following message.⁸

Your envoys, Household Administrator and *Tsu-chü* [*Tsugu*] Tiao Ch'ü Nan and Palace Attendant Han Liao, have delivered to Us two horses. . . . According to the decree of the former emperor, land north of the Great Wall, where people wield the bow and arrow, was to be commanded by the *shan-yü*, while the land within the wall, whose inhabitants dwell in houses and wear hats and girdles, was to be ruled by Us. . . . The Han and the Hsiung-nu are neighboring nations. But since the Hsiung-nu live in the north, where the land is cold and the killing frosts come early, We have commanded Our officials to send yearly to the *shan-yü* a fixed quantity of millet, leaven, gold, silk, cloth, thread, floss, and other articles. . . . Once *ho-ch'in* has been agreed upon, the Han shall not be the first to violate it.

After receiving this letter, the *shan-yü* expressed his willingness to abide by *ho-ch'in*. Emperor Wen then issued an edict.⁹

The great *shan-yü* of the Hsiung-nu has signified to Us his agreement to *ho-ch'in*. No action need be taken concerning those who have fled from one state to another. . . . The Hsiung-nu shall not enter within our borders, nor shall the Han forces venture beyond the frontier. Anyone who violates this agreement shall be executed. . . . We have given Our consent to this agreement and now wish to publish it to the world so that all may clearly understand.

6. The fourth year of Emperor Wen's Hou-yuan period (160 B.C.): Shan-yü Lao-shang died, and his son succeeded him with the title of Shan-yü Chün-ch'en (161–126 B.C.). Emperor Wen again renewed *ho-ch'in* with the Hsiung-nu.¹⁰

7. The first year of Emperor Ching (156 B.C.): Emperor Ching was enthroned in 157 B.C. (and reigned to 141 B.C.). In the fourth month of the first year of his reign, the emperor sent the Imperial Secretary T'ao Ch'ing to Tai to secure *ho-ch'in* with the Hsiung-nu.¹¹ In the autumn of 155 B.C., there is also a record of *ho-ch'in* agreements.¹²

8. The fifth year of Emperor Ching (152 B.C.): In the spring of this year, Emperor Ching sent a princess of the imperial house in marriage to Shan-yü Chüing-ch'en.¹³ At this time, the Han Court also allowed the Hsiung-nu to trade in the markets along the Han border and sent them other supplies, as had been done under earlier agreements.¹⁴

9. The first year of Emperor Wu's Chien-yuan period (140 B.C.): Upon ascending the throne, Emperor Wu reaffirmed *ho-ch'in* with the Hsiung-nu, treated them with generosity, allowed them to trade in the markets of the border stations, and sent them lavish gifts.¹⁵

10. The sixth year of Emperor Wu's Chien-yuan period (135 B.C.): The Hsiung-nu requested *ho-ch'in* once more in 135 B.C., and Emperor Wu, persuaded by a court conference decision, unwillingly agreed to renew *ho-ch'in* terms with the *shan-yü*. This was the last such agreement during Emperor Wu's reign. Two years later, the emperor, supported by the decision of another court conference, decided to solve the Hsiung-nu problem once and for all. Departing from the traditional defensive stance, he launched the first military campaign against the northern nomads since the time of Kao-ti. Although this probe, which put more than three hundred thousand Han troops into action, proved unsuccessful, massive offensive campaigns with mounted soldiers as the main component of the army became routine by 129 B.C., placing the Hsiung-nu under nearly constant attack. During this interval, the *shan-yü* made several requests to Emperor Wu for renewal of *ho ch'in*. None produced results because the emperor insisted on holding the *shan-yü*'s heir apparent at the Han Court as a hostage, a condition the *shan-yü* always refused.¹⁶

These records of *ho-ch'in* from its inception down to Emperor Wu's reign clearly demonstrate the detailed features of this institution. In sum, they are characterized by the following expectations.¹⁷

1. The Han and the Hsiung-nu, as two equal, brotherly nations, were to live in peace and not invade each other's territory, which was delimited as follows.
2. The land north of the Great Wall belonged to the Hsiung-nu and that south of the Great Wall to the Han.
3. The Han Court was supposed to send a fixed quantity of the following articles as gifts to the Hsiung-nu *shan-yü* annually.
 - A. Materials for clothing: silk floss, embroidery, brocade, and hemp cloth.
 - B. Foodstuffs: grains (husked and unhusked), leaven, wine (liquor), and others.
 - C. Precious goods: gold or the like.
4. The Hsiung-nu would be permitted to frequent Han markets along the borders and were to be well treated.
5. The Han were to send a princess of the imperial house in marriage to the new Hsiung-nu *shan-yü* when the latter assumed his title or soon after. (In general, one princess was sent to each *shan-yü*. However, Shan-yü Mo-tun was an exception; the Han sent two princesses to

him within a period of seven years, and it may have been Mo-tun who forced the Han emperor to accept this condition.) The Han also sent one or more eunuchs or other persons to accompany the princesses as tutors.

6. The peace agreement was to be renewed immediately whenever a new Han emperor came to the throne or a new Hsiung-nu *shan-yü* assumed his title.
7. The peace agreement was to be published to inform all the people, particularly those in the border areas. Anyone violating it was to be punished.

It is interesting to note that on one occasion the Han emperor even sent some ready-made clothes and similar articles to the *shan-yü*; this probably was an exception to the rule. Also the articles sent by the Han to the Hsiung-nu annually were regarded as gifts, not tribute. The *shan-yü* in turn sent horses and camels to the Han emperor, though these may not have been required. The Han apparently stressed the point that the two nations were equal and that the Han were to send these generous gifts to the Hsiung-nu because the latter lived in a desert, where good food and clothing were in short supply. Equality, not superiority, was the main concern of the Han in these dealings. However, the Han seem to have followed the traditional Chou feudal ideology that to give was to show one's superiority, that the giver was something more and higher than the recipient.¹⁸

Ho-ch'in agreements were concluded and made official by exchanges of letters between the two supreme rulers. In the Han era, approval or renewal of such an agreement was first to be discussed in a court conference of high-ranking officials and generals. Then the emperor was to make a final decision in cognizance of the majority opinion and practical considerations.

The envoys of various embassies dispatched to the *ho-ch'in* negotiations apparently were not restricted to a particular rank or position, but all of them were close to and trusted by the rulers and none was of low position. Among the Hsiung-nu envoys were palace attendants, royal household administrators, and *tsu-chü* (*tsugu*). Among the Han titles and ranks were marquis (Liu Ching, T'ao Ch'ing), imperial secretary (T'ao Ch'ing), palace grandee, master of internuncios, and *po-shih* (erudite).¹⁹ In general, the Han envoy's ranks were higher than those of their counterparts, for the Han considered the matter of *ho-ch'in* vital to their national security; the power and responsibility of negotiation, therefore, had to be in the hands of high-ranking officials. That a successful *ho-ch'in* negotiation could bring promotion to its chief architect is exemplified by T'ao Ch'ing (f. ca. 190–147 B.C.). T'ao, the only one who did not attend preliminary negotiations at the Hsiung-nu Court, went to conclude a successful *ho-ch'in*

treaty in 156 B.C. in his capacity as imperial secretary. The following year he was appointed chancellor.²⁰ This again reveals the importance of *ho-ch'in* in the Han national perspective.

Obviously, the results of *ho-ch'in* were not those expected by its designer, Liu Ching. Han clothing materials and foodstuffs were introduced in quantities too small to substantially change Hsiung-nu lifestyles or living standards.²¹ Neither did the Han princesses and their accompanying advisers do much to persuade the *shan-yü* accept Han ways. On the contrary, it seems that these Han people adjusted surprisingly well to the Hsiung-nu way of life. Not a single document records communication between the Han Court and those princesses and advisers.²² One such adviser, Chung-hang Yueh, even promoted the interests of the Hsiung-nu over those of the Han and became a defender of their "barbarous" customs and social organizations. He warned the *shan-yü* that demand for Chinese products would lead to the collapse of his nation. Admittedly, Chung-hang Yueh was an exception, since he was sent against his will to live among the Hsiung-nu.²³ It may also be true, however, that, as Owen Lattimore points out, some Chinese who ventured too far into the steppes were drawn away from China and assimilated into steppe society.²⁴

Liu Ching's strategy of *ho-ch'in* was also based on the Chinese ethical norm that the son-in-law (and grandson) should obey the father-in-law (and grandfather). However, there was no such norm among the Hsiung-nu, and the Han envoys failed to convert the *shan-yü* to the Chinese code of etiquette and moral behavior.²⁵ Consequently, agreements and marriages were unable to check the *shan-yü*'s ambition to invade the Han border regions. During the period 198–141 B.C. there were thirteen Hsiung-nu raids recorded, twice (166 and 158 B.C.) the Han capital was threatened, one governor (in 142 B.C.) and one chief commandant (in 166 B.C.) were killed resisting Hsiung-nu incursions, eight Han *chün* were invaded by the Hsiung-nu, and large numbers of people in these places were either killed or captured. Numerous animals were carried away, and a great deal of property was stolen by the Hsiung-nu. Table 4 summarizes these Hsiung-nu attacks.²⁶

The table shows that only during the reign of Kao-ti were the Hsiung-nu raids carried out with the cooperation of rebellious Chinese generals; the other incidents involved no Chinese. Thus, their invasions of Han territory were motivated only by the ambitions of certain *shan-yü* or by economic or other factors. Of these thirteen invasions, three were during the reign of Kao-ti, two during the reign of Empress Lü, five during the reign of Emperor Wen, and three during the reign of Emperor Ching. With regard to the geography of the raids, eleven were in northern China, four in the northwest, three in the west, and one in the northeast. The number of raids and the total losses indicate that the Hsiung-nu menace was most severe during Emperor Wen's reign. An imperial

TABLE 4. Hsiung-nu Invasions in Early Han China, 198–141 B.C.

Emperor (Reign)	Year (regnal/Western)	Number of Hsiung-nu Crossing Borders	Regions Invaded	Consequences	Rebellious Chinese Generals Involved
Kao-ti	10 (197 B.C.)		Tai		Han Hsin Ch'en Hsi
	11 (196 B.C.)		Tai (Ts'an-ho)		Han Hsin
	12 (195 B.C.)		Shang-ku and eastward		Lu Wan
Empress Lü	6 (182 B.C.)		Lung-hsi (Ti-tao)		
			T'ien-shui (A-yang)		
	7 (181 B.C.)		Lung-hsi (Ti-tao)	Abducted more than two thousand people. Plundered barbarians loyal to Han.	
Emperor Wen	1 (179 B.C.)		Yun-chung	Killed and captured a number of inhabitants.	
	3 (177 B.C.)		The region of Ho-nan Shang		
	11 (169 B.C.)				
	14 (166 B.C.)	140,000	An-ting (Ch'ao-na and Hsiao Kuan) Pei-ti	Burned Hui-chung Palace. Horse patrols reached Kan-chüan Palace.	
			An-ting (P'eng-yang) Yung (Kan-chüan Palace)		
Hou-yuan	6 (158 B.C.)	30,000	Shang	Ch'ang-an alarmed by signal fires.	
			Yun-chung, Tai (Kou-chu)		
Emperor Ching					
Chung-yuan	2 (148 B.C.)		Yen		
	6 (144 B.C.)		Yen-men Yun-chung (Wu-ch'uan) Shang	Stole horses from imperial pastures.	
Hou-yuan	2 (142 B.C.)		Yen-men	Governor Feng Ching died in battle against the Hsiung-nu.	

edict dated 162 B.C., four years before the death of the emperor, testifies to this point.²⁷

Lacking perspicacity, We have been unable to extend the influence of Our virtue to distant regions. This has caused the states outside the borders to be sometimes restless and discontented. Now, when the people outside the four wildernesses at the borders do not live quietly the people within the fiefs and imperial domain toil, suffer, and are ill at ease. The responsibility for trouble both inside and outside the borders lies altogether in the paucity of Our virtue and its failure to penetrate distant regions.

In recent years, several in succession, the Hsiung-nu have ravaged the border regions and killed many officials and common people. . . . For a long time, the central empire [the Han] and the outer kingdom [the Hsiung-nu] have been entangled in difficulties and military conflicts; how can they content themselves with the situation?

Now We have "risen early and retired late"; We have toiled and suffered for the world; We have been solicitous toward and concerned for all the people; for their sake, We have been compassionate, heartsick, and disturbed; not for one day has this matter left Our mind. Hence, We have sent envoys in rapid succession, so that the caps and carriage coverings of one caravan were in sight of the second and their wheel tracks were uninterrupted on the road, in order to enlighten the *shan-yü* concerning Our intentions.

Here one can see how deeply disturbed the Han emperor was by the Hsiung-nu problem, the sincerity of his desire for peace agreements with the *shan-yü*, and the humility in which he expressed his feelings of distress and desire for peace.

Although the repeated incursions were certainly irritating, the ego of every Han emperor since Kao-ti was probably injured more painfully by the humiliations that Shan-yü Mo-tun had inflicted on the first emperor and his empress, that is, the siege of Po-teng (P'ing-Ch'eng) and the insulting letter mentioned earlier. Pride, tradition, and a sense of history made the Han rulers feel uneasy and guilty as long as the Hsiung-nu were not wholly defeated. In 101 B.C., the Han conquered the kingdom of Ta-yuan, and the might of the Han reached its peak. Emperor Wu at this time had hopes of carrying out the final suppression of the Hsiung-nu, as expressed in the following edict.²⁸

Kao-tsu [Kao-ti] has left Us the task of avenging the difficulties he suffered at P'ing-ch'eng [Po-teng]. Furthermore, the *shan-yü* [Mo-tun] sent Kao-tsu's empress a most treasonable and insulting letter. In ancient

times, Duke Hsiang of Ch'i avenged an insult that one of his ancestors had suffered nine generations earlier, for which he was praised [by Confucius] in the *Spring and Autumn Annals*.

This vengeful outcry reveals Emperor Wu's deep sense of humiliation and inner anxiety about the Hsiung-nu menace, which he interpreted not merely as a political problem but more as an historical and moral obligation in accordance with the Confucian principle of avenging insults to ancestors. As will be discussed later, this same conception of the Hsiung-nu problem was shared by all Han rulers after Kao-ti and, for that matter, by the state as a whole.

THE QUEST FOR SECURITY

Toward the ever-growing menace posed by the dangerous Hsiung-nu, the Han, having no economic and military strength with which to wage an all-out offensive, applied more passive countermeasures. The most important and effective of these was the policy of *ch'üan-hsiang*, literally, encouraging the defection of the Hsiung-nu with respect, trust, and above all lavish material rewards. The policy was first put forth by the well-known Han political thinker Chia I (201/200–168 B.C.). It seems that around 174 B.C., Chia wrote several memorials to Emperor Wen about the urgent problems of the Han empire; one of these contained his suggestion for solving the Hsiung-nu problem, the famous policy of “three standards and five baits” (*san-piao wu-erh*). In observing the three standards the Han emperor should show (1) appreciation for the Hsiung-nu physical appearance; (2) deep interest in Hsiung-nu techniques; and (3) good faith in the *shan-yü*'s promises. These should contribute toward winning the Hsiung-nu's confidence in the emperor's sincerity and their trust in his word and would make them more willing to run the risks of affiliation with the Han. In dangling the “five baits,” the Han emperor should confer upon defeated and defecting Hsiung-nu (1) elegant clothes and carriages, (2) delicious food, (3) grand music and female attendants, (4) magnificent mansions with treasury storehouses and slaves, and (5) all manner of imperial favors and personal attention such as grand imperial reception parties. Thus, the baits were designed to win over the Hsiung-nu through transformation and control of their physical senses and tastes. Chia further suggested that for every thousand Hsiung-nu who defected with a leader the court should select two or three of them for grand rewards; for a group of ten thousand, the court should reward ten or more with great honors.²⁹

Convinced of the magical effectiveness of the Han emperor's moral charisma and the Han material superiority in international dealings,³⁰ Chia placed too much confidence in his policy. If implemented, he felt, it would elicit

a massive wave of Hsiung-nu defections and bring about the eventual downfall of the *shan-yü* and the Hsiung-nu as an independent nation within a period of two to five years. Chia's reasoning was rather simplistic: the lavish rewards would be such a temptation to the Hsiung-nu that as the word began to spread what modern psychological theory calls a peripheral motor activity of defection could be created among all Hsiung-nu, that is, they would be conditioned by means of a situational pattern to preempt their tribesmen by surreptitiously defecting to the Han.³¹ This new psychological force would sweep quickly through Hsiung-nu society and would produce an atmosphere of suspicion in that nation, eventually leading the *shan-yü* to suspect all his officials of being traitors and conspirators. This would mark the beginning of breakdown in unity and the collapse of the Hsiung-nu as a power.

Chia's policy may be regarded as a plan for systematic psychological warfare. Its basis is quite similar to modern techniques of reward propaganda.³² Conceiving of himself as a military strategist,³³ Chia evidently followed traditions of strategy and psychological warfare laid down in the ancient classics on war, *Sun-tzu ping-fa* (The Art of War) by Sun Wu (fl. 514–453 B.C.) and *Sun Pin ping-fa* by Sun Pin (fl. 380–316 B.C.).³⁴ While the authors of these works were history's earliest proponents of psychological warfare, Chia was among the first to apply such techniques in international relations.

On the other hand, Chia's policy also followed the classical Confucian strategy for dealing with non-Chinese, which stresses *huai-ti fu-yuan* (conciliating the enemy and winning over distant peoples).³⁵ This policy dictates the use of "culture power" rather than military force to win over remote peoples to China.³⁶ It is passive in principle, though perhaps not so passive in practice.

In 169 B.C., five years after Chia's proposal, another brilliant Han political thinker and statesman, Ch'ao Ts'o (ca. 200–154 B.C.), suggested a similar but more positive measure: using surrendered Hsiung-nu to attack their countrymen. In a long memorial about the Hsiung-nu menace submitted to Emperor Ching, Ch'ao suggested equipping surrendered Hsiung-nu as mounted soldiers and using them together with Han war chariots and foot soldiers to fight their own tribesmen.³⁷ The idea of "using barbarians to check barbarians" (*i-i chih-i* or *i-i fa-i*) was formulated in conjunction with Chia I's policy. It remained a fundamental tenet of Chinese foreign policy throughout the imperial era.

Chia I and Ch'ao Ts'o were two of the most brilliant and influential political thinkers and statesmen in Han China.³⁸ They lived in a critical transitional period during which the Han, responding to the most serious of domestic political crises and foreign challenges, gradually emerged as one of the great empires in Chinese history. The political ideas of Chia and Ch'ao offer us insights into the critical problems inherited and generated over the course of this transition. Most of their ideas were slowly but effectively implemented as basic policy

directives by Emperors Wen and Ching and became lasting elements in the Han and for that matter the Chinese political tradition.

Their recommendations for dealing with the Hsiung-nu problem under the *ho-ch'in* system were no exception. Records of new developments in Han-Hsiung-nu relations during and after Emperor Wen's reign testify to this point, though in some cases the degree of success was limited.

Before Emperor Wu's Hsiung-nu campaigns began to result in decisive victories in 129 B.C., eleven Hsiung-nu officials of the highest rank defected to the Han, including three chancellors and eight tribal kings. All of them were enfeoffed by the court as marquises with estates of from seven hundred to two thousand families, rewards much higher than those received by their regular Han counterparts. Table 5 sums up these developments.³⁹

These Hsiung-nu officials and kings did not come to the Han alone. They crossed the borders with their forces, and the size of the estates they were awarded was determined by the size of the forces they brought with them. Such defections therefore constituted a heavy material and military loss to the *shan-yü* over and above the psychological damage. It is not surprising that such defectors are classified in the *Han-shu*, compiled in the late first century A.D., as *kung-ch'en* (meritorious officials). Furthermore, these defecting marquises (with two exceptions) were all from states in the northern and northeastern border provinces. The Han Court clearly planned to use these Hsiung-nu forces to counteract the frequent raids directed by the *shan-yü*'s court. This was the policy of *i-i chih-i* (using barbarians to check barbarians) at work. In a later period, some of these defected Hsiung-nu also joined Han soldiers in their expeditions against the *shan-yü*'s forces,⁴⁰ thus demonstrating the success of the policies of Chia I and Ch'ao Ts'o.

Besides the policies just discussed, two other measures were put into practice in response to the Hsiung-nu threat during the reigns of Emperors Wen and Ching. One was aimed at strengthening Han defenses in the northern border areas, the other at building a mounted armed force to match the swiftness and dynamism of the Hsiung-nu cavalry. Both policies were suggested by Ch'ao Ts'o.

In a long memorial on frontier defense and the importance of agriculture, dated 169 B.C., Ch'ao Ts'o advised Emperor Wen to institute a program of transferring people from the interior to the northern frontier. The earliest systematic plan for such an undertaking in the history of Imperial China, it reads in part as follows.⁴¹

Your Majesty is greatly concerned about the security of the [northern] borders and has sent officials and soldiers to construct and guard the barriers, thereby doing a great service to the people [in the frontier areas].

TABLE 5. Enfeoffment of Surrendered Hsiung-nu Leaders

Name	Former Hsiung-nu Position	Marquisate and Location (by Han <i>chün</i>)	Dates (emperor/regnal year/ Western year)	Size of Estates (families)
Han Kuei-tang	Chancellor	Kung-kao (Ho-chien)	Wen, 16 (164 B.C.)	1,237
Han Ying	Chancellor	Hsiang-ch'eng (Ying-ch'uan)	Wen, 16 (164 B.C.)	2,000
Yü Chün	King	An-ling (Ying-ch'uan)	Ching, Chung-yuan 3 (147 B.C.)	1,550
Ssu	King	Huan (Ho-tung)	Ching, Chung-yuan 3 (147 B.C.)	?
Lu Ch'iang	King	Chiu (Cho-chün)	Ching, Chung-yuan 3 (147 B.C.)	1,570
Hsu Lu	King	Jung-ch'eng (Cho-chün)	Ching, Chung-yuan 3 (147 B.C.)	700
P'u Ching	King	I (Cho-chün)	Ching, Chung-yuan 3 (147 B.C.)	1,110
Fan Tai	King	Fan-yang (Cho-chün)	Ching, Chung-yuan 3 (147 B.C.)	1,197
Han Tan	King	Hsi (Wei)	Ching, Chung-yuan 3 (147 B.C.)	?
Lu T'a-chih	King	Yu-ku (Cho-chün)	Ching, Chung-yuan 5 (145 B.C.)	1,500
Chao Hsin	Chancellor	Hsi (Wei)	Wu, Yuan-kuang 4 (130 B.C.)	1,680

But these soldiers, who are sent there from distant places and stay for only one year's duty, are unable to understand the character and capacities of the Hsiung-nu. It would be better for defense purposes to settle permanent residents in these areas, providing them with houses and fields.

For these migrants, [the government] could construct walled cities, protected by high walls and deep moats and the placement of catapults and iron thorns. Within each city, an inner wall is also to be constructed, the distance between this and the outer wall measuring 150 *pu* [paces].⁴² Constructed at strategic points and along thoroughfares, these walled cities could be designed to hold no fewer than one thousand households each. Surrounding each residential area "sandy fields" could be laid out as a further protective measure.⁴³

In these settlements, the government could build houses and provide farming tools before the arrival of the migrants. As for the recruitment of migrants, the government should first enlist ordinary, pardoned, and *fu-tso* convicts.⁴⁴ If their number is not sufficient, then adult male and female slaves who were given [to the government] by their masters to atone for crimes and male and female slaves given by their masters to purchase orders of aristocratic rank could be employed. [If the number is still] not sufficient, then all those commoners who might desire to go could be granted ranks and their families exempted from taxation and service.

Provision of winter and summer clothing and food from the granaries could be discontinued when these migrants become self-supporting. The government could also buy mates for those without husbands or wives, for it is man's nature that without a mate he cannot stay permanently on the frontier.

Without generous salaries and benefits, these people cannot be made to stay long in such dangerous and difficult regions. Accordingly, the government could rule that anyone who stops a Hsiung-nu raid and recovers what has been plundered will have half of it, with the government making restitution to the original owners.

If all were intent upon halting the Hsiung-nu, people of walled cities and wards would lend each other mutual aid and assistance, standing up to the Hsiung-nu and not shunning death. They would do this not to ingratiate themselves to the emperor but to protect their kinfolk and win material rewards. Thus, the efficacy of the system [proposed] would be ten thousand times greater than the service performed by those garrison soldiers from the east who are not familiar with local conditions and are basically fearful of the Hsiung-nu.

If Your Majesty should choose to accept this proposal and transfer people to inhabit and fortify the border regions, then the common people would bear no garrison duties in the distant regions, and those on the frontier could protect each other while freeing themselves from fearful captivity. The benefits bestowed upon them would certainly be passed from generation to generation.

Ch'ao's proposal was acted upon immediately by the emperor, and the government thereupon enlisted people for removal to the northern frontier regions.

Together with the memorial just quoted, Ch'ao submitted a detailed national economic plan to support the frontier settlers. He suggested to Emperor Wen that people all over the empire be allowed to present grain to obtain orders of aristocratic rank and pardons for crimes.⁴⁵ The emperor again immediately followed Ch'ao's counsel and ordered that this grain be sent to the frontiers. He also set up a scale of rewards for grain contribution: for 600 *shih* of grain, people were to receive the second-order rank *shang-tso*. Then graduated orders of rank were to be granted for amounts up to 4,000 *shih*, which earned the ninth-order rank, *wu-ta-fu*, and from that up to 12,000 *shih*, for which was bestowed the eighteenth order of rank, *ta-shu-chang*. Intermediate orders of rank were scaled to the amount of grain contributed.⁴⁶

This second grain-rank plan was instituted to make the settlement plan successful and effective. There were in Han times twenty orders of aristocratic rank. The nineteenth and twentieth orders were the highest, carrying the titles marquis of Kuan-nei and Ch'e, respectively. Therefore, the eighteenth order was the highest below the level of marquis. Judging from the fact that the government rewarded even this order of rank to people just for the purpose of obtaining grain to support the frontier migrants, Ch'ao Ts'o's plan for reconstructing the frontier establishments must have been implemented on a large scale. It is also clear that the Han Court concentrated on rebuilding a defense system along the northern frontier, though it could not wage an all-out campaign against the Hsiung-nu at this time.⁴⁷

Ch'ao Ts'o's second proposal for meeting the ever-serious Hsiung-nu menace was in response to a most urgent military need. Having clearly discerned the inferiority of the Han army in war with the Hsiung-nu, partly because of the lesser mobility of its war chariots and infantry, Ch'ao saw the building of a large cavalry as the only military answer to the crisis. Therefore, he advised Emperor Wen in 169 B.C. to create a nationwide recruitment program to obtain the horses needed for a military buildup. Large-scale horse breeding was not common in early Han China, except in the northwestern and western border regions; the government had to take steps to advance such an endeavor. Ch'ao proposed that for each horse sent to the government a family would have three

men of draft age exempted from military service. This was immediately put into practice by the emperor.⁴⁸

Emperor Ching ascended the imperial throne in 157 B.C., and his reign started officially in the following year. Ch'ao Ts'o became the most trusted of all ministers to the new emperor. At this time, as was described by Ssu-ma Ch'ien (145–86 B.C.), Ch'ao Ts'o "often discussed matters of state with the emperor in private, and the emperor readily listened to all his advice; he enjoyed greater favor at court than the highest officials, and at his suggestion many changes were made in the laws of the empire."⁴⁹ In 155 B.C., he was appointed imperial secretary, a position next only to the chancellor, almost as important as the chancellor in power, and more important in terms of closeness to the emperor.⁵⁰ At this time, the Han government implemented its most ambitious program yet for acquiring horses: the establishment of large "government pastures" for breeding.⁵¹

The government set up thirty-six such pastures in the northern and western border regions, extending from Hsiang-p'ing District (modern Liao-yang) of Liao-tung (modern Liaoning and part of modern Antung) in the far northeast to Kuei-te District (near modern Ch'ing-yang) of Pei-ti (eastern Kansu) in the far west. The Office of the Grand Stud (T'ai-p'u) appointed six herdsmen (*mu-shih*), each with three assistants (*ch'eng*), to administer these pastures. Court gentlemen (*lang*) were appointed as superintendents (*yuan-ling*) to head each of them. A total of 30,000 government male and female slaves were sent to these places to care for the horses. The horses in these breeding pastures gradually increased to 300,000, with the best of them selected to receive military training. All local governments and governments in the various kingdoms were required to raise horses. By Wu-ti's time, the total number of horses had reached over 450,000.⁵²

A natural step in keeping with the buildup of the horse population was preventing them from winding up in the hands of the Hsiung-nu. A memorial by Imperial Secretary Wei Wan (d. 131 B.C.) in 146 B.C. proposed that horses whose height was more than 5 Han *ch'ih* (feet) and 9 Han *ts'un* (inches)—over 52.5 inches English measure—whose teeth were not yet smooth should not be allowed to cross the border passes. The proposal was approved immediately by Emperor Ching.⁵³

Because the military purpose of the breeding program was clear to the Hsiung-nu, they began to raid the government pastures. In 144 B.C., for instance, they entered Yen-men (modern Shansi), Wu-ch'üan (modern Wu-ch'üan) District of Yun-chung (modern Suiyuan), and Shang (modern Shensi) to raid the pastures and take the horses being specially trained for military use. Two thousand Han officials and soldiers died in their defense.⁵⁴ The casualties were by far the largest of all Han–Hsiung-nu conflicts until the beginning of Emperor Wu's

large-scale military campaigns in 129 B.C. Two years later, the Hsiung-nu again entered Yen-men, and Governor Feng Ching was killed in battle with them. The Han government then sent chariots and foot soldiers to garrison Yen-men.⁵⁵ These incidents illustrate the range and intensity of the battles and the recognition by both sides of the vital importance of the breeding pastures.

Cavalry horses thus became one of the centers of conflict between the two nations. Considering the later course of Han–Hsiung-nu relations, particularly under the reign of Emperor Wu, and the fact that the Hsiung-nu were militarily superior to the Han at this time, this was an inevitable development. The cavalry horses, more than anything else, made possible the temporary Hsiung-nu superiority and the Han acceptance of the *ho-ch'in* treaties. As the Han Court had decided to turn the tide with a buildup of cavalry horses, the Hsiung-nu strategy of attacking the pastures was a natural reaction.

THE GREAT DEBATES

In review, Han–Hsiung-nu relations between 200 and 133 B.C. may be best described as in an uneasy and precarious balance.⁵⁶ The Hsiung-nu were on the offensive and often pursued their own course of action without respect for treaty terms. The Han, naturally, were not content with the *ho-ch'in* arrangement, but practical considerations, particularly the lack of long-range, large-scale military resources, prevented them from changing the unpleasant situation. This dilemma was reflected in the debates over the matter among the Han leaders, especially the ranking officials and generals. Opinions about *ho-ch'in* had been bitterly divided since the time of Kao-ti.

The foes of the *ho-ch'in* policy argued that, first of all, it was an intolerable shame for a great empire like that of the Han to appease the Hsiung-nu by sending annual costly gifts. It was the barbarians who were expected to present tribute to the Han emperor. These points were effectively articulated by Chia I during the reign of Emperor Wen.⁵⁷

The second argument against *ho-ch'in*, as pointed out by Chia I, Wang Hui (d. 133 B.C.), and others, was based on the fact that the Hsiung-nu had never kept their promise to maintain peace with the Han. Although they had signed the peace treaty and received Chinese princesses and goods, the Hsiung-nu continued to raid in Chinese territory, to kill or capture people in frontier regions, and to seize property.⁵⁸ The life of the people in the border regions was made miserable by these constant Hsiung-nu raids. The government had the unavoidable responsibility to stop these raids and protect the people.⁵⁹

Third, a comparison of the national strength of the two nations showed that *ho-ch'in* was an unwise policy. As Chia I reasoned, the Hsiung-nu had only a small population—no more than that of a Han *hsien* (district); they could,

therefore, be easily defeated by the great Han empire.⁶⁰ Arguing similarly but in a more precise way, Ch'ao Ts'o pointed out in 169 B.C. that the Hsiung-nu had three points of military strength, namely, their special geographical situation; their ability to shoot the bow from horseback and to fight along dangerous mountain paths; and their superiority in enduring cold, hunger, thirst, and other physical deprivations. The Chinese, he said, were superior in five respects, namely, the effectiveness of their chariots and cavalry for fighting on level ground; their long spears, reflex crossbows, thick armor, and sharp blades; the maneuvering ability of their troops, especially the coordination of foot soldiers with highly accurate bowmen; and the mastery of hand-to-hand fighting with sword and spear. Thus, the Han topped the Hsiung-nu five to three in this comparison of their fighting strength.⁶¹

A tough line of argument was drawn from tradition. Arguing that the Hsiung-nu could be conquered only by force of arms, not by virtue and benevolence, Wang Hui emphasized that military conquest of the barbarians was a well-established tradition in Chinese history. As an example, he pointed to the victory achieved by General Meng T'ien (d. 210 B.C.) over the Hsiung-nu during the Ch'in period.⁶²

The preceding analysis indicates that the opponents of *ho-ch'in* argued on the rather emotional grounds of national pride, nostalgia for past glories, and patriotism. Except for Ch'ao Ts'o, none revealed an understanding of the strength and character of the Hsiung-nu. With poor reasoning such as equating military strength with population size, they failed to recognize the real difficulties of a war against the Hsiung-nu and were oblivious to the fact that the Hsiung-nu's mastery of archery from horseback and their nomadic way of life gave them great mobility and striking power. Almost all the opponents of the *ho-ch'in* policy lacked experience in border life or familiarity with the Hsiung-nu problem. Most were simply political writers. Wang Hui was the only exception. He had lived on the border for a long time and had knowledge of Hsiung-nu affairs. Nevertheless, he joined the opponents of *ho-ch'in*, apparently impressed by two undisputable facts: the Hsiung-nu had never respected the terms of a peace treaty and the people in the border regions were terrorized and demoralized by the frequent raids. Both facts proved the futility of *ho-ch'in*. It was apparently on these grounds that an expert on border affairs such as Wang Hui advocated its rejection.

The proponents of *ho-ch'in* advanced different arguments. First, there were military considerations. As pointed out by Ch'eng Chin in 201 B.C., Han An-kuo in 135 B.C., and Chu-fu Yen in 134 B.C., China enjoyed a comfortable edge over the Hsiung-nu in terms of population and territory, but a war could not be won merely on the basis of these factors because the Hsiung-nu were nomads with no fixed cities and forts. Moving from place to place like flocks of

birds, they were hard to follow and catch. Moreover, they had a special technique of archery on horseback that greatly increased their mobility and striking power.⁶³

A second line of argument was based on tradition. It had been the tradition of the Han dynasty to keep *ho-ch'in* with the Hsiung-nu ever since Kao-ti had been besieged at P'ing-ch'eng.⁶⁴ As Chi Pu and other generals pointed out in 192 B.C., if the mighty Kao-ti, with all his wisdom and bravery, could not win a victory over the Hsiung-nu, who could?⁶⁵ Besides, since the time of the sage rulers of the three ancient dynasties (Hsia, Shang, and Chou) it had been the tradition to let the barbarians in distant regions follow their own way of life.⁶⁶

Third, it was argued that war against the Hsiung-nu would put a disastrous strain on the empire's human and economic resources. After all, pillaging and plundering were a natural way of life for the Hsiung-nu, and ever since the ancient times of the Hsia, Shang, and Chou dynasties no attempt had been made to control them. Thus, the Ch'in dynasty had adopted an erroneous policy by so focusing on Hsiung-nu affairs that the whole empire was exhausted. The result was that Ch'en She (d. 208 B.C.), Wu Kuang (d. 208 B.C.), and others rebelled in 209 B.C., which eventually led to the downfall of the dynasty. This should have been a lesson to the Han.⁶⁷ That is, the proponents of *ho-ch'in* maintained that war against the Hsiung-nu would take a long time and that a long period of warfare would increase the economic burden of the people as well as that of military service. Furthermore, in such a war the people on the border would also suffer great strain and hardship and would be unable to cultivate their lands.⁶⁸ This could spark another rebellion. A related consideration was that such severe demands upon the empire would hardly be offset by the occupation of the Hsiung-nu territory because it was mainly composed of swamps and saline wastes.⁶⁹

An examination of the views of the proponents of *ho-ch'in* shows that most of their arguments were based on more realistic grounds than those of the opponents. Their understanding of the character and fighting power of the Hsiung-nu was more acute. For the Han Court, the most striking point they made was to ascribe the downfall of the Ch'in empire to its long period of warfare with the Hsiung-nu. Most of the proponents of *ho-ch'in* held high administrative and policy-making positions in the government. Many were generals. They apparently grasped the real difficulties of the Hsiung-nu problem. They were a majority in the court and were among the decision makers referred to as the *kung-ch'ing* (lords and ministers).⁷⁰ Therefore, their opinion determined the Han policy toward the Hsiung-nu. For example, in the years of 192 B.C., 176 B.C., and 135 B.C., the rulers (Empress Lü, Emperor Wen, and Emperor Wu) all wanted to fight the Hsiung-nu, but *ho-ch'in* was finally adopted in accordance with the majority opinion of the court conference.⁷¹

Reviewing the arguments of both sides, one finds that while both viewpoints involved military, practical, and traditional considerations the standpoint of the opponents of *ho-ch'in* was on the whole less realistic and more emotional. It is interesting to note that most of the opponents were men of lower rank. This was probably because the men of higher rank had a sense of caution flowing from their actual experience with the Hsiung-nu problem and from the burden of responsibility they would bear for consequences of a war. At the same time, the whole controversy shows the way in which vigorous debates at the Han Court served to air issues thoroughly. Eventually, the decision to solve the Hsiung-nu problem by force, as the opponents of *ho-ch'in* had repeatedly suggested, turned on many complicated considerations that concerned almost every corner of the Han empire.

A NEW ERA IN HAN HISTORY

The long era of uneasy and precarious balance in Han–Hsiung-nu relations came to an end in the second year of Wu-ti's Yuan-kuang period (133 B.C.), when the Han Court decided to abandon the *ho-ch'in* policy and take an offensive stand. Four years later, in 129 B.C., a massive attack on the Hsiung-nu was launched. Wu-ti's policy of offensive wars to defeat and conquer the Hsiung-nu marked a departure from the policy of containment and deterrence of his predecessors and the Ch'in rulers, who had sought to keep the Hsiung-nu away from China's northern borders. In the succeeding forty years or so, sixteen large-scale military campaigns were launched against the Hsiung-nu and five others against their allies—the Western Ch'iang and states in Central Asia. During these four decades, more than 12.5 million people were mobilized in these and related wars.⁷² As the Han soldiers marched to the edges of the Gobi Desert and inner Central Asia, an era of intensive military expeditions and expansion arrived.

The early Hsiung-nu campaigns produced a remarkable group of able, experienced military leaders; the continued military mobilization readied the empire's resources for other military purposes; and the successive victories generated confidence and zeal for further adventure for the ever-ambitious Emperor Wu, the court, and the Han empire as a whole. In short, the early Hsiung-nu campaigns brought forth a yearning for expansion and produced the military capability to achieve it. Thus, the largest and most powerful empire to date was in the making. From 112 B.C. to 105 B.C., in six expeditions, the veteran commanders of the Hsiung-nu campaigns led their troops to Hainan Island, Vietnam, Yunnan, and Sikang in the south and southwest and Korea in the northeast.⁷³ An empire of unprecedented magnitude and power was formed. Thus, one may conclude that the origins of Han Wu-ti's new empire were the Hsiung-nu challenge and the Han response.

Han Wu-ti's quest for an expanded empire from 133 B.C. onward marked the entrance of the Han dynasty into a new stage of history. The dynasty inherited its institutional foundations and some fundamental ideological content from its predecessor, the Ch'in. The Ch'in dynasty was China's first unified empire after the breakdown of the old Chou feudal order, though it lasted for only a short period—about fifteen years—partly because these institutions and ideologies were not firmly and deeply rooted in the whole empire. They functioned effectively under the iron hand of the First Emperor (Shih Huang-ti) and his tough ministers and administrators, but they began to falter after his death. Succeeding the Ch'in, the Han dynasty thus came at a critical juncture in the history of Chinese institutions and ideological molds. On the one hand, as it inherited the Ch'in institutions and ideologies to administer the empire, it sought to reform and to broaden the base of them to make them acceptable among the various segments of the populace. On the other hand, the dynasty had to create new institutions and adopt different ideologies to meet its unique and divergent needs and interests as a new empire. In general, the dynasty's first sixty years or so was a period of consolidation and the reform of old institutions and ideologies, the initiation and trial of new ones, and rebuilding and reorientation of the empire. In a word, the Han went through a period of transformation from a newborn, unstable empire to a well-coordinated, consolidated one. In the long history of Imperial China, this was a critical stage. Founded by the Ch'in in 221 B.C., it was unified for only twelve years, until 209 B.C., when rebellions broke out. It was not reunified until 202 B.C. by the founder of the Han dynasty, Kao-ti, after seven years of devastating wars among the various rival contenders. Thus, it is apparent that the early Former Han was a formative and transformative period not only for the Han empire but also for the long-lived Chinese empire as well.

The Hsiung-nu challenge and the Han response were the most important parts of the history of this period of transformation. As our study has demonstrated, they not only involved questions of foreign relations but were interlocked with Han institutions and ideological precepts.

The Han empire showed in its relations with the Hsiung-nu a conception of world order that generally differed from that of the later periods. It recognized the Hsiung-nu as an equal nation and accepted a two-power division of the world that it knew, with the land north of the Great Wall belonging to the Hsiung-nu and that south of the Great Wall to the Han. It also pledged to respect this territorial sovereignty and sustain peaceful coexistence with the Hsiung-nu. This was in essence a multinational world order, without the general sense of sinocentrism—Chinese superiority over non-Chinese peoples—or the dichotomy of China as a civilized nation and superpower and others being barbarians and tributary subordinates.

The concept of sinocentrism has its ideological and institutional origins in the Shang and Chou feudal order, in which the internal social and political world was structured according to a lord-vassal (master-subordinate) hierarchy and foreign relations were structured according to the extension of it—with the Chinese as the lord and non-Chinese peoples as subordinate barbarians.⁷⁴ With the decline of the power of the Chou king in the Eastern Chou period (after 771 B.C.), the feudal states became increasingly autonomous; such peripheral states as Ch'u, Wu, Yueh, and Ch'in, which had cultural traditions totally or partially different from those of the Shang and Chou (referred to as Hua-Hsia), also came to play a central role in the new world. As a result, a new conception of world order was emerging. First, in the Ch'un-ch'iu or Spring and Autumn period (722–404 B.C.) the emergence of virtually autonomous states made international relations in a general sense a reality. Principles and rules that regulated international affairs and delimited international conflicts were formed in the course of numerous *hui* and *meng* (meetings and joint pacts) between and among states.⁷⁵ A de facto multistate world order was experienced for the first time in China. It was not recognized in the de jure sense because the Chou king was still generally regarded as the nominal head of all states. This last condition disappeared in the Chan-kuo or Warring States period (403–221 B.C.), when various states became independent by achieving both de facto and de jure sovereignty. The Chou was one of these states. A pluralistic world order, with all states on an ideologically equal basis, thus became a fact of life in the Chan-kuo world.⁷⁶

The king of the Ch'in state, Ying Cheng (260/259–221 B.C.), the later Shih Huang-ti, brought that world of an international community of independent states to an end in 221 B.C. by establishing a unified empire that claimed sovereignty over the whole of T'ien-hsia (All under Heaven).⁷⁷ Consequently, with respect to relations with non-Chinese peoples, a sinocentric world order was elaborated and became an official ideology.

The Han empire thus inherited from its historical predecessors two major ideologies of world order: the sinocentric and the pluralistic. In his disastrous campaign against the Hsiung-nu in 201–200 B.C., Kao-ti clearly followed the first. But the special *ho-ch'in* policy toward the Hsiung-nu that he and his successors pursued afterward, up to 133 B.C., showed a shift to the pluralistic view of world order.⁷⁸ The Hsiung-nu empire was recognized as a nation whose international status was equal to that of the Han empire. The main concern of the Han rulers was peaceful coexistence. In quest of this goal, the Han emperors were even willing to compare the Hsiung-nu *shan-yü* to the sage-kings of ancient times, who always respected the territorial integrity of equal nations. After Han Wu-ti, only a few times did China recognize, politically and militarily, neighboring peoples as equal adversaries. Among these were the T'ang

dynasty (A.D. 618–907) in its relations with T'u-chüeh and later T'u-fan (also T'u-po); and the Sung dynasty (A.D. 960–1279) in its relations with Liao (Khitan), Chin (Jürcheds), and Yuan (Mongols).⁷⁹ Han relations with the Hsiung-nu set a pattern of world order in the history of Imperial China.

Han relations with the Hsiung-nu followed a realistic course in terms of national strength. Modern research reveals that the Hsiung-nu in early Former Han times controlled a territory of more than 2 million square miles and a population of more than 3.5 million. At the same time, the Han territory was about 1.5 million square miles and had a population of over 14 million.⁸⁰ Thus, while the Hsiung-nu population was only a quarter of the Han, their territory was actually larger than that of the Han by 500,000 square miles. This sharply contrasts with the myth about the Hsiung-nu made up by such war advocates as Chia I, who maintained that the Hsiung-nu controlled only a small territory with a population no more than that of a Han district. Furthermore, as conditioned by their nomadic lifestyle, every able-bodied Hsiung-nu man was a fighting cavalryman—a natural soldier riding and shooting on horseback—and there were at least 500,000 of them. That is why in the decisive P'ing-ch'eng battle the Hsiung-nu forces outnumbered the Han forces 400,000 to 320,000. These facts attest that in dealings with the Hsiung-nu the Han decision makers followed a realistic policy.

Court conferences played a decisive role in formulating the realistic Han policy toward the Hsiung-nu. All decisions were based on the opinion of the majority of the participants regardless of the wishes of the ruler. This participative and deliberative procedure of decision making on matters of peace and war was not substantially different from that followed by modern states. It is of special significance to note that the decisions were seldom impulsive acts of the ruler or any other individual.⁸¹ In this respect, the early Former Han rulers were not autocratic; the decision-making process was in a sense “democratic.” The openness and emphasis on shared responsibility and power reflected the special political structure that prevailed only during the formative period of the Han empire; it changed after Wu-ti's reign.

In a broad historical perspective, the various methods of the Han response to the Hsiung-nu challenge had a lasting impact on the Han empire in particular and the Chinese empire in general. The policy of “using barbarians to check barbarians” (*i-i chih-i, i-i fa-i*), which was first suggested by Chia I and then formulated by Ch'ao Ts'o, was to become a fundamental tenet of Chinese foreign policy throughout the imperial era. Ch'ao Ts'o's scheme of frontier agricultural colonization, with all its ramifications, became the standard plan of development in Han Wu-ti's colonization of what are now western Kansu, southern Tsinghai, Inner Mongolia, parts of Sinkiang and inner Central Asia, and other Han frontier regions.⁸² It was also followed by all later dynasties in their efforts

to colonize frontier regions.⁸³ Ch'ao Ts'o's program for increasing the empire's horse population resulted in Wu-ti's massive cavalry forces, which swiftly marched into the inner Gobi Desert and Central Asia to defeat the Hsiung-nu and their allies. The replacement of traditional war chariots with cavalry as the prime instrument of war marked a revolution in Chinese military technology. And with it came the rise of a military revolution—the emergence of a *professional* component of over 440,000 men in the Han army of over 500,000, half of which were professional cavalymen.⁸⁴

In conclusion, one may characterize the Han-Hsiung-nu conflict as an encounter between two different lifestyles—agricultural versus nomadic—and as the clash of two different cultural systems—a family-oriented ethical system versus a tribal value system. But it took place in a peculiar historical context. On one side was the agricultural, bureaucratic Chinese empire, which had just entered its formative stage; on the other side was the nomadic, tribal Hsiung-nu state, which had just been unified by the powerful *shan-yü* Mo-tun and was in the process of developing into a militarily strong empire. As both nations were rapidly developing, both tried in the beginning to defeat the other and become the master of a new world order. But their respective national strengths—and weaknesses—made that aim unrealistic. As a result, a new world order of two equal states was accepted by the Han and the Hsiung-nu. It lasted for about seventy years, from 200 to 133 B.C. But when the Han empire entered a new stage, one in which under a powerful leader for over fifty years its superior economic and military resources were fully developed and reached a revolutionary transformation under the command of a well-organized political machine, it was decidedly superior to the economically static and politically loosely organized Hsiung-nu empire, a confederation of powerful nomadic tribes ruled by seven different *shan-yü*.⁸⁵ At this point, the balance of the two powers was broken and tilted toward the Han. While the Han empire under Wu-ti became an imperialist giant in Asia, the Hsiung-nu gradually disintegrated. This process ended the first multistate world order in the history of Imperial China. At this point, China began to dominate the whole of Asia then known to it.



3

THE NORTHERN AND NORTHWESTERN CAMPAIGNS UNDER HAN WU-TI

Cavalry, Professional Army, and the Military Revolution

THE HAN EXPANSION STARTED with Wu-ti's all-out military campaigns against the Hsiung-nu and ended with Han China as the most aggressive imperialist colonial power in Asia. The Han empire in the East was matched in power and ambition only by the Roman Empire in the West in the ancient world. While the latter controlled the Mediterranean world and the land extending to the Atlantic Ocean, the Han hegemony over the Asian continent extended east to west from Korea on the Pacific Ocean to Uzbekistan and south to north from Vietnam and Kashmir to Mongolia. It was Pax Romana on one side of the globe and Pax Sinica on the other.

In a long historical perspective of Chinese history, the Han expansion was built on the foundation of the Ch'in expansion into Mongolia in the north and Vietnam in the south nearly ninety years before, but both its scope and its results would have been beyond even the extraordinary imagination of Shih Huang-ti, the architect of the Ch'in expansion. For almost every aspect in the Han expansion was occasioned by unprecedented ideological, political, economic, social, and military developments at this unique juncture in the *longue*

durée of Chinese history. While most of these concerns were examined earlier, the military is the subject of this chapter.

The uniqueness of the military in the Han expansion movement lies not only in the emergence of four critical military institutions—the mass breeding of saddle horses for military purposes, the building of a large cavalry, the formation of a professional army (in addition to conscripts), and the appearance of two gifted generals—but also in the timely union of all four at almost the same time. It was this union that enabled the Han to carry out the twenty extended military expeditions that changed the landscape of the Chinese empire.

THE CAMPAIGNS

Militarily, Han Wu-ti's northern and northwestern campaigns skillfully employed a unique mode of military operations, with cavalry as the main fighting force and professional soldiers as the main troops and officers corps. All of this revolutionized the military arts and opened a new page in Chinese military history. Important as they are, the new military breakthroughs have not been recorded in a detailed or systematic fashion and have even been overlooked in Han documents and later literary texts. For example, the *Shih-chi* and the *Han-shu* provide no systematic accounts of these campaigns. Modern scholars gradually came to recognize the critical importance of the issue in understanding Han-Hsiung-nu relations. But they did not see the connections among military expansion, military revolution, and nation building in Han Wu-ti's time because they failed to perceive the emergence of a military revolution and the expansion movement as a function of nation building at the time of Wu-ti's military campaigns. For example, Edward Harper Park's account of 1895 is barely an outline, much less an interpretation.¹ J. J. M. de Groot's account of 1921 contains only translations from *chüan* (chapters) 101 and 123 of the *Shih-chi*; *chüan* 5, 94, and 96 of the *Han-shu*; and the biographies of Wei Ch'ing, Huo Ch'ü-ping, Li Kuang, and others from these two sources.² Lei Hai-tsung's account of 1935 is more systematic and follows a certain intellectual framework of military history but without any understanding of the issues of military revolution and nation building.³ William M. McGovern's account of 1939, while it attempts to be systematic, is without a historical framework.⁴ Owen Lattimore, in 1940, criticizing both de Groot and Parker for having no idea of history as a process of growth and transformation and for rivaling each other in their purely anecdotal treatment of the succession of events, pioneered the interpretation of records and advanced the theory of the "steppe zone" in Han-Hsiung-nu relations.⁵ Since Lattimore's work, however, many important primary documents have been unearthed and numerous Chinese secondary studies have become available. In 1963, I reconstructed these military campaigns and provided a new

interpretation based on the new primary sources and secondary studies. In 1974, Michael Loewe reexamined the issue and provided more discussions of certain military aspects, but his study is based heavily on translated sources and made no effort to include social and cultural perspectives in his approach, nor did he incorporate modern military-historical studies advanced before the 1970s. The present examination of Han Wu-ti's northern and northwestern campaigns follows broad historical and new social and cultural perspectives, is framed with the benefit of recent advancements in military-historical studies, and includes recent archaeological discoveries and seminal studies on China written in the past four decades.⁶

Any systematic account of the campaigns must be based on all the relevant references in the *Shih-chi* and *Han-shu*, as well as those in other available Han writings. Table 6 attempts to be comprehensive both in its inclusion of relevant facts and in the coverage of sources (notes 7–17). The chief sources used, other than some recent studies and archaeological discoveries, include the following.

Shih-chi, by Ssu-ma Ch'ien (145–86 B.C.) (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1959), 108.2857–65, 109.2867–78, 110.2906–20, 111.2921–46.

Han-shu, by Pan Ku (A.D. 32–92) (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1962), 6.165–209, 17.642–66, 54.2439–59, 55.2471–93, 94.3765–81.

Shen Wei-hsien, *Erh-shih-wu shih pu-pien* (Shanghai: K'ai-ming shu-tien, 1935), 1752–74.

Ch'ien Wen-tzu, *Erh-shih-wu shih pu-pien* (Shanghai: K'ai-ming shu-tien, 1935), 407–23.

Ssu-ma Kuang, *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien* (Shanghai: Ku-chi ch'u-pan she, 1962), vol. 1.

Hsun Yueh, *Ch'ien-Han chi*, Kuo-hsueh chi-pen ts'ung-shu ed.; Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an ed.

It should be noted that in this table the large numbers of the Hsiung-nu killed or captured, as well as the number of the Han troops employed in the campaigns, must be viewed with caution. The reliability of Chinese figures has been convincingly proven in recent studies by experts on military history based on new archaeological evidence and recently discovered ancient texts.¹⁸

HORSES AND MOUNTED SOLDIERS

The campaign records in table 6 show that foot soldiers are mentioned in only one of the campaigns up to 110 B.C., that is, the campaign of 119 B.C., in which a large number of foot soldiers marched behind the mounted soldiers (presumably only for reinforcement should the battle last very long). In view of

TABLE 6. Han Northern and Northwestern Military Campaigns, 129–90 B.C.

Year (regnal)/ Western	Target	Chinese Forces	Generals	Native Place	Title	Place Where Troops Marched Out	Result
Yuan-kuang 6 (129 B.C.) ⁷ Spring	Hsiung-nu	40,000	Wei Ch'ing	Ho-tung (Ping-yang)	General of chariot and cavalry	Shang-ku	Victory: 700 captured and killed.
			Kung-sun Ao	Pei-ti (I-ch'ü)	Cavalry general	Tai	Defeated: 700 men lost.
			Kung-sun Ho (of barbarian ancestry)	Pei-ti (I-ch'ü)	General of light chariot	Yun-chung	"No merit" (inconclusive).
Yuan-so 1 (128 B.C.) Autumn	Hsiung-nu	40,000	Li Kuang	Lung-hsi (Ch'eng-chi)	General of resolute cavalry	Yen-men	Captured by Hsiung-nu, escaped and returned. Wei Ch'ing killed several thousand Hsiung-nu.
			Wei Ch'ing		General of chariot and cavalry	Tai	"No merit."
			Li Hsi	Pei-ti (I-ch'ü)	General	Tai	
Yuan-so 2 (127 B.C.) Spring	Hsiung-nu	?	Wei Ch'ing		General of chariot and cavalry	Yun-chung	Killed 2,300 Hsiung-nu, captured 3,000. Carried back 1 million horses, sheep, and cattle.
			Hao Hsien	?	Governor of Shang-ku	Yun-chung (under Wei Ch'ing)	"No merit."
			Li Hsi		General	Tai	
Yuan-so 5 (124 B.C.) Spring	Hsiung-nu	Over 100,000 (mostly light cavalry)					Han regained control of Ho-nan; So-fan and Wu-yuan were established.
			Wei Ch'ing		General of chariot and cavalry	So-fang (Kao-ch'üeh)	Wei's men captured ten or more petty chieftains, over 15,000 Hsiung-nu, and about 1 million domestic animals.
			Hao Hsien Li So	?	Colonel (under Wei Ch'ing)		

TABLE 6—Continued

Year (regnal)/ Western	Target	Chinese Forces	Generals	Native Place	Title	Place Where Troops Marched Out	Result
Yuan-so 6 (123 B.C.) Summer	Hsiung-nu	Over 100,000 horsemen	Kung-sun Ho		General of the left (under Wei Ch'ing)		
			Chao Hsin (a surrendered Hsiung-nu high minister)		General of the vanguard (under Wei Ch'ing)		
			Su Chien				
			Li Kuang		General of the right (under Wei Ch'ing)		
					General of the rear (under Wei Ch'ing)		
			Li Chü		General of crossbowmen (under Wei Ch'ing)		
			Same as in spring, under Wei Ch'ing as supreme commander Wei				Killed and captured over 16,000 Hsiung-nu.
			Hao Hsien				
			Huo Ch'ü-ping				Killed and captured 2,228 Hsiung-nu and several of their leaders. "No merit."
							"No merit."
			Kung-sun Ao				Defeated and surrendered to Hsiung-nu.
			Kung-sun Ho				Defeated and escaped alone. 3,000
			Chao Hsin				Han soldiers under Chao and Su were killed or captured. "No merit."
			Su Chien				?
			Li Kuang Li Chü				

Yuan-shou 2 (121 B.C.) Spring	Hsiung-nu	Over 10,000 horsemen	Huo Ch'ü-ping	Chiu-yuan	General of swift cavalry	Lung-hsi	Advanced 1,000 <i>li</i> beyond Mount Yen-chih, killing and capturing 8,960 Hsiung-nu, including kings, princes, ministers, and chief commandants. Huo also seized the “golden man (or men)” used by the Hsiu-ch'u king in worshipping Heaven.
Yuan-shou 2 (121 B.C.) Summer	Hsiung-nu	Several tens of thousands of horsemen	Chao P'o-nu (returned to the Han side after fleeing to the Hsiung-nu)	Hawklike attacking marshal (under Huo)	Hawklike attacking marshal Colonel (under Huo)	Pei-ti	Captured 3,330 Hsiung-nu.
			Huo Ch'ü-ping				
			Chao P'o-nu				Captured 1,768 Hsiung-nu.
			Kao Pu Shih (surrendered Hsiung-nu king) P'u Peng ⁸				Captured 5 Hsiung-nu kings.
Yuan-shou 2 (121 B.C.) Summer	Hsiung-nu	14,000 horsemen	Kung-su Ao	Marquis of Ho-ch'i		Pei-ti	Huo's men advanced 2,000 <i>li</i> , crossed the Chü-yen River, and attacked the Hsiung-nu at Mount Ch'i-lien, killing and capturing over 30,000, including 10 petty kings. Lost his way and failed to make contact with Huo.
			Chang Ch'ien	Commander of the Palace Guard		Yu-pei-p'ing	Late at rendezvous.
			Han-chung				

(continued)

TABLE 6—Continued

Year (regnal)/ Western	Target	Chinese Forces	Generals	Native Place	Title	Place Where Troops Marched Out	Result
Yuan-shou 4 (119 B.C.) Summer	Hsiung-nu	4,000 horsemen	Li Kuang		Chief of palace attendants	Yu-pei-p'ing	Killed 3,000 Hsiung-nu, lost his 4,000 men, and escaped alone.
		100,000 horsemen; several hundred thousand foot soldiers; volunteers with private horses: 140,000 ⁹					
		50,000 horsemen	Wei Ch'ing		Supreme commander	Ting-hsiang	Wei's men rode over 1,000 <i>li</i> to the north, reached the northern part of the Gobi Desert, surrounded the <i>shan-yü</i> , and killed 19,000 Hsiung-nu. The <i>shan-yü</i> fled, and Wei marched north to the T'ien-yan Mountains, seized the fort of Chao-hsin, and returned.
			Kuo Ch'ang	Yun-chung	Colonel (under Wei)		
			Hsun Chih	T'ai-yuan (Kuang-wu)			
			Ch'ang Hui	?	Governor of Hsi-ho (under Wei)		
			Sui Ch'eng	?	Governor of Yun-chung (under Wei)		
			Li Kuang		General of vanguard		Late at rendezvous and committed suicide.
			Chao I-chi	Tso-p'ing-i	General of the right		Late at rendezvous.
			Kung-sun Ao		General of the center		"No merit."
			T'sao Hsiang	P'ei	General of the rear		?
			Kung-sun Ho		General of the left		"No merit."
		50,000 horsemen	Huo Ch'ü-ping		Supreme commander	Tai, Yu-pei-p'ing	

Yuang-ting 6 (111 B.C.) Autumn	Hsiung-nu Over 25,000 horsemen 15,000 horsemen	Li Kan (Li Kuang's son)	Colonel (under Huo)	"Merit."
		Hsu Tzu-wei	Colonel (under Huo)	Killed and captured 12,700 Hsiung-nu.
		Lu Po-te	Governor of Yu-pei-p'ing (under Huo)	Captured a Hsiung-nu king.
		Wei Shan ¹⁰	Chief commandant of Po-ti (under Huo)	"Merit."
		Chao P'o-nu	Ts'ung-p'iao marquis (under Huo)	"Merit."
		?Chieh	Governor of Yü-yang	"Merit."
		Chao An Chi (surrendered Hsiung-nu king)	Marquis of Ch'ang wu (under Huo)	"Merit."
		Fu Lu Chih (the Yin-tun king of Hsiung-nu surrendered to Han)	Colonel (under Huo)	"Merit."
		I Chi Hsien (the Lou- chuan ¹¹ king of Hsiung-nu, surrendered to Han)	? (under Huo)	"Merit."
				Huo's force rode over 2,000 li, defeated the force of the wise king of the left, killed and captured 70,443 Hsiung-nu, and reached Mount Lang-chü-hsu, Mount Ku-yen, and Han-hai. ¹² Several tens of thousands of Wei's and Huo's soldiers died, and over 100,000 horses were killed.
		Kung-sun Ho	General of Fu-chü	Advanced over 2,000 li and reached Fu-chü-ching without encountering the Hsiung-nu.
			Wu-yuan	

(continued)

TABLE 6—Continued

Year (regnal)/ Western	Target	Chinese Forces	Generals	Native Place	Title	Place Where Troops Marched Out	Result
		10,000 horsemen	Chao P'o-nu		General of Hsiung River	Ling-chü	Reconnoitered several thousand <i>li</i> to the Hsiung River without encountering the Hsiung-nu.
Yuan-feng 1 (110 B.C.) Winter	Hsiung-nu	180,000 horsemen	Emperor Wu and 12 generals				The emperor arrived in So-fang: the <i>shan-yü</i> fled into hiding north of the Gobi Desert.
Yuan-feng 3 (108 B.C.) ?	Ku-shih	Several tens of thousands of horsemen from the Dependent States and foot soldiers from several <i>chün</i>	Chao P'o-nu		General of the Hsiung River		With 700 light cavalymen, Chao rode ahead of the main force and captured the king of Lou-lan.
T'ai-ch'u 1/2 (104–103 B.C.) Autumn	Ta-yuan	6,000 horsemen from the Dependent States; several tens of thousands of young men of bad reputation, rounded up from several <i>chün</i> and kingdoms	Wang Hui Li Kuang-li	? Chung-shan	General of palace attendants Erh-shih general or general of Sutrishna	Tun-huang	Captured the king of Chü-shih (?) ¹³ Li's force was defeated; only 10 to 20 percent of his men returned alive.
			Chao Shih- ch'eng	?	Director of martial law (under Li)		
			Wang Hui	?	Expedition guide (under Li)		
			Li Ch'e	?	Colonel (under Li)		

T'ai ch'ü 2 (103 B.C.) Summer	Hsiung-nu	Over 20,000 horsemen	Chao P'o-nu	General of Chün-chi	So-fang	Rode 2,000 <i>li</i> , killing or capturing several thousand Hsiung-nu. On his way back, was captured and surrendered with all his men.
T'ai-ch'ü 3/4 (102–101 B.C.) Autumn-spring	Ta-yuan	60,000 skilled bowmen freed from prison, horsemen from border states, young men of bad reputation Numerous volunteers with private horses All men of the seven classes of reprobate persons in the empire to transport supplies of dried boiled rice For transport, 100,000 oxen, over 30,000 horses, tens of thousands of donkeys, mules, camels	Li Kuang-li	General of Sutrishna	Tun-huang	
			Wang Shen- sheng	Colonel (under Li)		Killed.
			Chao Shih- ch'eng	Colonel (under Li)		"Merit."
			Li Ch'e	Colonel (under Li)		"Merit."
			Shang-kuan Chieh	Lung-hsi (Shang-kuei)		"Merit."
			Hu Ch'ung-ko	?	Chief commandant in charge of foraging (under Li) Former grand herald (under Li)	?
			Fifty other colonels			Li's men massacred the populace of Lun-t'ou and after besieging the capital of Ta-yuan received

(continued)

TABLE 6—Continued

Year (regnal)/ Western	Target	Chinese Forces	Generals	Native Place	Title	Place Where Troops Marched Out	Result
T'ien-han 2 (99 B.C.) Summer	Hsiung-nu	30,000 horsemen	Li Kuang-li		Colonel	So-fang	its surrender and the head of its king. They conquered Yü-ch'eng and reached K'ang-chü (Sogdiana), where they captured the king of Yü-ch'eng. Only some 10,000 men of Li's force returned alive with about 1,000 horses.
							Attacked the Hsiung-nu under the wise king of the right at the T'ien Mountains, killing or capturing over 10,000, but on their way back Li's men were surrounded and 60 to 70 percent were killed.
		? ?	Kung-sun Ao Lu Po-te		General of Yin-yü Chief commandant of crossbowmen	Hsi-ho Chü-yen	"No merit." "No merit."
		5,000 foot soldiers and horsemen	Li Ling (grandson of Li Kuang)		Chief commandant of cavalry	Chü-yen	Rode 1,000 <i>li</i> north of Chü-yen and fought the Shan-yü, killing or wounding over 10,000. Finally was defeated and surrendered. Only 400 men returned.
T'ien-han 4 (97 B.C.) Spring	Hsiung-nu	60,000 horsemen and 70,000 foot soldiers with conscripted criminals and recruits	Han Yen-nien Li Kuang-li	Ying-ch'uan	Colonel (under Li) General of Sutrishna	So-fang	Killed. Li and Lu met at the Yü-wu River and fought the <i>shan-yü</i> without gaining a victory.
		Over 10,000 foot soldiers	Lu Po-te		Chief commandant of crossbowmen	Chü-yen	

Cheng-ho 3 (90 B.C.) Spring	30,000 foot soldiers	Han Yueh	Scouting and attacking general	Wu-yuan	"No merit."
	10,000 horsemen,	Kung-sun Ao	General of Yin-yü	Yen-men	Defeated by the wise king of the left.
	30,000 foot soldiers				
Cheng-ho 3 (90 B.C.) Spring	79,000 horsemen ¹⁴ (including cavalry from the Dependent States)	Li Kuang-li	General of Sutrishna	Wu-yuan	After a victory at the Chih-chü River, Li was attacked at Mount Yen-jan and surrendered to the <i>sham-yü</i> with all his men.
	Over 30,000 horsemen(?) ¹⁵	Shang Ch'iu-ch'eng	Grand secretary	Hsi-ho	Fought the Hsiung-nu at Mount Chün-chi for nine days until the latter fled.
	40,000 horsemen	Ma T'ung ¹⁶			"No merit."
Cheng-ho 3 (90 B.C.)	Several thousand Han soldiers	Ch'eng Wan (King Chieh-ho of Hsiung-nu, who surrendered to Han)	Marquis of Ch'ung-ho Marquis of K'ai-ling	Chiu-ch'üan	Conquered Chü-shi and captured its king.
	Several tens of thousands of soldiers from Lou-lan, Wei-li, Wei-hsu, and three other countries in the Western Regions				
		Kings of the six countries in the Western Regions ¹⁷			

this fact, trained Han horsemen can be said to have provided the only force deployed against the Hsiung-nu during the early period of the campaigns, or at least during the first ten years (129–119 B.C.), when more than half of the total number of horsemen in all of Wu-ti's campaigns were used in ten key expeditions. Furthermore, it is probably also true that the trained mounted soldier was the key factor in the Hsiung-nu campaigns for the whole period from 129 to 90 B.C. Thus, horses and mounted soldiers can be said to have been the two vital elements in initiating and continuing the Hsiung-nu campaigns.

The horses mentioned in these campaign records were owned by the government unless they are indicated as private horses, as in the campaign of 119 B.C., in which about 140,000 volunteers joined the expedition with their own horses. However, at the beginning of the dynasty, cavalry fighting was not yet a well-established specialty of the Chinese, and large-scale horse breeding existed only in a few of the northwestern and western border regions in such *chün* (commanderies) as T'ien-shui, Lung-hsi, An-ting, Pei-ti, Shang, and Hsi-ho (all in modern central and eastern Kansu, western and northern Shensi, northern and central Shansi, southern Ningsia, southern Suiyuan). Thus, in Kao-ti's unsuccessful Hsiung-nu expedition of 201 B.C. most of the 320,000 men in the Chinese force were foot soldiers. After the Chinese defeat at P'ing-ch'eng, where Kao-ti was besieged for seven days by the Hsiung-nu cavalry, the Han saw the necessity of building a strong, mobile cavalry. But the economic situation and the technical problems involved made the immediate mass breeding of horses impossible. Consequently, the Han were forced to maintain the *ho-ch'in* policy of appeasing the Hsiung-nu while they were gradually establishing a cavalry.¹⁹ For example, in 178 B.C., following Ch'ao Ts'o's (ca. 200–154 B.C.) suggestion, Emperor Wen (r. 180–157 B.C.) ordered that three men of draft age be exempted from military service for each horse sent by a family to the government; and in 146 B.C. Emperor Ching (r. 157–141 B.C.) decreed that horses whose height was more than 5 *ch'ih* and 9 *ts'un* (about 4.3 feet) and whose teeth were not yet smooth would not be allowed at the border passes.²⁰

By the latter part of Emperor Ching's reign, the Han empire was enjoying internal political stability and economic prosperity.²¹ Consequently, the government took a positive step in its plan to build up a mounted armed force, setting up thirty-six government pastures in the northern and western border regions to breed and train horses for military use. The ministers of the imperial equipage were in charge of all the operations, court gentlemen were appointed superintendents of the pastures, and thirty thousand male and female slaves were sent to care for the horses. Moreover, these horses enjoyed certain privileges because of their special function. In 142 B.C., for example, when the government ordered that horses in the capital regions (Ching-chao,

Tso P'ing-i, and Yu Fu-feng) not be fed unhusked grain because of the poor harvest, horses in these border prefectures were exempt.²² On the basis of this information, it seems fairly certain that at the end of Emperor Ching's reign China had a great number of horses in the provinces (formerly commanderies under the Ch'in and in earlier Han period) along the northern and northwestern frontiers. When Emperor Wu came to the throne, he not only continued this policy but also increased the number of horses from three hundred thousand to over 450,000 and instituted other breeding measures. It was with these trained mounts that the young emperor was able to build up a cavalry force that matched that of the Hsiung-nu nomads in mobility and striking power.

In addition to horses, the building of a cavalry required a great number of soldiers trained as mounted archers. But in early Han China only the people of the northern and northwestern commanderies (roughly from present-day Hopei to Kansu) were accustomed to mounted archery because of the special geographic conditions of these regions. Furthermore, the old system of conscription prevented the government from recruiting a large number of soldiers for a long period of training. As a solution, Emperor Wu reformed the old draft system by establishing a permanent army through the use of mercenaries.²³ Thus, through this solution and the acquisition of fighting horses he was able to gather a large force of trained mounted soldiers to fight the Hsiung-nu.

The main Han fighting equipment before Emperor Wu was the war chariot, although the roles of both cavalry and infantry had been on the rise since the Warring States period (403–221 B.C.). Unlike the Ch'in dynasty (221–207 B.C.) which rose in the northwest and had a cavalry of over fifty thousand, or about 6 percent of its total armed forces, the Han, being a more "southerly" regime, commanded an army mainly drawn from the Central Plain and southern regions. Chariot fighting therefore played the central role on battlefield, and cavalry counted for no more than 1 or 2 percent of the Han army. Chariots were still used as the chief weapon in wars against the Hsiung-nu during the period of Emperor Wen, and their relative lack of mobility prevented the Han force from launching any distant expeditions or gaining major victories. This fighting method survived even into the early period of Emperor Wu. For example, in his first war against the Hsiung-nu, in 133 B.C., a large number of war chariots were mobilized as the chief military component. But when the *shan-yü* of the Hsiung-nu, realizing that he had been tricked by misinformation provided by a Han spy, retreated to his territory, the Han forces were unable to overtake him. Emperor Wu then decided to give up completely the use of war chariots, and they were not used in any of the sixteen subsequent Hsiung-nu campaigns. Their replacement by cavalry marks a revolution in Chinese military technology.²⁴

THE MILITARY REVOLUTION

This revolution took place during Wu-ti's reign, but it was also the result of a long period of development that went back to the era of the Warring States. The initial phase of this "cavalry revolution" began in the late fourth century B.C., when the state of Chao in North China under King Wu-ling (r. 325–299 B.C.) began in 304 B.C. to raise a cavalry (warriors riding horses and shooting from horseback) as an important component of its army. Although riding and fighting on horseback with sword and spear existed long before this time, going back to the Shang and early Chou times in the twelfth and eleventh centuries B.C., shooting arrows on horseback never became an issue in developing the military technology in China south of the steppes for lack of trained horses and mounted archers, both of which would take a long time to develop. Fighting by shooting on horseback was then considered the military specialty of the Hu people (northern nomads, Tungus, ancestors of the Hsiung-nu) outside the Chou northern borders in modern Inner Mongolia and beyond, whose natural environment understandably made riding and shooting part of their daily lives. The Chou fighting forces mainly used chariots, each of which carried three armed soldiers and was supported by seventy-five foot soldiers. Before the collapse of the Western Chou in 771 B.C. and in the early Ch'un-ch'iu times (770–404 B.C.), the Chou or the allied forces of the Chou feudal states could defend the northern borders by overwhelming the enemy with numbers. In late Ch'un-ch'iu times and afterward, that situation changed: The Chou Court lost the strength of its own forces and the following of the partly or fully independent states and naturally was unable to defend its northern borders. And the smaller armed forces of the states that bordered the nomadic regions could not defend themselves with their slow-moving chariots and foot soldiers. With their swift and mobile cavalry forces, the nomads won most of the battles and inflicted tremendous losses in property, people, and even land on the border "Chinese" (Chou) states. Therefore, there arose the necessity to adopt the Hu specialty and use cavalry to fight cavalry. The natural environment and resources of the Chinese states in the Central Plain region and the south, however, severely limited their ability to raise a large cavalry. Even the state of Chao, which comprised most of modern Shansi, parts of modern Hopei and Shantung, and the southern parts of modern Suiyuan and Chahar, could devote no more than 8 percent of its armed forces to cavalry in the mid-fourth century B.C., and it was regularly under the attack from its nomadic neighbors to the north. Other border states, such as Ch'in, Yen, and Wei, had no more than 2 percent of their armies in cavalry by the end of the third century B.C. Even the mighty military forces of the Ch'in empire under Shih Huang-ti (the First Emperor, r. 221–210 B.C.), estimated at 800,000 men at its height, had less

than 7 percent of its armed forces in cavalry.²⁵ As discussed earlier, the cavalry's role in Emperor Kao-ti's army was insignificant. This was reasonably the case during the next two reigns, those of Emperor Hui (r. 195–188 B.C.) and Empress Lü (r. 187–180 B.C.), since they simply did not have the economic resources and trained horses needed to build a substantial cavalry. During that period, as was discussed earlier, the whole Han state focused on only two critical issues: political consolidation (and stability) and full economic recovery after the devastation of the Ch'in-Han transition. And the reign of Emperor Wen that followed continued this same course; only by the end of his long reign in 157 B.C. was considerable political stability achieved and an economy recovery reached. Under Emperor Ching, while the measures of economic rebuilding continued, political consolidation was completed after the suppression of the Rebellion of the Seven Feudal Kingdoms in 154 B.C.²⁶ The emperor now turned his attention from domestic issues to the foreign challenge of the Hsiung-nu. Thus, as mentioned previously, he ordered that thirty-six government pastures be established to raise fighting horses. Over 300,000 horses were bred, raised, and trained in these pastures. During the early reign of Emperor Wu, which began in 141 B.C., that number reached more than 450,000.²⁷ No clear record exists of the number of cavalrymen that participated in the various Han conflicts with the Hsiung-nu during the reigns of Emperors Wen and Ching. Nor is the total force of the Han army known.²⁸ But in Emperor Wu's Hsiung-nu campaigns, the total force of the Han cavalry, as discussed earlier, was mostly recorded: 100,000 horsemen in 123 (recorded twice in the same year) and 121 B.C.; 100,000 (plus 140,000 volunteers with private horses) in 119 B.C.; and 180,000 in 110 B.C. Thus, the number of cavalrymen gradually increased from 100,000 to 180,000. It has been estimated that the Han population was over 43 million when Emperor Wu came to the throne and then gradually increased to 50 million. The total Han standing army, then, had over 400,000 men at the least at the beginning of Emperor Wu's reign, then increased to over 500,000, and reached 600,000 to 700,000 at the height of the Hsiung-nu campaigns. Thus, the cavalry constituted at least 25 percent of the armed forces in the early campaigns and 36 percent in the later ones. Clearly, the emperor would not send all of his cavalrymen on one campaign in the earlier times, when the Hsiung-nu forces were still strong enough to launch a surprise attack in a different direction. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that at least 50,000 to 80,000 cavalrymen, if not more, were on guard for any such attack while 100,000 were on a long-distance expedition in 123 B.C. or 121 B.C. The fact that in 110 B.C. a total of 180,000 horsemen, after all the losses in the earlier campaigns, were sent on a single expedition strongly supports the view that the Han army at that time consisted of a cavalry of at least 250,000 men, for at that time the Hsiung-nu had been weakened and hence were unable

to launch a surprise attack even when the Han forces were on a distant expedition. In the 110s, the Han cavalry would have eventually been over 300,000 men strong. Thus, in the early days of Emperor Wu's reign, the Han cavalry forces possibly amounted to 35.71 to 42.85 percent of the total Han standing army. Compared to the size of cavalry in the Chinese army from the Warring States period through the Ch'in empire, this change in the composition of the Han army was indeed revolutionary. As such, maintenance of the cavalry in the Han regular armed forces also required the lion's share of the annual military budget. As was discussed earlier, in Wu-ti's time a cavalryman with his horse cost on the average 87,000 in cash plus 36 *shih* of grain per year, while an infantryman cost just 10,000 in cash and 36 *shih* of grain per year. At the height of the Han military expansion, there were 300,000 horsemen in the regular armed forces, which would have cost 26.1 billion in cash per year, while the 400,000 foot soldiers cost only about 4 billion in cash per year. The total annual cost of the infantry amounted to only one-third of the annual government cash revenue, at 12 billion, but the annual spending on the cavalry was 2.18 times the entire national cash revenue. Thus, the rise of cavalry as the dominant military weapon in Han Wu-ti's time also resulted in a revolution in military spending in the Chinese economic world.

At the same time, another revolutionary change took place: the drastic increase in the number of professional soldiers. While the Han army under Wu-ti had a cavalry force of at least 180,000 men, it had at least as many professional soldiers as well, professional in that they served, voluntarily or compulsorily, for a much longer time than that required by the universal conscription law, which required every man of draft age (which varied over time from age fifteen to sixty, twenty to fifty-six, and twenty-three to fifty-six) to render two years of military service: guarding the capital and one year on garrison duty on the frontiers.²⁹ As was discussed earlier, the training of skilled fighting horsemen took a long time, and once trained they could not be replaced quickly by conscripts, who owed just one year of garrison service. The Hsiung-nu campaigns took forty long years, from 129 to 90 B.C., and many individual expeditions lasted longer than a year: the three-year campaign from 129 to 127 B.C.; two-year campaigns from 124 to 123 and 111 to 110 B.C.; three campaigns started in 121 B.C.; and a four-year campaign from 104 to 101 B.C. Therefore, the cavalrymen in these campaigns could not be replaced by new conscripts since geographic familiarity and battlefield experience were absolutely necessary requirements for the cavalrymen to engage in the long, distant expeditions in the Hsiung-nu and Hsi-yü campaigns in the immense Gobi Desert. Due to their length of service, most of the 180,000 cavalrymen were really professional soldiers. And so were the 50,000 to 80,000 horsemen who guarded the interior and the capital and over 100,000 foot soldiers, such

as those in the 104–101 B.C. Hsi-yü campaigns. In addition, the 140,000 volunteers with their own horses, the large number of hired soldiers (*mu-tsu*, *mu-ping*), and pardoned criminals should also be considered professional soldiers once they joined the Han army. To sum up, in Wu-ti's time there were at least 420,000 and at most 500,000 professional soldiers in the Han army if we estimate only from the records of the northern and northwestern (Hsiung-nu and Hsi-yü) campaigns. But in about 121 B.C. the emperor also established the Pa-chiao (Eight Divisions) of the Pei-chün (Northern Army) to guard the capital. The Eight Divisions consisted of Chung-lei (Central Division of Guardsmen for Headquarters of the Northern Army and Capital Gates and the Western Regions), Yueh-ch'i (Yueh Horsemen), Pu-ping (Foot Soldiers), Ch'ang-shui (Hu Horsemen Stationed in Ch'ang-shui; Hu (mostly surrendered Hsiung-nu and other "barbarians"), She-sheng (Skilled Archers or Sharpshooters), T'un-ch'i (Cavalry), Hu-ch'i (Hu Horsemen), and Hu-pen (Light and Fast Chariots). Each of the divisions was headed by a *chiao-wei* (colonel), and altogether they had a force of 8,000 to 10,000 men. The Eight Divisions were under the command of a *chung-wei* (commandant of the capital guards), which was changed to *chih chin-wu* (bearer of the gilded mace) in 104 B.C. Soldiers in the Eight Divisions were specifically recruited as lifelong professional soldiers; none were conscripts. In addition, Emperor Wu also established in 138 B.C. the Ch'i-men Division (Gate Guardsmen) and in 104 B.C. the Yü-lin Division (Cavalry of the Feathered Forest) to guard the palace, all under the Nan-chün (Southern Army), with a total force of 6,000 men, who were specifically recruited as lifelong professional soldiers.³⁹ Putting all the professional soldiers and other small groups together, they amounted to 440,000 to 520,000 men. If the Han standing army under Wu-ti reached 600,000 men at its height, professional soldiers then accounted for 73.33 to 86.67 percent; if the Han standing army reached 700,000 men, as could reasonably be supposed, professional soldiers still accounted for 62.86 to 74.29 percent. And if, as some scholars suggest, the Han standing army reached 800,000 men under Wu-ti, the percentage of professional soldiers would still be at 55 to 65 percent. Wu-ti clearly created the first professional army in Chinese history.

There were about twenty-two commanders in thirty-nine years during the Hsiung-nu and Hsi-yü campaigns. While most of them spent their lives in the army, such as Generals Wei Ch'ing, Huo Ch'ü-ping, and Li Kuang, others served for shorter periods: Kung-sun Ao for thirty-two years, Kung-sun Ho for eighteen, Li Hsi for seventeen, Li Kuang-li for fourteen, and Hsu Tzu-wei for eight. Between commands, some meritorious commanders were appointed to high-ranking civilian positions as a reward or for other reasons, but their home base remained in the military, and almost without exception they resumed their commands when the occasion demanded it. Five generals even went on to

become chancellors at the end of their military careers.³¹ In short, with the exception of no more than two, all the military commanders in Wu-ti's time were true professional soldiers.

Based on both literary and archaeological sources of the Han period and later, the hierarchy in the early Han cavalry went as follows: the highest commander was the general (*chiang-chün*); next was a colonel or commandant (*chiao-wei*), sometimes called a marshal (*ssu-ma*); next was a subcommandant (*hou* or *ch'ü-hou* or *chün-hou*); and finally a commander (*t'un-chang*). A general usually had a command of 5,000 to 20,000 horsemen (*ch'i-shih* or sometimes referred to as *ch'i*); a colonel had 800 to 1,000 (referred to as a *pu* or *chiao* unit); a subcommandant had 90 to 120 (referred to as a *ch'ü* or *ch'ü-hou* unit); and a commander had 30 to 36 (a *t'un* unit).³² A grand general (*ta Chiang-chün*) was the commander in chief of all troops in a campaign and at other times. Our knowledge about the length of military service of the high commanders is relatively thorough, but about the middle- and low-ranking commanders we know little, even given the recent discoveries of records of Han armies on bamboo and wood in the northern and northwestern frontier regions in modern Kansu, Tsinghai, Sinkiang, and Ningsia (now Inner Mongolia). From the nature and length of Wu-ti's Hsiung-nu and Hsi-yü campaigns and based on the bamboo and wood records of Wu-ti's time and slightly later, it is clear that these middle- and low-ranking officers were professional and that there were at least twelve thousand of them in Han Wu-ti's cavalry.

One critically important component of the professionalization of Han Wu-ti's army was the development of a well-organized standard corpus of handbooks for fundamental political ideology, general military training, the art of warfare, and special fighting skills (such as archery). These handbooks were written by militarists of the past—such as Sun Wu (fl. 514–453 B.C.), Sun Pin (fl. 380–316 B.C.), Wu Ch'i (fl. 460–388 B.C.), and Wei Liao (fl. 370–319 B.C.)—and present, such as General Li Kuang. They were studied by military officers for their training and the education of their subordinates. In addition, a well-established corpus of military laws, ordinances, and special orders was issued. It consisted of thousands of articles and covered every aspect of military affairs, including daily life and training, rewards and punishments, promotions and demotions, trials and disciplinary procedures, tests and evaluations, rules of proper conduct and the regulation of private life, religious worship and rites, and ceremonials and rituals.³³

Manufacturing the armaments of Han Wu-ti's huge army must have required a huge military-industrial complex. Take the 200,000 plus professional cavalrymen as an example. Each horse was equipped with specially made bridle, check rein, cropper, breast collar, saddle, and stirrups. Each horseman was armed with a light crossbow, arrows, long and short lance, sword, knife, shield,

breastplate, helmet, scabbard, and coat of mail and was supplied with special boots for riding and fighting on horseback. The weapons were made of both iron and bronze, depending on their size and function.³⁴ I have estimated elsewhere that the average cost of one soldier was 150,000 in cash a year and hence 30 billion for the 200,000 cavalymen. That figure is 2.5 times the total annual revenue (12 billion) of the Han government in Wu-ti's time.³⁵ With this comparison, we can gain a clear appreciation of the size and budget of the military-industrial complex in Han Wu-ti's time.

We have explored the size of Han Wu-ti's cavalry and professional army, discussed the education and training of his military officers, and examined the magnitude of the economic impact of his armed forces. Compared with similar issues in earlier times, each of these components represented a revolutionary change, and the effects of them combined certainly produced the first far-reaching military revolution in early Imperial China.³⁶ In this revolution, the most representative powerful signpost was the development of the cavalry as a major component of the Han army. In Wu-ti's time, the cavalry thus became the prime instrument through which the Han not only defended its territory from the Hsiung-nu attack but also gradually projected its power beyond its boundaries through military expansion.

THE ROLE OF MILITARY TALENT

At present, the prevailing view of the factors affecting the launching of the Hsiung-nu expeditions has tended to neglect the significance of the competence of the Han military leaders. Representative of such thinking is the statement of one prominent scholar in the field that border and steppe warfare were characteristic manifestations of the time and that the sending of an expedition against the Hsiung-nu did not depend on whether there happened to be a competent general in the imperial service because there was a whole class of such men.³⁷ However, a careful examination of the leading generals mentioned in the campaign records of the period disproves this view. Table 7 summarizes the fighting records of the generals involved in the sixteen Hsiung-nu campaigns of Emperor Wu where these have been recorded.

According to the table, no Han general who independently led a force in the Hsiung-nu campaigns, with the exception of Wei Ch'ing (ca. 158–106 B.C.) and Huo Ch'ü-ping (145–117 B.C.), was able to win a victory. Wei and Huo were the two most competent generals of the age. The last time they led an expedition against the Hsiung-nu was in 119 B.C.; therefore, this year may be said to mark a division in Emperor Wu's Hsiung-nu campaigns: the ten campaigns from 129 to 119 B.C., of which most were victorious; and the six expeditions after 119 B.C., of which almost none was victorious. It is evident that

the major Han victories were won only through the brilliant military leadership of Wei and Huo.

Furthermore, an examination of other relevant documents sheds new light on the important role of the military leadership in the Hsiung-nu campaigns. From the expedition of 127 on, General Wei began to win decisive victories. After each of these three victories, Emperor Wu praised the achievements of Wei and his men in detail in an edict, in which the sovereign's elation was evident. He also issued similar edicts after each of Huo Ch'ü-ping's victorious campaigns from 123 to 119 B.C. From these edicts, it is clear that the victories of Huo and Wei excited the emperor's confidence and his desire to send further expeditions. On the other hand, he did not issue a single edict after any of the six unsuccessful campaigns after 119 B.C.

At the same time, the annual frequency of campaigns greatly decreased—a ratio of about 1.0 (ten campaigns in ten years) to 0.2 (six campaigns in twenty-nine years)—indicating that, frustrated by defeats and the surrender of his generals, the emperor was slow to send further expeditions and gradually lost his enthusiasm for the Hsiung-nu campaigns. The incident of Li Kuang-li's brief career as a successful commander best illustrates this development. When Li achieved a great victory in the Western Regions expedition of 101 B.C., Emperor Wu's interest in military campaigns was again aroused; after the victorious return of Li's forces, he immediately issued an edict, declaring his determi-

TABLE 7. Military Records of Generals in Emperor Wu's Hsiung-nu Campaigns

Name	Rank or Title	Achievement ^a
Chang Ch'ien	General	5
Chao Hsin ^b	General	2
Chao P'o-nu	General	4,2
Han Yueh	General	4
Huo Ch'ü-ping	General	1,1,1
Kung-sun Ao	General	3,5,4,3
Kung-sun Ho	General	4,4
Li Hsi	General	4,4,4
Li Kuang	General	3,3
Li Ling	Chief commandant of cavalry	2
Li Kuang-li	General	3,2
Li Ts'ai	General (under Wei Ch'ing)	(1)
Lu Po-te	Chief commandant of crossbowmen	4,?
Ma T'ung	Marquis of Ch'ung-ho	4
Shang Ch'iu-ch'eng	Grand secretary	4
Su Chien	General (under Wei Ch'ing)	(?,3)
Wei Ch'ing	General	1,1,1,1,1,1

^a1 = won; 2 = defeated and surrendered; 3 = defeated; 4 = "no merit" or inconclusive; 5 = lost contact or late for rendezvous; ? = unknown or unclear result.

^bHsiung-nu surrendered to the Han

nation to send more expeditions against the Hsiung-nu to avenge Kao-ti's humiliation at P'ing-ch'eng. Li, however, failed to repeat his victory and to the emperor's dismay surrendered to the Hsiung-nu in 90 B.C. Now in his late sixties, the emperor was alarmed by this incident and decided against launching any further Hsiung-nu campaigns. This contrast between the state of Emperor Wu's mind in times of victory and defeat clearly shows that the ability of generals decided the outcome of a Hsiung-nu expedition and that the outcome in turn influenced the emperor's decision about whether to launch another campaign.

In view of the preceding analysis, one may conclude that military talent was among the most significant factors affecting the initiation and continuation of Emperor Wu's Hsiung-nu campaigns and that the dispatch of such an expedition to a considerable extent depended on whether there happened to be a competent general in the imperial service.

THE PROBLEM OF BARBARIANS IN THE CAMPAIGNS

In addition to the subject of horses and mounted soldiers, the employment of "barbarians" (non-Han, mostly surrendered Hsiung-nu) in Emperor Wu's campaign forces has been a topic frequently discussed by scholars. According to table 7, the use of cavalry from the Shu-kuo (Dependent States) is mentioned for only the last of the sixteen expeditions. We have no reason to believe that barbarian forces were ever employed in the other campaigns. As for military leaders, only five men of Hsiung-nu origin are mentioned. Of the five, only one, Chao Hsin, was a general in an early campaign (123 B.C.), and after being defeated he surrendered to the Hsiung-nu, never to return. The other four, Kao Pu Shih in the 121 B.C. campaign and Fu Lu Chih, I Chi Hsien, and Chao An Chi in the 119 B.C. campaign, all served in the minor military capacity of colonels under General Huo Ch'ü-ping, and only Kao Pu Shih is recorded as having killed or captured an enemy. Since Huo was especially gifted in leading surprise attacks with light cavalry, these surrendered Hsiung-nu probably served as guides under his command, which explains why he never lost his way even though he often penetrated deep into Hsiung-nu territory ahead of the main body of his army.

Besides the surrendered Hsiung-nu, two other generals of barbarian origin were in the Han army, Kung-sun Ho and Han Yueh. But in these instances one should note that both men were brought up and educated in Han China. Kung-sun's barbarian ancestors had lived in China for many generations. Although Han Yueh's great-grandfather had surrendered to the Hsiung-nu and married a Hsiung-nu girl, his grandfather brought his family back to China. Han Yueh himself had been the playmate of Emperor Wu in his boyhood. In view of these

facts, it is clear that barbarian forces did not play a significant role in Emperor Wu's Hsiung-nu campaigns.

However, as mentioned earlier, non-Han soldiers played a critical role in the Han army. Three of the four divisions of cavalry—under Hu, Ch'ang-shui, and Yueh—in the Northern Army were non-Han. The Northern Army was the most powerful and had best-equipped professional soldiers in the army; they had the awesome responsibility of guarding the imperial capital, while the rest of the army launched its extensive military campaigns for expansion.

THE MILITARY, SOCIETY, AND HISTORY

Han Wu-ti ended the military campaigns in 90 B.C., the last being an expedition to the Western Regions. Although the campaigns did not resolve the Hsiung-nu problem once and for all, the destruction they inflicted on the Hsiung-nu eventually led to their collapse thirty years later and the submission of a large proportion of them to Wu-ti's grandson, Hsuan-ti (74–49 B.C.), under the leadership of Shan-yü Hu-han-yeh (58–31 B.C.) in 54–52 B.C.³⁸ The campaigns led not only to territorial expansion amounting to over 886,000 square miles but also to a new social class: the huge professional army with its influential, high-ranking leaders, which formed an almost separate sector in Han society and "Chinese" culture. First, fifty-three of the military leaders were granted the most prestigious aristocratic rank, *hou* or *lieh-hou* (marquis), which represented 60 percent of all the *hou* granted in Wu-ti's time (eighty-nine in total). A *hou* rank automatically placed its recipient in the most influential circles in Han society and the political world as well.³⁹ In addition, five of the seven chancellors, the highest political position under the emperor, in Wu-ti's reign came from the military. Over twenty-five other military leaders held high rank of *chiu-ch'ing* (nine ranking ministers) or the equivalent.⁴⁰ Countless numbers of military men of low rank, and even some mere soldiers, were rewarded with high positions. Take the Ta-yuan campaign (104–101 B.C.). After a tremendous victory in which the Han troops and their allies defeated Ta-yuan (Fergana or Farghana in central Uzbekistan) and reached K'ang-chü (Sogdiana, the capital in the modern Samarkand area in Uzbekistan), Wu-ti meted out the following rewards.⁴¹

Li Kuang-li, the chief commander, was granted the title of *hou*.

Chao Ti, a cavalryman who killed the king of Yü-ch'eng (Uzgend in modern Kyrgyzstan), also was granted the title of *hou*.

Shang-kuan Chieh, a commandant who took the capital city of Yü-ch'eng, was granted the title of *shao-fu* (Privy Treasurer).

Three officers were appointed ranking ministers.

Over one hundred officers received appointments as chancellors of kingdoms, governors, and officials of high rank receiving 2,000 *shih* (bushels) of grain.

Over one thousand officers were granted ranks receiving 1,000 *shih* or less.

Thus, the Ta-yuan campaign alone produced two *hou*, four ranking ministers, over one hundred officials of the highest rank, and over one thousand of high to middle rank. And there were twelve victories of this same magnitude in Wu-ti's campaigns. It is therefore clear that during Wu-ti's forty years of military campaigns the military sector came to occupy a large segment of the Han ruling class and was a considerable component of the top echelon of its ruling apparatus. Small wonder, then, that all the powerful regents appointed by Emperor Wu on his deathbed to assist his eight-year-old son, the next ruler, Emperor Chao (r. 87–74 B.C.), were veteran military leaders: Grand General Huo Kuang, who was a commandant at the time of the appointment, General of Chariot and Cavalry Chin Mi-ti, who was a commandant, and General of the Left Shang-kuan Chieh, who was a commandant. Chin Mi-ti was the son of King Hsiu-ch'u of the Hsiung-nu and had surrendered to the Han in 121 B.C. after his force was defeated by General Huo Ch'ü-ping, who was Huo Kuang's brother.⁴² Thus, the Han military grew strong enough under Wu-ti to compete with and perhaps even overtake the civilian sector of Han society in the social elite and political ruling class.

As was discussed earlier, the military was dramatically professionalized under Wu-ti. It had a defined curriculum of education and special legal codes. Combined with its overwhelming political power and influence in the governing machinery, the military thus became a subsociety equal to its civilian counterpart in Han society. In the long history of China from the Shang and early Chou to the seventh century B.C., these two subsocieties—the military (referred to as *wu*) and the civilian (referred to as *wen*)—made up one society, that is, *wu* and *wen* were inseparable in theory and action, being always together as one unit in daily life and the political realm. In education, the basic curriculum included both *wen* and *wu* subjects, and the two formed an integral whole. As only the noblemen were allowed to receive an education and bear arms, an adult nobleman was both a political leader and a knight. That was the essence of the Chou feudal order. But that system began changing in the seventh century B.C. as the Chou feudal order began to disintegrate after the collapse of the Chou Court in Hao in the west in 771 B.C. and the removal of its capital to Lo-i in the east in 770 B.C. In life and education, the *wen* and the *wu* gradually began to part. On one hand, the nobleman and the soldier were to become two different persons, with each receiving different and more specialized training

and education; on the other hand, the size and frequency of wars among virtually independent and semi-independent feudal states forced the states to increase their fighting forces by instituting a new draft system to recruit soldiers from among the commoners. This trend continued for the next four hundred years, passing from the late Ch'un-ch'iu (770–404 B.C.) through the Warring States (403–221 B.C.) period until the unification (conquest) of the divided states by the state of Ch'in under King Ying Cheng (260/259–210 B.C.) and the later Shih Huang-ti (the First Emperor, r. 221–210 B.C.) of the Ch'in dynasty (221–207 B.C.). But the military at this time was not separated from the civilian society because, as discussed earlier, the soldiers were draftees conscripted on a rotation basis, and only a small segment of them was professional. It was under Han Wu-ti that the army became overwhelmingly professional in numbers and training, and the two segments of the society, *wen* and *wu*, became separate. Emperor Wu's Hsiung-nu campaigns brought about the completion of this revolutionary change in Chinese society.


In a long historical perspective, the rise of a professional army under Han Wu-ti changed the societal perception of the soldier (and the military). While the officers and the elite of the Han military became an influential power group in the government, at the same time a large segment of the Han military rank and file were "lowly elements" of the Han society. In the campaigns of 111, 104, and 97 B.C., for example, more than 130,000 paroled convicts and pardoned criminals, juvenile delinquents, hoodlums, and men of bad reputation and undesirable social station were drafted into the army to perform different functions. It is clear that these men would stay in the military after the campaigns, if they survived, and become "professional" soldiers. Together with similar elements in other campaigns, such as the conquests of the Southern Yueh and Southwestern I in 112 B.C. and of Korea in 109 B.C., the Han army had at least 150,000 such soldiers in its professional ranks by 97 B.C. And there is no indication in Han dynasty sources that the army ever went back to the rotating conscription of soldiers from men of regular social station (*liang-min*); the conscription system was replaced by a professional army. In either case, 150,000 men was a considerable percentage of the Han standing army of 500,000 to 600,000 men, and later 600,000 to 700,000, large enough to change the general perception and image of the Han army among the populace. The army now was an asylum for men of lowly social station and other undesirable elements of society, and military service was no longer mandatory. Hence there followed the gradual rise of the most detrimental image of the military in Chinese society: "A good man should never be in the army!" Soldiers were perceived to be the outcasts of society. And that tradition has continued into modern times.

The massive use of criminals and men of bad reputation and lowly social station was put into practice by Shih Huang-ti in his military campaigns, especially

in the south in 213 B.C., but the Ch'in dynasty lasted only six more years and the practice never became a permanent component of the military as the emperor died in 210 B.C. and the Ch'in continued to recruit its soldiers through the established conscription system.⁴³ It was Han Wu-ti's campaigns that brought about China's first measurable professional army composed of soldiers who were not criminals or men of bad reputation and lowly social station. As a result, it had a far-reaching impact on the image of the military in particular and the structure of Chinese society in general—the ideological fragmentation of Chinese society as a whole.

A further examination of the records reveals that, militarily speaking, the northwestern region of the empire alone was responsible for extending the campaigns into various areas in or beyond China. The horses were bred in the northwest; eighteen of the twenty military leaders of this period whose geographic origins are known came from the northwest; and judging from the fact that the northwest was famous for producing cavalymen in the Han period, a large number of the mounted troops in the campaigns were probably recruited from this region. In the long history of China, each of its various regions seems to have been associated with a particular historical or cultural mission.⁴⁴ Thus, the historical contribution of China's northwest lies in its special contribution to the great expansion of the Han empire during the period of Emperor Wu.


In Han Wu-ti's northern and northwestern campaigns, the interconnections among the Han armed forces, military technology, social structure, natural environment, and cultural and historical geography combined to chart the course of Chinese history. In the end, the success of the campaigns was the result of revolutionary changes in the Han military system and its technology, which in turn changed Han society at large. In their larger and long-range impact, the campaigns redefined the landscape of the Han empire at the time and reshaped the configuration of the Chinese empire in broad historical perspective.



FROM THE MOVING FRONTIERS
TO THE SETTLED COLONIES

THE CHINESE

EMPIRE EXPANDS





4

CHINA MOVES WEST

*The Colonization of the Ho-hsi Region
in the Former Han Period*

THE MILITARY CAMPAIGNS OF Han Wu-ti's reign carried the Chinese far beyond their old borders and gave them a systematic, complex, and most effective method of colonizing newly acquired territories. These territories greatly increased the size of the Chinese empire and to some extent changed its whole physical makeup. The colonization of the Ho-hsi region is a good example of this development. Its acquisition extended the borders of the Han empire from the banks of the Yellow River to the eastern part of modern Sinkiang. But, important as this expansion was, details of the colonization of these areas can scarcely be found in Han literature. Taking Ho-hsi as an example, only a few lines in the *Shih-chi* and the *Han-shu* discuss the process of colonization in that area; fortunately, recently discovered wood and bamboo records in that region have proved to be very revealing. It is quite possible that the colonization of Ho-hsi represents a fairly set pattern used by the Han in developing all newly acquired border areas such as eastern Sinkiang. This chapter aims to reconstitute this process using the Ho-hsi records as the basis for a case study in the broad pattern of the Han frontier system.

HO-HSI BEFORE 121 B.C.

The Ho-hsi region, consisting of four *chiin* in Han times—Wu-wei, Chang-yeh (Chang-i), Chiu-ch'üan, and Tun-huang—is located west of the Yellow River and extends westward to the eastern part of the modern province of Sinkiang. It corresponds approximately to the modern province of Kansu plus the southern part of Ninghsia and a small part of eastern Sinkiang and at one time even a small part of northwestern Tsinghai. On the southern edge of the region lies the Nan-shan Range, which extends roughly east-southeast to west-northwest and penetrates as far as latitude 48° north and longitude 98° east. On the northern side of the region are two lower mountain ranges, the North Mountains (Pei-shan) in the west and the Ho-li Mountains in the east. Both the North Mountains and the Ho-li Mountains run parallel to the Nan-shan Range, part of the huge Ch'i-lien mountain ranges. Between these parallel mountain chains lies the narrowest part of the province of Kansu, the so-called Ho-hsi or Kansu Corridor, whose central portion is 80 to 100 kilometers wide. In this corridor, the mountain streams flow down the slopes of the Nan-shan Range in a northwesterly direction. In the middle part of the region, most of these streams gradually unite with the Pei-ta (or Lin) River in the west and the Kan-chou (or Jo) River in the east. On the north flank of the depression, the two rivers encounter the foothills of the North and the Ho-li Mountains and are forced together through a gorge between these ranges. The newly merged river is called the Edsen-gol, which runs in a northeasterly direction to its terminal lakes. After having covered about three-eighths of its course, the Edsen-gol reaches the easternmost offshoots of the North Mountains near latitude 40° north, and here it divides; the new branch is called the Moren-gol. Farther north the Edsen-gol divides again into two main branches, the Narin-gol in the west and the Ikhen-gol in the east, the latter being a direct continuation of the Edsen-gol (see map 1).

In the western part of the Ho-hsi region, we find the Shu-le (or So-lo) River (also called the Bulungir River), which originates on Mount Ch'i-lien and runs in a northwesterly direction. After passing the modern city of An-hsi, it is joined by the Tang River, which flows from the city of Tun-huang. From there, the Shu-le River continues to flow westward and finally empties into the Khara-nor (also called Hala Lake or Hsi-hai-tzu).

In the eastern part of the Ho-hsi region is the Po-t'ing River, which also comes down from the Nan-shan Range. It runs in a northeasterly direction and empties into the Po-t'ing Lake.

As for the nature of the land, the section between the Pei-ta and the Kan-chou Rivers, or roughly between the modern cities of Chiu-ch'üan and Chang-yeh, has the most fertile soil. Numerous small branches of the main rivers make

irrigation in this area quite workable. Although the land is suitable for pasturage as well as farming, the area near the North and Ho-li Ranges is especially good for grazing.¹

Our knowledge of the ancient history of Ho-hsi (West of the [Yellow] River) is only fragmentary, but, relying on the limited information available, a general picture of this region before its acquisition by the Han in 121 B.C. can be tentatively reconstructed. When the Ch'in empire collapsed in 207 B.C., three groups of nomads lived in this region, the Yueh-chih, the Wu-sun, and the Ch'iang. The Yueh-chih (also misread as Jou-chih), with a population of over 400,000, was at one time the ruling group; even the Hsiung-nu sent their prince to their court as a hostage.² The Yueh-chih, however, were later defeated by the Hsiung-nu, which had a population estimated at about 1.0 to 1.3 million at the time. After that defeat, most of the Yueh-chih moved westward, first to the territory of the Sai (the modern I-li area of Sinkiang and west) and finally to Ta-hsia (Bactria in modern northern Afghanistan) in the basin of the Oxus River in Central Asia, though a small group moved southward to the Ch'iang's region in the Nan-shan Range and were henceforth called the Minor (or Little) Yueh-chih.³ The less powerful Ch'iang occupied the southern mountain regions. The Wu-sun, the third group in the area, were relatively weaker and smaller in number, with a population of around 105,000. They were defeated by the westward-moving Yueh-chih, and their king, Nan-tou-mi, was killed, but his infant son, La-chiao-mi (referred to later by his title *k'un-mo* in Han texts), survived and was reared by the *shan-yü* of the Hsiung-nu.⁴ After having grown to manhood, K'un-mo La-chiao-mi regathered his people, who had lived leaderless under the *shan-yü*'s rule since Nan-tou-mi's death, and led them to the Hsi-ch'eng area, while enforcing strict military discipline.⁵ Consequently, the Wu-sun developed formidable power under La-chiao-mi, but they still accepted the *shan-yü*'s rule. Later, with the consent of the *shan-yü*, K'un-mo La-chiao-mi led his army to attack the Yueh-chih in the Sai territory (Sakās); he avenged his father's death by defeating the Yueh-chih and killing their king. As the Yueh-chih moved farther west into Ta-hsia, the *k'un-mo* and his people settled in the Sai territory and established a new kingdom under the old name of Wu-sun. Independence from Hsiung-nu rule was also declared.⁶ Thus, the Hsiung-nu became the sole master of the land of Ho-hsi.

As one can easily perceive, two basic points have been omitted from this brief history of the Yueh-chih and the Wu-sun: (1) the original territories of the two peoples and their relative positions before the Hsiung-nu invasion; and (2) the dates of Yueh-chih defeats by the Hsiung-nu in Ho-hsi and by the *k'un-mo* in the Sai Territory. No definite information concerning these questions can be found in the *Shih-chi* or the *Han-shu*, a fact that has led to disagreement among scholars of the period. While the whole problem is too complicated to be fully

discussed here, a few words may be said about its basic issues. I shall first introduce the views of three prominent researchers.

In 1901, the eminent Japanese scholar Shiratori Kurakichi published a famous paper, "Uson ni tsuite kō" (On the Wu-sun), in the *Shigaku Zasshi* (Journal of Historical Science).⁷ Eleven years later another paper by the same author, "Seiikishijo no shin-kenkyū" (New Studies on the History of the Western Regions), appeared in the *Tōyō Gakuhō* (Reports of the Oriental Society).⁸ These two papers provided the most comprehensive and illuminating discussions of the day on the problems under consideration. Through voluminous documentation and lengthy argumentation, Shiratori concluded that the Wu-sun originally lived in the area between the Tang and Bulungir Rivers in modern Kansu and that most of the Yueh-chih were in the eastern part of the Hhsi region (called Liang-chou during the Ch'ing dynasty [1644-1911], now modern Wu-wei and neighboring districts). He also suggested that the Yueh-chih made their first move to the I-li area sometime during the reign of Shan-yü Lao-shang (174-161 B.C.) of the Hsiung-nu and their second move to the territory of Ta-hsia in the last year of that reign, around the year 158 B.C.⁹ Shiratori's views were not shared by Kuwabara Jitsuzō, another leading Japanese expert in this field. Kuwabara's "Chō Ken no ensei" (Chang Ch'ien's Western Expedition) was published in the *Zoku shi teki kenkyū* (More Studies in History) in 1916.¹⁰ According to Kuwabara, the Wu-sun originally occupied the area corresponding to Chang-yeh *chün* (in east-central Kansu) during the Han period, and the Yueh-chih's area was to the west of the Wu-sun. With regard to the dates of the Yueh-chih's two moves, Kuwabara agreed that the first took place during the reign of Shan-yü Lao-shang but argued that his reign should be from 174 to 161/160 B.C. instead of 174 to 158 B.C., as was suggested by Shiratori,¹¹ and that the second took place sometime after 139 B.C., when Chang Ch'ien (ca. 165-115 B.C.) was captured by the Hsiung-nu on his Yueh-chih mission. These points of Kuwabara elicited objections from another distinguished Japanese scholar, Fujita Tōyōhachi, in two papers, "Gesshi [Getsushi] no kochi sono seii no nendai" (The Former Territory of the Yueh-chih and the Date of Their Western Migration) published in *Tōyō Gakuhō* in 1917, and "Sei-iki kenkyū" (Studies on the Western Regions) published in *Shigaku Zasshi* in 1927.¹² Fujita suggested that even before their defeat by the Hsiung-nu the Yueh-chih expanded once into the vicinity of Wu-wei *chün* (in eastern Kansu), that at the time of their migration to I-li the Yueh-chih occupied only the Tunhuang area (in western Kansu) and a part of the T'ien-shan Range (the Heavenly Mountains), and that the Wu-sun originally occupied a part of the Tunhuang area but retreated to the northeastern part of the T'ien-shan Range at the time of the Hsiung-nu invasion. As for the respective dates of Yueh-chih's

two migrations, Fujita suggested the year of 176/175 B.C. for the first move and 160/161 B.C., the date of Shan-yü Lao-shang's death, for the second.¹³

Of the three theories, Fujita's views are closer to Shiratori's, whereas Kuwabara differs from both these men by holding that the former territory of the Yueh-chih was to the west of the Wu-sun and that the Yueh-chih's second migration took place after 139 B.C. Kuwabara bases his arguments on two statements in the *Biography of Chang Ch'ien* in the *Han-shu*. According to his interpretation, one statement implies that the former territory of the Wu-sun was in Chang-yeh *chiün* (in east-central Kansu) and the other indicates that the Yueh-chih were still in the I-li area in 139 B.C., when Chang Ch'ien started his mission to the Western Regions (Hsi-yü). However, as pointed out by Fujita, these documents may also be interpreted in such a way that they lend no support whatever to Kuwabara's argument.

Yasuma Yaichirō's study "Getsushi no seho ido ni tsuite" (On the Western Migrations of the Yueh-chih) appeared in *Shigaku Zasshi* in 1932. It favors Kuwabara's theory. According to him, the territory of the Yueh-chih before their migration was between Tun-huang and the Ch'i-lien Mountains and that of the Wu-sun in Chang-yeh. He further maintains that the Yueh-chih's first migration took place between 168 and 161 B.C. and their second between 138 and 130 B.C.¹⁴

Among the more recent Japanese studies, Uchida Gimpū's and Matsuda Hisao's works deserve special attention. Both scholars have concluded that the Yueh-chih's first move took place in 177 or 176 B.C., when the Hsiung-nu's Worthy King of the Right (*yu hsien-wang*) completed a successful expedition in Ho-hsi and areas westward. But they disagree about the relative geographic position of the Yueh-chih and the Wu-sun before their migrations. According to Uchida, the Yueh-chih's territory before migration was the area between Tun-huang and the Ch'i-lien Mountains, a part of the eastern T'ien-shan Range, and the Wu-sun's home was in Chang-yeh.¹⁵ According to Matsuda, the original territory of the Wu-sun was Bishbaliq, at the northern foot of the eastern T'ien-shan Range; thus, the Wu-sun before the Hsiung-nu invasion lived to the west of the Yueh-chih, just the reverse of Uchida's conclusion.¹⁶

There is a large body of Chinese and Western-language literature on the Yueh-chih and Wu-sun problems. Efforts to survey and examine the various theories in different languages have been admirably made by several leading scholars over the years. A few of such studies merit discussion here for their significant contribution to the understanding of the issue in question. Writing in 1917, Friedrich Hirth reviewed the works of several scholars and concluded that the Yueh-chih were defeated by the Hsiung-nu under Shan-yü Lao-shang in 165 B.C. and moved west to settle near Lake Issyk Kul, driving out the Sakā

princes, who migrated south and became rulers in Chi-pin (in modern Pakistan and Kashmir); and in 160 B.C. the Wu-sun, formerly under Hsiung-nu rule in western Kansu, moved west to drive out the Yueh-chih and occupy their territory near Lake Issyk Kul.¹⁷ A more comprehensive survey was made by Sten Konow in 1929.¹⁸ His conclusion is that the Hsiung-nu defeated the Yueh-chih in 176 B.C. and that the latter reached the Sai Territory in 165 B.C. and Bactria after 160 B.C. As to the former territories of Wu-sun and Yueh-chih, he followed Kuwabara. Similarly, Feng Chia-sheng's study in 1938, entitled "Ta Yueh-chih min-tsu chi-ch'i yen-chiu chieh-lun" (The Great Yueh-chih People and the Conclusions of Significant Studies in Their History), is probably the most comprehensive survey in that it consulted thirty-seven references in six languages. Feng concludes that, although the Yueh-chih controlled an area covering modern Kansu and Ninghsia before the Han dynasty, their territory before their migration to I-li was only that between Tun-huang and the Ch'i-lien Mountains and that the Yueh-chih's first move was in 176/175 B.C. and their second in 162/161 B.C.¹⁹ Also in 1938, William W. Tarn summarized in a celebrated book, *The Greeks in Bactria and India*, Western-language studies of the problem. In the end, he suggests that the Yueh-chih made their first migration in 176 or 174 B.C. and reached the Sai Territory before 160 B.C. He also holds that the Yueh-chih conquered Bactria sometime between 141 and 128 B.C.²⁰ In his article "The Yueh-chih Problem Re-Examined," published in 1945, Otto Maenchen-Helfen reviewed several critical issues in the study of the Yueh-chih problem in light of more recent historical and linguistic research and concluded that between 174 and 160 B.C. the Yueh-chih were defeated by the Hsiung-nu in their territory in Kansu and Ninghsia west of the Yellow River, that the greater part of the horde moved west to defeat a number of Sakā tribes in the northern T'ien-shan region on the upper I-li, Chu, and Naryn Rivers and stayed there for about three decades; and that between 133 and 129 B.C. the Yueh-chih were attacked by the Wu-sun and partly subjugated, though one group moved farther west and were rulers in Ta-hsia (Bactria) by 129–128 B.C. when Chang Ch'ien reached that country.²¹

In recent decades, a large number of books and articles have advanced new views or critiqued the preceding suggestions. These works all follow different and interdisciplinary approaches (historical, political, military, anthropological, ethnic, cultural, and socioeconomic). Recent archaeological finds and investigations have also expanded the range of research and opened new trails in the intellectual arena.²²

Needless to say, such diverse views make reconsideration mandatory, and recently there has been a large corpus of important studies in Chinese, Japanese, and Western languages. My first suggestions shall be in regard to the original territories of the Yueh-chih and the Wu-sun.²³ Both the *Shih-chi* and the

Han-shu record the defeat of the Yueh-chih by the Hsiung-nu, their migration to the Sai territory, and the formation of the Minor (or Little) Yueh-chih by a small group that was unable to make the long journey, but neither reveals the previous relative geographical positions of the Yueh-chih and the Ch'iang. Only the *Hou-Han shu* (History of the Latter Han Dynasty) by Fan Yeh (A.D. 398–445) throws new light on this problem. It describes the migration of that small group of Yueh-chih to the Nan-shan Range as "southward,"²⁴ which would place the former territory of the united Yueh-chih to the north of the Minor Yueh-chih.

As for the location of the Minor Yueh-chih, the *Shih-chi* provides the following information in an edict of Emperor Wu dated 121 B.C.²⁵

Swift Cavalry General Huo Ch'ü-ping has crossed the Chü-yen [River], [the land of] the Minor Yueh-chih, and attacked [the enemy in] the Ch'i-lien Mountains.

Since the military campaign referred to in this edict thrust roughly in a westward direction, the land of the Minor Yueh-chih must have been between the Chü-yen River in the east and the Ch'i-lien in the west. The Chü-yen River was probably the upper part of the Edsen-gol or the lower part of the Kan-chou.²⁶ But the exact location of the Ch'i-lien Mountains is not clear. Although many studies on this problem have been made, no two authors agree.²⁷ Fortunately, the approximate position of the Ch'i-lien Mountains can be traced in the *Hsi-ho chiu-shih* (Notes on Hsi-ho).

[The Ch'i-lien Range] is on the borderline between Chang-yeh and Chiu-ch'üan *chiün*. It extends over 200 *li* from east to west and over about 100 *li* from south to north.²⁸

Thus, Ch'i-lien must be the modern North Mountains or a part of the modern Ch'i-lien Range, which fits this description. On the basis of this, we may conclude that *the territory of the Yueh-chih on the eve of their first western migration was in the western part of Chang-yeh chiün*.

With regard to the territory of the Yueh-chih before their migration to the Sai territory, the *Shih-chi* gives the following information.²⁹

The Yueh-chih originally lived in the area between Tun-huang and the Chi-lien Mountains.

According to the T'ang commentator Chang Shou-chieh (fl. early eighth century A.D.), Tun-huang was on the western border and the Ch'i-lien Moun-

tains on the eastern border.³⁰ Consequently, all or part of the area in between was once controlled by the Yueh-chih.

Both the *Shih-chi* and the *Han-shu* mention that in the latter part of the struggle between Hsiang Yü and Liu Pang from 206 to 202 B.C., the Hsiung-nu, led by their mighty *shan-yü* Mo-tun (Modun or Modu, 209–174 B.C.), made a dashing attack on the Yueh-chih on their western border and drove them away.³¹ Thus, it is quite clear that at this time the Yueh-chih occupied an area that bordered the western territories of the Hsiung-nu. Although the western edge of the Hsiung-nu territory cannot be determined exactly due to the lack of such information in either written or archaeological evidence from the Han period, it could not have been far from the western edge of the bend of the Yellow River.³² Therefore, it is safe to say that *the Yueh-chih occupied the area of the northern part of the later Wu-wei chün and the region north of it.*

We have so far discussed three areas in the Ho-hsi region, from the far east to the far west, which were once controlled by the Yueh-chih. It is very difficult to judge the exact size of the three areas and impossible to determine whether the Yueh-chih controlled the three areas simultaneously or at different times. But it seems unlikely that the Yueh-chih could have at one time scattered over and held under their control the vast region from Tun-huang in the west to Wu-wei in the east. The history of the Yueh-chih further suggests that the three territories represent three different stages of Yueh-chih history or three earlier migrations before the first long western move that led them to the modern I-li area in Sinkiang. After their defeat by the Hsiung-nu, the Yueh-chih gradually retreated westward, migrating first from northern Wu-wei to western Chang-yeh and then to the Ch'i-lien–Tun-huang area.

With regard to the territory of the Wu-sun before their defeat by the Yueh-chih, the *Han-shu* states that at the time of Nan-tou-mi, or on the eve of the Hsiung-nu invasion, the Wu-sun, together with the Yueh-chih, dwelled in the area between the Ch'i-lien Mountains and Tun-huang. The relative geographical positions of the two peoples are not mentioned. Although other causes are possible,³³ the Yueh-chih–Wu-sun clash could have been a result of the latter's obstruction of the former's westward retreat from the Hsiung-nu attack. In any case, one may reason that the Wu-sun were to the west of the Yueh-chih, thus occupying western portions of the area between the Ch'i-lien Mountains and Tun-huang. Even so, the original home of the Wu-sun before Nan-tou-mi remains unidentified.

The dating of Yueh-chih's two migrations is easier than locating the Yueh-chih and Wu-sun territories in Ho-hsi. In 176 B.C., Shan-yü Mo-tun wrote Han emperor Wen (180–157 B.C.) a letter stating that the Hsiung-nu Worthy King of the Right, commanding a strong force of foot soldiers and cavalymen, had

campaigned to the far west through the Ho-hsi region in the preceding year (177 B.C.).³⁴

I sent the Wise King of the Right westward to search out the Yueh-chih and attack them. Through the blessing of Heaven, the excellence of his fighting men, and the great strength of his horses, he succeeded in exterminating the Yueh-chih, slaughtering or forcing into submission every member of the tribe. In addition, he conquered Lou-lan, Wu-sun, and Hu-chieh, as well as the twenty-six nearby states, so that all of them are now under the rule of the Hsiung-nu.

Although the whole statement is somewhat exaggerated, there is little doubt that in this campaign the Hsiung-nu armies overwhelmingly defeated the Yueh-chih in Ho-hsi. Since in the period preceding Emperor Wen's reign the Hsiung-nu already controlled the eastern part of Ho-hsi,³⁵ and since they advanced at least as far as the Lop-nor (Lob-nor) region in this campaign, the first western migration of the Yueh-chih evidently took place at this time.³⁶ And our previous studies indicate that the Yueh-chih's final collapse occurred in the area between the Chü-yen River and the Ch'i-lien Mountains.

As was mentioned earlier, the Wu-sun were defeated by the Yueh-chih when their *k'un-mo* (La-chiao-mi) was an infant. According to the *Shih-chi* and the *Han-shu*, in about the first year of the Yuan-ting period (116 B.C.) of Emperor Wu's reign (141–87 B.C.) the *k'un-mo* of Wu-sun, La-chiao-mi, was already too old to exercise sole control over state affairs. The Ch'ing scholar Hsu Sung (A.D. 1781–1848) concluded that at that time *K'un-mo* La-chiao-mi must have been over sixty years of age.³⁷ Thus, his infancy must have spanned the years 177–176 B.C., and the defeat of the Wu-sun by the Yueh-chih must also have taken place around this time. This conclusion is further reinforced by Mo-tun's letter, in which he stated that the Wu-sun lost their independence to the Hsiung-nu during the latter's victorious western campaign.

Upon the death of Shan-yü Mo-tun in 174 B.C., his son Chi-yü succeeded as the ruler of the Hsiung-nu and was called Shan-yü Lao-shang. *K'un-mo* La-chiao-mi, then, must have been reared by Lao-shang. In this connection, the *Shih-chi* says:³⁸

When the *k'un-mo* [La-chiao-mi] had grown to manhood, the *shan-yü* [Lao-shang] put him in command of a band of troops, and he several times won merit in battle. Then the *shan-yü* made him the leader of the people his father had ruled before and ordered him to guard Hsi-ch'eng. The *k'un-mo* gathered together his people, looked after them and led

them in attacks on small settlements in the vicinity. Soon he had several tens of thousands of skilled archers trained in warfare.

As his force grew stronger, K'un-mo La-chiao-mi asked Lao-shang for permission to avenge his father's death by leading his people to attack the Yueh-chih in the area of modern I-li. After his request was granted, the *k'un-mo* led an expedition to Yueh-chih's second home. He defeated their forces and killed their king. Thereafter, as a token of victory, he sent the head of the Yueh-chih king to Lao-shang, who had it made into a drinking cup.³⁹ While the victorious Wu-sun established a new kingdom in the Sai territory, the defeated Yueh-chih began their second migration, which led them to the Ta-hsia region. All this took place just before the death of Shan-yü Lao-shang in 161 B.C.⁴⁰ Therefore, this is the approximate dating for Yueh-chih's second migration.

At this point, I am able to present a new outline of the major stages of the history of Ho-hsi before its acquisition by the Han in 121 B.C.

<i>Year (B.C.)</i>	<i>Major Events</i>
204-203	First Hsiung-nu war with Yueh-chih in northeastern Wu-wei. Beginning of Yueh-chih westward retreat.
177-176	Yueh-chih migration to the Sai territory after suffering a severe Hsiung-nu attack between the Chü-yen River and the Ch'i-lien Mountains. Formation of the Minor Yueh-chih. Defeat of Wu-sun by Yueh-chih between Ch'i-lien and Tun-huang. Control of Ho-hsi by the Hsiung-nu.
161-160	K'un-mo La-chiao-mi's defeat of Yueh-chih in the Sai territory and restoration of the old Wu-sun state there. Yueh-chih migration to Ta-hsia. Hsiung-nu become sole inhabitants of Ho-hsi except for the Ch'iang in the southern mountain regions.

After the Hsiung-nu conquest, the Ho-hsi region was under the jurisdiction of the Worthy King of the Right, the commander of the western branch of the Hsiung-nu. But actual supervision was carried out by two lesser kings, Hun-yeh and Hsiu-ch'u, and their subordinates. The total Hsiung-nu population in Ho-hsi was about one hundred thousand at this time.⁴¹ According to the *Treatise on Geography (Ti-li chih)* in the *Han-shu*, Hun-yeh's territory was to the west of Hsiu-ch'u's. This matter has raised needless controversy. Considering that a nomadic people such as the Hsiung-nu had to move from place to place in

search of water and pastures, there probably existed no fixed territorial lines of demarcation between the subjects of the two kings.

During the Hsiung-nu rule of Ho-hsi, the Yellow River became the borderline between the Han empire and the Hsiung-nu. From 177 B.C. onward, the Hsiung-nu made frequent raids on the Chinese border regions of Lung-hsi (central and southern Kansu) and Pei-ti (northeastern Kansu, southeastern Ninghsia) and on the area later designated Chin-ch'eng *chün* (northeastern Tsinghai and southwestern Kansu). As a result, the Han government maintained heavy defenses along the Yellow River, stationing a large number of garrisons there.⁴²

THE ACQUISITION AND DEVELOPMENT OF HO-HSI

After Emperor Wu resolved to eliminate the Hsiung-nu problem once and for all and opened a new era in Hsiung-nu warfare by initiating large-scale military operations and employing a swift cavalry, Ho-hsi naturally became one of the primary targets of Han attack. In 121 B.C., two major Ho-hsi expeditions were launched, both commanded by General Huo Ch'ü-ping, who had ample opportunity to demonstrate his military genius. In each campaign, he led a force of over ten thousand cavalrymen, penetrating deep into Hsiung-nu territory as far as the Ch'i-lien Mountains. The total number of Hsiung-nu captured and killed by Huo's forces is said to have amounted to well over forty thousand men, about one-third to one-half of the total Hsiung-nu forces in Ho-hsi.⁴³ The Hsiung-nu *shan-yü* was so distressed over this loss that he determined to execute the two kings in charge of the Ho-hsi defenses, but King Hun-yeh and King Hsiu-ch'u were already in league and decided to surrender their remaining forces to the Han. However, en route to meet with the Han troops dispatched by General Huo, King Hsiu-ch'u suddenly changed his mind, and instead of proceeding he led a group of dissenters out of the main force. His action was too late, for Huo's men immediately rushed to the scene and they, together with King Hun-yeh's loyalists, killed King Hsiu-ch'u and eight thousand of his followers. At last, King Hun-yeh surrendered his force of about forty thousand men to General Huo, thereby ending Hsiung-nu rule in Ho-hsi.⁴⁴ The Ho-hsi region thereafter became a part of the Han empire (see map 1).

Following the surrender of King Hun-yeh, the western border regions, including Lung-hsi, Pei-ti, and Shang *chün* (northern Shensi), were no longer the westernmost frontiers of the Han empire and were troubled far less by the Hsiung-nu. The government therefore moved about 725,000 indigents from the Kuan-tung area (east of the pass, mainly the central and eastern Yellow River valleys) to populate the region south of the bend of the Yellow River known as

Hsin-Ch'in-chung.⁴⁵ Later in 119 B.C., as successful expeditions led by Generals Wei Ch'ing and Huo Ch'ü-ping forced the Hsiung-nu to retreat even farther from the Chinese borders, the Han sent about 60,000 farming officials and soldiers to the western side of the Yellow River to construct irrigation works in the area from So-fang (west-central Suiyuan) west to Ling-chü (modern P'ing-fan in central Kansu).⁴⁶ These events suggest that after 121 B.C. the Han government concentrated its efforts on developing its western border regions through immigration and farming.

Immediately after the acquisition of Ho-hsi, the Han set up *t'ing sui* (watch stations) in the eastern part. It appears likely that in the course of populating the western border regions the Han constructed a strong fort at Ling-chü to direct development of the surrounding area. The Han Court, however, did not have plans to proceed immediately with colonization of the entire Ho-hsi region, for the cost of systematically developing such a vast expanse would have been too great for the Han economy, which was overburdened after financing the large-scale military operations in the western border regions.⁴⁷ It was the Hsiung-nu on the northern borders of this territory that, by threatening to retake the region, forced the Han government into immediate action to consolidate its control over Ho-hsi. The Han first sought to induce the Wu-sun to reenter the western part of the region, so that a Han–Wu-sun alliance could be formed to block any further Hsiung-nu movement southward. The veteran diplomat Chang Ch'ien was once again called upon to carry out this mission in about 116 B.C., but he found only that the Wu-sun had no intention of going back to their former homeland.⁴⁸ This left the Han no choice but to develop the Ho-hsi region at once and all through their own efforts. In 115 B.C., Ling-chü was again expanded into a *sai* (a large barrier or command post) to direct the Ho-hsi colonization project.⁴⁹ In 114 B.C., criminal exiles were sent as far west as Tun-huang to engage in land cultivation.⁵⁰

At this time, an alliance was formed between the Hsiung-nu in the north and the Ch'iang in the south to squeeze the Han out of Ho-hsi. In 112 B.C., the Ch'iang, whose population is estimated to have been over fifty thousand at this time, attacked the neighboring region of Ling-chü, and the Hsiung-nu raided on the northwestern borders.⁵¹ The security of the Ho-hsi Corridor was thus at stake. In 111 B.C., the Han government sent a counterattack force of over one hundred thousand foot soldiers and cavalymen to campaign against the Ch'iang and at the same time also dispatched twenty-five thousand cavalymen under command of General Kung-sun Ho and General Chao P'o-nu to attack the Hsiung-nu. Kung-sun's forces marched from Chiu-yuan (in modern southern Suiyuan by the Yellow River bend) and Chao's from Ling-chü; both were reported to have been victorious.⁵² The Han government then sent six hundred thousand garrison soldiers, together with a number of farming officials, to Ho-

hsi and some neighboring regions for garrison duty and land cultivation.⁵³ It is clear that the Han Court at this time had resolved not only to develop Ho-hsi as rapidly and completely as possible but also to reinforce the various western border regions, on whose stability and strength the future of Ho-hsi depended. In addition, two *chün*, Chang-yeh (in middle Ho-hsi) and Chiu-ch'üan (in western Ho-hsi in west-central Kansu), were established over Ho-hsi at this time to administer its full colonization. With the establishment of these two *chün*, the history of Ho-hsi entered a new stage. Based in these well-developed *chün*, the Han forces gradually moved westward to colonize the Tun-huang area and northward along the Chü-yen River to occupy the Chü-yen region. Tun-huang *chün* was established in about 98 B.C. and that of Wu-wei in about 72 B.C. Thus, the entire Ho-hsi region was completely colonized by 72 B.C.⁵⁴

The development of Ho-hsi was the result of migrations of people from the interior and the establishment of civil and military agricultural colonies, a process known as *t'un-t'ien*. But the actual process of colonization and the various administrative measures that the Han employed in consolidating their control of the area are not clearly indicated in Han documents. Only in the light of recent archaeological discoveries can we understand some of their complex methods. Here we shall focus on the colonization of three parts of Ho-hsi as case studies, tracing their development in an attempt to reconstitute the general pattern of the Han colonization process in Ho-hsi and other newly acquired regions.

The Development of Tun-huang Hsien (District)

The *Memoir of Ta-yuan* (Ferghana) in the *Shih-chi* records that in 104 B.C. Tun-huang was still a *sai* or large fortress (barrier).⁵⁵ Since it was on the westernmost border of the Han empire, troops for the Ta-yuan expedition in the T'ai-ch'u period (104–101 B.C.) of Emperor Wu's reign first gathered there.⁵⁶ During the four years of this expedition, great numbers of people from the interior were transported to the Tun-huang area. At the same time, military victories expanded the Han territory westward beyond Tun-huang. The government transported more people to Tun-huang and the newly acquired regions to its west,⁵⁷ with watch stations established from Tun-huang westward to Salt Lake in the Lop-nor area in modern Sinkiang. Yü-men *kuan* (Jade Gate Pass) was also moved in 101 B.C. from its old site east of Tun-huang to what is now called Hsiao-fang-p'an (site TXIV in Aurel Stein's report), about 81 kilometers northwest of modern Tun-huang city. A well-developed colony grew up around the new site of the pass.⁵⁸ These facts indicate quite clearly that by the late T'ai-ch'u period the Tun-huang area not only was no longer the westernmost border of the Han empire but was a well-populated site. Accordingly, its status was

changed in 101 B.C. to the Chiu-ch'üan Chief Commandant Area, which was headed by a *tu-wei* (chief commandant) under the jurisdiction of Chiu-ch'üan *chün*.⁵⁹ Further development of the area led to the establishment of a *hsien* administration not later than the third year of the T'ien-han period of Emperor Wu's reign (98 B.C.).⁶⁰ This change to *hsien* status marked the end of Tun-huang's status as a military and agricultural colony and its inclusion in regular administrative channels. Now the *tu-wei* was responsible only for military matters, while the magistrate took charge of all civil matters. Thus, one may summarize the development of the Tun-huang area as follows (see map 1).

Tun-huang Barrier (Fortress) → Chiu-ch'üan Chief Commandant Area → Tun-huang *hsien*


The Development of Lung-le Hsien

Lung-le *hsien* was located to the west of Tun-huang *hsien* in Han times, and its central point was the Jade Gate Pass.⁶¹ A Han wooden document discovered by Hsia Nai in 1944 at the old site of the pass in Hsiao-fang-p'an indicates that the pass was administered by a *tu-wei*, whose title at one time read *Ch'iu-ch'üan Yü-men tu-wei* (Chief Commandant of the Jade Gate at Chiu-ch'üan).⁶² Another wooden document dated 94 B.C., discovered by Aurel Stein in the same locale, shows that the chief commandant of this pass was called simply *Yü-men tu-wei*.⁶³ The two titles differ probably because the first is from the time when *Yü-men kuan* still belonged to Chiu-ch'üan *chün* and the second was used after the establishment of Tun-huang *chün*, when *Yü-men kuan* was no longer a part of Chiu-ch'üan. Furthermore, as was discussed earlier, the *Yü-men* area was developed during and after the Ta-yuan expedition. Initially watch stations were established over the area, and then the Jade Gate Pass was included in the jurisdiction and became the headquarters of the central command of the whole area, with its chief commandant assuming the highest authority.⁶⁴ The establishment of Lung-le *hsien* over the area represents another stage in its expansion and development. The development of the *Yü-men* area may be outlined as follows.

Watch stations → Chiu-ch'üan Jade Gate Chief Commandant Area
→ Lung-le *hsien*

The Development of the Chü-yen Region

Beginning in the middle Yuan-feng period (110–105 B.C.) of Emperor Wu's reign,⁶⁵ Han forces gradually penetrated the area surrounding Chü-yen Lake.⁶⁶ In the second year of the T'ai-ch'u period (103 B.C.), the Han began to sys-



Map 1. The Ho-hsi Region during the Han Dynasty

tematically fortify the area of modern Khara-Khoto and establish a walled city, Chü-yen, to direct the development of the surrounding area. This was to safeguard the Ho-hsi Corridor from Hsiung-nu invasion during the Ta-yuan expedition.⁶⁷ In the next year, the Han government dispatched Chief Commandant of Crossbowmen Lu Po-te to the Chü-yen region to direct its colonization from his headquarters, the Che-lu Fortress, located beside Chü-yen city, a position he maintained until his death.⁶⁸ Under Lu's command, the area was termed the Chü-yen Chief Commandant Area, an independent administrative unit not belonging to Chang-yeh *chün*.⁶⁹ Down to the last years of Emperor Wu's reign Chü-yen city and its surrounding area were still enjoying such independence. It was listed in official dispatches as equal to other frontier *chün*.⁷⁰ A wooden document dated from 74 to 72 B.C. also shows that by this time Chü-yen was still a special region commanded by the Chü-yen chief commandant.⁷¹ In the Chü-yen documents, the earliest date of Chü-yen *hsien* is 64 B.C.;⁷² therefore, it was between 74 and 64 B.C. that the *hsien* administration was established in Chü-yen with its headquarters at Chü-yen city.⁷³ To summarize this discussion, one may outline the colonization stages in the Chü-yen region as follows.

(Watch stations) → fortress (city) → Chü-yen Chief Commandant
Area → Chü-yen *hsien*

The General Pattern of the Colonization Process

These studies on the developments of three areas in Ho-hsi have clearly suggested patterns in the Han colonization process.⁷⁴ The first step was to establish watch stations and/or a fortress in a region slated for development. In addition to the examples given earlier, further evidence can be drawn from the development of two other areas: the transformation of the western part of Chiu-ch'üan *chün*, that is, from the city of Chiu-ch'üan to the old Yü-men Pass;⁷⁵ and the establishment of watch stations and large fortresses in the long expanse between the Wu-yuan barrier (the Yü-lin barrier of Wu-yuan *chün*) and Lu-Chü (in modern Outer Mongolia near Arbai Khere), a distance of more than 1,000 *li*.⁷⁶ The *Memoir of the Western Ch'iang* in the *Hou-Han-shu* clearly refers to the expansion movement of Emperor Wu's reign as the establishment of barriers, fortresses, and watch stations on the frontiers.⁷⁷ In a proposal for the development of Lun-t'ai in the Western Regions submitted to Emperor Wu by Sang Hung-yang (152–80 B.C.) and others in 89 B.C., and in the imperial edict responding to this proposal, the opening of a new frontier area is also referred to as the establishment of watch stations (*ch'i t'ing sui*).⁷⁸ The selection of an appropriate spot depended on four factors: (1) strategic importance,⁷⁹ (2) availability of water sources,⁸⁰ (3) convenience of communication with the adjacent

commanding headquarters,⁸¹ and (4) arable land in the surrounding area.⁸² The development of such an area was under the command of a military officer, but civilians who went to the area as migrants or hired laborers of the government also stayed in these watch stations and fortresses.⁸³ While the military guarded the area, the civilians tilled the land outside to make the area self-supporting.⁸⁴ If all conditions worked out favorably for further development, the government would transfer more people to the area to construct more watch stations and fortresses and open more arable land. As expansion progressed, the control and administration of such areas became more complicated and a chief commandant was appointed as supervisor. As has been indicated in the development of Tun-huang, Lung-le, and Chü-yen, and in the development of I-hsun of Shan-shan in the Western Regions, as described in the *Han-shu* and examined in chapter 5, the appointment of a chief commandant to an emerging area marked the beginning of its advanced stage of colonization.⁸⁵

The area under the command of a chief commandant usually consisted of many fortress units and their related organizations, each under a single commandant. In general, the various units in such area formed a hierarchy as follows.

tu-wei → *hou-kuan* → *hou* → *t'ing*, *sui*

Each of these units was headed by a military officer, the whole region by a *tu-wei* (chief commandant), the *hou-kuan* by a *hou-kuan* or *hou* (commandant), the *hou* by a *hou-cheng* (subcommandant), and the *t'ing* or *sui* by a *t'ing-chang* or *sui-chang* (commander).⁸⁶ Since each of these units had jurisdiction over a specified area, a *tu-wei* unit over the whole territory, and a *t'ing* or *sui* unit over the smallest area, they could be designated as follows.⁸⁷

chief commandant area
 ↓
 commandant area
 ↓
 subcommandant area
 ↓
 commander area

Han dynasty documents on wood and bamboo discovered in the old Ho-hsi region have revealed some details of chief commandant area organization. For example, in the Yü-men Chief Commandant Area (Yü-men *tu-wei*), there were two commandant areas (Yü-men and Ta-Chien), four subcommandant areas, and fifteen commandant areas.⁸⁸

- I. Yü-men *hou-kuan*
 1. Pei-pu *hou*
 2. Yü-men *hou*
 - a. Kuan *sui*
 - b. Tang-ku *sui*
 - c. Kuang-hsin *sui*
 - d. Hsien-ming *sui*
 3. Hu-meng *hou*
 - a. Hu-meng *sui*
 - b. I-ch'iu *sui*
 - c. Yung-kan *sui*
 - d. Ta-fu *sui*
- II. Ta-chien-tu *hou-kuan*
 1. Hsi-pu *hou*
 - a. Fu-ch'ang *sui*
 - b. Kuang-wu *sui*
 - c. Pu-ch'ang *sui*
 - d. Ling-hu *sui*
 - e. Ya-hu *sui*
 - f. Kuang-ch'ang *sui*
 - g. Ta-chien-tu *sui*

The organization of the Chü-yen Chief Commandant Area was even more complex. At its peak of development, the Chü-yen region had at least 7 *hou-kuan*, over 40 *hou* (also called *pu*), and about 260 *t'ing sui*. The area covered by these units of garrison and administration extended over 250 kilometers from south to north and 12 to 50 kilometers from east to west.

The commander areas are too numerous to be listed here. In general, there were five to six commander areas under a subcommandant area. In a chief commandant area, the chief commandant resided in a city, the commandants in *chang* or fortresses, and the subcommandants and commanders in watch stations.⁸⁹ Civilian migrants engaging in land cultivation and other pursuits also stayed in special sections within the headquarters of various levels. These sections were known as *li*, or "wards," when they were located within a city, and as *t'ing-pu* or *pi* (alternately *wu* or *wu-pi*) when they were located outside a city or within fortresses and watch stations.⁹⁰ While the region was directed either by the office of a governor (*t'ai-shou*) or by the central government, the chief commandant had sole jurisdiction over both military and civil affairs in his region, this being the unique characteristic of chief commandant areas.⁹¹ Such an area could expand rapidly given favorable external and internal conditions. Its continued growth naturally extended and complicated the dimensions of local civil

government. This led to the establishment of a *hsien* type of administration over the region in which the magistrate assumed command of civil affairs and the duties of chief commandant became more strictly military, but civil matters relating to the military establishment still remained under the chief commandant's authority.⁹²

The establishment of a *hsien* government marked, in general, the end of military rule in a region and the completion of colonization. If the region was on the border of an existing *chün* and had been developed under the supervision of a *chün* government, the new *hsien* would then be incorporated into the regular *hsien* system of that *chün*; it might be split up to form a new *chün* with adjacent *hsien* and special areas. Tun-huang is an example of the latter case. Tun-huang *hsien* was established in about 98 B.C., and at approximately the same time Tun-huang *chün* was formed over Tun-huang *hsien*, along with its adjacent districts and newly developed areas to the west (such as Lung-le *hsien*), which up to this point had belonged to Chiu-ch'üan *chün*.⁹³ On the other hand, if a region had originally been developed under the central government's direction, the new *hsien* was incorporated into an adjacent *chün*.⁹⁴ Chü-yen's annexation by Chang-yeh is an example: in 72 B.C., Chang-yeh was too large to operate as a single *chün*, so its eastern and northeastern parts were split, forming a new *chün* called Wu-wei. The western part still carried its old name, Chang-yeh, but it was enlarged to include the Chü-yen region to its north, over which a *hsien* government was probably established at the same time.⁹⁵ These jurisdictional changes in developing areas represent the final stage in achieving regular Han governance. In all the cases discussed here, the *tu-wei* remained functional, although it eventually became one of the regular *chün tu-wei* (*chün-wei*) and its name was sometimes changed.

The foregoing discussions clearly demonstrate the pattern of colonization that prevailed in certain parts of Ho-hsi. Let us now examine whether the opening and colonization of the entire Ho-hsi region followed this path. The *Biography of Li Kuang-li* in the *Han-shu* tells us that at the time of the construction of Chü-yen city during the Ta-yuan expedition (104–102 B.C.), the city of Hsiu-ch'u was built to prevent the Hsiung-nu from marching southward.⁹⁶ The context clearly indicates that Hsiu-ch'u city was on the border of the Han settlements in Ho-hsi. Since the capital of Wu-wei *hsien* (to the north of modern Min-ch'in *hsien* in central Kansu) was in Han times still north of Hsiu-ch'u city, which was between modern Wu-wei city and Chen-fan city (slightly to the south of Wu-wei),⁹⁷ the area of Wu-wei *hsien* was evidently not well colonized until the last years of Wu-ti's T'ai-ch'u period (104–101 B.C.) or later. Therefore, the systematic development of the region of Ho-hsi north of Chang-yeh *hsien* did not take place until the period during and after the Ta-yuan expedition. Li Tao-yuan's (A.D. 467–527) suggestion in his *Shui-ching chu* (Commen-

tary on the Water Classic) that Wu-wei *hsien* was established in 101 B.C.⁹⁸ is probably not far from fact. Although details of the colonization of this region are not known, the fact that, like Chü-yen, Hsiu-ch'u city was later under the command of a *tu-wei* suggests that parts of this region also went through the chief commandant area stage.⁹⁹ The existence of *t'ing* and *chang* in these areas strongly supports this point.¹⁰⁰

As for the development of the other regions of Ho-hsi, it is quite clear that from 108 B.C. to 101 B.C. the line of systematically maintained Han watch stations gradually extended westward from Chiu-ch'üan city, first to the old Yü-men Pass (at modern Chia-ku Pass in western Kansu) and then to the Salt Lake (Lop-nor) area.¹⁰¹ The northern expansion from Chang-yeh followed the same path. Based in the Mao-mu (Ting-hsin) area in modern central Kansu, the Han line of watch stations extended gradually northward along the Edsen-gol.¹⁰² By 103 B.C., the area of modern Khara-Khoto became the headquarters of a cluster of Han watch stations, and by 90 B.C. the Han forces had developed quite fully the northernmost part of the Chü-yen region, T'ien-pei in the modern Wayen-torei area.¹⁰³ Thus, the northern and western parts of Ho-hsi had been opened and were being colonized no later than 90 B.C.

Of the entire Ho-hsi region, the area whose stages of development are least clear is that part covered by the Chang-yeh and Chiu-ch'üan *chün* in about 111 B.C., the oldest Han establishment in Ho-hsi. We know only that the colonization of this area started with the building of watch stations. But, even though no information is available regarding its further development up to the founding of those two *chün*, on the basis of the facts and the pattern of development shown in parts of Ho-hsi, it seems reasonable to assume that this area, or its oldest key sections, went through the same chief commandant area stages before *hsien* governments were instituted. Consequently, one may conclude that the opening and colonization of the Ho-hsi region on the whole followed the pattern under consideration. But it must be noted that the Han establishments in Ho-hsi were effected gradually and consolidated over the course of about thirty years, from the earliest settlements in 119 B.C. to the development of T'ien-pei in the far north of the Chü-yen region in 90 B.C. or earlier. During this period, Han colonization in Ho-hsi was accomplished through systematic settlement along the western and northern fronts. Obviously, the Han pattern of colonization was practical and typical only for the development of settlements in regions on these fronts. For regions in the interior, such measures were unnecessary. As such fronts moved farther outward, the boundary lines of the old establishments would expand and the old administrative system would also have to undergo changes. New *hsien* governments were established, and at times new *chün* governments were also instituted by splitting the old. As was already

mentioned, the founding of the Chang-yeh and Chiu-ch'üan *chiün* in about 111 B.C. was a result of such a process, as was that of Tun-huang and Wu-wei in about 98 and 72 B.C., respectively, Tun-huang was the result of first-stage development in Ho-hsi and Wu-wei the result of further expansion. While each was a landmark in the course of Ho-hsi colonization, the formation of Wu-wei *chiün* marked the completion of the formal process of colonization.

THE HO-HSI EXPANSION AND THE HAN EMPIRE

The Ho-hsi campaign was part of the long and expensive Hsiung-nu war during the reign of Han Wu-ti. But its consequences were far-reaching. First, it acquired a territory of over 265,000 square miles, which proved to be rich in a variety of agricultural and industrial resources such as dairy, lumber, textiles, mining, and farm products. Second, it extended Han influence far to the west of the Yellow River, through the thoroughfare of the Ho-hsi Corridor, and into the heart of Central Asia. Han Wu-ti's armies conquered, from 108 to 101 B.C., Lou-lan (Lop-nor), Lun-t'ou (the Bugur region), Ta-yuan (with its capital at Ferghana), and finally K'ang-chü (Sogdiana, with its capital at Samarkand). As a result, the entire population of the Western Regions was shocked and awed, and the kings of most states sent envoys to present tribute to China and sent their sons or brothers to the Han Court as hostages.¹⁰⁴ China emerged for the first time as an imperialist power on the Asian continent. Third, after the era of Han Wu-ti, Ho-hsi, China's gateway to the West, remained a pivot in Chinese-Central Asian and Chinese-Western relations. As such, Ho-hsi played an enormously important role in later Chinese political, economic, social, intellectual, religious, and artistic history. To illustrate this point, one needs only to mention, among others, the Silk Road, the role of Ho-hsi in medieval—particularly T'ang—politics and foreign relations, the coming of Buddhism from Central Asia, the Ho-hsi learning (Ho-hsi *hsueh*) in the Six Dynasties period (A.D. 221–589), and the great treasure of arts and manuscripts at Tun-huang and Mai-chi-shan in Kansu.¹⁰⁵ The acquisition of Ho-hsi, then, was indeed the addition of a new frontier to the Han empire that was instrumental in the formation and changes of character and outlook of some areas of Chinese culture and history.

The actual colonization of Ho-hsi also had a lasting impact. From an economic standpoint, it represented the region's transformation from an uncultivated area of nomadic pastures into an agricultural domain. Viewed from the perspective of societal stages in world history, the colonization of Ho-hsi represented the victory of agricultural over nomadic society, a continuing process in

North and East Asia in which the domain of the nomads gradually shrunk due to the expansion of agricultural civilizations.¹⁰⁶ This transformation necessarily produced institutional and other fundamental changes in society.

In the case of Ho-hsi, the transformation was carried out by the Han government through an ingenious design—the *t'un-t'ien* system. The region was populated by emigrants from the “old world” of the Han empire. These colonists, from almost every section of the empire, settled in their new world according to a systematic plan and were rigidly organized in every way. In general, their frontier society was a transplantation of the society of the old world. They did not develop a new spirit or a new philosophy of life. In this sense, the new world of Ho-hsi was merely an extension of the traditional world of the old east.¹⁰⁷

The noninnovative nature of the Han frontier society, however, did not make the colonization apparatus less effective. On the contrary, the Han westward expansion proceeded rather successfully through the operation of this frontier system. Not only was Ho-hsi completely colonized in a span of about fifty years, but, as will be shown later, the Han expansion front also went far beyond the western boundary of Ho-hsi into a sizable part of Central Asia, including modern Sinkiang and adjacent areas.¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, the same Han frontier system was employed by later dynasties—such as the T'ang (A.D. 618–907), the Yuan (A.D. 1279–1368), the Ming (A.D. 1368–1644), and the Ch'ing (A.D. 1644–1911)—to develop their newly acquired and border regions.¹⁰⁹ The system was even applied in the interior regions by regional groups or regimes during times of disunion in the Chinese empire.¹¹⁰ Thus, we may conclude that the Han frontier system was a great heritage in the historical and political context of Imperial China.

The immediate effects of the Ho-hsi colonization on the Han empire were twofold. The new world absorbed a large segment of the dislocated, economically depressed, and undesirable population of the old east. The emigration thereby reduced the economic burden of the eastern segments of the empire and lessened the potential for unrest and political instability in times of natural disasters or poor harvests.¹¹¹ Since the settling of these colonists was financed by the government, the economic costs were extremely high; to these should also be added the costly expenses of the various military expeditions that made possible the colonization of the Ho-hsi region. Although exact figures cannot be obtained from available Han sources, it is reasonable to assume on the basis of various relevant references that the total expenses for these campaigns and emigrations amounted to about 100 billion in cash in the 110s B.C.¹¹² This had tremendous economic and other implications. As was discussed earlier, the annual revenue of the Han government prior to Wu-ti's military campaigns and colonial programs is estimated to have been about 12 billion plus in cash.¹¹³ It

becomes quite clear that the total expenses for the acquisition and colonization of Ho-hsi exerted a severe strain on the Han economy. Both Ssu-ma Ch'ien (145–86 B.C.) and Pan Ku (A.D. 32–92) confirmed this point. These two great historians of Han China contended that the skyrocketing expenditures emptied the government treasuries and exhausted national economic resources.¹¹⁴ This financial crisis forced the Han government to institute numerous drastic measures to acquire more revenue: additional and new taxes, reform of the currency, reorganization of government monopolies on salt and iron, a new monopoly on liquor, price and market controls (*chün-shu* and *p'ing-chun*), sale of offices in addition to aristocratic ranks, and forced “voluntary contributions,” to mention only a few.¹¹⁵ New legal measures—often unusually harsh—were also established to enforce these financial schemes.¹¹⁶ All these, needless to say, had a lasting impact on the economic conditions and political course of the Former Han empire. As Hsia-hou Sheng (first century B.C.) pointed out in the first year of Hsuan-ti's reign (74–49 B.C.), since Wu-ti the Former Han dynasty had been hard put to recover from the economic and political deterioration resulting from his military campaigns and colonizations.¹¹⁷ Moreover, almost all of these measures continued through later periods and became permanent features in the economic and governmental institutions of Imperial China.¹¹⁸



5

THE HAN MARCH TO INNER ASIA

*The Colonization of the Western Regions
in Former Han Times*

HAN WU-TI DIED in the spring of 87 B.C. By the end of his long reign of fifty-four years, his troops had marched in twenty-eight expeditions, from 129 to 90 B.C., to the edges of the Gobi Desert in the north, to inner Central Asia in the west, to Hainan Island in the south, to Vietnam, Yunnan, and Sikang in the southwest, and to Korea in the northeast. They had acquired 1.5–1.7 million square miles of new land for him, large enough to establish twenty-five new *chün*. This was the largest expansion in Chinese history, and it established China as the most powerful state in Asia for the next two thousand years. With a solidly controlled territory of at least 3.5 million square miles, a population of 50 million, and a standing army of six to seven hundred thousand men with the most advanced weaponry of the time (crossbows), Han Wu-ti's new empire was the greatest power on earth (see map 2).

THE WESTERN REGIONS IN HAN WU-TI'S TIME

Han Wu-ti's empire continued to grow after his reign. The largest area of development was Hsi-yü (the Western Regions) in modern Sinkiang, which

extended from the Pamirs (Ts'ung-ling) in the southwest to eastern Uzbekistan in the west and to Lake Balkhash (Wu-sun territory) in the northwest, including modern Tajikistan (Tadzhik), Kyrgyzstan (Kirgizia), and parts of Pakistan, Kashmir, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. Covering a territory of over 800,000 square miles, the land was the home of thirty-eight countries, with Ta-yuan and Wu-sun the westernmost. Although it was called Hsi-yü or Little Hsi-yü (Hsiao Hsi-yü), it was really only the eastern part of the large region of Hsi-yü, which generally referred to the land west of Ho-hsi in Kansu, extending from modern Sinkiang to the Roman Empire (called Ta-Ch'in in Han times) in the west and India in the south. As the Han knew it, there were fifty-five countries in this larger Hsi-yü, of which forty-three were sedentary or semisedentary (*ch'eng-kuo* or *chü-kuo*) and twelve were nomadic (*hsing-kuo*). The former generally cultivated the land and lived in cities; and the latter followed "water and grass" ("oases," *chu shui-ts'ao*) and were not engaged in farming. The middle ones practiced both. It was noticed that some of the inhabitants spoke Han Chinese, the ones close to the Han in both geographical and political terms; some spoke a language that was written horizontally (*heng-hsing*) and on animal skins or other types of leather, the ones living in the far west from modern Afghanistan (Ta Yueh-chih, Bactria) to the Mediterranean Sea (Hsi-hai, known as the West Sea, in Han times); and some spoke a similar language but resided in the southwestern portion of the Han empire (Pakistan, Kashmir, and India). The second category obviously referred to the Indo-European language family, which included Tocharian and Indo-Iranian.

In Han Wu-ti's time and later, the Han advance in Hsi-yü centered on the smaller Hsi-yü, with K'ang-chü only occasionally being involved along with temporary control of Chi-pin (modern Pakistan and Kashmir). This smaller Hsi-yü (sometimes referred to as the Little Western Regions), was bounded by the Ts'ung-ling mountain ranges (Pamirs) in the west; the Pei ("north," also T'ien or "Heavenly") mountain ranges in the north; the Kurak Tagh mountains, the extended Gobi Desert, and salt-encrusted sand hills such as the Pai-lung tui (White Dragon Mounds) in the east; and the Nan ("south," also known as K'un-lun) mountain ranges in the south. The main river is the Tarim (called Ho, meaning "river," in Han times), which runs from west to east for over 1,350 miles to Lop-nor (Yen-tse or P'u-ch'ang hai, with an area of 1,342 square miles in Han times). It has several tributaries, some of which, such as the Yü-t'ien River, flow north-south. The K'ai-tu (Konche) River comes from the north-central area and runs south to the Tarim River through Lake Bostang (Ch'in hai in Han times), 326 kilometers (136 miles) west of Lop-nor. In the northwest, the major river is the Ili, which was in the territory of Wu-sun. The largest lake is the Issyk Kul (or T'ien-ch'ih, "Heavenly Lake"). Between the southern and northern mountain ranges is the Tarim Basin, which covers an area of over 500,000 square miles and

contains the immense Taklamakan Desert (or Ta-mo, the "Great Desert," in Han times) of 123,550 square miles. This huge land of Hsi-yü is mainly desert and mountain regions, and only in river valleys and oases, located mainly on the edges of the immense Great Desert, were dotted with settlements. In Han Wu-ti's time, there were only two routes through Hsi-yü, both along the edges of the Great Desert. On the northern side, the route extended from the Yü-men (Jade Gate), 81 kilometers northwest of Tun-huang in Kansu, to Lou-lan in the Lop-nor area, then to the northern edge of the Great Desert and along the River (Tarim) all the way west to the foot of the Ts'ung-ling mountain ranges. This was called the Northern Route (Pei-tao). Crossing over the high mountains, this route led to the countries of Ta-yuan (Ferghana/Farghana in eastern Uzbekistan) and K'ang-chü (Sogdiana, with its capital at Samarkand, east in Uzbekistan and extending to the northwest of Tajikistan and the western part of Kazakhstan). On the southern edge of the Great Desert, the route led first from Yang Pass, 61 kilometers southwest of Tun-huang in Kansu, to the southern part of Lou-lan, then southwest to the southern edge of the Great Desert, then along the foot of the Southern Ranges (Nan-shan) all the way to the foot of Ts'ung-ling. This was called the Southern Route (Nan-tao). Across over the high mountain ranges, this route led to Ta Yueh-chih (Bactria in modern Afghanistan) and An-hsi (Parthia in modern Iran) (see map 3).¹

The inhabitants of the thirty-eight countries in the Little Hsi-yü before the Han conquest were a mixture of many races, including Persians, Aryans, Bactrians, Sakās, Turks, and Hsiung-nu. These countries were mostly small city-states, and a majority were sedentary, with only about a third nomadic. These states contained a population of over a million and a total military force of over 320,000 men. But they were not united and often fought one another. The Hsiung-nu took control of this region before the coming of the Han forces. A *T'ung-p'u tu-wei* (Chief Commandant of Slaves and Servants) was appointed to administer Hsi-yü by King Jih-chu of the Hsiung-nu, who was in charge of the western domain.²

THE HAN MARCH TO INNER ASIA UNDER WU-TI

As part of the solution of the Hsiung-nu problem, Han Wu-ti aimed to gain control of Hsi-yü to reduce the Hsiung-nu threat from the west. He tried a diplomatic strategy before launching his Hsiung-nu campaigns. This was the previously discussed Chang Ch'ien mission. After the failure of his diplomatic approach, he defeated the Hsiung-nu and acquired the Ho-hsi region. Wu-ti then began his military conquest of Hsi-yü. From 108 to 90 B.C., he sent six major military expeditions there.³


1. 108–107 B.C.: The Han force of seven hundred cavalrymen under General Chao P'o-nu (a surrendered Hsiung-nu) marched to the capital of Lou-lan (northwest of Lop-nor) and captured its king.⁴ Later a larger Han force under General Wang Hui went to the northwest and captured the king of Ku-shih (Ku-shih, in the modern Turfan, Ch'i-t'ai, and Fu-k'ang area in northwestern Sinkiang, with its center at Chiao-ho city, Yarkhoto). The name of the country was changed to Chü-shih.⁵
2. 104–103 B.C.: Under General Li Kuang-li, about forty thousand Han soldiers marched from Tun-huang to attack Ta-yuan. After having passed through modern Sinkiang and forced the surrender of several small states, the Han army reached eastern Ta-yuan and encountered strong resistance at Yü-ch'eng (Uzgend, Kyrgyzstan). With no hope of reaching the Ta-yuan capital, it returned to Tun-huang.
3. 102 B.C.: General Li Kuang-li commanded a massive Han force of over eighty thousand men with the support of one hundred thousand oxen, over thirty thousand horses, and tens of thousands of donkeys, mules, and camels that marched from Tun-huang to Hsi-yü. His forces conquered all the small states. But when they reached the state of Lun-t'ou (also known as Lun-t'ai, located southwest of modern Lun-t'ai [Bugur] in central Sinkiang) they met strong resistance. After several days of fierce fighting, the Han force massacred the populace of Lun-t'ou.⁶
4. 102–101 B.C.: After having conquered all the states in modern western Sinkiang, Li Kuang-li's forces crossed over the Pamirs and reached Kuei-shan, the capital of Ta-yuan (in Ferghana in east Uzbekistan). They attacked the capital and received Ta-yuan's surrender and the head of its king. They then marched farther west to conquer K'ang-chü.
5. 99 B.C.: The marquis of K'ai-ling (Ch'eng Wen, the former King Chieh-ho of the Hsiung-nu, who had surrendered to the Han) commanded the soldiers of Lou-lan to attack Chü-shih. As the Wise King of the Right of the Hsiung-nu led more than thirty thousand men to assist Chü-shih, Marquis K'ai-ling withdrew.
6. 94 B.C.: In the summer, Hsu Hsiang-ju, an imperial inspector, called out the troops of the Hsi-yü states under Han command to campaign against So-chü (the Sha-ch'e region in western Sinkiang, Yarkand), beheaded its king, Fu-lo, and captured fifteen hundred of its people.
7. 90 B.C.: Over thirty thousand soldiers from six states in the Western Regions—Yen-ch'i, Wei-li, Wei-hsu, Shan-kuo, Lou-lan, and Chü-mo—under the command of their kings and about five thousand Han

soldiers under the marquis of K'ai-ling conquered Chü-shih again and captured its king.

8. Late in Wu-ti's reign a chief commandant named Wen Chung was sent as an envoy to Chi-pin (a capital city east of modern Islamabad, Pakistan), where he killed its king and set a new king on the throne, Yin-mo-fu, who accepted Han credentials (such as the national seal and other regalia) as a Han subordinate state. Han control of Chi-pin lasted from the late second century B.C. to 25 B.C. but ended in the last years of the Former Han dynasty.⁷

In the first four campaigns, the Han armies marched through the Western Regions from the Han western border in Tun-huang to the Pamirs and K'ang-chü, altogether a distance of 8,428 *li* (Han) or 3,152 kilometers (2,180 miles). They conquered five key states—K'ang-chü, Ta-yuan, Lun-t'ai, Chü-shih (Kushih), and Lou-lan—and had received the surrender and allegiance of such other key or smaller states as Wu-sun, Wei-li (in the modern Wei-li region, southwest of Lake Bostang in central Sinkiang), Wei-hsu (in modern Ch'ü-hui, north of Lake Bostang in central Sinkiang), Chü-mo (in the modern Chü-mo region in southern Sinkiang), Shan-kuo (northwest of Lop-nor and southeast of Lake Bostang in eastern Sinkiang), and Yen-ch'i (west of modern Yen-ch'i, Karashar, in central Sinkiang).⁸ In the sixth campaign, in 94 B.C., the Han conquered So-chü in far southwestern modern Sinkiang.⁹ Under Wu-ti, the Han clearly gained firm control of the eastern part of Hsi-yü in modern central and eastern Sinkiang, and its military might could deliver devastating blows to countries in southwestern Sinkiang and across the Pamirs to countries as far west as Ta-yuan and K'ang-chü in modern Uzbekistan. But the Han also suffered enormous human and material losses. In the 104 B.C. campaign to Ta-yuan, only 10 to 20 percent of the forty thousand soldiers under General Li Kuang-li managed to return alive. In the final Ta-yuan campaign in 102–101 B.C., only ten thousand out of eighty thousand soldiers returned alive and only one thousand out of thirty thousand horses survived. Thus, in the two campaigns alone, over one hundred thousand men died and more than thirty thousand horses were lost. The total cost was over 100 million in cash.¹⁰ Therefore, although by 101 B.C. the Han military had forced many countries in Hsi-yü to submit by sending their princes as hostages to the Han capital, the Han could launch no more costly military campaigns under Wu-ti. It was primarily for this reason that the conquests of Chü-shih in 99 and 90 B.C. and of So-chü in 94 B.C. were carried out mainly by the forces of Hsi-yü countries that had already submitted to the Han. The Han also began to use the forces of Hsi-yü countries to rule Hsi-yü.

The countries in the Western Regions under Han control in Wu-ti's time



Map 3. The Han Conquest and Colonization of Inner Asia, 121-7 B.C.

included Lou-lan, Shan-kuo, Chü-shih, Wei-hsu, Wei-li, Yen-chi, and Chü-mo, and the lands of three states that the Han forces had already defeated and dissolved were Ch'ü-li (in K'u-erh le, Kurla area), Chieh-chih (in Ch'e-erh ch'u, Charchi area), and Lun-t'ou.¹¹ They extended from the eastern Han border to the central part of modern Sinkiang. Distances to Tun-huang are listed in table 8.¹²

The ten countries and regions in the table constitute an enormous territory extending over 1,200 kilometers (745 miles) from east to west and 417 kilometers (259 miles) from north to south, amounting to an area of 500,400 square kilometers or 192,955 square miles. After the costly military conquest, the Han Court realized that a full military occupation of Hsi-yü was out of the question. A different approach must be used for the control and colonization of this huge land. The success of the "frontier strategy" in developing Ho-hsi and the Chü-yen region presented itself as the best policy to adopt. Wu-ti's advisers and strategists put the plan of frontier development into practice in Hsi-yü. First, the Han established a line of defense and communication from its westernmost gate at the Yü-men (Jade Gate) Pass in Tun-huang to the easternmost entrance into Hsi-yü in Yen-tse (Lop-nor). Watch stations and other defense measures were established along this line of 300 kilometers. A long wall was also built along the eastern segment of this road.¹³ Next several hundred (usually over three hundred) farming soldiers (*t'ien-tsu*) were sent under the command of an inspector-colonel (*shih-che chiao-wei*) to Lun-t'ou, the heart of Hsi-yü and the westernmost region under Han control.¹⁴ By doing so, the Han placed guards on both the western and eastern ends of a line some 300 kilometers (186 miles) long in the key route through Hsi-yü, with eight of the ten countries and regions under the Han authority—Lou-lan, Lou-t'ou, Yen-ch'i, Wei-li, Ch'ü-li, Wei-hsu, Chieh-chih, Shan-kuo—clustered on it. The Han now extended its

TABLE 8. Han Wu-ti's Central Asia ca. 90 B.C.

Country	Population (estimated)	Soldiers (estimated)	Distance to Tun-huang (in kilometers, round figures)
Lou-lan	7,000	1,500	328
Chü-shih	3,000	1,000	1,622
Shan-kuo	2,500	500	1,300
Wei-hsu	2,500	1,000	1,351
Wei-li	5,000	1,000	1,126
Chieh-chih	—	—	941
Ch'ü-li	—	—	726
Yen-ch'i	16,000	3,000	1,146
Lun-t'ou	—	—	1,197
Chü-mo	800	150	1,155

westernmost borderline to Yen-tse by setting up barriers along the road from Tun-huang to the Lop-nor area, where both the Southern and Northern Routes began, and turned the land from Yen-tse to Lun-t'ou into a new frontier zone for colonization. With the states in this region in submission and having sent delegations headed by princes and royal family members (really hostages) to the Han capital, the Han Court began to employ the military forces of these countries as its own to maintain order in the region. The 99 and 90 B.C. campaigns against Chü-shih were successful applications of this policy. At the same time, the farming soldiers in Lun-t'ou were both a military and economic force on the westernmost border of this region. As a military force, they served to defend the entrance point to this region from the west. With a special title *shih-che* (literally "imperial envoy"), the colonel represented the emperor and commanded the forces of the autochthonous states if and when they were needed. Economically, the farming soldiers cultivated the land in the fertile Lun-t'ou area. They not only became self-supporting but eventually they were expected to produce enough grain to support Han envoys on their missions to countries west of this region. Lun-t'ou now was the command center of the Han empire in colonizing Hsi-yü. The first step in the Han colonization of the Western Regions was taken after the colonization of Ho-hsi and the Chü-yen region had been accomplished.

The second step of the Han scheme to colonize Hsi-yü was proposed to Wu-ti in 90 B.C. by Sang Hung-yang (Sang Hung-hsiang, 153–80 B.C.), the commandant of grain (finance minister); Prime Minister T'ien Ch'ien-ch'iu; and the Imperial Secretary Shang Ch'iu-ch'eng. The plan included the following measures.¹⁵

1. The Han would develop the fertile land of 500,000 *mu* (57,000 acres) in Chieh-chih and Ch'ü-li east of Lun-t'ou.
2. Farming soldiers under the command of three colonels would be assigned to the area. They would cultivate the land, construct irrigation canals and ditches, and grow the five field crops, as in China.
3. Cavalrymen from Chang-yeh and Chiu-ch'üan *chün* would be dispatched under acting marshals to patrol the region. They would be under the command of the three colonels and would protect the farming soldiers.
4. A rapid communications route employing mounted couriers using fast-running horses would be established to connect the region to the Han command centers in the east. Any emergency would be immediately reported.¹⁶
5. After a year of farming and accumulation of grain in this region, able and healthy men with their families would be recruited from the

interior to emigrate to the agricultural colonies. They would farm the land as their occupation and continue to open more new fields.

6. After the settlements were established, a line of watch stations connected by a wall would be constructed from the region west to Lun-t'ou and beyond. It would demonstrate to the states of the west the deep Han penetration into and firm control of Hsi-yü. It would also give support to Wu-sun on the far northwestern edge of Hsi-yü, which had already submitted to the Han.

This was the long-range plan for the colonization of Hsi-yü. It was the model that the Han had used to develop Ho-hsi and Chü-yen. It began with military-agricultural colonies, where farming soldiers worked in fields under the protection of the regular military forces; then brought in civilians to establish Han settlements; and finally expanded the frontier with the construction of watch stations and walls. The targeting of Chieh-chih and Ch'ü-li for agricultural colonization also followed the pattern of settlements in the Ho-hsi and Chü-yen model. Chieh-chih was 256 kilometers from Lun-t'ou and Ch'ü-li was 270, far from the frontier in Hsi-yü. From Chieh-chih to Ch'ü-li was 205 kilometers. The Chieh-chih-Ch'ü-li region was thus in the middle of the Han line of control in Hsi-yü from the easternmost command center at Yen-tse to the westernmost at Lun-t'ou.

The proposal was so well considered that it noted that the time of harvest was the same as in the interior of China. It also suggested that if grain production was not sufficient enough to support the Han colonists in the beginning, the Han soldiers could use agricultural tools, gold, and silk to trade for grain with adjacent autochthonous states. The Han empire builders, of whom Sang Hung-yang was the leading voice, in the court were ready to take the second step to colonize Hsi-yü and make it part of the Han empire. But Wu-ti followed the advice of the ministers who objected to further expansion. He rejected the proposal and decided to stop sending troops to distant regions in Hsi-yü. And he had a very good reason to do so. His court had been overwhelmingly occupied by military expeditions from 129 to 90 B.C. In forty years, his court had sent out twenty-eight major expeditions. The enormous human sacrifice and economic losses had brought his empire and himself to the brink of breakdown. It was said that the population had been reduced to half and all national resources exhausted.¹⁷ In the northwestern campaigns against the Hsiung-nu, the Ch'iang, and Hsi-yü alone, the total force sent numbered over 12.6 million men—1.2 million cavalymen, 900,000 foot soldiers, and 10.5 million men of supporting duties, a quarter of the Han population in Wu-ti's time. The entire population of able-bodied men were eligible for and could serve in the military. In many of these campaigns, only about 10 to 20 percent of the soldiers




Pl. 1. Part of the Ch'in Great Wall of the third century B.C. in the Wei-yuan-Lin-t'ao area in eastern Kansu (Gansu), forerunner of the later Han Great Wall in the Ho-hsi region. The bottom photograph illustrates its huge layers. The ruins of certain sections in this region still measure 9 meters high and 18 meters wide. In the photograph, each layer is at least 2×2 meters.




Pl. 2. Ruins of the "River Granary City" (Ho-ts'ang *ch'eng*), about 70 kilometers northwest of modern Tun-huang in western Kansu. Located on the southern side of the So-lo River, this was the largest Han granary in Ho-hsi, covering an area of 1,980 square meters (132 meters east-west, 15 meters south-north) with walls over 8.5 meters high. The Han Great Wall was on the north, extending east-west.



Pl. 3. Ruins of the Han "River Granary City," showing one of the four large watchtowers and part of the "outer wall" on the right side.



Pl. 4. Remains of the headquarters of the chief commandant of the Yü-men (Jade Gate) Pass (Yü-men *kuan tu-wei*), 81 kilometers northwest of Tun-huang, a square structure covering an area of 676 square meters with walls 4.6 meters thick and 9 meters high. It was originally protected by a series of watch stations, moats, and long walls, 91 meters of which remain. The Yü-men Pass was to the west of this fortress in modern Ma-chüan *wan*, and the Great Wall protected the city on the north. The pass was the starting point of the 6,000-mile Silk Road connecting the Han empire to the Roman Empire.




Pl. 5. A Han beacon and watchtower atop a mountain near the Tang River southwest of Tun-huang. This was the only stone tower in Ho-hsi and part of the Han Great Wall, which extended over 50 kilometers southwest of Tun-huang.




Pl. 6. A Han beacon and watchtower near the Han Great Wall just west of the headquarters of the chief commandant of the Yü-men Pass. The wall extends more than 400 miles to the north-east. More than eighty-five Han watchtowers still stand in the Tun-huang area.




Pl. 7. The remains of a Han garrison fortress with watchtower in western Sinkiang (Xinjiang.)




Pl. 8. The tallest and earliest Han beacon and watchtower that has survived to modern times. It is located 10 kilometers northwest of Kucha (Ch'iu-tzu in Han times) in northwestern Sinkiang. The remains still measure 15 meters high with a base of 38 meters. A wooden strip was found as recently as 1985.




Pl. 9. A Ch'in pottery horseman with his fully pommelized horse from the tomb of the First Emperor, Shih Huang-ti (r. 221–210 B.C.), in Sian (Xi'an) in Shensi (Shaanxi). The Ch'in cavalry was the forerunner of the Han cavalry.



Pl. 10. Pottery figures of warriors with coats of arms and their commander on horseback from an early Han tomb (pre-141 B.C.) in Shensi near Sian (Xi'an).



Pl. 11. Pottery figures of foot soldiers (infantry) and horsemen (cavalry) in armor from an early Han tomb (pre-141 B.C.) in Shensi (near Sian), showing the procession formation: a column of soldiers on foot and cavalrymen on horses. The contingent of horsemen is huge, indicating the increasing importance of cavalry in the Han army.



Pl. 12. A register of station carts (*chuan-chü*), dated 23 B.C., one of the Han documents discovered in Hsuan-ch'üan (modern T'ien-shui-ching [Sweet Water Well]), 64 kilometers east of Tun-huang, Kansu. The Hsuan-ch'üan Station dates to 111 B.C. at the latest and was a major post on the highway between the Han empire and Hsi-yü (Central Asia).

managed to come back alive. For the Ta-yuan expedition, the economic cost was 100 million in cash. If other campaigns were only half the cost of this one, the total cost of Han Wu-ti's northwestern campaigns would have amounted to more than 1.15 billion in cash. The full colonization and development of the Ho-hsi region cost 100 billion in cash in a year at one time. That is why both the nation and the emperor could no longer sustain the devastating human and economic losses of military and territorial expansion. In response to the new proposal for colonization of Hsi-yü, Wu-ti placed a moratorium on all further military expeditions and expansion plans. Forty years of military action and territorial expansion came to an end. But the Han dynasty and Chinese empire were forever changed under Wu-ti's reign. And nowhere was this change so manifest as in the military conquest of Hsi-yü and the march of the Han soldiers all the way to the heart of Central Asia in K'ang-chü, 2,180 miles from the Han western border in Tun-huang. China began to dominate the world of Asia. The establishment of a command center in Lun-t'ou, over 740 miles from Tun-huang, signified not only China's determination to control Central Asia but also the beginning of its scheme to transform the inner Asia of Hsi-yü into a new Chinese frontier region ready for full colonization.

Although Wu-ti did not take the second step of full colonization of Hsi-yü in 90 B.C., his ministers, led by Sang Hung-yang, drafted a systematic plan for such action. And his successor, Chao-ti (r. 87-74 B.C.), put that plan into action in his ninth year on the throne. In 78 B.C., the emperor appointed Crown Prince Lai-tan of Wu-mi (in the Yü-t'ien region), who was a hostage in the Han capital, a colonel, with Han official credentials (seal and ribbon on a belt), to command a force that would farm the land at Lun-t'ou and in the Ch'ü-li area. Lai-tan was later killed by the king of Ch'iu-tzu (in the modern Kucha region in central Sinkiang).¹⁸ But the Han agricultural colonies in Lun-t'ou and Ch'ü-li remained. In 77 B.C., Fu Chieh-tzu, the superintendent of the stables at the P'ing-lo Palace, led a small group of brave and venturesome Han men to make a surprise move to assassinate the Lou-lan king An-kuei. And he temporarily controlled Lou-lan.¹⁹ Emperor Chao then ordered Subcommandant Chang of the Chia-ch'ü Commandant Area of the Chü-yen region to lead a small force to the Lou-lan capital for occupation. The emperor further ordered Subcommandant Chang to bring An-kuei's head to Tun-huang for delivery to Ch'ang-an and to post ten soldiers and two female interpreters in Lou-lan.²⁰ The Han Court then established An-kuei's brother Wei-t'u-ch'i, who had already surrendered to the Han and was then in the Han capital Ch'ang-an, as the new king of Lou-lan and changed the country's name to Shan-shan. Upon his return to his country, Wei-t'u-ch'i requested that the Han further dispatch a marshal with forty officers and soldiers to set up a Han military-agricultural colony in I-hsun (in modern Mi-yuan or Mi-lan, Miran, in southeastern

Sinkiang) of Shan-shan. A little later, the Han also established the post of I-hsun *tu-wei* (chief commandant of I-hsun) to direct the development of the area. I-hsun, southwest of Yen-tse, was the capital of Shan-shan, 667 kilometers (258 miles) from the Yang Pass and 726 kilometers (280 miles) from Tun-huang. It now was the new starting point of the Southern Route of Hsi-yü, with the next state to the west, Chü-mo, 300 kilometers (116 miles) away. The Han took over the old Lou-lan area by Yen-tse and established a military-agricultural colony to guard the entrance to the Northern Route of Hsi-yü.²¹ Following in the footsteps of Han Wu-ti and with no military effort, Emperor Chao began to implement Sang Hung-yang's plan of colonizing Hsi-yü. Two key military-agricultural colonies were established in eastern Lun-t'ou. One was in the Ch'ü-li area and the other in I-hsun. Thus, the Han consolidated their control over the eastern-central region of Hsi-yü and were ready to move farther west. The first stage in the Han colonization of Inner Asia was now complete.

THE FULL COLONIZATION OF HSI-YÜ

The reign of Emperor Chao was an era of peace and reconstruction after the tumultuous period of expansion under Emperor Wu. No aggressive military campaigns were launched; six military expeditions were sent and all were to defend against Hsiung-nu attacks and pacify rebellions in Hsi-yü. His cautious move in continuing the colonization of Hsi-yü is a good illustration of the spirit of his reign. The emperor died in the summer of 74 B.C. In the early fall began the reign of Hsuan-ti (74–49 B.C.), the eighth ruler of the Han dynasty. Hsuan-ti and his court turned to a more active policy toward military expeditions and expansion. After sixteen years of peaceful reconstruction since 90 B.C., the Han empire was ready again to colonize Hsi-yü and eliminate the Hsiung-nu influence in Inner Asia so as to weaken the Hsiung-nu in the east, a long-range Han strategy since Wu-ti's time.

1. In 72–71 B.C., upon Wu-sun's request, the Han sent 150,000 cavalrymen under five generals to attack the western wing of the Hsiung-nu, which had raided Wu-sun; a Han force under Colonel Ch'ang Hui, acting as special envoy, was sent to aid Wu-sun. Wu-sun's king commanded over 50,000 of his soldiers to attack the Hsiung-nu from the west. Ch'ang Hui and Wu-sun's force captured over 39,000 Hsiung-nu; over 50,000 horses, oxen, donkeys, and camels; and over 600,000 sheep.²²

2. In 69 B.C., Ch'ang Hui led five hundred men to Wu-sun. He ordered the states west of Wu-sun to send over twenty thousand men, the states east of Wu-sun over twenty thousand, and Wu-sun over seven thousand—to attack Ch'iu-tz'u for the killing of Colonel Lai-tan in Lun-t'ou. The king of Ch'iu-tz'u then resubmitted his country to Han suzerainty.²³

3. In 68 B.C., Cheng Chi, a gentleman in attendance, and Colonel Ssu-ma Hsi led fifteen hundred pardoned convicts as farming soldiers to work the land at Ch'ü-li. They would gather the harvest there and be ready to launch an attack against Chü-shih, which had shifted its allegiance to Hsiung-nu during Emperor Chao's reign. In the fall, Cheng and Ssu-ma led their force to Chiao-ho city, the capital of Chü-shih. But Chü-shih's king escaped to northern Shih-ch'eng (in the mountain south of modern Pao-hui in northeastern Sinkiang). When they ran out of food, the Han forces returned to Ch'ü-li. Next fall, Cheng and Ssu-ma again advanced their troops to Chü-shih, and King Wu-kuei surrendered to the Han. Cheng and Ssu-ma posted twenty soldiers under a sub-commandant in Chü-shih's capital to guard the king and led their forces back to Ch'ü-li. Later the king of Chü-shih escaped to Wu-sun, and Cheng Chi sent three hundred officers and soldiers to work the land in Chü-shih (in the Chiao-ho city area).²⁴ The Han now established the fourth agricultural colony in Hsi-yü.

4. In 67 B.C., Cheng Chi was appointed special envoy and marshal of palace guards protecting all the Hsi-yü states west of Shan-shan in the south (along the Southern Route). This was the first formal Han office established to direct Hsi-yü affairs.²⁵

5. In 65 B.C., rebels in So-chü (in the modern Sha-ch'e [So-chü] region in southwest Sinkiang) killed their king, Wan-nien, who had been placed on the throne by the Han Court, and shifted So-chü's allegiance to the Hsiung-nu. When Special Envoy Feng Feng-shih, the marquis of Wei, escorted the envoys of Ta-yuan and many western states back to their homeland, he reached I-hsun of Shan-shan and then called out troops of the Hsi-yü states to attack So-chü. The various states then sent over fifteen thousand men under Feng's command to attack So-chü; they took its capital and forced the new king to commit suicide. Feng sent his head to Ch'ang-an, and the Han established a new king for So-chü.²⁶ Han control of western Hsi-yü was further consolidated.

6. In 64 B.C., Cheng Chi ordered all fifteen hundred farming soldiers from Ch'ü-li to work the land in Chü-shih. The Hsiung-nu sent reinforcements to the Chü-shih area and besieged Cheng's force in Chiao-ho. After the Han sent a large force to the Chü-shih area from Chang Yeh and Chiu-ch'üan, the Hsiung-nu withdrew; Cheng Chi also led all Han forces to Ch'ü-li, where they continued to work the land under three colonels.²⁷ The Han removed all the people of Chü-shih to Ch'ü-li and established a new king for them.²⁸

7. In 60 B.C., King Jih-chu, who had the responsibility of controlling the Western Regions for the Hsiung-nu, surrendered to Cheng Chi with his twelve thousand men and twelve noble leaders and generals. Cheng Chi called out over fifty thousand troops from Ch'ü-li, Ch'iu-tz'u, and other states to escort King Jih-chu to Han territory. With that, the Hsiung-nu influence in Hsi-yü

practically ended.²⁹ The Han Court established the office of Hsi-yü *tu-hu* (protector general of the Western Regions) to direct and command all the countries of both the Southern and Northern Routes. Cheng Chi was given the additional responsibility of protecting the states west of Chü-shih on the northern side of Hsi-yü. As Cheng Chi now was in charge of directing and protecting all states in Hsi-yü, he was given the title Hsi-yü *tu-hui* or protector general of the Western Regions (then thirty-six states), and his office was called *Hsi-yü tu-hu fu* (Protectorate General of the Western Regions), with the authority of overseeing and settling all Hsi-yü affairs by either peaceful or military means as the situation warranted. The headquarters of the protector general was located in Wu-lei (west of Yeh-yun-kou in central Sinkiang). Close to the Han farming establishments in Ch'ü-li, Wu-lei was 2,878 *li* (1,200 kilometers or 745 miles) from Tun-huang.³⁰

8. In 59 B.C., when King Jih-chu surrendered to the Han, the office of Chief Commandant of Slaves and Servants of the Hsiung-nu was abolished. The Hsiung-nu influence in Hsi-yü had ended. All the countries in Hsi-yü submitted to the Han. The Han then split the old Ku-shih territory into eight smaller states: Ch'e-shih ch'ien-kuo (in the modern Turfan area, with Chiao-ho ch'eng, Yarkhoto, as its capital), Ch'e-shih hou-kuo (in the modern Jimsa area), Chü-mi tung-kuo (in the modern Urumuchi area), Chü-mi hsi-kuo (west of Urumuchi), P'u-lei Ch'ien-kuo (in the modern Chen-hsi area), P'u-lei hou-kuo (north of modern Chen-hsi), Pu-lu ch'ien-kuo (in modern Fu-k'ang), and Pei-lu hou-kuo (north of modern Ch'ang-chi). After having consolidated the east, the Han then established an agricultural colony in Pei-hsu-chien of So-chü in the far west, 5,900 *li* (2,460 kilometers or 1,528 miles) from Tun-huang. At the same time, the three colonels in charge of the agricultural colonies in Hsi-yü, based in the Lun-t'ai-Ch'ü-li region—were subordinated to the protector general.³¹ Thus, the Han colonization of Hsi-yü was extended to the far west, the Han command in Hsi-yü was centralized, and the Han administration of the development of Hsi-yü was unified under one office.

9. In 53 B.C., after an internal rebellion in Wu-sun, the Han Court sent fifteen thousand soldiers under General Hsin Wu-hsien to Tun-huang in preparation for an advance into Wu-sun. As a result, the new king of Wu-sun submitted to the Han. The Han then divided the country into two regions, one under Yuan-kuei-mi (r. 53–51 B.C.), with a population of sixty thousand households; and another under Wu-chiu-t'u (r. 53–33 B.C.), with a population of forty thousand households. Both were given seals and other credentials symbolic of Han suzerainty. The Han also sent Ch'ang Hui, the marquis of Ch'ang-lo, to lead a contingent of the officers and soldiers of the Lun-t'ai-Ch'ü-li agricultural colonies to colonize the area of Ch'ih-ku (southeast of Issyk Kul), the old capital of Wu-sun, 4,850 *li* (2,022 kilometers or 1,256 miles) from Tun-

huang and 1,720 *li* (717 kilometers or 445 miles) from Wu-lei.³² The Han agricultural colony now extended into the far northwest of Hsi-yü.

10. In 52–51 B.C., Colonel Hsin Ch'ing-chi under Marquis Ch'ang Hui was sent to establish an agricultural colony in Yen-ch'i, 2,478 *li* (1,146 kilometers or 712 miles) west of Tun-huang and 400 *li* (167 kilometers or 104 miles) east of Wu-lei.³³

During the reign of Emperor Hsuan, in 72–51 B.C., the Han further consolidated their control of Hsi-yü through more military expeditions, expanded the Han control of Hsi-yü to the far west by establishing military-agricultural colonies in So-chü and Wu-sun, and centralized and institutionalized the Han command in Hsi-yü by establishing the office of the protector general. With the surrender of King Jih-chu to the Han in 60 B.C., the competing Hsiung-nu influence in Hsi-yü ended. The Han control of Hsi-yü now became complete. With the split of the Hsiung-nu into five fighting groups in 57 B.C., and its main force under Shan-yü Hu-han-yeh (58–31 B.C.) having submitted to the Han in 54 B.C., the Hsiung-nu could no longer threaten the empire or challenge Han supremacy in Hsi-yü. Han Wu-ti started the Hsiung-nu campaign and the Han march to Hsi-yü to support that campaign; his great-grandson, Hsuan-ti, completed both with success. Han empire building reached its zenith in the hands of Emperor Hsuan.

Still Hsuan-ti's successors continued his effort to intensify the colonization of Hsi-yü. During the reign of Yuan-ti (48–33 B.C.), Hsuan-ti's son, an office of Wu-Chi *chiao-wei* (Colonel of the Wu and Chi Divisions) was established in 48 B.C. in Chü-shih ch'ien-kuo to develop a military-agricultural colony in the Chiao-ho (Yarkhoto) area, and the main force in the Ch'ü-li region was placed under the Wu-Chi *chiao-wei*.³⁴ The military-agricultural colony was the Han command center in northeastern Hsi-yü. During the reign of Ch'eng-ti (33–7 B.C.), Yuan-ti's son, the Han sent in 31 B.C. the officers and farming soldiers of the Chi Division from Chü-shih ch'ien-kuo to establish a military-agricultural colony at Ku-mo (in the modern A-k'o-su or Aksu area of western Sinkiang), 4,076 *li* (1,700 kilometers or 1,056 miles) west of Tun-huang and 1,220 *li* (509 kilometers or 316 miles) west of the protector general's office in Wu-lei.³⁵ The Han now established a command center in the central region of western Hsi-yü.

During the reigns of Emperors Yuan and Ch'eng, the Han also further intensified their control of Hsi-yü by political and military moves. First was the elimination of the final Hsiung-nu threat in the region. When the southern Hsiung-nu under Shan-yü Hu-han-yeh surrendered to the Han, Shan-yü Chih-chih (56–36 B.C.), who was Hu-han-yeh's brother, led a large group of the Hsiung-nu to the far northwest, where they conquered Ting-ling, Wu-chieh, and K'un-chien (in modern northern Sinkiang, Siberia, and Outer Mongolia) and attacked Wu-sun in 49 B.C. Then he settled in eastern K'ang-chü and

established a new capital called Chih-chih city (in the Talas area) on the Tu-lai (Talas) River in modern Kazakhstan. He now threatened the security of western Hsi-yü, especially Wu-sun and Ta-yuan. In 36 B.C., Protector General Kan Yen-shou and Deputy Colonel Ch'en T'ang called out the Han troops under the colonel of the Wu-Chi Divisions in Chü-shih and in the Hsi-yü states to attack Chih-chih in K'ang-chü. Together over 40,000 soldiers under three colonels and three deputy colonels and the kings of fifteen Hsi-yü states marched into the K'ang-chü territory. They defeated the Hsiung-nu and K'ang-chü forces; took Chih-chih city; killed the Chih-chih *shan-yü* together with 1,518 Hsiung-nu princes, nobles, and other leaders; captured 145 Hsiung-nu; and received the surrender of over 1,000.³⁶ The Hsiung-nu force in Hsi-yü was completely eliminated. Besides military action, the Yuan and Ch'eng periods also saw further measures intensifying Han control of Hsi-yü. In 48 B.C., the king of East P'u-lei (east of Bar Köl in modern northeast Sinkiang), Tzu-li-chih, surrendered with 1,700 of his people from Hsiung-nu to the Han protector general Han Hsuan. The protector general then settled them in the western region of Chü-shih *hou-kuo* and designated it a new state, Wu-t'an chü-li (in the modern Sui-lai area of the Mannas River in northern Sinkiang).³⁷ This further weakened the Chü-shih *hou-kuo* and strengthened Han control in northeastern Hsi-yü. In 31–29 B.C., the Smaller *k'un-mi* of Wu-sun, Fu-li (r. 33–30 B.C.), was killed by his brother Jih-erh. The Han protector general then appointed a new king, An-jih (Fu-li's son, r. 30–17 B.C.), for Wu-sun and forced Jih-erh to flee to K'ang-chü. Later Jih-erh was assassinated in K'ang-chü. Thus, Han control of Wu-sun was further consolidated and Han authority and suzerainty were reaffirmed.³⁸

By the beginning of the reign of Emperor Ch'eng, Han military control of Hsi-yü was complete. The Hsiung-nu threat had been eliminated, the armed forces of the Hsi-yü states were now under the authority of the protector general, and the Han forces were firmly established in key strategic areas. Han colonization of Hsi-yü was also fully developed. In the east, the Han had major military-agricultural colonies in Yen-tse (middle), I-hsun (south), and Chü-shih (north), the three forming a triangle guarding the eastern line of defense and directing the development of the eastern region. In the middle, the Han had colonies in Lun-t'ai (middle), Ch'ü-li (south), and Yen-ch'i (north), another triangle of military defense and agricultural development. In the west, the Han had colonies in Ku-mo (middle), Wu-sun (north), and So-chü (south), a triangle of both military and agricultural establishments. These nine military-agricultural colonies could control the Northern Route. The four key command centers along this line were Yen-tse in the east, Lun-t'ai in the middle, Ku-mo in the west, and Ch'ü-li in the east between Yen-tse and Lun-t'ai. The four were about evenly spaced—270 kilometers from Yen-tse to Ch'ü-li, 326 kilometers from Ch'ü-li to Lun-t'ai, and 360 kilometers from Lun-t'ai to Ku-mo. Yen-tse to

Tun-huang, the central Han command post on its western border, was almost the same distance, 328 kilometers. Wu-lei, the command center of Han administration and colonization in Hsi-yü and the location of the office of the protector general was also near this line (see table 9).

The colonization of Hsi-yü began with Han Wu-ti and reached its full development during Hsuan-ti's reign. By the time of Ch'eng-ti, the whole of Hsi-yü, from Shan-shan in the east to Wu-sun in the far west, was part of a well-designed system of control and development. In practical terms, as a network of colonies under the command of the protector general, Hsi-yü now was a part of the Han empire, the core of the Han *colonial* empire.

THE HAN SYSTEM OF COLONIZATION IN HSI-YÜ

The Han policy of colonizing Hsi-yü consisted of two strategies. One was the scheme of colonization that the Han used in developing the Ho-hsi region, basically the *t'un-t'ien* system (military-agricultural colonies), and the other was the apparatus of political and military control that the Han developed to rule the many kingdoms (*wang-kuo*) since the early times of the dynasty. Both had long histories of evolution in ancient China but reached their fullest growth and structure in early Han times, especially during the reigns of Emperors Wen, Ching, and Wu. And both systems underwent some modifications and improved their effectiveness in the large Hsi-yü region.

The highest Han command in Hsi-yü was that of the protector general. He

TABLE 9. Han Military-Agricultural Colonies in Hsi-yü

Structure	Location of Colonies in Hsi-yü	Distance to Key Han Command Posts (in kilometers)	
		In Ho-hsi (Tun-huang)	In Hsi-yü (Wu-lei)
Central			
Command	Wu-lei	1,200	—
Eastern	Yen-tse (m) ^a	328	872 W ^b
Triangle	I-hsun (s)	726	462 NW
	Chü-shih (n)	1,613	521 SW
Middle	Lun-t'ai (m)	1,197	70 NE
Triangle	Ch'ü-li (s)	726	138 N
	Yen-ch'i (n)	1,146	167 W
Western	Ku-mo (m)	1,700	509 W
Triangle	Wu-sun (n)	2,022	717 E
	So-chü (s)	2,460	856 NW

^am = middle; s = south; n = north

^bW = west; NW = northwest; SW = southwest; NE = northeast; N = north; E = east

represented the Han emperor in Hsi-yü and was given special insignia (*chieh-chuan*) to execute that function. With this insignia, he had the power to resolve conflicts in and among any states and administrative units in Hsi-yü by peaceful or military means; he had the authority, upon orders from the court, to dethrone or enthrone any ruler in a state and even to dismantle a state or set up a new state in a form fitting the political and military environment; he had the power to call out the troops of all states to serve a defined or court-approved Han cause or maintain order in Hsi-yü; and he had the authority to collect some sort of tax in kind in the form of materials and food from the states for military and diplomatic support. In practical terms, he was the all-powerful king of all kings of the fifty-some Hsi-yü states from Ta-yuan in the west to Yen-tse and Shan-shan in the east that had accepted Han empire's suzerainty. His official responsibility was to protect the Hsi-yü states from both external and internal threats, but his real charge was to keep Hsi-yü firmly under Han control.

To control the states in Hsi-yü, the Han also employed other measures. All states under Han authority were required to send hostages (mostly heirs apparent and princes) to the Han Court in Ch'ang-an. The succession in the states also had to have Han approval. The title of each ruler of a state had to be preceded or prefixed with the word *Han*, such as Han Ching-chueh (*kuo*) *wang*, the "king of Ching-chueh (kingdom, state) of the Han empire." The Han also sent court ladies (or the daughters of certain kings who pretended to be imperial princesses) to become wives of the kings of Hsi-yü states, following the *ho-ch'in* tradition. For example, from 108 to 103 B.C., the Han sent two ladies to Wu-sun: Hsi-chün (the daughter of the king of Chiang-tu) and Chieh-yu (the daughter of the king of Ch'u). Chieh-yu, who was in Wu-sun from 103 to 51 B.C., was the wife of three different *k'un-mi* and had a significant impact there. Three of her sons became kings of Wu-sun, one became king of So-chü, and one became a grand general in Wu-sun.

When occasion arose, the Han also divided larger Hsi-yü states into several smaller ones, easy to control. As mentioned earlier, Ku-shih (Chü-shih) was divided into eight states in 59 B.C. and Wu-sun into two regions in 53 B.C. The Han also set up a *tu-wei* state in the former Chü-shih called Chü-shih Tu-wei-kuo, which was ruled by a *tu-wei* and controlled a small walled town and its nearby areas. The Wu-lei Tu-wei-kuo was set up in the same fashion. Similarly, a Chü-shih hou-ch'eng chang *kuo* was established, which controlled only a small town and was governed by a *chang* (head). These states, including Wu-t'an chü-li and a few others, were essentially the counterparts in structure and institutional goals of the *shu-kuo* (dependent states of surrendered non-Han peoples) set up in the border regions within the Han empire proper. Once a state was under Han control, the Han granted a special seal and ribbon on a belt (*yin shou*) to the king, symbolizing his subordination to the emperor. The Han

Court also appointed other officials for these states. They were selected from among the natives and were also granted Han seals and ribbons on belts for the specific offices. Among these were *hou* (a marquis or prince), *tu-wei* (chief commandant), *chiin* (lord), *i-chang* (head of interpreters), *ch'eng-chang* (commander of a walled town), *ta Chiang-chiün* (grand general), *Chiang* (general), *hsiang* (prime minister or chief minister), *chien* (inspector), *li* (officer), *ch'ien-chang* (chief of one thousand), *ta-lu* (high official or noble lord), and other military titles. By the end of the reign of Emperor Ch'eng, 376 Hsi-yü kings and officials had received Han appointments with seals and ribbons on belts. This manifested the degree of Han control of the states in Hsi-yü. The Han legal system was also applied to Hsi-yü states.

To further the Han control of and connection to Hsi-yü states, the Han Court sent, almost monthly, teams of inspectors (called *shih-che* or envoys like those sent to the interior kingdoms) ranging from several hundreds to one hundred to visit Hsi-yü states, hear about the conditions there, and detect new developments in their external and internal affairs. Even for countries outside the main Hsi-yü realm, such as Chi-pin in South Asia, the Han Court's mission amounted to eighty people. Some kings and high officials from these states regularly came to the Han Court to make reports about their countries. The recently discovered Han documents in the Han Hsuan-ch'üan Station show that from 54 to 2 B.C. more than seventeen such missions passed through this station alone (64 kilometers east of Tun-huang). They included officials from K'ang-chü, Ta Yueh-chih, Ta-yuan, Wu-sun, Shu-lei (modern Kashgar of western Sinkiang), Yü-t'ien (in modern Ho-t'ien hsien in southwestern Sinkiang) and Wu-mi (near Yü-t'ien), So-chü, Ch'ü-lei (south of Yü-t'ien), Ching-chueh (in modern Ni-ya of Ming-feng hsien in southern Sinkiang), Ku-mo, Shan-shan, and Chü-shih. The size of these missions could go as high as 470 men. The Hsi-yü states also sent people to Ch'ang-an to learn about Han culture and receive an education. Many states had adopted Han customs and lifestyles, starting a long process of cultural assimilation, and still others requested to move their states to the Han interior.³⁹

In Hsi-yü, the protector general was the commander in chief of all Han armed forces and farming soldiers and the highest official over all Han civilians, permanent residents, and travelers. Thus, he was the highest administrator of both military and civilian affairs in Hsi-yü. He carried the titles *ch'i tu-wei* (chief commandant of the cavalry) as a military officer and *chien ta-fu* (grandee remonstrant) or *kuang-lu ta-fu* (grandee attendant) as a civil official. There were eighteen protector generals from 60 B.C. to A.D. 23. Table 10 shows the names and tenures of these officials. Under a protector general were a deputy colonel (*fu chiao-wei*), with a salary rank of equal-to-2,000 *shih*, then an assistant (*ch'eng*), two marshals (*ssu-ma*), two commandants (*hou*), and two chiefs of one thousand

(*ch'ien-jen*), all with the salary rank of 600 *shih*. Under a commandant, there were commanders (*t'un-chang* or *sui-chang*) and a head clerk (*ling-shih*), each with a salary rank of 200 *shih*.⁴⁰ These officers were in charge of both military and civilian affairs in their assigned areas.

The Han started the colonization of Hsi-yü with the *tu-wei* (chief commandant area) stage, as it did in the Ho-hsi region. The main command centers of colonization were the nine military-agricultural colonies. They were developed by farming soldiers, the total number of which were about two thousand by Emperor Ch'eng's time. About fifteen hundred of these soldiers were under the command of the Wu-Chi colonel headquartered in Chiao-ho, about fifty under the command of the I-hsun *tu-wei* in Shan-shan, and the rest directly under the deputy colonel together with the protector general in the Wu-lei region. The farming soldiers under the Wu-Chi colonel were deployed in Chü-shih, Yen-tse, Yen-ch'i, Ch'iu-tzu, Ku-mo, Wu-sun, and So-chü; the soldiers under the protector general worked in the Wu-lei, Lun-t'ai, and Ch'ü-li areas.

The *chiao* divisions were further divided into *ch'ü* (regiments) headed by a *hou* (commandant), also called *chün-hou*. Under the Wu-Chi colonel, there were five *hou*. While the flag post of the Wu-Chi colonel was in Chiao-ho, the various *hou* were dispatched to direct the development of other military-agricultural areas occupied by his farming soldiers. In the reign of Yuan-ti (48–33 B.C.), probably no later than 40 to 39 B.C., the office of the Wu-Chi colonel was split in two (the Wu colonel and the Chi colonel) to direct military-agricultural work in different areas. In 31 B.C., for example, the Wu subdivision (*pu*) was sent to develop Ku-mo under the deputy colonel while the Wu-Chi colonel remained in Chü-shih.⁴¹

In Hsi-yü, all the military-agricultural colonies were developed by the soldiers that belonged to the regular Han military units in Hsi-yü. Therefore, the

TABLE 10. Han Protector Generals in Hsi-yü

Name	Tenure
Cheng Chi	60–49 B.C.
Han Hsuan	48–46 B.C.
Kan Yen-shou	36–34 B.C.
Tuan Hui-tsung	33–31 B.C.
Lien Pao	30–28 B.C.
Tuan Hui-tsung	27–25 B.C.
Han Li	24–22 B.C.
Tuan Hui-tsung	21–19 B.C.
Kuo Shun	12–10 B.C.
Sun Chien	A.D. 1–3
Tan Ch'in	A.D. 4–13
Li Ch'ung	A.D. 16–23

organization of the work forces of the colonies was the same as in the regular military line of command. Each of the nine Han military-agricultural colonies in Hsi-yü was referred to as a *t'ien-kuan* (government farming area), a term that was also used in the Chü-yen region but with a much broader geographical dimension. Each of these colonies had more than one area under cultivation by soldiers. The headquarters of these *t'ien-kuan* were walled fortresses, which had the housing units for soldiers (called *lei*, "barracks") and their families (called *pi* or *wu-pi*).⁴² Watchtowers were constructed inside the fortresses and in the whole *t'ien-kuan* region.⁴³ Other military measures for protecting the region were taken. Communications systems within and without were established, following the models used in the Ho-hsi region. Storehouses for weapons and granaries were a regular part of these colonies.⁴⁴ Between the nine main military-agricultural colonies, stations with watchtowers were established along the main trails for communication and defense purposes. They were evenly spaced 5 to 10 kilometers apart and formed well-designed lines of connection among all Han establishments in the region.⁴⁵

The organization and operation of the Han forces under the Wu-Chi colonel may be used to illustrate the structure of the Han system of military-agricultural colonies in Hsi-yü. The highest commander, the Wu-Chi colonel, resided in the Wu-Chi *chiao-wei ch'eng* (walled city [fortress] of the Wu-Chi colonel) in the old Chiao-ho city. His subordinate officers, marshals, and administrative assistants (*ch'eng* and *shih*) supervised the units under his authority: the marshal and *ch'eng* were in charge of the various *pi*, logistics, granaries,

TABLE 11. The Organization and Operation of the Han Forces under the Wu-Chi Colonel in Hsi-yü

Line of Command	Colonel	Commandant	Commander
Subordinate officers	Marshal <i>ch'eng-shih</i>	Marshal <i>ling-shih</i>	None
Flag post Land assignments	Colonel fortress Supervision of all land work and granaries under his authority	Command post <i>T'ien-kuan</i> areas (of various size)	Watch station Small field
Military responsibility	All Hsi-yü under the protector general; areas under garrison of his troops	Assigned <i>t'ien-kuan</i> areas and special regions	Defense of watch station area, manning communications systems, sending and receiving signals

and other matters; and the commandants, assisted by subordinate officers and the chief clerk (*ling-shih*), supervised the various barracks. The watchtowers were manned by soldiers, under a commander, to carry out communications and other routine assignments. There were two large agricultural regions, one in the Chiao-ho area and another in the Kao-ch'ang (Jimsa) area.⁴⁶ The major granaries in the units under the Wu-Chi colonel included the Chiao-ho Granary and Chü-lu-chü Granary, each headed by a *ch'eng* (assistant).⁴⁷ Table 11 sums up the organization and operation of the Han farming-soldiers forces under the Wu-Chi colonel in Hsi-yü.

The Han soldiers in Hsi-yü came from different parts of the empire, from the capital area Ching-chao yin to eastern Nan-yang in Honan and Hupei. As in Chü-yen, they included regular conscripts and hired soldiers (*ying-mu shih*), volunteers, and *ssu-ts'ung* (private followers). Some of the soldiers also held aristocratic ranks such as *ta-fu* (the fifth order) and *kung-ch'eng* (the eighth order).⁴⁸ They were allowed to have their families (wife, children, and the like) with them.⁴⁹ But these families all were under military authority and their properties registered with the local office.

The *t'ien-kuan* areas in Hsi-yü were under strict military control. Local populations were registered with the military authorities, and no travel was allowed without a permit. Deaths and births were also recorded. Checkpoints (*kuan*) were set up to control the comings and goings of travelers. Anyone passing these checkpoints had to be recorded and everything he or she carried was thoroughly inspected and recorded.⁵⁰

As some military-agricultural colonies became more developed and secure in the eastern part of Hsi-yü, east of Wu-lei, the Han government began to send civilians to settle in these *t'ien-kuan* regions. Basic local administrative systems such as the *hsiang* (county) and *li* (ward) organizations were then set up. The first colonies that reached this stage were Yen-tse and Chü-shih, the two easternmost Han establishments in Hsi-yü. Most of the immigrants were from the western part of the Ho-hsi region, especially Tun-huang.⁵¹ These colonies now advanced to the second stage of development—the beginning of the civil administrative system—a stage that was shown in the colonization of Ho-hsi. At the same time, the Han government also transferred Hsi-yü populations to the interior of the empire. Some Ch'iu-tzu people were removed to modern northern Shensi, and some people from Wen-su (in northern Aksu in western Sinkiang) were removed to southern Shensi.⁵² Hsi-yü began to progress from the *tu-wei* to the *hsien-hsiang* (district-county) stage in the Han process of developing a frontier region. The Han commenced to make Hsi-yü a regular part of its territory and develop it as such.

From the Hsi-yü of Han times to the Sinkiang of modern times, this region went through a long history, and, like almost all the frontier regions of Imperial

China, the territory of Hsi-yü did not belong to the empire when China was weak, not even under the Han dynasty itself. But during the strong and unified dynasties the Hsi-yü of the Former Han empire remained part of the Chinese empire, and in the long run it became a regular province of China.⁵³ The expansion of the empire under Han Wu-ti and his successors began the process of adding that huge territory to China.



CONCLUSION

Expansion, Frontier, and Empire

THE LONG PROCESS OF Han western expansion was completed with the full consolidation of the Western Regions in 29 B.C. With it, the larger Han expansion movement that began with Emperor Wu's massive Hsiung-nu campaigns in 129 B.C. came to its full fruition. The Han dynasty had by now acquired 1.5–1.7 million square miles of new land and reshaped the territorial boundaries of the Chinese empire. It was the largest expansion movement in Chinese history and virtually gave birth to a new China. Since the geographical contour and basic spatial extension of China have since experienced little fundamental change, the Han expansion may be said to have defined the ecology and hence the direction of Chinese society, culture, and history. This is the *longue durée* significance of the Han expansion.

EXPANSION AND EMPIRE

Almost all of the Han expansion was carried out during Wu-ti's reign, mainly from 129 to 90 B.C. Later military expeditions were mostly for the defense and further consolidation of territories acquired in his time. Wu-ti's major campaigns of conquest took place in four regions beyond the Han borders of his day. These were the north and northwest, mainly the land of the Hsiung-nu and Ch'iang and the Western Regions in modern Outer Mongolia, Inner Mongolia, Siberia, Tsinghai, Kansu, Sinkiang, eastern Central Asia, and northern South Asia; the southeast and south, mainly the land of the Yueh in modern southern

Chekiang, Fukien, Kwangtung, Hainan Island, Kwangsi, and Vietnam; the southwest, the land of various peoples together called the "Southwest Barbarians" (Hsi-nan i) in Chinese texts, in modern western Szechwan, Kueichou, Yunnan, eastern Sikang, and southern Kansu; and the northeast, Ch'ao-hsien (modern Korea). The western expansion—the campaigns and development of the north and northwest regions—has been the central focus of this study.¹ The Han expansion in the other three regions is summarized in the following pages.

The South and Southeast

1. Nan-yueh: Originally part of the Ch'in territory, it became an independent state under Chao T'uo after the fall of the Ch'in in 207 B.C. Under the Han, it first became an independent state and then agreed to become a kingdom (*wang-kuo*) as part of the Han empire. In the summer of 112 B.C., it rebelled and declared its independence. Emperor Wu sent General Han Ch'ien-ch'iu with two thousand men to Nan-yueh, but the Han army was defeated and General Han was killed. In the fall of 112 B.C., the emperor sent two Han generals (Lu Po-te and Yang P'u) and three surrendered Yueh generals (Yen, Chia, and I) to lead one hundred thousand marines from South China and convicts from Pa and Shu in the southwest to attack Nan-yueh. Before the rest of the expeditionary forces began to march, the Han army of thirteen hundred men under Generals Lu and Yang reached and took the capital of Nan-yueh, P'an-yü (Kwangchow), captured its king, Chao Chien-te, and conquered the whole Nan-yueh territory. At the same time, the king of Ts'ang-wu, Chao Kuang, surrendered to the Han forces. The Han then established nine *chün* over the land of Nan-yueh and Ts'ang-wu: Tan-erh (in modern west-central Hainan Island), Chu-ya (in southern Hainan Island), Nan-hai (in modern southern Kwangtung), Ho-p'u (in southwestern Kwangtung), Ts'ang-wu (in modern eastern Kwangsi), Yü-lin (in modern western Kwangsi), Chiao-chih (in northern Vietnam), Chiu-chen (in central Vietnam), and Jih-nan (in south-central Vietnam).²

2. Min-yueh: This was a *chün* (Min-chung, including modern Fukien and southern Chekiang) under the Ch'in. It became an independent state after the fall of the Ch'in called Min-yueh. The Han recognized it as a kingdom (*wang-kuo*). In 192 B.C., the Han Court separated the northern part of Min-yueh (modern southern Chekiang) from it and created another kingdom, Tung-hai (or Tung-ou). The rest of Min-yueh was called Tung-yueh. In 138 B.C., Tung-ou asked the Han Court to move its people to the interior of the Han empire. Wu-ti agreed to remove the entire population of Tung-ou north to settle in the region between the Huai and Yangtze Rivers in modern northern Kiangsu.³ In the late fall of 111 B.C., the king of Tung-yueh, Tsou Yü-shan, rebelled and

declared the kingdom's independence. Emperor Wu sent three Han generals (Han Yueh, Yang P'u, and Wang Wen-shu) and two Yueh generals (Yen and Chia) to attack Min-yueh. Yü-shan was killed by his own people, and Tung-yueh brought back under Han control. Wu-ti then ordered that the Han army remove the entire population of Tung-yueh, about 3,500 persons, north to the region between the Huai and Yangtze Rivers in modern Kiangsu.⁴ The land of old Min-yueh became part of K'uai-chi *chün*.

The Southwest

There were over one hundred small independent tribal groups and states in the region extending from western Szechwan and Kweichow to eastern Sikang in an east-west direction and from southern Kansu to Yunnan in a north-south direction. These were the Ch'iang, Lao, Ch'iung, K'un, Ts'e, and Ti peoples. The large ones were the Yeh-lang (in northern, western, and central Kueichou), Chü-lan (also called T'ou-lan in east Kueichou), Mo-mo (in northeastern Yunnan), Tien (in most of Yunnan), Ch'iung-tu (in southeastern Sikang), Sui (in eastern Sikang), Hsi (in eastern Sikang), Ts'e-tu (between Sui and Hsi in eastern Sikang), K'un-ming (in northwestern and western Yunnan), Jan-p'ang (in northwestern Szechwan), and Pai-ma (in southern Kansu and northwestern Szechwan). The majority of these tribes were sedentary, such as the Yeh-lang, Mo-mo, Tien, and Ch'iung-tu; a small number were nomadic, such as the Sui and K'un-ming; and a few were both, such as the Hsi, Ts'e-tu, and Jan-p'ang. The Ch'in controlled a few of them in the eastern regions, but the Han made no effort to control any until Wu-ti's time. In 135 B.C., Wu-ti sent General T'ang Meng to lead ten thousand men to Yeh-lang. Through negotiation, the Han established a *chün*, Chien-wei, over the northern part of Yeh-lang and southern Szechwan without any military action. In 110 B.C., a Han army of about five thousand men under eight colonels and two generals (Kuo Ch'ang and Wei Kuang) conquered Yeh-lang and all the states and tribes except those in Yunnan and western Kueichou and established five *chün*: Tsang-k'o (the land of Yeh-lang and Chü-lan), Yueh-sui (the land of Ch'iung-tu), Shen-li (the land of Ts'e-tu), Wen-shan (the land of Jan-p'ang), and Wu-tu (the land of Pai-ma). In 109 B.C., Wu-ti sent soldiers from Pa and Shu to conquer Tien, Mo-mo, and other states in Yunnan and western Kueichou and established the I-chou *chün* in the region.⁵

The Northeast

This was called Ch'ao-hsien (Chosen) in Han times. The whole region included parts of Antung and Chilin (Kirin) provinces of China and northern

and central Korea (including modern North Korea and the northern part of South Korea). The northern part of Ch'ao-hsien was under the control of the state of Yen during the Warring States period (403–221 B.C.). The Ch'in made no effort to control the whole country and drew its borderline along the eastern part of the northern strip of northern Korea to the P'yongyang area where the Great Wall ended; it was part of Liao-tung *chiün*. The Han dynasty followed the Ch'in line and made the Pa (or Pai) River (Ch'ing-ch'uan River) the border. It was part of the Yen kingdom of Lu Wan. When Lu Wan rebelled against the Han and fled to join the Hsiung-nu in 195 B.C., one of his followers, Wei Man, led thirteen hundred men across the Pa River to control the rest of Ch'ao-hsien as its new king, with the capital at Wang-Hsien (modern P'yongyang). The Han Court was unable to launch a campaign against him until Wu-ti's reign. In Wu-ti's time, Wei Man's grandson, Yu-ch'ü, was the king of Ch'ao-hsien, and direct conflict took place between Han and Ch'ao-hsien. In the fall of 109 B.C., Emperor Wu sent General Yang P'u with fifty thousand men to attack Ch'ao-hsien from the sea and General Hsun Chih with several thousand men to approach Wang Hsien by land. General Yang reached Wang Hsien first, with seven thousand men, and was defeated by Yu-ch'ü. Hsun's force was also defeated at the Pa River. The campaign stalled for several months. In the spring of 108 B.C., the Han forces under Yang and Hsun reorganized and marched to Wang Hsien again. They besieged the city for several months. In the summer, Hsun took sole command of the Han army and finally took the city after leading Ch'ao-hsien officials killed Yu-ch'ü and other Ch'ao-hsien leaders who opposed the Han. After the conquest of Ch'ao-hsien, Wu-ti established four *chiün* in the territory: Hsuan-t'u (in northern North Korea—north to the Yalu River—in southern Chilin, and in western Antung), Lo-lang (in southern North Korea), Chen-p'an (in southwestern North Korea and northwestern South Korea), and Lin-t'un (in southeastern North Korea and northeastern South Korea).⁶

Wu-ti's expansion to the three regions led to the establishment of twenty new *chiün* and significantly enlarged one existing *chiün*. The total land acquired amounted to over 563,000 square miles (over 314,000 in the southeast and south, over 193,000 in the southwest, and over 56,700 in the northeast).⁷ The Han territorial boundaries now extended in the south to Hainan Island and Vietnam in the South China Sea beyond Kwangtung and Kwangsi, in the southwest to southwestern Yunnan and eastern Sikang, in the southeast to Fukien by the East China Sea, and in the northeast to northern South Korea. Wu-ti's northwestern expansion led the Han troops to Mongolia in the north and to Sinkiang through the Ho-hsi Corridor and resulted in the establishment of five new *chiün*: Chiu-ch'üan, Chang-yeh, Tun-huang, So-fang, and Wu-yuan.

Thus, by the end of Wu-ti's reign the Han empire extended from Korea in the east to Sinkiang in the west and from Hainan Island and Vietnam in the south to the edge of Inner Mongolia in the north. The total amount of land under Han control was over 3.25 million square miles.⁸

The Chinese empire was established by Shih huang-ti (the First Emperor, r. 221–210 B.C.) of the Ch'in dynasty. It gave birth of a new China after a long period of disunity that began in 770 B.C. and complete partition that began in 403 B.C. It also ended the feudal order, which had been in place since the late Shang and Western Chou periods (ca. 1400–771 B.C.).⁹ It also defined a unified China under an absolute monarch with one centralized bureaucratic administration, one written language, one land system, one currency, one system of weights and measures, one legal structure, one uniform network of transportation and communications, and one state ideology (Legalism).¹⁰ But the Ch'in territory was yet to be defined at the time of the death of the First Emperor in the summer of 210 B.C. The domain of the Ch'in empire in 221 B.C. was mainly the combined territories of seven contending states—Ch'in, Ch'i, Ch'u, Yen, Han, Chao, and Wei—of the Warring States period (403–221 B.C.). In 215–214 B.C., the Ch'in expanded northward to the modern southern Inner Mongolia by defeating the Hsiung-nu and establishing forty-four new districts. They expanded southward to modern Fukien, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and northern Vietnam by defeating the Yueh and establishing three *chün*: Kuei-lin (Kwangsi), Nan-hai (Kwangtung and eastern Kwangsi), and Hsiang (southwestern Kwangtung, southern Kwangsi, and northern Vietnam).¹¹ The Ch'in had a territory that extended in the north to the Ordos region near the Yin mountain range, northeast to the Liao-tung Peninsula, south to the South China Sea and northern Vietnam, west to central Kansu, southwest to central Szechwan, and east to the East China Sea and northern North Korea in the P'yongyang area.¹² That was the empire and the world in Shih huang-ti's time.¹³ But it was a smaller world in comparison with the traditionally recognized size of the Chinese empire in later dynasties. It was the Han emperor Wu-ti who first defined the general geographical outline of the Chinese empire through his immense expansion in all directions. As was discussed, under Wu-ti the Han empire extended in the south to the South China Sea (Hainan Island and Vietnam), in the north to the edge of Ta-mo (the Immense and Gobi Deserts), in the west to the mountain ranges of western Sinkiang, in east to the East China Sea all the way to Korea, and in the southwest to Yunnan. With the exception of Korea and Vietnam, which became independent later, and western Tibet, which was added in Ch'ing times, Wu-ti's new territory virtually defined the commonly accepted confines of the Chinese empire for most of the duration of Imperial China, 221 B.C. to A.D. 1911, and of the Chinese Republic today. Shih huang-ti defined the institutional frame and ideological orientation of the

Chinese empire from 221 to 210 B.C., and Han Wu-ti established the territorial contour of the Chinese empire through his immense expansion from 129 to 90 B.C. The Chinese empire now possessed its basic institutional and geographical structures. Both were inherited by subsequent dynasties and hence served as the two most critical factors in shaping the later course of Imperial China. The institutional structure was important because it provided the framework for the Chinese political system. The geographical structure was important because it defined Imperial China's borders and frontiers, the maintenance or loss of which was regarded as the measure of the achievements or failures of a dynasty. For this reason, in the A.D. era, the Sung (960–1279) and Ming (1368–1644) were considered weak dynasties and the T'ang (618–907) and Ch'ing (1644–1911) strong dynasties. Individual rulers also perceived the maintenance of the Chinese territory established by Wu-ti as a measure of their greatness. For this, they often drove themselves to launch unnecessary and disastrous military campaigns that significantly affected their lives and the fate of their dynasties. The disastrous campaigns to conquer Korea by Emperor Yang (r. 604–618) of the Sui dynasty (589–618) and Emperor T'ai-tsung (r. 626–649) of the T'ang dynasty and the destructive so-called Ten Perfect Campaigns of Emperor Ch'ien-lung (r. 1736–1795) of the Ch'ing dynasty all clearly make this point. Yang-ti's adventure eventually led to the fall of his dynasty, T'ai-tsung's defeat led to illness and the end of his life, and Ch'ien-lung's Ten Perfect Campaigns, which were deceptive and resulted in a tremendous loss of life and economic resources, began the decline of the Ch'ing dynasty in China.¹⁴

THE WESTERN EXPANSION

Of Wu-ti's territorial conquests, Hsi-yü and eighteen of the twenty-five new *chün* were of lands that the Ch'in did not control. They accounted for the land of modern Hainan Island, central and southern Vietnam, northern and central Korea, Yunnan, Kueichou, western Szechwan, eastern Sikang, northeastern Tsinghai, southern, central, and western Kansu, and eastern Sinkiang. Land acquisitions totaled over 886,000 square miles, and nearly two-thirds of this, over 589,000 square miles, was the result of the western expansion. It manifests the overwhelming significance of the western expansion in Han Wu-ti's empire building. In addition, while the process of western expansion lasted for forty years, from 129 to 90 B.C., the military campaigns to acquire the land of the south and southeast, the northeast, and the southwest took place only between 112 and 108 B.C., and in each of the three regions the actual military engagements lasted less than six months. The total force engaged in all three regions amounted to no more than fifty thousand men: about thirty-five thousand in the south and southeast, five thousand in the southwest, and ten thousand in

the northeast. This was only a small fraction (less than 0.4 percent) of the 12.6 million men engaged in the western expansion overall. Moreover, all the commanding generals of the campaigns in the three regions were veterans of the Hsiung-nu expeditions that commenced the first phase of the Han western expansion. The Han expansion in the three regions came after their decisive victories over the Hsiung-nu, which resulted in the acquisition of the Ho-hsi territory and the recovery of the Ordos region, and after a massive migration of the interior population to colonize Ho-hsi and the establishment in 127 B.C. of two *chün*, So-fang and Wu-yuan (in modern Sui-yuan and Ninghsia provinces), in the Ordos region had already accelerated the Han tide of expansion. Such immense success naturally induced the ambitious Emperor Wu to resolve by military means the standing issues of Min-yueh, Nan-yueh, Ch'ao-hsien, and the "Southwest Barbarians," which had not been under the Han empire's authority since the time of its founding.¹⁵ It is clear that the western expansion set the stage for the other Han expansions in the northeast, southwest, south, and southeast.

Of the three regions the Han acquired from 112 to 108 B.C., the huge territories of modern southern Chekiang and Fukien, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, northwestern Korea, and northeastern Vietnam all had been part of the regular administrative system of the Ch'in empire, as were Liao-tung, Min-chung, Nan-hai, Kuei-lin, and Hsiang *chün*; the rest of Korea and Vietnam, Hainan Island, and almost all of the land of the Southwest Barbarians were not under Ch'in control. The former category totaled about 301,000 square miles and the latter about 262,000. The ratio of new acquisitions and recovered Ch'in land was about even (54 percent to 46 percent or 1.15:1). But both the new land and the recovered Ch'in territory were already developed and arable (most of the land was agriculturally rich), and hence as new frontier regions they demanded very few Han resources for further consolidation. In fact, the only transition for the new territories was that they were brought into Han administrative system and under Han military control, just like all other Han *chün* or *wang-kuo* (kingdoms). Some of these even became the new breadbaskets of the Han empire and the land of economic opportunity for Han emigrants who were driven away from the interior because of natural calamities and human-made catastrophes. Thus, these new frontier regions presented no financial burdens for the Han empire after their conquest.

In contrast, the development of the regions gained through western expansion was devastatingly costly. The development of the Ho-nan (Ordos) region from 127 B.C. on cost 100 billion in cash a year, the colonization of Ho-hsi from 116 B.C. on cost 100 billion, and the consolidation of Hsi-yü from 101 B.C. on cost 30 million.¹⁶ The total regular revenue of the Han government in Wu-ti's time of expansion was about 12 billion in cash a year.¹⁷ Thus, the annual cost of

developing Ho-nan and Ho-hsi may have amounted to nearly seventeen times the entire annual government revenue of the Han empire.

The total financial cost of the Han campaigns in the three regions from 112 to 108 B.C. was about 7.5 billion in cash, less than the regular revenue of the Han government in a year. But the cost of the military operations in the western expansion was devastatingly higher. It amounted to over 1.89 trillion in cash in the forty years from 129 to 90 B.C.¹⁸ This was an annual average of 47.25 billion in cash, about 3.92 times the regular annual revenue of the Han government. If the combat operations lasted on average only six months a year, it still cost 23.625 billion in cash a year, 1.96 times the annual government revenue. As was discussed earlier, the annual cost for seven hundred thousand servicemen was 20.1 billion; half of that figure would be 10.05 billion, the regular expenses for six months for the Han standing army when it was not seeing action. Adding this figure to the 23.625 billion total, the total cost for seven hundred thousand servicemen who spent only half a year in combat would have been 33.675 billion in cash, still 2.81 times the total annual revenue of the Han government.

Wu-ti's western expansion proved to be extremely costly in both human and economic terms, and its effects on the Han dynasty in particular and Imperial China in general were also extensive and enduring.

EXPANSION AND THE FRONTIER

These effects, however, were not the result of the impact of the frontier society, culture, and economy on the Han empire; rather, they were the result of the military campaigns and initial development of the frontier after the acquisition of new territories. The geopolitical and cultural nature of these frontier regions and the method of the Han system of frontier development led to this result.¹⁹

The Han frontier system, in its varying forms of structure, was devised to control and colonize frontier regions. Its ultimate goal was to transform the frontiers to the condition of the interior or core regions. In the Ho-hsi and Ch'iang territories, this involved the total transplantation of the interior population into almost the entire frontier region. Such frontier development fostered no institutional, social, economic, and cultural changes. The frontier society was in its structure the same as the interior society, only more rigid and less dynamic, and under stricter military and political control. In Hsi-yü, the Han frontier system operated with the same goal as in Ho-hsi: control, colonization, and transformation. Naturally, the Han military-agricultural colonies there developed the same way. But because of its special geographical condition and the large number of native populations, the Han Court tolerated some different

political systems, varying economic patterns, and a multicultural society. However, these different political structures, economic forms, and cultural types were basically inferior to the Han and hence had no impact on the Han government, economy, society, and culture, although certain peculiar items, such as food and musical instruments, found their way into Han life. In Han times, the states and peoples of Hsi-yü often wanted to adopt the Han culture and lifestyle. For instance, King Chiang-pin of Ch'iu-tzu adopted the Han culture and political system for his court in 64–63 B.C.²⁰ And almost every Hsi-yü state sent officials and members of royal families to Ch'ang-an to study Han government and culture. The western frontiers thus produced few fundamental changes in the political, social, economic, and cultural structure of the Han empire. They only transformed their own lands and societies and made them part of the Han world.

The Han western expansion, however, produced significant changes in certain specific areas of the Han economy, society, and culture. First, the Hsi-yü area introduced to Han China at least fourteen cuisine items: sesame, garlic, coriander, cucumbers, carrots, broad beans, green lentils, garden peas, lucerne, black pepper, onions, olives, grapes, and pomegranates. Grape wine also came from the Western Regions.²¹ Thirteen new musical instruments came to the Han from Hsi-yü to greatly enrich and refine the Chinese musical arts. These include such familiar instruments in traditional Chinese music as the two-stringed violin (*hu-ch'in*), the balloon guitar (*p'i-pa*), and the vina.²² Some materials that were not native products of Hsi-yü were introduced to Han China through their importation to Hsi-yü. But at the same time some precious and highly valued items in Han times have been misunderstood as foreign imports to China through this route. One such item was Roman-type glass, which has long been mistakenly taken as a Roman import to China through the Silk Road.²³ Buddhism from India came to the Han from Hsi-yü in Former Han times. Chang Ch'ien's missions evidently made him aware of Buddhist ideas (such as the worship of Golden Man [God]). By the end of the Former Han, some scholars were already studying Buddhist sutras under learned Buddhists of the Western Regions. But Buddhism as a religious institution was not introduced to the Han Court and populace until Latter Han times. During that time, Buddhist temples were built and systematic translation of Buddhist sutras was undertaken by many Hsi-yü Buddhists, who came to the capital at Loyang and other cities of the Han empire to spread the religion.²⁴

The opening and control of Hsi-yü resulted in the importation of many other products, such as special textile materials and rugs; living commodities, which included curious animals such as special elephants, lions, big birds, horses of the finest quality; and human beings, such as slaves, jugglers, magicians,

dancers, and musicians.²⁵ But these imports represented only the enrichment of the variety of existing species and materials in Han China; they added nothing fundamentally new to the Han material and cultural world.

Although the Han western frontiers were not the catalyst for changes in Han society and culture, the frontier system in the west was the cornerstone of Han empire building. The system engendered the successful colonization of Hsi-yü, Ho-hsi, and Ch'iang and eventually assimilated them into the Han empire. In the process, the region that was first colonized became the base from which the Han military forces conquered the next region. The Han empire thus extended from its old border in the east, at the Yellow River in Kansu, to the region west of the Yellow River (Ho-hsi), then from the western border of Ho-hsi to central Hsi-yü, and then from central Hsi-yü to its western edge in Wu-sun. From Ho-hsi to Hsi-yü, the expansion of frontiers added an area of 1.1 million square miles to the Han empire and reshaped the Chinese empire.

In a larger historical perspective, the Han frontier system was a long-lasting national and cultural construction that critically affected the development of the Chinese empire. The Han defined their national strength by the boundaries of their frontiers. The success in frontier expansion shaped the geographical boundaries of the Han empire and the cultural boundary between the Han civilization and those that were considered inferior to it. While the outward expansion of the frontier indicated an increase in the influence of the Chinese empire and its culture, the inward retreat implied the opposite. Thus, the frontier often defined the national goals of the Chinese empire, articulated the national imagination of what constituted the Chinese nation and culture, and enunciated its destiny and historical mission as a great empire. As such, the frontier may be seen as one of the most enduring legacies of Han.

As has been examined in detail, the growth of the Chinese empire was a process of interaction between the center (the empire proper) and the periphery (the frontier regions outside that defined domain) beginning with the earlier Shang and Chou dynasties. The Shang arose in the frontier region of the Hsia in the seventeenth century B.C. and the Chou in the Shang frontier region in the eleventh century B.C. Later the Ch'in expanded from its original frontier region to unify China and establish its first centralized bureaucratic empire. During Ch'in and Han times, the pattern of center-periphery interaction was transformed. No longer did the periphery subjugate the center; now the center conquered the periphery and the empire expanded its domain. This new pattern of frontier-empire relations began to take shape during the Ch'in dynasty under Shih Huang-ti (r. 221–210 B.C.) and completed as a well-defined paradigm under the Han emperor Wu-ti. Thus, with the operation of both patterns—the subjugation of the center by the periphery and the conquest of border regimes (frontier regions) by the center (the empire)—the Chinese empire

strove to maintain its well-conceived territorial configuration, long-established developmental mold, and historical ideal of T'ien-hsia (All under Heaven) during the next two millennia under both Chinese and non-Chinese regimes (e.g., the expansion of the T'ang empire, the conquest of the Sung by the Mongols in 1279, and the rise of the Manchu (Ch'ing) empire in the seventeenth century).

EXPANSION, STATE, AND NATION

The huge territorial acquisitions were the result of extremely costly military campaigns and schemes of colonization, and all of these had a far-reaching impact on the Han state. Specifically, the western expansion under Wu-ti caused some fundamental changes in the political, economic, and military structures of the Han state that had a lasting influence on Imperial China after the Han dynasty collapsed.

First, the continuing military operations changed the nature and structure of the Chinese political system. Military and political operations are of a drastically different nature. In the attainment of desired goals, the latter places emphasis on collective wisdom through discussion, cooperation, and compromise, but the former stresses strict obedience and subordination of the participants in executing the strategy. Thus, with the military expansion in full swing since 122 B.C., the court conference and the chancellorship (prime ministership), the two hallmarks of openness and collective deliberation in the Ch'in and Han political systems, which remained almost intact from Ch'in Shih Huang-ti through the first five Han rulers, underwent fundamental changes. The court conference almost ceased to function, as dissenting views always led to the death penalty, and the office of the prime minister, which had by established tradition a certain degree of political and administrative independence and whose power generally balanced the arbitrariness of the emperor's, was transferred to veteran military generals or obedient, submissive officials. Emperor Wu wanted to make that office a strategic council for military campaigns. Of the six prime ministers who served the emperor in normal terms (seven in total) before his death, five were participants in military operations in various capacities, and all five of them were either executed or committed suicide while in office by the emperor's order. The office clearly became a death trap and completely lost its respect and independence.²⁶ Kung-sun Ho is a case in point. A man of "barbarian" descent, the emperor's in-law, and a veteran campaign commander in the many Hsiung-nu expeditions since 129 B.C., he was scared to death when he was appointed prime minister in 103 B.C. and reluctantly took office after his refusal was angrily rejected by the emperor. Each time he saw the emperor he showed visible shaking and fear during the thirteen years of his tenure. Under such conditions, how could a prime minister serve the emperor

with dignity and the necessary degree of independence? In the end, he and all his family were executed.²⁷

The emperor died in 87 B.C., but his treatment of the long-established institution of the court conference and the office of the prime minister forever changed the nature of the two institutions by reducing their tradition-honored function and effectiveness in balancing the arbitrary power of a despotic emperor. It seems that the Chinese political system moved in the direction of high authoritarianism for good in Emperor Wu's hands.

Wu-ti's military campaigns also introduced revolutionary changes in the Chinese military and society. These included the rise of cavalry as the main constituent of the Chinese army for the first time in Chinese history and the rise of a massive professional fighting force as the standing army of the Chinese empire to replace the long-standing practice of universal conscription. The military leaders also became a major political power bloc in the Han top ruling class in and out of the court. Furthermore, the military developed and standardized its own educational and training programs. This brought about a military revolution in Chinese society. And that fundamentally changed the structure of Chinese society. In ancient China under the feudal order, the military (*wu*) and civilians (*wen*) were not separated in political position, social station, and education, nor in any other realms. The distinction between peace and war did not exist because every nobleman was a soldier, and his education included both military and civil subjects. Thus, the military and civilian societies were two in one. Now, as a result of Wu-ti's military campaigns and expansion, the military became professionalized and formed a society of its own that was independent of the civilian sector of the society in all those realms of social station and daily life. So the military and civilian sectors (*wu* and *wen*) became two separate societies. Although this revolutionary change in Chinese society began in the sixth century B.C., when the feudal order started to disintegrate, it was under Wu-ti's reign and as a result of his military expansion that this far-reaching social transformation finally reached its completion, a fact that is forcefully testified to by the official registers of officials recently discovered on the old Han frontier in western China, especially in Chü-yen, Tun-huang, and Lou-lan. On these registers, the officials were classified by their *wen* and *wu* origins. The military nature of all new regimes in ancient times, such as the Shang and the Chou, which dictated that they had to conquer another regime to establish their own, became the essential part of their educational core of learning, but in the Ch'in and Han period this military dimension was gradually separated from daily social and cultural activities because of social, political, and economic changes. The *wen* part, that is the art of government, which was the basis for reconstructing, sustaining, and improving a newly established regime after a military conquest (*wu*), remained an essential part of daily life. Therefore, in the life of

a new regime, the *wu* started, consolidated, maintained, and expanded it, and the *wen* governed and ruled it. Thus, the *wen* and the *wu* became inseparable in traditional and modern China. The former has been referred to as *wen-chih* (glorious political order and cultural achievements) and the latter as *wu-kung* (military glory). Although the origins of the two ideals and institutions go back to the Shang and Chou dynasties, the new paradigm was really established by Shih Huang-ti of the Ch'in and was concretely exemplified by Wu-ti of the Han by means of their successful political rule and institutional innovations, ideological breakthroughs, and grand military expansions.

Ideologically, Wu-ti also sent China in a new direction. He established Confucianism as the state ideology, and, with some minor exceptions, it was followed and reinforced by all later major dynasties. But this Confucianism is new in that it had absorbed Legalism, Taoism, Mohism, and Yin-yang cosmology through its restructuring by earlier Han Confucianists and especially by Tung Chung-shu (179–104 B.C.) in Wu-ti's time and was happily endorsed by Wu-ti for the purpose of centralizing and affirming the autocratic and divine power of the ruler. The basic tenets of Confucianism, that is, the purpose of a polity, to nurture the people in the interest of order and prosperity, were kept but further expanded to include an institutional structure such as the Imperial College for educating and training future government public servants. Furthermore, the idea of *ta-t'ung* (grand unity), the utopian ideal of unifying All under Heaven (T'ien-hsia) under one ruler for a peaceful, ordered, prosperous, and well-controlled "big society," now became a high Confucian political and social ideal. But the Mohist idea of a divine covenant between the ruler and the ruled, in which by divine arrangement the ruled gave unquestioning obedience to the ruler in the interest of order and peace, was added to the fundamental Confucian doctrine, thereby granting divine sanction and ideological justification to the ruler's autocratic power. Legalism further provided the administrative instruments and harsh judicial means to control the behavior of the people and to direct the development of society by a predesigned model (*fa-shih*), all in the name of societal order and peace. These Legalist tactics of political control were further complemented by the crafty ruling skills of Huang-Lao Taoism: mysteriousness, inscrutability, and cunning. The Yin-yang ideology of the connection between natural phenomena and human life was added to Confucianism for the purpose of establishing the legitimacy of the Han regime, as following the dynastic line from the Hsia to the Shang to the Chou to the Ch'in and the Han, all by Heaven's design and will. It was also meant to affirm the rise of the Han dynasty to new glory. In the end, the new ideology, though still officially identified as Confucianism, was just a complex, eclectic compound of the most functional elements concerned with the state, nation, statecraft, kingship, empire, and imperialism contained in Confucianism, Legalism, Taoism,

Mohism, and Yin-yang cosmology, schools of thought that had been hybridized since the commencement of the Han dynasty in 202 B.C. All this perfectly fits the young, ambitious Wu-ti's desire for military action against the Hsiung-nu with a politically and socially unified state. Once the great empire had been created, the new Confucian ideology became a permanent component of the new state and of the dynasties to follow. At the same time, Wu-ti unified the confusing religious beliefs and standardized the numerous and diverse worship and sacrificial systems of his time. The new Han religious and worship system, which conditioned and coordinated both imperial and individual behavioral modes and everyday life, continued throughout the imperial period.²⁸

Economically, Wu-ti's military expansion and empire building laid down the basic socioeconomic policy and taxation system as well as establishing the economic relationship between the state and the private sector. First, the Han policy of *chung-nung ch'ing-shang*, which promoted agriculture by elevating the status of farmers while restricting commercial activities and oppressing merchants, became entrenched in the legal system. This policy became, at least in the large theoretical framework, one of the key components of the Chinese social structure in the imperial period. The merchant class (*shang*) was at the bottom of the class structure in Chinese society, in theory if not in practice. Merchants could be appointed to high positions in government, as were Tung-kuo Hsien-yang, K'ung Chin, Sang Hung-yang, and Pu Shih, if their financial expertise was needed. Wu-ti also sold offices and aristocratic ranks to merchants, thus granting them political influence and a certain social status. Second, the taxation system in its rate structures (such as 15 percent for the land tax) and categorical forms (such as the poll, income, property, commercial, industrial, luxury, market, rent, military, and labor taxes), which was created and refined during Wu-ti's reign, became the model for later dynasties, sometimes exactly. Third, the monetary structure, especially the mint system, the *wu-shu* coinage, and the general policy of currency control, which played a critical role in financing Wu-ti's costly campaigns and colonization projects, was adopted as the basic monetary system by later dynasties. Fourth, Wu-ti's monopoly policy on salt, iron, gold, wine (liquor), coinage, and other daily essentials, as well as the market and price control apparatuses, such as *ping-chun* (standardization of prices) and *chün-shu* (equalization of prices through transportation) measures, also became the standard economic and financial policies of most later dynasties. Some of them have even survived in modern times in both Taiwan (the government monopoly on wine and tobacco) and other regions in Asia under Chinese cultural influence. One may further state that the state industries in the People's Republic of China came directly from those Han policies, even if they operate under the lofty labels of socialism and communism. Fifth, Wu-ti's accumulation of a massive national debt to meet the

costs of financial emergencies and special military operations became standard practice in later dynasties. In all, these policies and measures of Wu-ti's time, mostly due to the ingenious designs of Sang Hung-yang and other merchants turned officials, also served to define in Imperial China the frames of the economic and financial relationships between the state and society as a whole. Some of these economic policies and institutions were not Wu-ti's inventions and could be traced back to Ch'in times or even earlier, but it was under Wu-ti that they were restructured and implemented so that they functioned together with the other parts of the system to generate rich economic and financial resources and sources for unusual national expenditures. And that was solely Wu-ti's and his advisers' contribution to Imperial China and the growth of the Chinese empire for the next two thousand years.

To maintain order and stability during intense mobilizations for the massive military campaigns, which often resulted in enormous economic losses and disorder, Wu-ti entrusted two strict Legalists, Chao Yü and Chang T'ang, to codify the growing numbers of statutes and ordinances. These included civil, criminal, and administrative laws. The two overly strict Legalist minds organized and clarified these laws and codified them into comprehensive systematic legal structures in 33 parts in 359 sections, containing 409 articles on capital punishment with 1,882 offenses that automatically receive death penalty and 13,472 precedents and model cases for the death penalty. The emperor adopted them and issued them to the empire and governmental agencies. It was the first codification of the complex laws, ordinances, and orders since the Ch'in, and it was designed to meet the new social, economic, and legal needs of the new racially and culturally diverse empire. The new legal codes defined the rules for maintaining social, economic, and political order and administering governmental operations. But, more important, the new codes made clear in their elaborate legal articles that the emperor was the only lawgiver, that the state's power was absolute, and that the government possessed the unquestioned authority to administer the law by the harshest means throughout the empire.²⁹ This legal framework was established under the Ch'in, but it was Wu-ti and his advisers who systematically implemented it as an effective administrative instrument in order to serve completely political ends. And it was passed on to the later dynasties, although the practical articles of the Han law did not survive completely.

Wu-ti's massive military campaigns and subsequent territorial expansion through compulsory migrations and agricultural colonization not only established a standard model of military and territorial expansion up to modern times, but they also greatly extended the economic modes of agricultural life far beyond the earlier boundaries between the peasant and nomadic economies. At the same time, the expansion also greatly enlarged the cultural confines of the

old Han civilization. By including parts of Central Asia, Inner Asia, Korea, Vietnam, and the southwest border regions into the Han empire, the expansion greatly increased the racial, ethnic, cultural, religious, and even ethical and intellectual verities and complexities of Han society. While the Confucian culture still occupied the “hegemonic” or dominant position in the empire, the emergent or minority cultures had to be recognized and dealt with.³⁰

Thus, a new idea about cultural and national identity came to being. The empire was identified by the large and all-inclusive Confucian cultural label and the Han state system, not by individual racial, ethnic, religious, or other national or cultural symbols and labels. Within the empire, there was only one Han nation, a nation that was defined only by its territorial boundaries under the rule of the Han Court. All of the people in the empire were in theory the subjects of the T’ien-tzu, the “Son of Heaven.” China was identified by the name of the dynasty in power, and hence the Han empire was referred to as *Han-chia*, the “House of the Han.” Referring to the empire as the “house” of a ruling dynasty or regime was a new practice. The specific boundary lines of culture and race all disappeared within this new, informal definition of the dynastic unity of nation, culture, and state. From this point on, nationalism was replaced with loyalty to the dynasty, specifically the Imperial Court in power, such as the Han. This is why nationalism after the Mongol conquest of the Sung dynasty (A.D. 960–1279) existed mainly in the form of “Sung loyalism,” that is, loyalty to the Sung Court established by the Chao family, and the nationalism after the Manchu conquest of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) existed in the form “Ming loyalism,” loyalty to the Ming Court of the Chu family. Even in two dynasties established by racially different peoples—the Mongol Yuan (1279–1368) and Manchu Ch’ing—nonracial nationalism prevailed in the form of dynastic loyalism, that is, Yuan loyalism and Ch’ing loyalism. One only needs to witness the number of non-Mongol and non-Manchu people who died for the two dynasties or chose to fight for their restoration after their demise and refused to serve their conquerors. After the fall of the Ch’ing dynasty, for example, it was a “Han Chinese,” Chang Hsun (1854–1923), who made the unsuccessful attempt to restore the Manchu dynasty in July 1917. Wang Kuo-wei (1877–1927), a “Han Chinese” considered by many to have been the greatest scholar and historian in modern times, actually committed suicide for the Manchu dynasty in 1927, sixteen years after its demise.³¹ And this was so even though those two “alien dynasties” had sometimes made “race” a political issue during their reigns.³² From these examples, it is obvious that nationalism in Imperial China after Wu-ti’s expansion was a state of mind or a concept of loyalty and not a manifestation of racial, ethnic, or cultural differences. It was characterized by a defined set of special feelings and emotions that made a political regime or body politic the cause of collective or individual action for

fulfilling or actualizing a collective mission or individual ideal of life. The loyalist movement for the restoration of the Yuan dynasty was a collective mission; a Yuan loyalist's suicide for the dynasty after its demise was a case of an individual action intended to fulfill an individual ideal.³³

Wu-ti's expansion led the Chinese for the first time to distant lands and countries with cultures and languages different from their own. It then created a new form of national identity. They began to identify themselves by the name of their dynasty, the Han, a marker of their "nationality," as a geographical guidepost and a political-military and cultural entity, of which they were a member, although it was more of the former than of the latter. They did so because centuries-old forms of national identity such as *Chung-kuo* (Center Kingdom, Central Kingdom, or Middle Kingdom) and *Chung-yuan* (Central Plain of the Hua [Hua-Hsia] culture), both of which were based exclusively on the historical consciousness of cultural or political superiority, no longer had any practical purpose for the peoples of those distant lands, who were historically and culturally uninformed of their meanings and implications.³⁴ Second, previously the people of the Ch'in dynasty, following a much earlier tradition of Shang and Chou times, had already adopted this dynastic identification when they went to the eastern regions of Hsi-yü before the Han dynasty. They were known as Ch'in-jen, "people of or from the Ch'in."³⁵ This new national identification by the name of a dynasty began a long-lasting tradition in Chinese history. Witness that influence in today's China and abroad, where the most common language is generally known as Han-yü (language of the Han), where written Chinese is known as Han-wen (Han writing), and where over 95 percent of the Chinese people are referred to as Han-jen (Han people). After the Han dynasty, the practice of marking national identity, or the marker of nationality, became standard. The people of almost every unified dynasty in the Chinese empire identified themselves with or were referred to by the name of their dynasty outside China and/or after the end of that dynasty. So there were the Chin-jen (people of the Chin dynasty), T'ang-jen (people of the T'ang dynasty), Sung-jen (people of the Sung dynasty), Yuan-jen (people of the Yuan dynasty), Ming-jen (people of the Ming dynasty), and Ch'ing-jen (people of the Ch'ing dynasty). When China was not unified under one regime, the people of different regions and power groups referred to themselves as or were referred to by the names of their regional kingdoms and regimes. And this practice included the "alien or conquest regimes" in China, such as Wei-jen (people of the Hsien-pei [Northern] Wei dynasty), Liao-jen (people of the Khitan Liao dynasty), Chin-jen (people of the Jurchen Chin dynasty), and Hsi-Hsia-jen (people of the Tangut Hsi-Hsia dynasty). Sometimes peoples of border or non-Han origins also referred to themselves or were referred to by the names of their earlier or predynastic regimes, such as Hsien-pei (Hsien-pi, proto-Mongol),

Ch'i-tan (Khitan), Meng-ku (Mongol), and Man-chou (Manchu, Manju). Such discursive conventions of nomenclature clearly followed the Han practice, under which such terms described or implied only political, geographical, or cultural placement, without racial-ethnic connotations. When a dynasty or regime was not firmly established or yet well known or was disliked for some reason, then Han-jen, Hua-jen (people of the culturally glorious Chung-hua, the central region of the tradition-honored Hua[-Hsia] culture), T'ang-jen, or other classical or nonpolitical expressions were used outside the domain of the Chinese empire. From all this, it is evident that the extensive expansion and empire building in Han Wu-ti's time redefined the meaning of what is known in modern times as the term *nation* as a purely political, geographical, or cultural construction with no racial-ethnic connotations; that is, when the term was used it identified mainly the people's geographical location, political orientation, and culture, not racial, ethnic, religious, or linguistic attributes.³⁶ This national consciousness in Han times seems to have contributed significantly to the longevity of the Chinese empire due to its emphasis on the importance of dynastic unification through a long historical consciousness of territorial unity and the disregard for racial-ethnic differences. If so, this is certainly one of the most historically significant legacies of Wu-ti's military and territorial expansions. One only needs to look at the colossal racial assimilation process in North China during the long Six Dynasties period from 220 to 589. The Hsien-pei, for example, implemented the grand *Hua-hua* (sinicization) scheme to assimilate their people to Chinese culture by forcing them to adopt the Chinese language, names, and clothing styles, as well as to marry and live with Chinese. This was all done by a Hsien-pei ruler, Emperor Hsiao-wen (r. A.D. 471–499), of the Northern Wei dynasty, which controlled North China at that time. In the end, the people of different races and ethnicities in North China were transformed into a new nation, neither Han nor non-Han Chinese. It was a new Chinese nation with mixed blood, as was so clearly manifested in the ruling houses of the subsequent Sui and T'ang Dynasties. Although both had old Han Chinese names—Yang and Li, respectively—they were half Chinese and half Hsien-pei. It seems that in this case once the race issue became less sensitive and deferential to cultural, political, and geographical concerns, assimilation and acculturation among races became more attainable.³⁷

The historical significance of this point is even more far-reaching if one looks at an unusual change in Han political culture as a result of Wu-ti's expansion movement. That is the changed meaning of the term *kuo-chia*. Although it has been translated as “country,” “state,” and occasionally “nation,” in the sense of the two preceding terms it originally meant the lands of a leading feudal lord (*kuo*, “fiefdom”) or a lesser lord (*chia*, “clans”) in Chou times (ca. 1100–221 B.C.), not a country, state, or nation. But with the

decline of the feudal system beginning in the middle of the Eastern Chou period (771–221 B.C.), the terms *kuo* and *chia* also began to lose their meaning, since the original Chou feudal lords had become virtually independent sovereigns, or were striving to reach that status, and the Chou king had lost the power to become the Son of Heaven. He was now even weaker than many of his former vassals. Under these circumstances, the original meanings of *kuo* and *chia* lost their meanings, and as a result a term that combined *kuo* and *chia* (*kuo-chia*) came to mean the country, state, or nation—that is, the whole land under the rule of a regime, though some writers of that age of war and chaos continued to use the two words in their original meanings in their various political tracts or statecraft discourses calling for the return to the old Chou feudal system. But that period of “transition” for China, and for the term *kuo-chia*, ended in 221 B.C. when the Ch’in unified all the Warring States and formally abolished the feudal system. As the Ch’in instituted a nationwide, centralized, *chün-hsien* administrative system, there were no more individual *kuo* and *chia*. All the land under Heaven was under a single sovereign, the emperor (*huang-ti*), and all the people were members of one nation and one state in the territory of one country, that is, one *kuo-chia*. This meaning of *kuo-chia* remained unchanged in the Han dynasty until the era of Wu-ti’s expansion. As was discussed earlier, military expansion brought an unusual centralization of the emperor’s power; his personal identification with the state; his absolute political, economic, military, and legal authority, and the rise of a new understanding of what constitutes the concept of the modern term *nation*. As the whole nation, in fact the whole empire, was considered one unit under the rule of the Son of Heaven and by virtue of the Confucian political ideology that ethical verities are the foundation of such a state, it was really like a big family, with the emperor as its head, just like he was under the old feudal order in Chou times. Therefore, the emperor was the de facto state or the abstract representation of the *kuo-chia*. And that is exactly what happened in practical political discourse: The emperor began to be referred to as the *kuo-chia* and addressed himself as *kuo-chia* in first-person expressions, not only in the later reigns of the Han dynasty but also in subsequent dynasties.³⁸ This means that the state, the nation, and the empire all became one in the person of the emperor. Thus, the emperor’s divinely sanctioned power was transformed into the actual institutional representation of the nation-state-empire trinity. This was a new definition of the institution of emperorship and a new phase in Chinese statecraft, amounting to a revolution in Chinese political culture. The political structure and basic ideology of Imperial China after Wu-ti never departed from this path. Han Wu-ti and his great expansions thus forever changed the structure of the Chinese state in particular and the Chinese political culture as a whole.

THE PARADIGM OF EMPIRE AND IMPERIALISM

At the end of the great Han expansion in the last years of the first century B.C., the Han built a vast transterritorial and transnational *colonial* empire, an empire that controlled the immense domain extending from the Yellow Sea and East Sea (the western edge of the Pacific Ocean) in the east to the mountain ranges of the Pamirs in the west and the southern part of the Gobi Desert (in modern Mongolia) in the north to Hainan Island and Vietnam in the South Sea in the south. It was an empire that controlled nearly fifty external and nine internal colonies, with a total population of over 1.5 million, of which 375,000 were armed warriors. These Han colonies also spread over a territory of nearly a million square miles. It was a multiracial, multicultural, multilinguistic, and multifaceted empire composed of five major sectors.

1. The Han empire proper: This part was under what was commonly called the *chün-hsien* structure, altogether eighty to ninety *chün* and twenty kingdoms. These were under one bureaucratic administration answerable to the Han Court. It may be referred to as the core of the Han empire, covering the land extending from the East Sea and northern Korea in the east to the westernmost border of Tun-huang *chün* in the west and from northern Vietnam in the south to the southern edge of the Gobi Desert in the north.

2. *Shu-kuo* (the Dependent States): These were the internal colonies, districts that were set up for surrendered non-Han peoples such as the Hsiung-nu, Ch'iang, and Ch'iu-tzu, where they were granted limited administrative independence and autonomy in their social and economic lifestyles, religious observances, and cultural traditions, though all military and territorial affairs were under the strict control of the Han Court. Located in the border regions of the Han empire proper, they were under the authority of the *Tien Shu-kuo* (Minister [Director] of the Dependent States), a position ranked among the highest ministers in the central government. They were also under the command of a *tu-wei* (chief commandant) appointed by the central government, who was either a non-Han or a Han man. They were located in the border *chün* (*wai-chün*, outer *chün*), which were heavily garrisoned by regular Han troops and border cavalry forces. In Former Han times, there were nine such *Shu-kuo*, ranging in population from several thousand to over thirty thousand, all of which were in the process of being transformed into regular Han *hsien* (district) administrative units.

3. The outer empire: These were the external colonies under the command of the Protector General in the Western Regions (Hsi-yü *tu-hu*). Numbering about fifty, they enjoyed different states of independence and autonomy at various stages of their administrative transformation. They also varied greatly in size. Wu-sun, for example, had a population of over 630,000 and an army of

over 188,000 soldiers, while Ch'iu-tzu (Kucha) had over 82,000 people and an army of over 21,000. Some smaller states had only a few hundred people. A number of these colonies had been established by the Han Court, and at least six of them were much like the *shu-kuo* in the Han empire proper—their states had been set up by the Han, and a majority of them were headed by a *tu-wei* or officials of equivalent status. The colonies where Han farming soldiers were stationed and garrisoned were next to this category in their degrees of autonomy and administrative transformation. The rest of the colonies, each of which was a state in some form, were farther down on the scale of complete Han control and transformation, where they followed the rules imposed by the Han Court as part of the Hsi-yü Protectorate General. The heads of these colonies were required to pay regular official visits to the Han Court (*ju-ch'ao*) and to send their princes as hostages to the court (*chih-tzu*). These hostages, together with their families, resided in the area called the Kao-chieh (Foreigners' Quarters) in Ch'ang-an and received instruction in Han culture and politics. While in Ch'ang-an, foreign heads of state, hostages, and other envoys were under the command of the *T'ien-k'o*, the Ministry of Guests, one of the nine highest-ranking ministries in the Han central government. It should also be noted that these states were prohibited by the court from exchanging hostages and court visits since they all were subjects of the Han (*ch'en-shu*, *ch'eng-ch'en*). The officials of these colonies were granted official seals and credentials symbolizing their status as Han subordinates.

4. Han protectorates: These states accepted Han suzerainty and the special seals and credentials (*yin*, *chang*, *shou*) but enjoyed political and military autonomy. Located outside the Han borders, they were under Han military protection and received regular economic assistance; they followed Han orders in military mobilization and joint military actions. In essence, these states or regimes enjoyed only partial sovereignty. The best-known Han protectorate was the Southern Hsiung-nu (Nan Hsiung-nu) under Shan-yü Hu-Han-yeh (58–31 B.C.) and his successors, whose territory was just outside the Han northern border.

5. *Chi-mi* states: These states were subject to the Han policy of *chi-mi* (loose rein or appeasement) and not part of the colonial network of the protectorate general of the Western Regions. Also called *fan-kuo* (satellite foreign states), they had been conquered by the Han but had not completely submitted to the empire, and the Han made no effort to control them directly. They paid court visits and sent hostages to the Han Court, though irregularly. The absence of such court visits or hostages did not lead Han punitive expeditions. The country of K'ang-ch'ü (Sogdiana) is the best-known example. A Greco-Bactrian kingdom (mainly in modern Uzbekistan) with Aramaic as the official written language and Sogdiana or Bactrian as the spoken language, it had a population

of 600,000 and 120,000 fighting soldiers. Several other countries in South and Central Asia were in this category.

The Han colonial empire was structured with the ideological framework of universal kingship (*wang T'ien-hsia*, *i T'ien-hsia*), which had been fully developed under Emperor Wu. This ideology of world empire advances the theory that once a ruler has achieved full moral kingship (becoming a *sheng-wang*, "sage-emperor") and has guided his empire (a specific domain) to a high level of peace, order, and prosperity (*wang-tao*) he has the responsibility of providing the "barbarian" world with the same high spiritual and material civilization, that is, to lead these barbarians to high civilization from the spiritual, moral, and economic backwardness that they themselves might not be able to recognize. However, to achieve such "lofty" goals, the sage-emperor must consider "cultural transformation" (*chiao-hua*, *t'ung-hua*) to be of primary importance and "military conquest" (*cheng-fa*, *pa*) a last resort. A military action must also be justified on the noble pretext of keeping "world peace" (*t'ien-hsia ho-chi/anting*) and "world order" (*t'ien-hsia i-chih*). The best and most effective means of exercising power was the masterly application of the time-honored principles of "divide and rule" (*fen-chih*) and "using barbarians against (or to check, control, or conquer) barbarians" (*i-i chih-i*, *i-i fa-i*). For example, in the Western Regions in 59 B.C., the Han, taking the divide and rule policy literally, conquered Kuchih, a country that had resisted Han conquest since 108 B.C., and then divided it into eight small states. In 53 B.C., the Han partitioned Wu-sun, a powerful country of Sakās and Bactrians with a population of 630,000, into two smaller states. By applying the two principles skillfully with special strategic, diplomatic, and military maneuvers and with its superior economic strength and technological advantages, with only 1,500 to 2,000 soldiers the Han were able to rule the world of the Western Regions, which together had a population of over 1.3 million and a combined armed force of over 320,000 men. In 71 B.C., for instance, with only 500 Han soldiers, Colonel Ch'ang Hui summoned 50,000 troops from several countries in the Western Regions to subjugate Ch'iu-tzu (Kucha), a country of 81,317 people with an armed force of 21,076 men, which earlier had violated Han "colonial rule" by attacking another small state. In 65 B.C., with fewer than 100 Han soldiers Commandant Feng Feng-shih called out 15,000 troops from several countries in the Western Regions to subdue So-chü (Yarkand). They forced its rebellious king to commit suicide and placed a more submissive king on the throne. In dealing with the Hsiung-nu, the Han applied the same principles, first by using the armed forces of the Western Regions against the Hsiung-nu. In 71 B.C., with about 500 Han soldiers, Colonel Ch'ang Hui commanded over 50,000 Wu-sun cavalymen and inflicted heavy losses on the west wing of the Hsiung-nu forces—killing or capturing

39,000, including the *shan-yü*'s father, princesses, and high-ranking officials and officers—and seized over 700,000 horses, cows, sheep, donkeys, camels, and mules. In 60 B.C., General Cheng Chi called out 50,000 soldiers from Ch'ü-li, Ch'iu-tzu, and other states in the Western Regions to escort to the Han capital at Ch'ang-an King Jih-chu, who surrendered to Han with his twelve subordinate kings and 12,000 Hsiung-nu, the entire Hsiung-nu west wing. The Han also played one group of Hsiung-nu against another and devised schemes to split them into contending factions in 56 B.C. After 54 B.C., the Han played Shan-yü Hu-han-yeh against Shan-yü Chih-chih until the latter's demise in 36 B.C.³⁹

But, lofty and glorified ideology aside, what were the true ambitions behind the empire building and the rise of Han imperialism? From this study, we can see the following causes and factors as predominant: (1) the emergence of a young, brilliant, ambitious, and strong-willed ruler (Emperor Wu); (2) the advent of a new generation of aggressive, devoted, and zealous empire builders and expansionists, who had a strong conviction that they were the bearers of a unique historic mission; (3) strategic necessity, such as the pressing concerns over national security caused by the Hsiung-nu challenge; (4) the call of the historic mission of taking up the mantle of a great empire of the past, either real or idealized, for example, the "legendary" great empires T'ang and Yü of the sage-kings Yao and Shun; (5) ethical demands, such as avenging an ancestor's defeat and humiliation by a non-Han group or state (such as the Hsiung-nu defeat of Kao-ti [Liu Pang] at P'ing-ch'eng early in the Han dynasty); (6) the defense of national pride, that is, the civilized Chinese (Han) versus the uncivilized, non-Chinese barbarians (generally referred to as *pai-man*, *man-i*, or *i-ti*, in Han texts); (7) extraordinary economic growth providing sufficient resources to meet military expenses and confidence of the success of expansionist campaigns; (8) compelling military necessity, such as seizing new resources to strengthen the armed forces (special fighting horses such as the mythic Farghana "heavenly horses" [*t'ien-ma*] in Emperor Wu's case); (9) the coming of unusually gifted, talented, and adventurous military leaders and strategists, such as Wei Ch'ing, Huo Ch'ü-ping, Li Kuang-li, Cheng Chi, Ch'ang Hui, Chao Ch'ung-kuo, Feng Feng-shih, Tuan Hui-tsung, Hsin Ch'ing-chi, Ch'en T'ang, Kan Yen-shou, Princess Chieh-yu, and Lady Feng Liao in Wu Ti's time and later; (10) the presence of a single, powerful foreign challenge, a challenge that could endanger the very existence of the Chinese empire, such as the Hsiung-nu with their strong satellite states in the Western Regions in the early Han, with which the Han had already been locked in lengthy conflicts from 202 to 141 B.C.; (11) geographical position, the location of the Han empire being favorable to sustaining a long military conflict with the Hsiung-nu; (12) technological and organizational advantages, such as the advanced iron-casting technology that enabled the Han to make powerful, sharp weapons that allowed

(as reported by Ch'en T'ang) one Han soldier to overcome 5 to 3 native soldiers, and the development of a professional cavalry; and (13) a noble response to the call to build the utopian world of Ta-t'ung (Grand Unity) by extending high Chinese civilization to the world of the barbarians and transforming the chaotic and divided non-Han states into a world of peace, order, prosperity, and perfect morality under Han universal kingship (suzerainty)—the world of *hun-i* (all peoples, cultures, and lands within the four seas blended and unified as one nation under the command of one man, the overlord of All under Heaven, that is, the Han T'ien-tzu, "Son of Heaven")—which could be achieved first by means of military conquest and then by an infusion of Han culture and Confucian ethical teachings. In broad intellectual terms, these factors and causes can be thought of as ideological, historical, political, ethical, personal, economic, and military. Some may be examined as primary factors, and others may play only secondary roles in an expansion movement. An expansion movement, in general, can commence without the presence of all thirteen factors, nor are all of them set in motion at the same time. But critical primary factors often combine to effect the movement, and then the other factors, mostly of secondary importance, gradually come to play an important role when they are needed to bring the movement to a successful conclusion. The degree of importance, primary or secondary, always varies with each specific case and cannot be universally defined or evaluated by a fixed standard. One category of critical factors in building a colonial empire was the training of interpreters and translators, who served as the bridge of communication and hence the functional link between the core and the colonies. In the Han central government, there were special departments of such officials in both the Ministry of Guests (the Grand Herald after 32 B.C.), which was headed by directors of interpreters and translators (*i-kuan*), and the Ministry of Dependent States, which was headed by nine chiefs of interpreters and translators (*i-ling*). In the various Dependent States, frontier establishments, and colonial states and regions, similar institutions were established to facilitate communication between Han officials and non-Han peoples, who used various languages in writing and speaking such as Turkic, Sakā, Prakrit, Bactrian, Greek, Aramaic, Avestan, Sogdian, Sanskrit, and Tocharian. In the Western Regions, as recorded in the incomplete Han records, there were thirty-four such head interpreters and translators (*i-chang*) in twenty-three different states and regions. Among the interpreters and translators were both men and women.⁴⁰ The second group of special experts in building the Han colonial empire was the well-trained and experienced specialists in colonial affairs who held positions in the colonial regions, such as the protector general of the Western Regions, his deputies and other low officers, and the ministers of guests and the Dependent States and their subordinates. The partial list of the best-known and most successful Former Han colonial experts includes Cheng Chi, Su Wu,

Tuan Hui-tsung, Kan Yen-shou, Ch'en T'ang, Ch'ang Hui, Hsu Tzu-wei, Jen Li-cheng, Tu Ch'in, Kuo Shun, Tan Ch'in, and three generations of the Feng Feng-shih family, of whom Tuan Hui-tsung served as the protector general of the Western Regions three times (33–31, 27–25, and 21–19 B.C.) and died in office. Ch'ang Hui served as both protector general of the Western Regions and minister of the Dependent States, where he also held the post of general of the rear (*hou Chiang-chün*), one of the highest military positions in the empire.⁴¹

As the Han empire gradually expanded and a huge colonial empire was formed and consolidated from Emperor Wu's long reign onward, with it the paradigm of Han conquest was steadily formulated and advanced by the Han imperialists, including rulers, ministers, high-ranking officials, generals, and theorists of imperialism. Essentially, the formation of the Han colonial empire from the 130s B.C. to the turn of the millennium was the result of the imperial vision, personal ambitions, determination, and unimaginable endurance of suffering of these driving personalities, who skillfully mobilized, utilized, and infused all the possible historical forces in the pursuit of national security, imperial power and glory, and divine approval and legitimacy of the mythic ideal of T'ien-tzu, the Son of Heaven and the chosen master of All under Heaven, which can be traced back to the rulers of the Shang dynasty in the sixteenth century B.C. In practical terms, the Han colonial empire developed the concept of the "natural boundaries" of the Chinese empire, which would endure for the next 2,000 years, from the South and East Seas to the Gobi Desert, the Himalaya, and the Pamirs. The Han acquisition and colonization of Ho-hsi (the region west of the Yellow River), Hsi-yü (the Western Regions), Pei-pien and Pei-sai (the northern frontier), and other regions also initiated the cultural, economic, and social transformation of the peoples in these colonies and developing regions and made them part of the so-called Han imperial culture. Thus, the Han colonial accomplishment realized a long-held utopian ideology, *ssu-hai chih-nei chieh hsiung-ti* (we all are brothers within the four seas). A popular Han song of the time reflected this ideal.⁴²

Within the Four Seas,
We all are brothers,
And none be taken as strangers!

The term *four seas* (*ssu-hai*) in this poem has mythological origins. Up to the Han dynasty, it had long been considered just a metaphor for the boundaries of China at the time of reference. Whereas the four seas were the East Sea (*Tung-hai*), South Sea (*Nan-hai*), North Sea (*Pei-hai*), and West Sea (*Hsi-hai*), only the first two were geographically identified and recognized as China's eastern and southern boundaries; the North and West Seas existed only in geographical

imagination. The Han expansion brought new geographical knowledge to the Han Chinese and significantly changed their conception of the world. First, their military and diplomatic activities with the Hsiung-nu led them to a “huge sea” (Han-hai) in the far northern Hsiung-nu territory, Lake Baikal, and hence impressed on them the identification of the mythical Pei-hai (North Sea). Then, with the grand westward march of the Han soldiers and colonists from the 120s to the 30s B.C., a series of “huge seas” were encountered: first Lake Tsinghai (in modern Tsinghai), then Lop Nor, Lake Bostang, Lake Balkhash (in southeastern Kazakhstan), and finally the Persian Gulf (by T’iao-chih kingdom, in modern Iraq), and so a series of Hsi-hai, lined up with the moving front of Han imperial power and colonial rule in the west. The Han military expansion ended in 36 B.C. when its forces conquered Chih-chih in the Talas River region and reached the domain of K’ang-chü (Sogdiana) for the second time. Thus, during this long march of the Han empire in the west, its imperial power reached only to the middle of modern Uzbekistan and no expedition went beyond the last Hsi-hai (the Persian Gulf), though the majesty and reputation of its military might did (*wu-ch’ang Hsi-hai*, as the Han expansionists proudly claimed about the repercussions of the Chih-chih conquest).⁴³ Thus, the Han westward expansion defined the actual territorial contents of the age-old metaphoric Four Seas by their geographical locations as follows.

1. The traditional domain: East Sea, South Sea, Lake Baikal, and Lake Tsinghai.
2. The new, more realistic domain: East Sea, South Sea, Lake Baikal, and Lake Balkhash.
3. The idealized domain: East Sea, South Sea, Lake Baikal, and the Persian Gulf.

Since the Han were unable to march farther than K’ang-chü on its western front after 36 B.C., the second domain became their final sphere of imperial ambitions. Nor were any of the later dynasties in Imperial China able to go farther, with the exception of the Mongol Yuan regime (A.D. 1279–1368). The T’ang dynasty (A.D. 618–907) made claims to territories beyond the Han boundaries and set up some nominal administrative systems over them, but it never controlled the region so claimed.⁴⁴ Thus, the Han territorial boundaries became the “natural boundaries” of Imperial China.

The long, extensive, and costly Han expansion from Wu-ti onward certainly brought greatest glory and pride to the Han empire, but it also unintentionally defined the limits of its imperial power. The Han could not go any farther than K’ang-chü after 36 B.C. because they had reached the limit of the empire’s “imperial potential.” It had exhausted its economic capacity; it had

failed to produce a new generation of military and strategic leaders; it was unable to overcome the natural barriers of physical geography, which caused enormous transportation and communications problems (as seen in the Ta-yuan expedition of 104–101 B.C.); and it had failed to overcome the resistance of the conquered due to unresolvable deep racial, religious, historical, and cultural differences. These are the cardinal reasons why the Han stopped expanding, even though they were militarily superior to the states beyond the Western Regions. In fact, the Han also recognized that there was a world larger than T'ien-hsia, and they came to accept the fact that outside the immense Han colonial empire there were others: the An-hsi empire, with its satellite states (Parthia, the Persian empire), just to the west; and the Ta-Ch'in empire, with its enormous satellite states and colonies (the Roman Empire), west of that. The Han paid great respect to both and clearly accepted the three-empire world they lived in.⁴⁵ In this respect, the Han expansion unexpectedly changed the earlier Chinese concept of sinocentrism, at least in Han times.

THE LEGACY OF THE CH'IN AND HAN EMPIRES

The immense military expansion and territorial extension of Imperial China from Ch'in Shih Huang-ti to the end of the Former Han peaked in Han Wu-ti's long reign of over fifty years and gave birth to a new Chinese empire. It was an empire of one state and one nation within a commonly defined frontier boundary under the authoritarian rule of one sovereign with the support of a centralized bureaucracy. That was the formation of the paradigm of the Chinese empire. The instrument to maintain and consolidate this empire was its military power and complex frontier system based on population migration and systematic agricultural colonization. It was, however, a multiregional, multiracial, multilingual (spoken), and multicultural empire bound together only by the absolute power of the state, one written language, and a loosely defined national identity based on political expediency and the convenience of an arbitrarily constructed nationality. One clear example of the latter point is the forms of population registration and passports and other travel documents that were examined in detail elsewhere. They all exemplify this point by listing only the holder's geographical origin, political and social status, *wen* (civilian) or *wu* (military) classification (if one was an official), and one simple identifiable physical feature such as height or skin color. The Han empire did not consider other issues important. Nor did the other dynasties that followed the Han.

This empire had, however, inherent tensions and problems because of its multiplicity of races, cultures, and regions. For it was built on the balance of a strong imperial court with top central leadership, an effective bureaucracy, an extensive and capable military, and the common recognition of the necessity of

sacrifice of individual cultural, racial, and regional differences for the convenience in other, more urgent pursuits and concerns. The empire would collapse if that balance ceased to hold or became dysfunctional. And that is actually the recurrent pattern in the history of the Chinese empire.

But in the *longue durée*, the Chinese empire, as defined by the Ch'in-Han expansion, commenced by Ch'in Shih Huang-ti, and completed by Han Wu-ti and his Han heirs, forever ended the stage of a multistate China to produce a single imperial polity and became a political ideal and a characteristic symbolic practice in state building in political culture and in the core of requisite virtues of leadership in Imperial China. It became a permanent component of Chinese civilization. The building of a unified empire with a territory no smaller than the Han empire at its peak of glory became the "Manifest Destiny" of China in the minds of the imperial leadership and the political consciousness of every great ruler, particularly a dynastic founder, native or alien. In the long run, this ideal gradually became a permanent element in the Chinese political mind. Thus, one can measure the process of state building and changes in the national economic and military strength of a dynasty or regime by the degree of intensity of its rhetoric for empire building or by whether or not that dynasty or regime took empire building as its main political project and historical mission. The state of the Chinese empire reflected and reinforced the state of Chinese civilization. That was the essence of the lofty arguments offered to Han Wu-ti and his heirs (such as Emperors Chao, Hsuan, and Yuan) by their chief political and economic advisers and leading generals.⁴⁶ That tradition was inherited by their counterparts in later dynasties and regimes and is still much in evidence in today's China.

In a broad historical perspective, the formation and development of the Chinese empire under the Ch'in and Han were the result of unique individual personalities, historical circumstances, administrative reforms, racial and ethnic conditions, military revolution, economic progress, population increase, and foreign challenges. This pattern of empire building was to become a fixture of the Chinese empire for the next two thousand years and is still a key signpost in examining the course of Chinese history in modern times. In fact, this seems to be the universal pattern of empire building in the history of world civilization past and present.



Appendix I

A Note on the Tu-wei Institution on the Han Frontier

THE TERM *tu-wei* had two connotations in Han times. One was an official title, generally translated as “chief commandant,” which referred to an official equal in rank to a minister or a military officer equal to a general or the highest military officer in a *chün* or special region such as the *shu-kuo*. The other meaning referred to an area under the administration of a *tu-wei*, which I have rendered as “chief commandant area.” This study takes the second connotation of *tu-wei* as its subject matter, and unless otherwise noted it refers to a chief commandant area throughout. A chief commandant in a chief commandant area administered both civilian and military affairs, while the chief commandant in a regular *chün* or administrative unit was prohibited from involving himself in civilian affairs.

In Han times, various types of *tu-wei* were established on the frontier for the development of newly acquired areas (or for other purposes). The first type was for the settlement of “barbarians,” for example, Mao-niu *tu-wei* of Shu *chün*, instituted in 97 B.C.,¹ and the Shu-kuo (Dependent States) *tu-wei*, especially the five Shu-kuo *tu-wei* established in 121 B.C. by Wu-ti for the resettlement of surrendered Hsiung-nu of Ho-hsi.² The second type was for Chinese settlers, for example, the Ch’ing-I *tu-wei* of Shu *chün*, established in 97 B.C.³ The third type was for both Chinese and barbarians, for example, the Yeh-lang *tu-wei* (134–123 B.C.) and the various *tu-wei* of Ho-hsi.⁴ These *tu-wei* can also be classified according to their size. The smallest controlled a city and its surrounding area such as the *tu-wei* in Ho-hsi. The medium-sized ones controlled one or two *hsien* such as Mao-niu, Ch’ing-I, and Yeh-lang. The largest con-

trolled several *hsien*, with an organizational structure similar to a *chün*, such as the Hsi-i (Western Barbarians) *tu-wei* and the Nan-i (Southern Barbarians) *tu-wei* of Shu (135 B.C.), with ten or more *hsien*;⁵ the Nan-pu *tu-wei* of Chen-p'an and the Tung-pu *tu-wei* of Lin-t'un with seven *hsien* (in modern Korea); the Hsi-pu *tu-wei* of I-chou (A.D. 67), with six *hsien*; and the Shu-kuo *tu-wei* of Shu (A.D. 123), with four *hsien*.⁶

These organizational differences among the various *tu-wei* reflect differing developmental stages and regional variations. In the southwestern regions, the Han government established a *hsien* administration immediately after an area was acquired because these regions had already been well developed by the natives.⁷ *Tu-wei* governments were then established in several *hsien* to direct their further development, thus constituting a transitional stage from *hsien* to *chün* government. But in the northwestern regions (particularly in Ho-hsi), since the areas under colonization were depopulated after the surrender of the Hsiung-nu, the Han had to develop them from scratch. Therefore, *hsien* governments could not be instituted until the areas had been populated and developed to a considerable extent under the military rule of a *tu-wei* (chief commandant), which provided both protection against possible Hsiung-nu attack and guidance in farming activities. The distinction between these two types of *tu-wei* was evident only under the Former Han dynasty. During the Later Han, high-level *tu-wei* were also established in the northwestern regions. For example, in A.D. 102 the former *chün* of Hsi-hai was restored, but the Hsi-pei *tu-wei* of Chin-ch'eng *chün* was assigned to administer its development.⁸ As they were developed, the chief commandant areas in Ho-hsi and other northwestern regions were generally promoted to *hsien* status, as with the *tu-wei* of Chiu-ch'üan at Tun-huang, of Yü-men, and of Chü-yen. But most of those in the southwest were given *chün* administrations, as with the Hsi-pu *tu-wei* of I-chou, which was combined with adjacent districts in A.D. 69 to form Yung-ch'ang *chün*, its chief commandant becoming the governor.⁹ On the other hand, the various Shu-kuo *tu-wei* (chief commandants) in the Former Han period were under the jurisdiction of the *Tien Shu-kuo* (director of the Dependent States) and developed outside the framework of the *chün* system. This condition remained unchanged until 28 B.C., when the Department of the Dependent States was abolished and the various Shu-kuo *tu-wei* merged with the *chün* in which they were located or one nearby.¹⁰

This sketch of the *tu-wei* institution during the Han dynasty shows fairly clearly that the *tu-wei* frontier units in general represent a special administrative system that the Han government developed to colonize its newly acquired border regions and control the surrendered barbarians. Its special form combined military rule and civil administration into one, though its size and functions varied with local conditions. From all indications, it was different from the reg-

ular *tu-wei* at various governmental levels in the interior and played a very special and important role in the territorial expansion of the Han empire. The special institution of the chief commandant area, like that of the chief commandant itself, originated during the Ch'in dynasty, as it developed the newly acquired territory of Nan-yueh, in which Nan-hai *chiün* (in modern Kuangtung Province) was initially a *tu-wei* region governed by Jen Hsiao in 221–209 B.C. and later by Chao T'uo in 209–203 B.C.¹¹ When the Han inherited it, they expanded it into a complex and effective frontier system that served as a base for further expansion and colonization. This is another link in the continuity of the Ch'in and Han empires and imperialism.



Appendix 2

The Military Leadership in the Former Han Period: A Cultural and Sociological Analysis

IT IS GENERALLY RECOGNIZED that three of the keys to understanding Chinese history are the state, the land system, and the military. While the second dictates the life pattern of the people, the third determines the political regime and the shape of the state. It is also generally accepted that, although these three essential factors have a long history of evolution, they developed and consolidated their basic patterns and structures under the Former Han dynasty (202 B.C.–A.D. 8). Their later history has generally been no more than a series of adaptations of Han-type systems to new environments and challenges. Indeed, while the Ch'in (221–207 B.C.) laid down their foundations, all the basic forms of the Chinese state, land, and military systems emerged during the Former Han.

By way of illustrating the importance of these key factors in Chinese history, this essay examines an aspect of one of them, the leadership of the Former Han military. An understanding of the composition and behavior of that leadership will give us a better understanding of the inner aspects of the Former Han dynasty and the military in particular. The other issues and systems have been examined elsewhere.¹

BASIC TRENDS IN FORMER HAN HISTORY

The Han military leadership cannot be understood without placing it in its historical, political, social, and cultural contexts. It grew and shaped its structure

as a response to the political needs and changing military policies of a growing dynasty. It expanded, as did the Han economy; it gradually changed its function, as did the national spirit of the age; it reshaped its hierarchical structure as the imperial leaders directed; and it adapted its basic organizational structure as the civil-military relationship changed in response to societal change.

The history of the Former Han dynasty can be divided into five periods.²

1. The period of founding, 202–180 B.C.
2. The period of the first transition, 179–141 B.C.
3. The period of the new frontier, 140–87 B.C.
4. The period of the second transition, 86–49 B.C.
5. The period of stagnation, 48 B.C.–A.D. 8

From a political-economic perspective, the first period saw little governmental interference, and the people's thinking and behavior were generally not much bound by institutions and traditions. The Han legal framework of this period followed Ch'in law but was made simple and easy to observe. Almost without exception, the political leaders of this period were the former military advisers and fighting comrades of the first Han emperor, Kao-ti (202–195 B.C.). In fact, until the reign of Wu-ti (141–87 B.C.), the sixth ruler, the grand title of general (*chiang-chün*), the highest military rank, was almost exclusively granted only to those with real experience in combat and military command: 107 out of 114 times (one person could have held the title at different times, and each instance is counted as one). In numbers of appointees, this was the case with 71 out of 73 generals.

In this period, there was general suspicion of and disrespect toward educated persons and cultural institutions, a fact that even the most celebrated Confucianist of the day, Shu-sung T'ung (ca. 246–163 B.C.), accepted. There was a stronger interest in domestic affairs than in foreign affairs in the first years. Generally this period was characterized by the founding spirit—closeness between the ruler and his ministers and generals, open channels of communication between the emperor and his subjects, a strong belief in nonconformity, and an elaborate cultivation of a strong self-image.

The second period saw a continuation of some national policies and the political philosophy of the founding period, but some basic changes were initiated. Discontented with the Ch'in influence in the Han government, many political leaders demanded new institutions within the dynasty; among the leading proponents of change were Chia I (201/200–168 B.C.), Ch'ao Ts'o (ca. 200–154 B.C.), and Chang Shih-chih (second century B.C.). National interest and the emperor's focus of attention began to shift to foreign affairs. A strong centralized government was established. Innovation in the recruitment of

bureaucrats and a military buildup began. In general, this period represented a transition to a new era.

The third period was marked by a new frontier in Han history. The young emperor Wu-ti came to throne in 141 B.C.; he was dynamic, ambitious, and strong-willed. The Han empire was no longer troubled by domestic instability and poverty. With the help of his advisers, among whom were Tung Chung-shu (ca. 179–104 B.C.) and Chang T'ang (fl. 130–115 B.C.), he developed a new political ideology, which included the following points: (1) the ultimate goal of the throne was to achieve the wise governance of the former sage-rulers Yao and Shun (legendary); (2) the ruler had the ultimate authority over the state, but he must grant the necessary power to his ministers and generals; (3) the ruler must change the current political philosophy of *wu-wei* (nonactive pursuit) to the Confucian philosophy of actively “educating” and “caring for” his subjects; (4) two of the most important responsibilities of the ruler were to maintain the agricultural economy and select the talented to serve; (5) laws should be extended and unified in terms of the Han spirit and needs; and (6) a sage-ruler (*sheng-wang*) must influence and improve the lives of people outside Chung-kuo, the Middle Kingdom and should strive to be the “universal king,” the ruler of All under Heaven (T'ien-hsia). This last point is of special significance, for it was precisely the pretended motive of improving the lives of a wide range of people that led Wu-ti to launch his great expeditions of expansion. And expansion was the center of Han life from 129 to 90 B.C., during which time there emerged a new generation of talented political, economic, legal, and military leaders, who instituted all sorts of reforms and new policies to support the expansion. For these leaders expansion was a mission, not just a state program. Sang Hung-yang (also known as Sang Hung-hsiang, 152–82 B.C.) was a typical example. The spirit of a new frontier in Wu-ti's reign was heightened by such great literary talents as Ssu-ma Hsiang-ju (179–117 B.C.). Wu-ti was a man of letters and also the first Han emperor who had a genuine interest in literature and music. In sum, one may say that the reign of Wu-ti was marked by the spirit of a new frontier, whose goal was to reshape the Chinese empire through an extensive expansion movement and great cultural advancement.

The fourth period, the second transition of Former Han China, reaped the benefits of Wu-ti's expansion. A colonial empire was achieved over the lands of the Ch'iang and the Hsiung-nu; over a large part of Central Asia, where the Protectorate General of Western Regions (Hsi-yü *tu-hu*) was instituted under Hsuan-ti (r. 74–49 B.C.) in 60 B.C., and over Korea, Vietnam, and what is now southeastern and the southwestern China. Confucianism became firmly rooted in Han society and politics. Both military and political leaders of this time customarily had a strong Confucian background. The court itself was actively engaged in the pursuit of Confucian studies; in 51 B.C. it called a conference of

Confucian scholars to discuss problems in the Confucian classics. Dynastic traditions and Confucian orthodoxies began to affect the minds of both the rulers and the public. The earlier open and active spirit began to diminish. Above all, for the first time in Han history one family with military power began to dominate Han politics. For twenty years, from 86 to 66 B.C., Huo Kuang's family was supreme. It enthroned two emperors, deposed one, killed one king, and produced one empress and seven top-ranking military officials. More than any other circumstances, the extensive influence of this one family signaled a change in Han politics and society, a change for the worse. After Wu-ti's reign, seventy-two out of eighty-five times (84.7 percent) the title of general was given to court officials who had no military training or combat experience, nor were they given actual military assignments.

The fifth period saw the stagnation and decline of the Former Han. Pan Ku (A.D. 32–92), who first pointed out this fact, gave several reasons for the decline. First, the emperors were not good rulers, and some of them indulged in an immoral life. Second, the lack of an effective ruler at the top contributed to inefficient administration at all levels of government because righteous men were no longer willing to serve. Third, for the most part the relatives of the emperor dominated the court and controlled the armed forces. In general, this period was characterized by the strong influence of stagnant Confucian orthodoxies. The creative spirit completely died out. The rulers, the officials, and the people were all fond of talking about and reliving the glories of the former reigns; they seemed to have lost confidence in themselves. In a letter (dated 23 B.C.) to a friend who was on a very important mission in the Western Regions (Hsi-yü), Ku Yung (fl. 36–8 B.C.), one of the most renowned Confucian officials of the day, advised: "Merely follow the old established practices; do not try to earn great merit."³ Ku indeed spoke for his age.

The picture of Former Han history that I have just sketched is quite pertinent to the development of the military leadership. As will be detailed later, during each of these stages the military leadership underwent fundamental changes. By focusing on these historical stages, we will be able to see the interlocking connections among politics, society, and the military in Former Han China.

THE MILITARY HIGH HIERARCHY

As mentioned earlier, the Han fundamentally followed the Ch'in imperial system and further developed and modified it. The Han military structure was no exception to this general pattern. The general organizational line of the Han military is drawn in table 12.⁴

In this appendix, we are concerned with the first three groups and occasion-

ally with the fourth. In addition, military officials of the status of *ssu-ma* (marshal), *ch'ien-jen* (commander of one thousand), *wu-lang* (military court gentleman), *chang-shih* (chief assistant to the general), *chung-lang-chiang* (colonel of palace attendants), *wei-wei* (commandant general of the Imperial Guards), *chung-wei* (commandant general of Capital Guards), and *t'ai-wei* (grand commandant), to mention just a few, are also included in this study.⁵

The generals can be classified into a few categories. First, the grand general (*ta Chiang-chün*) was the chief of all generals. He was the most powerful military officer. Second, generals whose offices were permanent institutions were in rank order the generals of the front, the rear, the left, the right, swift cavalry, chariot and cavalry, protection, and several others. These, however, were not regularly maintained throughout the Former Han period. For the most part, only three or four of them were active at any one time and had the command of the military units in the imperial capital and special armed forces outside it. For example, from 68 to 67 B.C., there were three generals: Chang An-shih (d. 62 B.C.), the general of chariot and cavalry (an office he held from 73 to 67 B.C.); Huo Yü (d. 66 B.C.), the general of the right; and Fan Ming-yu (d. 66 B.C.), the general of crossing the Liao River, an office he held from 78 to 67 B.C. All of them commanded regular armed forces and maintained offices of the general.⁶ Third, the

TABLE 12. The Military Hierarchy in the Former Han Period

Rank Order	Title	Organizations and Offices
1	<i>Ta-chiang-chün</i> (grand general)	<i>Mu-fu</i>
2	<i>Chiang-chün</i> (general)	<i>Mu-fu</i>
3	<i>Chiao-wei</i> (colonel)	<i>Pu</i>
	<i>Tu-wei</i> (chief commandant)	<i>Tu-wei-fu</i>
4	<i>Hou, chün-hou, or hou-kuan</i> in frontier regions (commandant)	<i>Ch'ü; hou-kuan</i>
5	<i>T'un-chang; hou-chang</i> in frontier regions (commandant or subcommandant)	<i>T'un; hou or pu</i>
6	<i>Ping, tsu, shih</i> (soldiers): <i>ts'ai-kuan</i> (foot soldiers) <i>ch'i-shih</i> (horsemen) <i>lou-ch'uan</i> (-shih) or <i>chi-chao-shih</i> (mariners) <i>ch'e-shih</i> or <i>chü-shih</i> (chariot soldiers) etc.	

majority of generals were only appointed temporarily for particular military campaigns. The generals of two military campaigns are listed here with their regular positions to illustrate this point:⁷

EXPEDITION AGAINST THE HSIUNG-NU IN 133 B.C.

<i>Name</i>	<i>Regular Position</i>	<i>Special Titles</i>
Han An-kuo	Imperial Secretary	General of the Protecting Army
Li Kuang	Commandant General	General of Resolute Cavalry of the Imperial Guards
Kung-sun Ho	Grand Servant	General of Light Chariots
Wang Hui	Grand Messenger	General in Charge of Encampments
Li Hsi	Grand Palace Grandee	General of Foot Soldiers

EXPEDITION AGAINST THE HSIUNG-NU IN 72 B.C.⁸

<i>Name</i>	<i>Regular Position</i>	<i>Special Titles</i>
T'ien Kuang-ming	Imperial Secretary	General of the Ch'i-lien Mountains
Chao Ch'ung-kuo	General of the Rear	General of P'u-lei Lake (Lake Barkul)
T'ien Shun	Governor of Yun-chung	Tiger's Teeth General
Fan Ming-yu	General of Crossing the Liao River	Same as regular position
Han Tseng	General of the Front	Same as regular position

As we have seen, all generals carried a special title. Some of these titles were used only once. Others were used many times and were even carried by the same person for several years. There were at least thirty-five titles of generals during the Former Han, which took their names from the places and targets of expeditions, the nature of the general's duties, the types of soldiers he commanded, and the special mission of a campaign.

From the standpoint of modern military history, many of these generals would perhaps not be regarded as professional.⁹ On the other hand, during their tenure they all had special seals and credentials; regular supervision over military training; and special office staff, which included directors of martial law, a chief assistant, and various other assistants, scribes, and advisers.¹⁰ If the expedition lasted a long time, and many did, a certain professional orientation

always developed. In this sense, they were professionals and should be taken as such in this analysis.

One last note on the generals concerns the number of troops under their command. It varied considerably and depended on the nature, importance, and geography of the expedition; the availability of manpower; and the position and importance of the general in command. The average number of troops was from ten to forty thousand, with two thousand being the lowest and over one hundred thousand the highest.¹¹

The colonels and chief commandants stood next in rank to the generals. They were the backbone of the Han military. They could be called professionals in every sense of the term because theirs were permanent positions. They were responsible for the regular training of the armed forces. In battle, they were the most important combat leaders.

Like the generals, the colonels and chief commandants also had specific titles, including swift colonel, colonel of light cavalry, colonel of the protecting army, commandant of crossbow men, commandant of horsemen, and so forth. The specific titles were given in much the same fashion as those for the generals. The number of troops under their command varied from time to time and from individual to individual. It generally ranged from a few hundred to as many as five thousand, with five hundred to one thousand being the average.¹²

The grand commandant was very important during the early years of the Former Han dynasty and was in charge of all military affairs. But again his office was not a permanent institution, being set up whenever the need arose and eliminated when the need disappeared. It was abolished in 139 B.C. during Wu-ti's reign.¹³

The pattern of promotion within the Han military hierarchy was characterized by its irregularity. During the reigns of Wu-ti and his predecessors, a low-ranking officer, a commoner, or a condemned person could become a colonel or a general overnight. This was particularly true during the times of Emperors Kao-tsu and Wu, the two most creative periods (but in a different sense) in Han history. The three leading generals of Wu-ti's reign, Grand General Wei Ch'ing (ca. 158–106 B.C.), Swift General Huo Ch'ü-ping (145–117 B.C.), and Erh-shih (Sutrishna) General Li Kuang-li (d. 90 B.C.), never held low office.

In general, the high-ranking military officials came from three sources: (1) imperial relatives, (2) court gentlemen, and (3) people known to have special talent.

The paths of advancement for certain military careers can be traced in some detail, especially after Wu-ti's reign. First, we may single out the most brilliant general after Wu-ti's reign, Chao Ch'ung-kuo (137–52 B.C.), as an example. He started his military career as a *ch'i-shih*, or horseman, and eventually rose to the position of general of the rear. A professional soldier, he never held any civil

position. A less illustrious military career was that of Hsin Ch'ing-chi (fl. 72–22 B.C.). As the son of a governor and general, he was able, by special favor, to take the position of colonel's assistant at the beginning of his career. He, too, eventually attained the rank of general of the left. Table 13 illustrates these two military careers.¹⁴

A last remark on the Former Han military hierarchy concerns its operational procedure. The offices at the various levels of this hierarchy all kept in close communication with and exercised tight supervision over lower officers. Reports and meetings were scheduled rigidly. In times of emergency and before making an important decision, the general or any superior officer would hold a conference with his staff members and senior subordinates. The decision-making process was flexible to a certain extent. For example, in the Hsiung-nu campaign of 123 B.C., General Su Chien (d. after 123 B.C.) lost all his troops, thus committing a serious error. As Su's superior officer, Grand General Wei Ch'ing consulted with his director of martial law, chief assistant, and adviser about how to handle the case. His final decision followed the suggestion of one of his advisers. In the Ch'iang campaign of 61 B.C., Emperor Hsuan instructed General Chao Ch'ung-kuo to consult about strategy with his colonels, chief assistant, and other lower officials familiar with Ch'iang affairs.¹⁵

The regular Former Han army can be divided into three segments: the Cap-

TABLE 13. Career Paths of Two Generals

Chao Ch'ung-kuo	Hsin Ch'ing-chi
Horseman	Colonel's assistant
↓	↓
Acting marshal	Palace attendant
↓	↓
Court gentleman	Colonel
↓	↓
Chief assistant to general of chariots and cavalry	Governor
↓	↓
Chief commandant of the protecting army under the grand general	Grandee attendant
↓	↓
Colonel of palace attendants	Colonel of palace attendants
↓	↓
Chief commandant of waters and parks	Commandant general of capital guards
↓	↓
General of the rear	General of the right
	↓
	General of the left

ital Guards and other stationed troops, local conscripts, and surrendered non-Chinese forces. During emergencies, many segments of the population would be mobilized through both voluntary enlistment and compulsory conscription.¹⁶

The local army in the interior regions was generally under the command of the chief commandant (*tu-wei*), but in the frontier regions it was generally under the supreme command of the governor (*t'ai-shou*). However, only in times of emergency could this army be mobilized by order of the emperor. In most cases, the governor was then appointed general to lead the expedition; only under special circumstances could a military official be appointed to command the local army.¹⁷

In any event, the emperor served as the highest commander and the grand general or a specially appointed general served as the field commander in chief.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

There were four major components in civil-military relations: the relationships between the military and the throne, the soldier and the state, military leaders and the social elite, and the armed forces and economic interests. In the main, we will be concerned with the involvements of military leaders in the court and politics and with their social and economic status.

To begin, I should briefly note the method and sources used in this study. The basic method is sociological and cultural; the military is analyzed as a bureaucratic structure and cultural entity.¹⁸ But the frame of the study is historical; the military is always analyzed against the context of historical developments, of which the military is but one part. Following this point of view, I have checked all relevant sources, literary and archaeological, for the study of Former Han China, and have compiled essential biographical data on 223 high-ranking military leaders. I have then classified these data according to categories drawn from theoretical and comparative sociological and historical analyses.¹⁹ Then these leaders are placed in the five major periodic divisions of Former Han history. The distribution of military leaders is given in table 14.²⁰

Table 14. Historical Distribution of Military Leaders

Historical Stages	Number of Leaders
1 (202–180 B.C.)	27
2 (179–141 B.C.)	20
3 (140–87 B.C.)	81
4 (86–49 B.C.)	39
5 (48 B.C.–A.D. 8)	58

In Imperial China, the support of the throne held the key to the success or failure of any individual or project. The armed forces were the state's foremost instrument of violence; they therefore had to serve the will of the throne. The military leaders recognized the monarch as the only legitimate source of authority. And they had to have his support in order to achieve their goals. Naturally, no support was stronger than that given to the monarch's kin. Thus, we can see the reason why the four most successful generals of the Former Han period, Wei Ch'ing, Huo Ch'ü-ping, Li Kuang-li, and Chao Ch'ung-kuo, were all related to members of the court. They had the utmost confidence of the monarch, which others could not have, and they did not feel the fear that most others did in their maneuvering and strategizing. Wei Ch'ing, a brother-in-law of Wu-ti, clearly stated this advantage in 123 B.C. He said that as the emperor's relative he had all the authority he needed to make his subordinates fear him.²¹ Thus, like many other aspects of civilization, high military status and power in traditional societies are often influenced by kinship.²²

Table 15 gives the number of imperial in-laws and kin in the Former Han military leadership. It reveals a continuous increase of the number of imperial in-laws. This naturally meant an increase in their political power. This sort of development generally signals a reduction in court power and hence the decline of the dynasty. In the case of the Former Han, the court had been dominated since 33 B.C. by one empress's family, the Wang, and was eventually taken over by one of its members, Wang Mang (45 B.C.–A.D. 23), in A.D. 8.

The table further shows that the royal family produced no military leaders after the third stage. Usually this meant that the royal family had lost interest in military affairs and that its members had been softened by the leisure they enjoyed. In general, this was a sign of corruption and other weaknesses in the court.

It is important that the armed forces that helped found the dynasty never intervened in politics during the first two reigns. The idea of using military power to take control of the government, as happened so frequently in later dynasties, never occurred to the Former Han founding generals. Some of them

TABLE 15. Imperial Connections of Military Leaders

Historical Stages (numbers)	Kinship Connection		Total
	In-Laws	Kin	
1 (27)	1	4	5
2 (20)	2	1	3
3 (81)	7	1	8
4 (39)	6	0	6
5 (58)	15	0	15

engaged in open rebellion, but that was different from using the military to take political power. The first challenge to the existence of the dynasty by using the armed forces came in the last years of Empress Lü's reign, 181–180 B.C., when the Lü family controlled both the Northern and Southern Armies (Pei-chün and Nan-chün) in the capital. But the attempt to take over by the family failed, and all of its members were killed. As was mentioned earlier, the second and third such attempts were made by the Huo and Wang families during stages 4 and 5.

In the final analysis, it is clear that there was no military intervention in politics during the Former Han period. Rather, there were only ambitious political figures who attempted to use political influence to gain control of the armed forces and then the court. This unique pattern of civil-military relations marked the differences between the Former Han and later periods.

But this development did not exclude the involvement of the military leadership in the civilian domain. The number of military leaders who assumed high-ranking civil positions is given in table 16. The table shows that about half of the Former Han chancellors had a military connection. Stage 4, the reigns of Chao-ti and Hsuan-ti, saw the least military involvement in the highest state office, that of the chancellor. This fact can be satisfactorily explained. During the first two stages, all but a few high-ranking offices were filled by military followers, advisers, and generals of the dynasty's founder, Kao-tsu.²³ Wu-ti's reign marked an era of new leadership in which military and the civil life were for the most part kept separate; although five of the seven chancellors came from the military, they were far more submissive than their predecessors. The trend continued and further developed in stage 4 because of the period's relative peacefulness and because of Hsuan-ti's strong interest in Confucianism. In stage 5, the return to a high percentage of chancellors with a military connection was the result of the increasing practice of appointing civilians to military positions.

It is interesting to note that both the early and late stages of Former Han history show high percentages of military involvement in the highest civilian position. In the first case, it was the result of the appointment of military lead-

TABLE 16. Civilian Involvement of Military Leaders

Stages	Chancellors with Military Connections	Total Chancellors of the Period
1	3	5
2	5	7
3	5	12
4	2	8
5	8	13
Total	23	45

ers to the chancellorship, and in the second case civilians had originally been appointed as military leaders. In any event, the table indicates strong military involvement in politics; it also suggests that the most creative and prosperous eras of a dynasty had the least turnover of military leaders in civilian offices.

The social status of the military leadership may be analyzed from a few different angles. The social origins of the leaders are shown in table 17. Clearly the majority came from commoner families. Two points are worthy of comment. First, after the founding period the percentage of military leaders who came from the class of commoners became steady at about one-half to one-third. That the first period saw about two-thirds of the military leaders from the commoner class is quite understandable. These conditions are true for the founding of almost all other dynasties. Second, only a small percentage of military leaders came from the nobility and the families of officials, except for the founding period and the last stage of the dynasty. This suggests that during the middle part of the dynasty most people were reluctant to pursue a military career, while during the founding period the former members of the nobility provided the organizational leadership and during the period of decline people began to enter the armed forces as a way to attain power.

The last category in table 17, "Other," includes foreigners who became military leaders. An examination of the foreign element in the Former Han military leadership is provided in table 18. It is a well-known fact that foreign troops were constantly in use in the Han army. These included, first, troops of foreign countries that were temporarily merged with the Han army for a united campaign. They were commanded by the native leader but joined by a Han adviser. In the Western Regions (Hsi-yü), the highest Han military officer, generally the protector general of the Western Regions, served as the chief commander. Second, the Han used troops of the Shu-kuo (Dependent States). These were generally led by the commandants of the Shu-kuo or by Han officials in very special cases. Third, some foreign troops were integrated into the Han army. These were commanded by foreign officials who had surrendered to the army or by Han officials, depending on the occasion. Perhaps the best-known components

TABLE 17. Family Background of Military Leaders

Family Status	Stage 1 (27)	Stage 2 (20)	Stage 3 (81)	Stage 4 (39)	Stage 5 (58)	Total
Nobility	8	4	6	8	20	46
Official	1	3	13	6	15	37
Commoner	18	12	38	18	21	107
Other ^a	1	24	4	0	2	31

^aUnknown, foreigners. Most of the unknowns may be assumed to be commoners.

of this particular branch of the Han army were the three *hu-ch'i* (foreign cavalymen) divisions (Yueh, Ch'ang-shui, and Hu), which were established by Emperor Wu in about 101 B.C. They were the finest of the Han army and were responsible for protecting the imperial capital, Ch'ang-an.²⁴ The figures in table 18 include the third category only, for these foreigners became a part of the Han military bureaucracy when they held military positions. Military leaders of foreign origin of the first generation thus came to function only during Wu-ti's reign, and the same practice continued in the reigns of Chao-ti and Hsuan-ti, 86–49 B.C. The seventeen persons listed in table 18 include three Southern Yueh and fourteen Hsiung-nu. Since they functioned as regular military bureaucrats, they were treated the same, politically and socially, as their Han counterparts.

The Han military leaders were specialists in the management of violence.²⁵ For their service, they were paid by both the government and society. Payment generally was of two types: respect and rewards. For the former, it was a question of social status. For the latter, the economic gains were of three kinds: salaries, cash rewards, and appointments to high aristocratic ranks, which ensured the recipients a continuing source of extra income.

The regular salary system of Han military leaders is outlined in table 19.²⁶ These salaries were equivalent to those of civilian officials. They certainly inspired respect. It should be pointed out that officials with salaries on the low

TABLE 18. Foreign Origins of Military Leaders

Origin	Stage 1	Stage 2	Stage 3	Stage 4	Stage 5
Foreign born	0	0	12	1	0
First generation (one or both parents foreign born)	0	0	1	3	0
Total			13	4	

TABLE 19. Salary System of Military Officers

Title	Salary	
	Rate (<i>shih</i> of grain)	Cash Payment ^a (per month)
<i>Ta-chiang-chün</i>	Special (not fixed)	60,000
<i>Chiang-chün</i>	Middle 2,000	21,600
<i>Chiao-wei</i>	Equal-to-2,000	12,000
<i>Tu-wei</i>		
<i>Hou</i> or <i>chün-hou</i> / <i>Hou-kuan</i>	Equal-to-600	3,000
<i>T'un-chang</i> / <i>hou-chang</i>	Equal-to-200	1,200–1,800

^aCash refers to standard copper coins (basic monetary units).

end received additional compensation in grain and cash for the support of their families.

Perhaps the most attractive reward of all for a Han military leader, or for any Han official, was the acquisition of the high aristocratic rank of *hou* (marquis). It meant not only economic gain but also membership in the highest social and political circles. The receiver could thus exert a significant social and political influence. Table 20 is an account of the highest aristocratic ranks—*hou* and above—granted on the basis of military merit during the Former Han period. A striking impression gained from the table is that 60 percent of the highest aristocratic ranks (regular and special military) granted during Wu-ti's reign were rewards for military merit. And Wu-ti granted the largest number of highest aristocratic ranks during the Former Han period. These facts clearly reflect the emphasis on military affairs during Wu-ti's reign, which marked one of the greatest eras of expansion in Chinese history. Another cause for the granting of large numbers of such aristocratic ranks can be found in Wu-ti's character. Possessing a dynamic, ambitious, and romantic personality, the emperor believed in personal heroics and was quite generous in bestowing high aristocratic ranks. Naturally, as one of the most skillful and shrewd emperors in Chinese history, he also knew the psychological effect of bestowing aristocratic ranks on both the recipient and the public. The ratio of high aristocratic ranks granted during the Former Han to those granted on the basis of military merit is about five to one. The specific ratios of stages 2 and 5 are far below this average because these periods were relatively peaceful. Without great wars, there were no great heroes. The specific ratio of stage 1 is about five to four, which is quite understandable, for this was an age whose early years saw a succession of wars, domestic and foreign, and naturally produced many heroes. Kao-ti, too, was a romantic person who believed in personal heroics and often rewarded them lavishly.²⁷

The benefits derived from these high aristocratic ranks were enormous. First, such a rank meant an extra annual income of 60,000 to 2 million in cash for a *hou* enfeoffed with 300 to 10,000 households, respectively. And it could

TABLE 20. High Aristocratic Ranks of Military Leaders

Stages	Number of <i>Hou</i> and Higher Ranks Granted on Military Merit	Total High Ranks Granted during the Period
1	23	187
2	5	56
3	53	89
4	8	51
5	3	105
Total	92	488

often increase to a very large amount. For example, Wei Ch'ing was enfeoffed with 16,300 households or 3.26 million in cash; Huo Ch'ü-ping even received more, 17,700 households or 3.54 million in cash.²⁸

Of equal importance were the political privileges granted to the *hou*, who had the right to participate in the court conference—the most important decision-making body. It was in this conference that major decisions on internal and external affairs were made.²⁹ Through his participation in these conferences, a *hou* could exert significant political influence.

While the throne rewarded its generals handsomely, it also had the final say on their lives and positions. In fact, the possibility of death in disgrace was tremendous. The statistics in table 21 illustrate this point. Stages 3 and 4 had the largest number of such deaths. These two periods represented the height of Han expansion; therefore, wars were frequent and the degree of tension was high. Under these conditions, generals had a greater opportunity to achieve fame and honor but at the same time a higher risk of death both on and off the battlefield.

Sociologists maintain that the client of every profession is society. Perhaps for the Former Han military leaders, their only client was the throne. On the other hand, under Wu-ti's reign the continuing large-scale military expeditions and the resulting territorial acquisitions cultivated a concrete form of military professionalism and a strong sense of glorification of war and the military profession, and the many extended, long-distance expeditions further fostered a strong feeling of autonomy and pride among the military leaders, a fact that was fully shown in the many exchanges of communications between these commanders and the emperor. This led to the standardization of the military establishment, including a complex organizational and command structure, enormously developed war-making strategies and techniques, a well-designed legal and disciplinary support system in the army, and a bureaucratized policy-making and logistical system. The later rise of these generals to the highest political positions, such as chancellor and regent, after Wu-ti's reign and the sharp increase in the number of court officials without military experience granted the grand title of general in later reigns are further testimonials to this transformation of the Han military.

TABLE 21. Deaths of Generals in Disgrace

	Stage 1	Stage 2	Stage 3	Stage 4	Stage 5
Number of Military Leaders	27	20	79	39	58
Number of Deaths in Disgrace	6	5	23	15	15

GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP

Pan Ku (A.D. 32–92) maintains that the people of the northwestern border regions of T'ien-shui, Lung-hsi, An-ting, and Pei-ti (mainly modern east-central Kansu, northern Shensi, and southeastern Ninghsia) were strong and skillful in riding and shooting from horses. Living on the border, they had to fight for their survival against the nomadic barbarians. As a result, the northwest became the most important source of generals in Ch'in and Han times. Pan Ku cited twelve of the most famous Han generals to support his statement.³⁰ An examination of the origins of the military leaders confirms that there existed a correlation between the geography and military leadership. For example, all but one of the chief commanders in Wu-ti's Hsiung-nu, Ch'iang, and Hsi-yü campaigns were natives of the northwestern regions, and it was these campaigns that defined Wu-ti's new empire, for his other campaigns involved only the recovery of former Ch'in territories and further extensions of them. It also suggests that the political factor should be considered as well. For example, P'ei (in modern northwestern Kiangsu) produced twelve generals during stage 1 because it was the home province of the dynastic founder, Kao-ti, but it supplied no generals during the last three stages. Ching-chao (then called Ching-chao-yin) and Fu-feng (mainly in modern central and southern Shensi), the two capital *chün* combined to supply the largest number of generals, a total of thirty-three, because these were the capital areas, which is a political factor.

In addition to the geographic and political factors, the personal factor was very important. Ho-tung *chün* (in modern central and southern Shansi) became a great producer of generals, for it was the home region of the most famous generals of Former Han times, Wei Ch'ing and Huo Ch'ü-ping. Naturally many of their followers were from that area as well.

EDUCATION AND THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP

The education of the military leaders is an interesting and significant subject. It is by examining their education and training that we may be able to understand the inner workings of the military mind of Former Han China. This can be done from different angles. Table 22 examines the early training of such leaders. Although definite conclusions about their education cannot be drawn, due to the fact that the early training of many of these men is not known, it is clear that during the founding period of the dynasty most of them did not have military training and were not prepared to command troops. It is also clear that during stage 5 of the Former Han most of them received civilian training. From the

point of view of military sociology, insufficient training of military leaders may be one reason for the prolonged disturbances during dynastic transitions.

The second aspect of the education of military leaders is the influence of Confucianism in the military. Table 23 examines the educational background of these leaders. It reflects exactly the process of the development of state political ideologies. While Taoist doctrines prevailed during stages 1 and 2, Confucianism gained state support during stage 3 under Wu-ti. Kung-sun Hung (ca. 200–121 B.C.) was the first true Confucian chancellor in Han history. Confucianism became firmly rooted in Han politics and consolidated its position during stage 5, starting with Yuan-ti's reign (48–33 B.C.). In this sense, the small sample actually reveals, happily, a general national trend.

The military officers' training was based on both oral instruction and the reading of military handbooks, tracts, and classics—generally called *ping-shu* (military texts, later referred to as *chün-shu*)—which were written by famous early and contemporary militarists (*ping-chia*), including some of their own commanders. These books were composed at different times, and as such they reflected the historical circumstances and cultural environments in which they were written. In ancient China up to the late seventh century B.C., Chinese society did not distinguish war (*wu*) and peace (*wen*); military affairs were part of daily life. In this society, only the ruling class, the nobles, the majority of whom were called *shih*, could bear arms, and the art of warfare—archery and chariot driving—was part of the basic curriculum, known as the six arts (*liu-i*), along with rites, music, arithmetic, and writing. Military affairs (*jung*, “warfare and related matters”), along with sacrifice (*ssu*, “religion”), were considered the essence of a state's noble and fundamental concerns as late as in 574 B.C., for the two were the manifestation of the elemental structure of human life

TABLE 22. Early Training of Military Leaders

Training	Stage 1	Stage 2	Stage 3	Stage 4	Stage 5
Number of military leaders	27	20	81	39	58
Civilian	22	6	15	12	32
Military	4	6	44	23	9
Foreign trained	0	0	13	4	0
Unknown	1	8	9	0	17

TABLE 23. Ideological Orientation of Military Leaders

Education	Stage 1	Stage 2	Stage 3	Stage 4	Stage 5
Confucian	0	0	2	4	29
Taoist	1	0	0	0	0

(*ming*).³¹ It was by such understanding that the early written word about the art of warfare was considered part of *li*, the code of conduct among the noblemen, since at the time warfare and religion, like other human activities, could be reduced to a set of principles of proper conduct. The fourth-century B.C. compilation of early Chou views on and rules of warfare in the office of the *ssu-ma* (minister of military affairs), the *Ssu-ma Fa* (Records of the Office of the *Ssu-ma*), is one example. It was classified, and rightly so, under the category of *li* in the earliest Chinese bibliography in the first century B.C., although the book has been mistakenly attributed to one of the compilers, whose family name happened to be Ssu-ma, Ssu-ma Jang-chü (fl. 356–320 B.C.).³² However, this tradition, like other important traditions of the Chou, changed as the basic political and social structure of the dynasty began to disintegrate in the late seventh century B.C. War became a more “professional” activity in both strategic and manpower terms: strategic because the old rules of warfare were no longer observed, manpower because commoners and others were recruited to the military when war became more frequent, casualties drastically increased, and the ranks of the traditional source of manpower, the nobility, became depleted. In fact, the very nature of war changed. In the early Chou period, before the sixth century B.C., warfare followed long-established protocols, with both parties informed about the date of the encounter, battlefield formations, and relative military strengths. War was played as a game, not an instrument of destruction. But after the seventh century B.C. the nature, process, and tactics of warfare changed; now war was fought to win and destroy at any cost.³³ As a result, specialized books and treatises on warfare, or the best strategies for winning, began to appear and then flourished. From the sixth to the end of the third century B.C., 186 such books, treatises, and tracts were compiled by as many authors or specialists, who were known as “militarists” (some with actual combat experience and some without), and well-known thinkers. The former included Sun Wu (fl. 514–453 B.C.), Wu Ch’i (fl. 461–380 B.C.), Sun Pin (fl. 380–316 B.C.), Wei Liao (fl. 370–319 B.C.), and Ssu-ma Chü-jang. The latter included Kuan Chung (Kuan Tzu, fl. 685–645 B.C.), Mo Ti (Mo Tzu, fl. 479–400 B.C.), Hsun K’uang (Hsun Tzu, ca. 313–235 B.C.), Han Fei (280?–233 B.C.), and Lü Pu-wei (fl. 290–235 B.C.).³⁴ After the Han dynasty was established in 202 B.C., Emperor Kao (r. 202–195 B.C.), the founder, ordered two militarists, General Han Hsin (ca. 245–196 B.C.) and strategist Chang Liang (fl. 221–189 B.C.), to select and edit the most authentic military texts and compile them in a usable and manageable collection. Only thirty-five texts were chosen. The collection was considered sacred and top secret and could be used only by members of the court and the army.³⁵ Among the thirty-five texts, whose identity is confirmed by literary records and archaeological evidence, were the following.³⁶

1. *Sun-tzu ping-fa* (The Art of Warfare by Sun Tzu), by Sun Wu, in eighty-two sections, with nine rolls of maps, written in either 513 B.C. or between 496 and 453 B.C.
2. *Sun Pin ping-fa* (The Art of Warfare), by Sun Pin of the Ch'i state, in eighty-nine sections, with 4 rolls of maps.
3. *Wu Ch'i* (Wu Ch'i on Military Affairs), by Wu Ch'i of the Wei state, in forty-eight sections, written between 400 and 381 B.C.
4. *Wei Liao* (Wei Liao's Art of War), by Wei Liao, in twenty-four to thirty-one sections; written in the mid-fourth century B.C. or between 350 and 335 B.C.
5. *Liu-t'ao* (Six Treatises on the Art of Warfare), written between 368 and 321 B.C., author unknown, in six sections.

The size of the five books, judging from the number of sections, was probably greatly reduced by the editors. The section numbers follow Pan Ku's *I-wen chih* (Treatise on Literature) of the *Han-shu*, an annotated bibliography of all the books in the six imperial libraries in six categories, which was an edited and abbreviated version of Liu Hsin's (ca. 50 B.C.–A.D. 23) *Ch'i-lueh* (An Annotated Bibliography of All Known Books in Seven Classifications Written before and during the Han).³⁷ The sizes of the books so listed were the unedited versions examined by Chang Liang and Han Hsin and later deposited in the imperial libraries. However, these versions did not survive, and even in early Han times it was Chang Liang's and Han Hsin's edited and shortened versions that were treasured and became the standard and available versions among the Han generals and officials. In Han tombs dated from the mid-second century to the mid-first century B.C. which were opened in recent decades, the *Sun-tzu ping-fa*, *Sun Pin ping-fa*, *Wei Liao*, and *Liu-t'ao* were found buried with the deceased masters, who were military officers, demonstrating that these were treasured texts. Since these tomb occupants were military officers, it is also clear that these texts were the ones they used for their own training and that of their subordinates. Modern scholars have reconstructed these military texts as follows.³⁸

1. *Sun-tzu ping-fa*, in two parts, thirteen sections in part 1, five sections in part 2
2. *Sun Pin ping-fa*, in thirty sections
3. *Wei Liao* (also called *Wei Liao tzu*), in five sections
4. *Liao-t'ao*, in fourteen sections

These books are clearly smaller than what was indicated in the *I-wen chih* of the *Han-shu*. Since these particular texts were common during Wu-ti's reign

(141–87 B.C.), the dating of the tomb (tomb 1 in Yin-ch'üeh-shan of Lin-I, Shantung, 1972) in which they were buried ranges from 140 to 118 B.C. and many scholars believe that they were copied early in Kao-ti's reign, it stands to reason that they were the Chang Liang and Han Hsin edited versions, for forging military texts was considered a crime under Han law at that time. The contents of these military texts (later referred to as *wu-ching*, "military classics") include eight broad topics: (1) political principles (equivalent to modern "political ideology") and warfare, which was a reflection of the original nature of such texts (part of *li*) in ancient feudal societies; (2) military thought and the philosophy and the ethics of military action (violence); (3) the organization of military forces; (4) the nature and education of leadership; (5) training and testing; (6) weaponry; (7) strategies for special crack forces; and (8) battlefield tactics. Each topic is treated in great detail both in principle and in practical applications, together forming a complex and comprehensive guide for Han military officers. Thus, the Han generals and officers were trained in "two cultures"—the political culture and the strategic culture.

From our discussions, it is clear that the four military texts just listed were valued handbooks for military training and the management of warfare, at least in the reigns of the Han dynasty up to the time of Wu-ti, and it is likely that they continued to perform this function in later reigns since some of them have also been found in Han tombs of the mid-first century B.C. In addition to these "military classics," which were written several hundred years before the Han dynasty, some famous Han generals wrote their own training handbooks. One military technique that was of special importance in Former Han times was archery, especially the use of the crossbow, which had been in use since the campaigns against the Hsiung-nu. To counteract the Hsiung-nu's special fighting skills—shooting arrows from horseback—the Han had to build a large and skilled cavalry. This resulted in a military revolution, and in that revolution skillful archery was a basic component. Some Han generals specialized in archery because they had grown up in the frontier regions, where they received early training in it as a family tradition. These included such celebrated generals as Li Kuang; Wang Wei (fl. late second to first century B.C.), who was a general of the crossbow; and Wang Ho (fl. first century B.C.), a master of archery. They all composed handbooks on archery (*she-fa*) that were used as training handbooks for officers, who in turn taught the soldiers. Li Kuang's book had three sections (*Li Chiang-chün she-fa*), Wang Wei's five sections (*Ch'iang-nu Chiang-chün Wang Wei she-fa*), and Wang Ho's, five sections (*Hu-chün she-shih Wang Ho she-shu*).³⁹

The third group of training manuals for the Han army dealt with the various military laws, rules, ordinances, and orders generally referred to as *lü ling*. Copies were recovered in the last century from numerous Han tombs (including Yin-

ch'üeh-shan, Shang Sun-chia-chai of Ta-t'ung in Tsinghai, and Chang-chia-shan of Chiang-ling in Hupeh). Others have been found in the ruins of frontier settlements such as Chü-yen (in modern Ningsia, Inner Mongolia), Tun-huang (in western Kansu), and Lou-lan (in Sinkiang). Together these *lû ling* contain more than three thousand articles covering almost every aspect of life in the military and a soldier's daily and nightly activities: operating and training procedures, every detail of the logistic structure, communications and control systems, daily work and garrison duty, the promotion and reward system, reporting and recording procedures, examination and evaluation systems, punishment and military trials, duty and leave details, honors and demotions, the scale for counting merit points, and so on.⁴⁰ From the nature and complexity of these *lû ling* and the location of their discoveries, it is clear that the administration of these laws involved the division of labor among officers based on their positions and expertise.

Han military leaders also were educated in a complex corpus of military rites, rituals, and ceremonials (collectively referred to as *chiin-li*) that involved credentials, seals, insignia, rules for celebrations, marching orders, rewards and discipline, religious rites, procedures for retreat and attack, proper conduct, and so forth.⁴¹

To sum up, the Former Han generals and military officials were well trained for command due to a large and well-constructed corpus of texts on political culture, military culture, legal knowledge, and administrative skills.

THE PARADIGM OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP: THREE HAN MODELS

The Former Han generals may be categorized according to three military leadership models: (1) the heroic-romantic type, (2) the strategist type, and (3) the bureaucratic type.⁴² These models reflect the three major periods of Former Han history. The first represents the early period, stages 1 and 2, the soul of which was the founding spirit of the dynasty. It was a world of confidence and non-conformity that stressed individualism. Good representatives of this model are Li Kuang (ca. 185–119 B.C.) and his grandson Li Ling (b. before 108–d. 73 B.C.). Their leadership did not emphasize discipline; war, in their view, was an art and a game of adventure. It was on this romantic thinking that they based their military strategies. To them, individual talent and perhaps personal intuition were more important than collective action. These strategies worked before Wu-ti's time but failed under his reign because the age had changed and along with it the basic tenets of military science.

Wu-ti's reign initiated a new phase in Han history and also in that of Imperial China. The new age stressed efficiency and most of all organization. It

emphasized a utilitarian and active approach to the world and state affairs. The military mind of Wu-ti's two most brilliant generals, Wei Ch'ing and Huo Ch'ü-ping, represented this view. They all stressed organization, knowledge, tactics, and strategy. War for them demanded the utmost concentration, a complete understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy, and the strict observance of carefully constructed rules. They applied the same philosophy to life and the relationship between the ruler and his ministers. In politics, as in war, individuals followed the rules and made the best of them.

Chao Ch'ung-kuo represents the third leadership model. His strategic emphasis was on long-range planning. Of the three models, Chao's is the most comprehensive and "modern" for its time. He considered psychological warfare the most effective and essential form. He therefore proposed that the best strategy was to win a war without real fighting. In analyzing his military thinking, one sees the climate of opinion in his day and the influence of earlier masters such as Sun Wu, Sun Pin, and Wei Liao. It was an age that followed an era of great expansion. The state and the people were eager for peace and stability. Chao's theory of winning a war without fighting followed the same logic. It stressed stability, not aggression, which could only lead to disaster.

All three types of military leaders served their times well and contributed to the growth of the Chinese empire after the Ch'in, but it was the last two that really marked the difference between the Ch'in and Han empires. Not only did their adherents reshape the landscape of the Chinese empire, but they also won glory and mostly a happy ending in life. In that sense, all three models were really the products of three historical stages of development, each conditioned by a unique natural, social, political, and cultural environment.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this appendix, I have examined the structure and pattern of the Han military leadership through the historical and social development of the Former Han dynasty. An analysis of the leading military minds of the period has helped us see the many connections between military affairs and the history and society of the Former Han period. One cannot emphasize enough that the military was an essential part of the nation's society and culture. Not only does it reflect the nature and significant characteristics of that society and culture, but it continues to reshape that society and culture in many critical ways. The Former Han military expansion certainly provides the most forceful testimonial to this point: it transformed the Chinese empire at its formative stage.



Appendix 3

On the Formation of the “Chinese” National Identity: Chung-kuo, Chung-kuo Jen, and Han-jen

IN ITS EARLIEST USAGE, the term *chung-kuo* referred to the capital domain under the king (*wang*), T'ien-tzu (Son of Heaven), or T'ien-wang (the Heavenly King) of the Chou dynasty. In the Chou feudal system, the entire empire was referred to as T'ien-hsia (All under Heaven), literally all the land under Heaven between the four seas (east [East Sea], south [South Sea], north [Lake Baikal], and west [undefined]). Each of the domains of the leading feudal lords (*chu-hou*) was called a *kuo*, or fiefdom. As the overlord of all the feudal lords of the T'ien-hsia, the king had his own special domain, rightly called the *wang-kuo* (king's domain) or *wang-chi* (royal domain), which was the king's home base and as such provided the core economic and military resources that he needed to rule over his feudal lords. Therefore, the royal domain was also a *kuo*, and in the Chou feudal order this was in theory the center (*chung*) of all *kuo* in the Chou world and all of Chou society, culture, religion, and government, thereby the coinage of the term *chung-kuo* (“The Center or Middle of All Domains or States or Kingdoms,” commonly referred to as the Central or Middle Kingdom).¹ The term *chung-kuo*, however, lost this meaning after the Chou Court collapsed in 771 B.C. and moved east to Lo-i (Loyang). After this loss of his home base in the west, the king was no longer the all-powerful overlord, and he began to lose the respect of the leading feudal lords in the east, on whose economic and military support he depended for survival. The various feudal lords began to fight among themselves, particularly the southern and northern

states. During this period, 770–404 B.C., the northern states began to call themselves *Chung-kuo*, the land in the north along the Yellow river valley that was the homeland and center of the high culture of the Hsia-Shang-Chou traditions. That region was also traditionally called *Chung-yuan*, the Central Plain. The northern states adopted the term because they wanted to pronounce themselves the heirs of the great Hsia-Shang-Chou (also *Hua-Hsia* [Glorious Hsia]) cultural traditions and therefore superior to such "uncultured" states as those of *Ch'u* in the south, *Ch'in* in the west, and the "barbarian" *Jung* and *Ti* on the northwestern and northern borders, both of which threatened them with force.²

Such political-cultural differences were no longer meaningful after the unification of the Warring States by the *Ch'in* in 221 B.C. The newly established *Ch'in* dynasty began to refer to its empire as *T'ien-hsia* in the Chou tradition. *Shih huang-ti* (The First Emperor, r. 221–210 B.C.) particularly wanted to use the term *t'ien-hsia* to assert the historical legitimacy of the *Ch'in* dynasty as the heir of the Chou empire and to demonstrate his personal greatness and divine power as the Son of Heaven ruling over All under Heaven. The term *chung-kuo* was still used, but never by the emperor in his many official proclamations and stone inscriptions. Border regions such as *Nan-hai* (modern Kwangtung and eastern Kwangsi), however, customarily used *Chung-kuo* to refer to the central (or core) regions of the *Ch'in* empire, which extended from the Yellow river valley regions from Shensi to Shantung to the middle and lower Yangtze valley from modern Hupei to Kiangsu. Thus, the geographical extent of *Chung-kuo* greatly expanded to cover the northern half of what is now South China. The people in this huge territory were referred to as *Chung-kuo jen*, "the people of *Chung-kuo*."³

When the Han dynasty was first established, the Chou and *Ch'in* concept of *T'ien-hsia* was retained as a broad designation for the entire empire, but it was occasionally used to mean the state or the conceptual representation of the control of the empire regardless of its actual size. At this time, the Han Court indeed controlled a relatively smaller territory than had the *Ch'in*. *Chao T'uo* (ca. 239–137 B.C.), a native of northern China (*Chen-ting* in modern Hopei), established the sovereign *Nan-yueh* Kingdom at the end of the *Ch'in* dynasty in 207 B.C. and then assumed the title *huang-ti* (emperor or Son of Heaven) in 203 B.C. He controlled a large part of southern China, including modern Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and the northern part of Vietnam. In the north, the *Hsiung-nu* became a strong state under a powerful *shan-yü*, *Modun* (209–147 B.C.), and controlled a territory as large as that of the Han, extending from the modern Korean border in the east to the modern Kansu-Sinkiang borders in the west. Given this, the Han began to refer to their land as *Chung-kuo*, meaning a large country with a huge population and enormous wealth and resources under the

rule of one royal house. These were the words of Lu Chia (ca. 250–175 B.C.) to Chao T'uo in 179 B.C. when he was sent by Wen-ti (r. 180–157 B.C.) to persuade Chao to give up the lofty title *huang-ti*. Chung-kuo then became a name for the Han empire, that is, the name of a whole country. On the same occasion, Lu Chia also referred to the people of Chung-kuo as Chung-kuo jen.⁴ The two conventions in the use of the terms *Chung-kuo* and *Chung-kuo jen* became standard in early Han times. This can be seen through Ssu-ma Ch'ien's (145–86 B.C.) use of these terms in his immortal *Shih-chi* (Historical Records), written primarily from about 110 to 90 B.C.⁵

When Han Wu-ti's (r. 141–87 B.C.) expansion extended far into Hsi-yü (the Western Regions), certain situations arose that called for new ways to express the national identity, both collective and personal, of the Han state and individuals in or from it. Before the expansion, although the Han already had extensive experience in dealing with various peoples outside their domain, they considered these peoples their distant "cousins," albeit barbarians, because they all were of the same ancestry in the remote past. For example, the Hsiung-nu, Jung, and Ti were recognized as having descended from the same bloodline as the founder of the great Hsia dynasty. So were the Yueh peoples in the south, who inhabited a territory extending from modern Kiangsu to Chekiang to Fukien to Kantung and Kwangsi and Vietnam, and the peoples in the southwestern regions (Kweichow, southwestern Hupei, Yunnan, and part of Szechwan), who were generally called Hsi-nan I (Yi) or Southwestern I (Yi) Barbarians. The peoples in modern Korea in the north were regarded originally as either emigrants from the Han or the descendants of Lord Chi of the Shang royal clan, who escaped there after the Chou conquest of the Shang dynasty. The Ch'iang in modern Kansu, Ch'ing-hai (Tsinghai), and Hsi-tsang (Tibet) were of the same bloodline as the Chou ruling house.⁶ This understanding of the origins of these peoples in ancient and Han China, of course, did not come from factual investigation or scientific studies in the modern sense; it was based on the historical portrayal of these peoples accumulated through the recording and reconstructing of a collective memory of myths, legends, and imaginings over a long period of time. In the end, they all became historical realities in the minds of Han readers. Besides, the basic physical features of these peoples, such as skin color, hair and eye color, and height, were not drastically different from those of the heirs of the Hsia, Shang, and Chou peoples, the ancestors of the Chung-kuo jen in early Han times. Their differences were all cultural: hairstyles (long or short, straight or combed/brushed, worn down or up), tattoos (styles, placement, with or without), eating habits (cooked or raw; beef, pork, chicken, or lamb), clothing materials (hemp, silk, leather, or plain animal skin), fashion (long or short, folding robes to the left or right), and language (pitches, accents, understandable or not). Such differences might change with time, environ-

ment, religious beliefs, or political orientation, but they were not critical enough to refute the idea that they all shared the same bloodline. Therefore, the Chung-kuo jen were convinced that the time-honored historical accounts were unquestionably valid and authentic.

Han Wu-ti's expansion led the Han people into the distant lands of Hsi-yü, where they encountered peoples that not only had drastically different physical features (such as golden hair, blue eyes, and white skin) but were ignorant of the history and culture of the Han and shared no historically constructed genealogical link. Under these circumstances, the Han could no longer employ their long-established cultural and geographical identifiers, Chung-kuo and Chung-kuo jen; the strangers in the new lands simply could not comprehend the meanings and connotations of these terms. Therefore, the Han chose to go with the name of the dynasty as its state identity, and the people of or from the Han empire were referred to as Han-jen, literally "Han man" or "Han people." The use of a dynastic name for national identification had occurred in early China, (for example, the use of *Shang-jen* (people of the Shang dynasty), *Chou-jen* (people of the Chou dynasty), and *Ch'in-jen* (people of the Ch'in), but such terms only served as political and cultural signifiers in third-person expressions. Now the Han began to employ such constructs to represent their national identity, as defined by the geographical location, cultural attributes, and political-ideological characteristics of a country or person, without regard to racial, religious, or language differences within the Han empire. This new model for national identity replaced the old Chung-kuo jen, and it was followed almost uniformly by all later dynasties and regimes.

The new nomenclature of toponym and antinomasia for collective national identity and individual national identifications, however, was not meant to, and did not, render the time-honored terms *Chung-kuo* and *T'ien-hsia* obsolete. The term *T'ien-hsia* kept its traditional meaning of All under Heaven, which in the long-established ideology of universal kingship were under the control of the Son of Heaven or simply the Mandate of Heaven (*T'ien-ming*), the abstract representation of imperial power and sovereignty. *Chung-kuo* still referred to the land under the actual control of a dynasty, with its traditional sense of cultural superiority and political-military advancement, but its use was generally restricted to internal, domestic, or Han to Han discourses and to occasions when the hidden connections of such expressions could be understood without any cultural or historical barriers.⁷

Major Dynasties and Periods of China

1. THE CLASSICAL AGE (ANCIENT CHINA)

The Hsia (Xia) dynasty	Ca. 2000/1900–1600 B.C. (trad. 2200–1766 B.C.)
The Shang dynasty	Ca. 1600–1100 B.C. (trad. 1766–1122 B.C.)
The Chou (Zhou) dynasty	Ca. 1100–256 B.C. (trad. 1122–256 B.C.)
Western Chou	Ca. 1100–771 B.C.
Eastern Chou	770–256 B.C.
The Spring and Autumn (Ch'un-ch'iu) period	722–468 B.C./770–404 B.C.
The Warring States (Chan-kuo) period	403–221 B.C.

2. THE IMPERIAL PERIOD (IMPERIAL CHINA)

EARLY IMPERIAL

The Ch'in (Qin) dynasty	221–207 B.C.
The Ch'u-Han transition	206–202 B.C.
The Western (Former) Han dynasty	202 B.C.–A.D. 8
The Hsin (Xin) dynasty	A.D. 9–23
The Eastern (Latter) Han dynasty	A.D. 25–220

MIDDLE IMPERIAL

The Three Kingdoms period	
Shu (Shu-Han)	A.D. 221–263
Wei	A.D. 220–265
Wu	A.D. 222–280
The Chin (Jin) dynasty	A.D. 265–280–420

Western Chin	A.D. 265–317
Eastern Chin	A.D. 317–420
The Southern Dynasties period	
The Former (or Liu) Sung	
(Song) dynasty	A.D. 420–479
The Southern Ch'i (Qi) dynasty	A.D. 479–502
The Southern Liang dynasty	A.D. 502–557
(The Latter Liang dynasty	A.D. 555–587)
The Southern Ch'en dynasty	A.D. 557–589
The Northern Dynasties period	
The Northern Wei dynasty	A.D. 386–534/535
The Eastern Wei	A.D. 534–550
The Western Wei	A.D. 535–557
The Northern Ch'i (Qi) dynasty	A.D. 550–577
The Northern Chou (Zhou) dynasty	A.D. 557–581
The Sui dynasty	A.D. 581–589–618
The T'ang (Tang) dynasty	A.D. 618–907
The Five Dynasties period	
Later Liang	A.D. 907–923
Later T'ang	A.D. 923–936
Later Chin (Jin)	A.D. 936–947
Later Han	A.D. 947–950
Later Chou (Zhou)	A.D. 951–960
LATE IMPERIAL	
The Sung (Song) dynasty	A.D. 960–1279
Northern Sung	A.D. 960–1126
Southern Sung	A.D. 1127–1279
The Liao (Khitan) dynasty	A.D. 907–916–1125
The Hsi-Hsia (Xi Xia, Tangut	
Tibetan) dynasty	A.D. 990–1032–1227
The Chin (Jin, Jurchen) dynasty	A.D. 1115–1234
The Yuan (Mongol) dynasty	A.D. 1279–1368
The Ming dynasty	A.D. 1368–1644
The Southern Ming	A.D. 1645–1662/1683
The Ch'ing (Qing, Manchu) dynasty	A.D. 1644–1911/1912
3. THE REPUBLIC	A.D. 1912–



Notes

INTRODUCTION

1. For detailed studies of these issues, see Chun-shu Chang, *Han-tai pien-chiang shih lun-chi* (Taipei: Shih-huo, 1975), pp. 1–121 (hereafter cited as Chun-shu Chang 1975a); Chun-shu Chang, “Han-tai ssu-ch’ou chih-lu te k’ai-t’o yü fan-chan,” *Shih-huo*, new ser., 15, nos. 1–2 (June 1985): 1–14; and Chun-shu Chang, in *Ssu-ch’ou chih-lu wen-hsien shu-lu*, ed. Kansu sheng she-hui k’o-hsueh hsueh-hui lien-ho hui (Lanchou: Lanchou ta-hsueh ch’u-pan she, 1989), pp. 226–27.

2. For a systematic and comprehensive discussion of the discovery and studies of the Han wooden and bamboo documents since 1900, see Chun-shu Chang, “Han-chien te fa-hsien yü cheng-li,” *Shih-huo*, new ser., 16, nos. 5–6 (April 25, 1987): 1–19 (hereafter Chun-shu Chang 1987); Chun-shu Chang, “Pa-shih nien lai Han-chien te fa-hsien cheng-li yü yen-chiu,” in *Chung-yang yen-chiu yuan ti-erh chieh kuo-chi Han-hsueh hui-i lun-wen chi* (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1989), pp. 417–40 (hereafter Chun-shu Chang 1989); and Chun-shu Chang, “Ch’in-Han shih yü Ch’in-Han chien-tu yen-chiu chung te i-hsieh wen-t’i,” in *Min-kuo i-lai kuo-shih yen-chiu te hui-ku yü chan-wang yen-t’ao hui lun-wen chi* (Taipei: National Taiwan University, 1992), pp. 173–77. See also Pien Yü-ch’ien et al., comp., *Pen shih-chi i-lai ch’u-t’u chien-po kai-shu* (Taipei: Wan-chüan lou, 1999), esp. pp. 93–113, which updates my work for the period 1987–93; Ch’ên Sung-chang, *Hsiang-kang chung-wen ta-hsueh wen-wu-kuan ts’ang chien-tu* (Hong Kong: Chung-wen ta-hsueh wen-wu kuan, 2001); and Ōba Osamu, ed., *Kankan no kenkyō to hatten* (Suita-shi: Kansai University Press, 1993), pp. 12–22 (article by Hsu P’in-fang); and Ōba Osamu, *Mokkan* (Tokyo, 1998).

3. For the discovery, study, and publication of the Chü-yen documents, see Chun-shu Chang 1989, pp. 423–27; and Chun-shu Chang 1987, pp. 5–9. See also *Chü-yen hsin-chien*, introduction; Hsing I-t’ien, “Fu Ssu-nien, Hu Shih, yü Chü-yen Han-chien te yun-Mei yü fan-T’ai,” *Chung-yang yen-chiu yuan li-shih yü-yen yen-chiu so chi-k’an* (*Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica*) (hereafter CYYY) 66, no. 3 (September 1995): 921–52; Hsueh Ying-ch’ün, *Chü-yen Han-chien t’ung-lun* (Lanchow: Kansu chia-yü ch’u-pan she, 1991); and Chien-tu cheng-li hsiao-tsu, *Chü-yen Han-chien pu-pien* (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1998), pp. 1–5.

4. See Chun-shu Chang 1987, pp. 2–5; and Chun-shu Chang 1989, pp. 419–21, for a

detailed discussion of the history, research, and publication of the Tun-huang documents. See also *Tun-huang Han-chien*, introduction (1:1-3); *Han-chien yen-chiu wen-chi*, ed., Kansu sheng po-wu kuan (Lanchow, Kansu, 1984), pp. 1-41; and Jao Tsung-i and Li Chün-ming, *Tun-huang Han-chien pien-nien k'ao-cheng* (sometimes titled *Hsin Mang chien chi-cheng*) (Taipei, 1995), pp. 1-10.

5. Chun-shu Chang 1989, p. 423; Chun-shu Chang 1987, p. 5.

6. For the study and publication of the Lop-nor documents, see Chun-shu Chang 1989, pp. 421-22; and Chun-shu Chang 1987, p. 4. See also Hou Ts'an, *Kao-ch'ang Lou-lan yen-chiu lun-chi* (Ürumqi, 1990), esp. pp. 219-333; *Lou-lan Ni-ya*, esp. pp. 1-8; and Meng Fan-jen, *Lou-lan Shan-shan chien-tu nien-tai hsueh yen-chiu* (Ürumqi, 1995), pp. 1-285.

7. For the archaeological work, study, and content of the Ta-t'ung documents, see Chun-shu Chang 1987, p. 10; and Chun-shu Chang 1989, p. 429.

8. The Hsuan-ch'üan documents have not been published. My use of these documents had constraints under which I agreed to abide. But I have used some of the most important documents for my study and have also quoted some of them. For earlier reports, see *Hsuan-ch'üan Han-chien* (hereafter cited as HCHC). See also Hu P'ing-sheng and Chang Te-fang, *Tun-huang Hsuan-ch'üan Han-chien chien-shih* (Shanghai: Ku-chi, 2001), esp. pp. 200-206.

9. See Chun-shu Chang 1987, pp. 9-19; and Chun-shu Chang 1989, pp. 427-37. In 1983 and 1985, I did archaeological work in the Yung-teng area and found a few wooden documents of the Han period. Another recent discovery is the Yin-wan *Han-chien* (Han era wooden and bamboo documents from Yin-wan), 157 pieces of various sizes uncovered in the spring of 1993 in tombs in Yin-wan Village in the Tung-hai district of Lien-yun-kang in eastern Kiangsu by the sea. These documents, dated from 15 to 10 B.C., provide extremely important materials for the study of the administrative system in Han local governments. See Lien-yun-kang shih po-wu kuan, *Yin-wan Han-mu chien-tu* (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, [1996] 1997), pp. 1-7. All documents discovered in places outside the main areas under study in this book are conveniently collected in *San-chien Han-chien*. See also *Lou-lan Ni-ya*.

10. For a comprehensive discussion of these archaeological finds, see Li Hsueh-ch'in, *Tung-Chou yü Ch'in-tai wen-ming* (Peking: Wen-wu ch'u-pan she, 1981); and Wang Chung-shu, *Han-tai k'ao-ku hsueh kai-shuo* (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1984). Both Li's and Wang's books are available in English. See Kwang-chih Chang, trans., *Eastern Zhou and Qin Civilizations*, by Li Xueqin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); and *Han Civilization*, by Wang Zhongshu (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982). See also Chun-shu Chang, Review of Li Xueqin, *Eastern Zhou and Qin Civilizations*, *American Historical Review* 94, no. 2 (April 1989).

11. For an evaluation of secondary studies on Ch'in-Han China, see Chun-shu Chang, "Ch'in-Han shih yü Ch'in-Han chien-tu yen-chiu chung te i-hsieh wen-t'i," pp. 173-76; and Chun-shu Chang, "Ch'in-Han China in Review," *Studies in Chinese History* 5 (1994): 47-59. At least six hundred monographs and thirteen thousand articles on the Ch'in and Han dynasties have been published in modern times.

PROLOGUE

1. The issues here are enormous, and I have commenced this complex study mainly by reading, though with varying degrees of intensity, the following sources: Hans Kohn,

Nationalism: Its Meaning and History (New York: Van Nostrand, 1955), esp. pp. 9–92; Boyd C. Shafer, *Nationalism: Myth and Reality* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1956), esp. pp. 1–152; Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism*, rev. ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993); Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, 2d ed. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966); Hans Rogger, *National Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century Russia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959); Louis L. Snyder, *The Dynamics of Nationalism: Readings in Its Meaning and Development* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1964); Anthony D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), esp. pp. 1–152; Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon, 1978); Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nation and Nationalism since 1870: Programme, Myth, Reality* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Ernest Gellner, *Nation and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983; rev. ed., 1991); Geoff Eley, *Reshaping the German Right: Radical Nationalism and Political Change after Bismarck* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); Geoff Eley and Ronald G. Suny, eds., *Becoming National: A Reader* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986); Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); George M. Frederickson, *The Comparative Imagination: On the History of Racism, Nationalism, and Social Movements* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 77–116; Hagen Schulze, *States, Nations, and Nationalism: From the Middle Ages to the Present*, trans. William E. Yuill (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1996), 95–194; and Brian Porter, “When Nationalism Began to Hate: Imagining Modern Politics in 19th Century Poland” (manuscript). The constructions of “nation” and “nationalism” in these works have provided useful comparative perspectives and viewpoints on the origins, development, and functions of the two concepts, but the models these authors have built cannot be meaningfully followed in the Chinese case. The disquisition on nation and nationalism that follows is the result of my having examined the views of many pioneering scholars in the field, particularly Liah Greenfield, Hans Kohn, Boyd C. Shafer, Louis Snyder, Isaiah Berlin, Miroslav Hroch, Karl Deutsch, Elie Kedourie, Edward Said, Eric Hobsbawm, Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, Anthony D. Smith, Geoffrey Eley, Partha Chatterjee, and Hagen Schulze. But in the end my view may prove to be quite close but fundamentally different from those of these scholars. It is a synthesis based on selective adoption rather than wholesale borrowing. For related topics, I have consulted a different group of references, and they will be noted where appropriate.

2. On this issue, the works of Boyd Shafer, Louis Snyder, Anthony Smith, Geoffrey Eley, and Ronald Suny cited in note 1 are particularly useful. Shafer even states that any use of the word *nationalism* to describe historical events before the eighteenth century is probably anachronistic (*Nationalism*, p. 5). However, I think that the measure of anachronism is always a matter of logic and semantics. First, if a term such as *nation* or *nationalism* has no fixed, universal definition, but rather is a function of historical time and geographical location, then the use of it to describe a historical event can never be “anachronistic.” Most of the terms we use for historical analysis were “invented” (or created) after the time in question. For instance, we use the term *prehistoric* to describe the period before written records in human history, but that was hardly the notion or understanding of the people of that period.

3. For a detailed study of the history of the term *min-tsu* and its derivative *min-tsu*

hsueh ("ethnology," first used by Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei in 1927) in China, see Jui I-fu (Ruey Yifu), "Min-tsu hsueh tsai Chung-kuo" (Ethnology in China) in *Chung-kuo ming-tsu chi-ch'i wen-hua lun-chi* (Collected Studies of Chinese People and Chinese Culture) (Taipei: National Taiwan University, 1972), pp. 1407-24 (originally published in *Ta-lu tsai-chih* in 1951). Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (1873-1929) first discussed the misuse of *min-tsu* and *min-tsu chu-i* in 1902. See *Hsin-min ts'ung-pao* (Renovation of the People), no. 1 (February 8, 1902), a periodical published in Yokohama, Japan. Also see Liang's collected works, *Yin-ping shih ch'üan-chi* (reprint; Tainan: Tsung-ho, 1975), pp. 1-23; and *Chung-kuo min-tsu shih* (The Chinese: A Historical Survey) (reprint; Taipei: Shang-wu yin-shu kuan, 1965).

4. On the anthropological perspective in the development of the nation and state, see Robert L. Carneiro, "A Theory of the Origin of the State," *Science* 169 (1970): 733-38; Elman Service, *Primitive Social Organization: An Evolutionary Perspective* (New York: Random House, 1962); Elman Service, *Origins of the State and Civilization* (New York: Norton, 1974); Morton H. Fried, *The Evolution of Political Society* (New York: Random House, 1967); Henry Wright, "Recent Research on the Origin of the State," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 6 (1977): 379-97; Henry J. M. Classen and Peter Skalník, eds., *The Early State* (The Hague: Mouton, 1978); Jonathan Haas, *The Evolution of the Prehistoric State* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), esp. pp. 1-33, 172-82; Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society* (Cambridge, England: Polity, 1984); Anthony Giddens and Jonathan H. Turner, eds., *Social Theory Today* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987); Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); and James Scott, *Seeing Like a State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). Harold J. Laski's classic *The State in Theory and Practice* (New York: Viking, 1935) looks at the issue more from the standpoint of philosophical and political concerns than historical and anthropological ones (esp. pp. 3-85). For the use and meaning of the key terms such as *tsu*, *tsung-tsu*, *shih-tsu*, and *hsing-tsu*, see the detailed analysis of these and related terms in Yang Hsi-mei, "Tsai-lun hsien-Ch'in *hsing-tsu* ho *shih-tsu*" (A Further note on the *hsing-tsu* and *shih-tsu* in pre-Ch'in times), *Chung-kuo shih yen-chiu* 1 (February 1993): 1-9, esp. 8-9; and his collection of articles on the same issues from 1950 through the 1970s, *Hsien-Ch'in wen-hua shih lun-chi* (A Collection of Critical Essays on the History and Culture of Pre-Ch'in Times) (Peking: Chung-kuo she-hui k'o-hsueh ch'u-pan she, 1995), pp. 29-154, 169-256. See also Jui I-fu, *Chung-kuo min-tsu chi-ch'i wen-hua lun-kao*, pp. 723-52, 821-936; and Wang Hsien-ch'ien (1842-1917), *Shih-ming shu-cheng pu* (Supplementary Notes on the *Shih-ming* [Dictionary of the Kinship System in Ancient Times] by Liu Hsi [ca. A.D. 200]) (Peking: Kuchi ch'u-pan she, 1984; reprint of 1896 ed., *chüan* 3 and 8). Han-yi Feng's *The Chinese Kinship System* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948) is also very useful.

5. My suggestion for the definition of *nation* is of course the ideal-type definition. Some actual or practical process of "nation formation" may vary with a specific group of people or peoples in a specific historical context, but the general outline and categorical components should, I believe, remain largely valid. I should also mention here that in reaching my theoretical framework for the definition of *nation* I have benefited enormously from many earlier studies, including, among others, Anthony Smith, *Theories of Nationalism*, esp. chaps. 7 and 8; Louis Snyder, *The Dynamism of Nationalism*, esp. pp. 369-79; Boyd Shafer, *Nationalism*, esp. pp. 1-56; Benjamin Akzin, *State and Nation* (London: Hutchinson, 1967), chap. 3; Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Kalman H. Silvert, ed., *Expectant Peoples: Nationalism and Development* (New York: Random House, 1967), esp. 19,

440-41; and Dankwart A. Rustow, *A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1967), chap. 1, esp. pp. 21-28 (Rustow defines *nation* as "a self-contained group of human beings who place loyalty to the group as a whole above competing loyalties." Max Weber defines *nation* as "a community of sentiments which would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own; hence . . . a community which normally tends to produce a state of its own." See *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, trans. and ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 176. See also Hagen Schulze, *States, Nations and Nationalism: From the Middle Ages to the Present*, trans. William E. Yuill (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 94-113 ("A nation is state of mind, a community that exists as long as it is willed and lives in the hearts and minds of its members and which perishes when it no longer exists in their thoughts and aspirations. Nations are founded on national awareness" [pp. 97-98]).

6. For original and early systematic records about the myths of the Shang and Chou origins, see *Shih-ching* (The Book of Poetry, *Wu-ching tu-pen* ed.), pp. 129-30, 167 (scholars generally agree that the first poem, "Hsuan-niao" ["The Black Bird," about the Shang ancestor Hsieh] was written in the mid-seventh century B.C. based on old oral traditions; the second poem, "Sheng-min" ["The Origin of the Chou," about the Chou ancestor Chi] was composed in the beginning of the Chou, the eleventh century B.C., also based on old oral traditions); and Ssu-ma Ch'ien (145-86 B.C.), *Shih-chi* (Historical Records) (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1963 ed., hereafter *Shih-chi*), pp. 91, 111. A profound modern anthropological study of the patterns and origins of these myths is given in Li Tsung-t'ung, *Chung-kuo ku-tai she-hui shih* (The History of Ancient Chinese Society) (Taipei: Chung-hua wen-hua, 1954), pp. 12-16, 29-35. See also Fu Ssu-nien, *Fu Meng-chen hsien-sheng chi* (The Complete Works of Fu Ssu-nien) (Taipei: T'ai-wan ta-hsueh, 1952), pp. 13-22, 32-43. Michael Puett gives a different perceptive interpretation of these stories in *The Ambivalence of Creation: Debates Concerning Innovation and Artifice in Early China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 29-30.

For the investigations and studies of prehistoric sites that shed light on the evolution of the Chinese state, see Chung Hsiao-ch'ing, "Ch'ien-an Ta-ti-wan chien-chu i-chih fen-hsi" (An Analysis of the Architectural Remains at Ta-ti-wan in Ch'in-an, Kansu), *Wen-wu* 5 (May 2000): 62-73; Shih Hsing-pang, *Pan-p'o shih-tsu kung-she* (Pan-p'o Culture and Society, ca. 5000-3000 B.C.) (Sian: Jen-min, 1979); Institute of Archaeology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, *Yen-shih Erh-li-t'ou* (The Archaeology of Yen-shih Erh-li-t'ou [in Honan]) (Peking: Chung-kuo ta pai-k'o ch'üan-shu, 1998); Shantung ta-hsueh li-shih hsi, comp., *Ta-wen-k'ou wen-hua t'ao-lun chi* (Essays on the Ta-wen-k'ou Culture) (Chinan: Ch'i-Lu, 1979); Chinan shih po-wu kuan, comp., *Ta-wen-k'ou* (Ta-wen-k'ou Neolithic Culture) (Peking: Wen-wu, 1974); Shantung sheng wen-wu k'ao-ku yen-chiu so, comp., *Ta-wen-k'ou hsu-chi* (Ta-wen-k'ou Neolithic Culture, Second Series) (Peking: K'o-hsueh, 1997); Kao Kuang-jen, "Shih-lun Ta-wen-k'ou wen-hua te fen-ch'i" (On the Development and Dating of the Ta-wen-k'ou Culture), *K'ao-ku hsueh-pao* 4 (1978): 399-419; Chang Hsueh-hai, "Lun Shan-tung t'i-ch'ü te Lung-shan wen-hua ch'eng" (On the Ch'eng of Lungshan Culture in Shantung), *Wen-wu* 12 (December 1996): 40-52; and Luan Feng-shih, *Hai-tai ti-ch'ü k'ao-ku yen-chiu* (Archaeological Studies in the Hai-Tai Region) (Chinan: Shantung University, 1997).

7. My suggestion for the definition of the state is based on both historical and anthropological understandings rather than the modern concept of the term, which primarily reflects the modern political perspective. The latter can be best illustrated by Max

Weber's definition of the state as "a human community which successfully claims within a given territory the legitimate use of physical force" (*From Max Weber*, p. 78). Such a definition seems too narrow and modern to be useful in a historical and anthropological sense. On the other hand, Emile Durkheim's definition of the state as an "organ of social thought" is too broad and abstract to be applicable in most cases, especially that of ancient China. The basic references for my definition are given in notes 4 and 5 in this prologue. It is also based on the research on the development of Hsia-Shang-Chou China that follows.

The topic of the origins of the Chinese state has been under debate in China and abroad in recent years. The key issue is really the definition of the term *state*. While my own definition is given here, a few of other studies are listed to show the magnitude of the disagreement. See Hsia Nai, "Chung-kuo wen-ming te ch'i-yuan" (The Origins of Chinese Civilization) (Peking: Wen-wu, 1985); Su Ping-ch'i, *Chung-kuo wen-ming ch'i-yuan hsin-t'an* (A New Examination of the Origins of Chinese Civilization) (Hong Kong: Shang-wu, 1997); Hsieh Wei-yang, *Chung-kuo tsao-ch'i kuo-chia* (The State in Ancient China) (Hangzhou: Chekiang Jen-min, 1995); and the many articles on the same issue cited later in this prologue. Jonathan Haas also covers the evolution of the state in early China in *The Evolution of the Prehistoric State*, esp. pp. 88–91.

8. The discussion or reconstruction of the history of the Shang from band to tribe to nation to state needs clarification both in its use of source materials and in its approaches. The main primary sources include the following. (1) *I-ching* (The Book of Change; *Wu-ching tu-pen* ed., *Shih-san ching chu-shu* ed.; *Chou I ku-ching chin-chu* ed., by Kao Heng, [Peking: Chung-hua, 1984]). "Ta-chuang" (no. 34) and "Lü" (no. 56) relate the story of Wang Hai and his struggle with Mien Ch'en of the Yu I (Yu Yi) group. Both were composed during the reign of King Wu of the Chou dynasty in the early eleventh century B.C. or slightly earlier. (2) *Shih-ching* (The Book of Poetry; *Wu-ching tu-pen* ed.; *Shih-san ching chu-shu* ed.; other editions [such as Ch'ü Wan-li's] to be noted in due course). The most important part is "Shang-sung" (The Glory of the Shang), which scholars generally agree was composed in the second half of the seventh or the eighth century B.C. at the earliest. (The "Shang-sung" part in five pieces is on pages 166–69 in the *Wu-ching tu-pen* ed., in *chüan* 22:3 in the *Shih-san ching chu-shu* ed.) (3) *Shu-ching* (The Book of History; *Wu-ching tu-pen* ed.; *Shih-san ching chu-shu* ed.; other editions [such as Tseng Yun-ch'ien's and Ch'ü Wan-li's] to be noted in due course). Various parts date from the eleventh to the eighth centuries B.C. with varying degrees of authenticity. (4) *Tso-chuan* (Tso's Commentary on the *Ch'un-ch'iu* [The Spring and Autumn Annals]; *Wu-ching tu-pen* ed., Yang Po-chün, *Ch'un-ch'iu Tso-chuan chu* ed. [Peking, 1981]). Relevant entries are under the years 625, 564, 541, 525, 513, and 506 B.C., but the *Tso-chuan* is generally considered a work of the fourth century B.C. (5) *Kuo-yü* (Discourses of the States, 967–453 B.C.; *Kuo-hsueh chi-pen ts'ung-shu* ed. (Shanghai: Ku-chi ch'u-pan she, 1978). Relevant references are in *chüan* 3, 4, 10, and 16. The main parts of *Kuo-yü* were probably composed in the early third century B.C. based on the same sources that the *Tso-chuan* followed earlier, but the two were not of the same hand. (6) *Shih-pen* (Genealogical Records [of Ancient Rulers]; *Ts'ung-shu chi-ch'eng ch'u-pien* ed.; *Shih-pen pa-chung* ed. [Shanghai: Shang-wu, 1957]), a work of the late third century B.C. (probably around 234–228 B.C. [Ch'en Meng-chia, *Liu-kuo chi-nien* (Peking, 1955), pp. 133–41]) in 15 sections, but the original was long lost in the Southern Sung period (1127–1279). Fragments did exist in other ancient works and were collected by various scholars in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Information on predynastic Shang

lords and some simple events can be found in various sections, especially the section on the genealogy of rulers (*Ti-hsi*). (7) *Chu-shu chi-nien* (The Chronicle [of Ancient China to 299 B.C.] or "Bamboo Annals"; *Ku-pen chu-shu chi-nien chi-chiao ting-pu* ed., by Fan Hsiang-yung [Shanghai: Jen-min, 1957]; Fang Shih-ming, *Ku-pen Chu-shu chi-nien chi-cheng* ed. [Shanghai: Ku-chi ch'u-pan she, 1981]; *Chu-shu chi-nien pa-chung* [reprint; Taipei, 1977]), a work compiled from 318 to 299 B.C. in the state of Wei discovered in a tomb in Honan in 279 A.D. in thirteen sections. Most of it was lost in the Southern Sung period and the rest in the Yuan period. Fragments were collected by various scholars from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries. The most comprehensive and critically edited appeared in 1957, based on Wang Kuo-wei's edition of 1917. See Fan Hsiang-yung's article in *Wen-shih* 25 (1985): 53–60. The authenticity of the book was questioned by David N. Keightley in "The Bamboo Annals and Shang-Chou Chronology," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 38 (1978): 423–28. It is useful and important for the study of the struggle between the Shang leaders Hai and Shang Chia (written as Chu Chia Wei) and the Yu Yi leader Mien Ch'en and for the dynastic Shang period beginning with T'ang. The (*Chin-pen*) *Chu-shu chi-nien* (*Kuo-hsueh chi-pen ts'ung-shu* ed.; *Chu-shu chi-nien pa-chung*; Lei Hsueh-ch'i, *Chu-shu chi-nien i-cheng* ed. [reprint; Taipei: I-wen, n.d.]) will be used for comparison and supplementary information, and its authenticity will be discussed in due course. (8) *Ch'u-tz'u* (The Songs of the Ch'u, or "The Songs of the South"), by Ch'ü Yuan (ca. 343–277 B.C.), Sung Yü (ca. 290–222 B.C.), and others (*Wan-yu wen-k'u* ed. annotated by Wang I [d. 158 A.D.]; *Ch'ü-fu hsin-pien* ed., by T'an Chieh-fu [Peking: Chung-hua, 1978]). The relevant parts are "T'ien-wen" (Questions to Heaven), *chüan* 3 in the *Wan-yu wen-k'u* ed.; and "Li-sao" (On Encountering Sorrows), in *chüan* 2 in the *Wan-yu wen-k'u* ed. T'an Chieh-fu holds that "T'ien-wen" is not Ch'ü Yuan's work (pp. 404–532) and gives a reconstruction (rearrangement) of the text, while "Li-sao" was indeed composed by Ch'ü Yuan (pp. 200–280) and provides a detailed analysis of the poem. (9) Hsun K'uang (Hsun Tzu, Hsun Ch'ing, ca. 313–235 B.C.), *Hsun Tzu* (The Works of Hsun Tzu; *Hsun Tzu chi-chieh* ed., by Wang Hsien-ch'ien [reprint; Taipei: Shih-chieh, 1962]; *Hsun Tzu ku-i* ed. [Chinan: Ch'i-Lu, 1985]). Chapter 25 contains information on Hsieh, Chao-ming, and Ch'eng T'ang (pp. 308–9). (10) Meng K'o (Meng Tzu, 377–289 B.C.), *Meng Tzu* (The Works of Meng Tzu; *Ssu-shu chang-chü chi-chu* ed.). *Chüan* 2 (p. 215) and 6 (p. 268) are about T'ang (Shang) and the state of Ko. (11) *Lü-shih ch'un-ch'iu* (Mr. Lü's Spring and Autumn Annals), compiled by Lü Pu-wei (fl. 290–235 B.C.) and others in 239 B.C. (*Lü-shih ch'un-ch'iu chiao-shih* ed., by Ch'en Ch'i-yu [Shanghai, 1984]; by Ying Chung-jung [Taipei, 1952]). *Chüan* 15 and 27 have the most important information (pp. 843–44) about the struggle between T'ang and King Chieh of the Hsia. (12) *Shan-hai ching* (The Mountain and Sea Classic; *Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an* ed.; *Shan-hai ching chiao-chu* ed., by Yuan K'o [Shanghai: Ku-chi, 1980]). *Chüan* 9 in Yuan K'o's edition (14 in the old edition) contains stories about Wang Hai and his struggle with the Yu Yi group. The date of the book has been under debate since ancient times, but it is generally agreed among modern scholars that the first version was composed in the fourth century B.C. and the current text is the result of several revisions with many later additions, probably compiled in the early second century B.C. I believe, however, that the Wang Hai story was an earlier version because it contains materials not found in later versions of the same story. (13) *Li-chi* (The Book of Rites; *Wu-ching tu-pen* ed.; *Shih-san ching chu-shu* ed.; *Li-chi chin-chu chin-i* ed., by Wang Meng-ou [Taipei: Shang-wu, 1970]). *Chüan* 23 has information about the religious rites (grades of sacrifice) for K'u and Ming given in the Shang period. It should be noted that while the

Li-chi contains pieces gradually written from the early fourth to the early first centuries B.C., the piece entitled “Chi-fa” (Treatise on Sacrifices), of which the aforementioned religious sacrifice is a part, was probably composed in the third century B.C. based on the materials in the *Kuo-yü* or following the same sources used by it. I subscribe to the view that the first version of the *Li-chi* was composed in the last years of the second century B.C. by Shu-sung T’ung (ca. 246–163 B.C.). (14) *Ta Tai Li-chi* (The Elder Tai’s [Tai Teh] Version of the *Book of Rites*; *Ta Tai Li-chi chin-chu chin-i* ed., by Kao Ming [Taipei: Shang-wu, 1984]), secs. 62 and 63. The dating of the book generally is the same as the *Li-chi*; the two sections provide the genealogical line of the ancient rulers from the legendary Huang Ti (Yellow Emperor) to the mythological founders Hsieh of the Shang and Hou Chi of the Chou, as well as rulers of other groups such as K’un-wu and Ch’u (*Wu-ti te*, *Ti-hsi*). It is also believed that the two sections date no later than the early fourth century B.C. (15) *Shu-hsu* (Preface to the Documents in the Book of History; in *Shang-shu chin-chu chin-i*, by Ch’ü Wan-li [Taipei: Shang-wu, 1970]; *Shang-shu cheng-tu*, by Tseng Yun-ch’ien [Peking: Chung-hua, 1964]). This is probably a work of the late fifth to early fourth centuries B.C. (some scholars consider it a piece from the Han period). It provides a concise introduction to the documents in the *Shang-shu*, including many that were missing after the Ch’in dynasty (221–207 B.C.). The lines on late Hsia, Shang, and early Chou give broad historical and documentary background to our understanding about the rise of the Shang. (16) *Shih-chi* (Historical Records; various editions, including *Po-na*, Takigawa Kametaro ed. [reprint; 1955], I-wen [1965], and Chung-hua [1963]), by Ssu-ma Ch’ien (145–86 B.C.), the most comprehensive and systematic reconstruction of the history of the Hsia, Shang, and Chou periods. Most of our knowledge of the early Shang comes from the *Shih-chi*, whose account of the first eight generations of the Shang has been proved to be generally accurate by archaeological evidence. One important reason for this is perhaps that most of the sources that Ssu-ma Ch’ien consulted for his work were relatively complete but later partially or completely disappeared. (17) Pan Ku (A.D. 32–92), *Han-shu* (History of the [Former] Han Dynasty, 202 B.C.–A.D. 8 [207 B.C.–A.D. 25]; various editions, including *Po-na*, I-wen, and Chung-hua [1964]). This work covers more than the period that its title indicates, thus the inclusion of the piece “Ku-chin jen-piao” (Table of Historical Personages from High Antiquity to the End of the Ch’in Dynasty). In listing the earliest Shang leaders and the next seven predynastic lords, from Hsieh to Hai to Chu Kuei and the dynastic founder T’ang, Pan Ku generally followed Ssu-ma Ch’ien, but also showed some differences, such as in the case of Hsieh’s name and showing the comparative time frame of the Hsia, Shang, and Chou leaders. Most interesting is his grading of these people on a moral scale. In a scale of nine—A+ (sage), A (good human), A– (wise man), B+, B, B–, C+, C, and C– (fool)—Hsieh was graded A; Chao-ming and his son (and successor) Hsiang-t’u were graded A–; Ch’ang-jo and his son (and successor) Ken-yü, Ming (Ken-yü’s son), and Hai (Ming’s son) were graded B+; Wei (Shang Chia) was graded B+; Pao I, Pao Ting, Pao Ping, Chu Jen, and Chu Kuei (Pan Ku’s line of order), were graded B; and T’ang was graded A+. See *Han-shu* (1964), pp. 861, 884–90. Compare Wang Li-ch’i, *Han-shu Ku-chin jen-piao shu-cheng* (Chinan: Ch’i-Lu shu-she, 1988); and Chai Yun-sheng, *Chiao-cheng ku-chin jen-piao* (Collations and Supplementary Notes to *Ku-chin jen-piao*), in *Erh-shih wu-shih pu-pien* (Supplements to the Twenty-five Dynastic Histories), 6 vols., Kaiming ed., pp. 369–83, esp. 369–77. Pan Ku’s order of ranking is an intrigue issue. If he based his grading on actual historical sources that list the deeds of these Shang lords, then most of these sources were not seen, or were ignored, by Ssu-ma

Ch'ien; they would be uniquely valuable to our understanding of earlier Shang history and culture had they survived. It does not seem possible that Pan Ku created these rankings on his own; he is too good a historian to create that kind of fabrication. It is for this reason that I have decided to use the "Ku-chin jen-piao" in my reconstruction of early Shang history. (18) *Ti-wang shih-chi* (Annals of the Rulers from the High Antiquity to the End of the Wei Dynasty, A.D. 220–65; *Ti-wang shih-chi chi-ts'un* ed., by Hsu Tsung-yuan [Peking: Chung-hua, 1964]), by Huang-fu Mi (A.D. 214–268). Originally in ten *chüan*, the book was lost in the early thirteenth century during the period of war with the Northern Sung (A.D. 960–1126) and the Southern Sung (A.D. 1127–1279) when the Jurcheds (also Jurchens, Chin) seized control of northern China. In its completeness, this book was not a mere chronicle; it was intended to be a comprehensive yet concise treatise on the history and culture of the period covered, arranged by the order of rulers of the various eras and dynasties. It contained materials that Ssu-ma Ch'ien used in writing the *Shih-chi* but were not passed on to later ages; its coverage of the early or predynastic Shang is more detailed than Ssu-ma Ch'ien's in some respects, although the current text has only fragments of the original work. The *Ti-wang shih-chi chi-ts'un* (1964) represents the most comprehensive collection of the fragments of the book quoted in other works that have been found by numerous scholars since the late Yuan period (1279–1368).

Looking closely at the nature of these sources, it is easy to see the varying degree of their relevance to the subject and the uncertainty of their authenticity as the most immediate primary sources for the Shang in the first seven generations from the mythological hero-founder Hsieh to Hai, who died at the hands of the Yu Yi group. They range in date from the eleventh century B.C. to the third century A.D. and in length from a few words to long story-type narratives. However, in terms of time and length of coverage, the materials in the *I-ching* (or *Yi* [I] as it was known in pre-Ch'in times), *Shih-ching* (*Shih*), *Shu-ching* (*Shu*), *Tso-chuan*, *Kuo-yü*, *Shih-pen*, *Ch'u-tz'u*, *Chu-shu chi-nien*, *Hsun Tzu*, *Meng-tzu*, *Li-chi*, and *Ta-Ta Li-chi* are the most important and useful. Ssu-ma Ch'ien's *Shih-chi* provides a list of the Shang lords between Shang Chia (Wei) and T'ang, and it was followed by Pan Ku in the *Han-shu*. But in his list of rankings Pan also showed the relative importance of these lords as historical figures, about most of whom, such as Ch'ang-jo, Ts'ao-yü, Ming, Pao I, Pao Ping, and Pao Ting, a little is known through other extant ancient works. Needless to say, none of these sources is contemporary; and only three of them—the *I-ching*, *Shih-ching*, and *Shang-shu*—could have contained materials that can be dated to the last years of the Shang dynasty by some recent studies. All of these are naturally very remote in time from the first thirteen generations of the Shang from Hsieh to Chu Kuei. The oracle records discovered in modern times are only of the period after the nineteenth ruler (P'an-keng) of the Shang dynasty, which was founded by Chu Kuei's successor T'ang. These records can be used to confirm the existence of certain predynastic lords and some relevant religious practices and not much beyond that. Therefore, a reconstruction of the major events and developmental stages of the Shang before T'ang still depends in the main on the interpretation and imaginative analysis of the old written texts.

The second point of importance for this discussion is the issue of approaches. To make up for the problems in the timing, paucity, and authenticity of the available sources, I have employed comparative knowledge in modern anthropology and archaeology, as well as other comparative studies, to organize the written sources into a coherent history of the Shang from Hsieh to T'ang, that is, from bands to clan to tribe to nation to cen-

tral chieftainship and feudal state. This is not the first such reconstruction of Shang pre-dynastic history, but my structure and use of sources are different from other such schemes. The validity of my scheme will depend on more archaeological discoveries and some contemporaneous written texts. Another important question that must be raised here is the *countless* (literally in the thousands) works on the dating and authenticity of the ancient Chinese sources written, compiled, and edited by past and modern scholars inside and outside China. The most comprehensive and well researched include the works by such modern scholars as Chang Hsin-ch'eng, Huang Yun-mei, Hu Shih, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Wang Kuo-wei, Ch'ien Mu, Ku Chieh-k'ang, Lo Ken-tse, Ch'ü Wan-li (several titles), Ch'ang Pi-te, Chang Shun-hui, Yang Po-chün, B. Karlgren, Natō Konan, Yoshikawa Keijirō, Michael Loewe (ed., 1993), Mark E. Lewis (1999), and numerous others. I have made no effort to list these works, as there are too many to do them justice. My views are primarily my own, based on a select number of works past and present.

9. For primary sources, see those works cited in note 8. In this study on the early development of the Shang, I have benefited from seminal works by modern scholars, especially Wang Kuo-wei (1877–1927), *Kuan-t'ang chi-lin* (Selected Works of Wang Kuan-t'ang [Wang Kuo-wei]) (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1959), pp. 409–27, 515–33; *Wang Kuan-t'ang hsien-sheng ch'üan-chi* (Complete Works of Wang Kuan-t'ang), vols. 3, 4, 6 (Taipei: Wen-hua, 1968 ed.). Fu Ssu-nien, *Fu Meng-chen hsien-sheng chi*, pp. 43–96; Wu Ch'i-ch'ang, “Pu tz'u so-chien Yin hsien-kung hsien-wang san hsu k'ao” (The Early Shang Predynastic Lords and Dynastic Kings as Seen in Oracle Bone and Shell Inscriptions), *Yen-ching hsueh-pao* 14 (1933): 1–58; Ku Chieh-kang, “Chou I kua yao tz'u chung te ku-shih” (Historical Events and Stories in the Book of Chang), *Ku-shih pien* 3 (1931): 5–8; Tung Tso-pin, *Chia-ku hsueh wu-shih nien* (The Study of Shang Oracle Records in Fifty Years) (Taipei: I-wen, 1955), esp. pp. 69–73; Chao T'ieh-han, *Ku-shih k'ao-shu* (Research on Selected Topics in Ancient Chinese History) (Taipei: Cheng-chung shu-chü, 1956), pp. 141–238; Ch'ü Wan-li, *Shu-yung lun-hsueh chi* (Selected Writings of Ch'ü Wan-li) (Taipei: K'ai-ming shu-chü, 1969), pp. 7–28, 352–80, and “Shih-chi 'Yin pen-chi' chi ch'i-ta chi-lu chung so-tsai Yin-Shang shih-tai te shih-shih” (The History of Yin-Shang as recorded in the *Yin pen-chi* of the *Shih-chi* and Other Records), *Kuo-li T'ai-wan ta-hsueh wen-hsueh-che hsueh-pao* 14 (1965): 87–106, ref. on pp. 89–93 (table on p. 93, for Wang Wu; I have followed Tung Tso-pin); Ch'en Meng-chia, *Yin-hsü Pu-tz'u tsung-shu* (A Comprehensive Study of the Oracle Bone Inscriptions and Yin-Shang History and Other Related Issues in Shang-Chou History) (Taipei: Ta-t'ung shu-chü, 1971, reprint of Peking: K'o-hsueh ch'u-pan she, 1956 ed.), pp. 333–69; Ting Shan, *Chia-ku wen so-chien shih-tsu chi-ch'i chih-tu* (The Yin-Shang Clan and Lineage System as Seen in the Oracle Bone and Shell Inscriptions), and *Yin-Shang shih-tsu pang-kuo chih* (A Study of the Tribal Groups and “States” in Yin-Shang Times), both included in Ch'en Meng-chia's book, pp. 1–159 from back (pt. 2); Yen I-p'ing, *Yin-Shang shih-chi* (The History of the Shang from the Beginning to King Hsin), 3 vols. (Taipei: I-wen, 1985), pp. 1–78, the first three *chüan* covering K'u to T'ang, including old sources and his own studies, both written texts and sources in oracle bone and shell inscriptions; Chou Hung-hsiang, *Shang-Yin ti-wang pen-chi* (The Rulers of the Shang-Yin) (Hong Kong: Po-wen, 1958), generally replaced by Yen I-p'ing's work, but his views and critique of old sources still offer important points; Sun Miao, *Hsia-Shang shih kao* (A Draft History of the Hsia and Shang Periods) (Peking: Wen-wu, 1987), pp. 239–319, providing summary views from recent archaeological work but often with questionable interpretations; Chang Kuang-chih (Kwang-chih Chang), *Chung-kuo ch'ing-t'ung Shih-tai* (The Bronze Age of China),

vol. 1 (Hong Kong: Chung-ta-hsueh ch'u-pan she, 1982) (hereafter cited as Chang Kwang-chih 1982b), and *Chung-kuo ch'ing-t'ung Shih-tai*, *Erh-chi* (The Bronze Age of China), vol. 2 (Peking: San-lien, 1990); and *Mei-shu sheng-huo yü chi-ssu* (Chinese version of Kwang-chih Chang 1983) (Taipei: Tao-hsiang ch'u-pan she, 1993); Shima Kunio, *Inkyo bokuji kenkyū* (Studies in the Oracle Bone and Shell Records from the Yin Ruins) (Tokyo: Kyuko shoin, 1958); Akatsuka Kiyoshi, *Chūgoku kodai no shūkyō to bunka—In ōchō no saishi* (The Religion and Culture of Ancient China: Sacrificial Rituals in the Yin Dynasty) (Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten, 1977) (a critical review of this book is given by David N. Keightley in *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 42, no. 1 [June 1982]: 267–320); Ping-ti Ho, *The Cradle of the East: An Inquiry into the Indigenous Origins of Techniques and Ideas of Neolithic and Early Historic China, 5000–1000 B.C.* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1975); Kwang-chih Chang, *Shang Civilization* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 3–10, 322–55; Kwang-chih Chang, *Studies in Shang Archaeology* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), and *Art, Myth, and Ritual: The Path to Political Authority in Ancient China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), and *Early Chinese Civilization: Anthropological Perspectives* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); and David N. Keightley, ed., *The Origins of Chinese Civilization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 411–564 (articles by E. G. Pulleyblank, Morton H. Fried, K. C. Chang, and David N. Keightley on various aspects of the development of “tribe and state” in prehistoric China). I should point out that Wang Kuo-wei’s work was pioneering, Ch’en Meng-chia’s is the most comprehensive among all modern studies on Yin-Shang history, Yen I-p’ing’s is the most detailed study of the Shang-Yin rulers with comprehensive analyses based on both written and oracle bone records, Chang Kwang-chih’s is most concise and illuminating from the archaeological and anthropological perspectives and includes a proposed scheme of the evolutionary stages of the Shang as a people from tribe to state, and the various articles in David N. Keightley’s edited volume have proposed various views and perspectives. However, all of these inquiries have raised more questions than answers and generally have provided foundational work for further research and the formulation of different approaches. The Western-language works focus mainly on the archaeological record and post-P’an Keng historic China (e.g., Keightley’s study of the origin of the state in the late Shang). Many of the critical problems in early Shang development remain unresolved, including such basic issues as the locations of the early eight removals of the Shang centers (capitals, walled cities, and towns [nucleated settlements]), even if the number eight is beyond question, a matter that is still under debate. On the question of the identification of the first seven Shang leaders in the oracle bone and shell inscriptions, Ch’en Meng-chia holds that only Hai was recorded, and none of the first six was (p. 367), while Tung Tso-pin maintains that at least three of the seven were identified (pp. 71–73, 103–4). Hai’s name was written in seven or eight forms (using different characters). Hsieh was also referred to as Hsuan Wang (Dark King) in some written texts, including the *Book of Poetry*. For an earlier but no less classic analysis of the formation of the Chinese nation, see Li Chi, *The Formation of the Chinese People* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1928).

10. The second sequence of names, Shang Chia [Shang Chia Wei], Pao I to Pao Ting, and Chu Jen and Chu Kuei, were the forms that appeared in the various written texts cited in note 8 (e.g., the *Shih-chi* and *Han-shu*). The word *Pao* preceding the I-Ping-Ting series was written as a small box with the left side open, like “J” in oracle bone and shell records, and it was pronounced “fang” in ancient times. It was the form of the box holding the ancestral tablets in the royal temple, a religious symbol for sacrifices and

offerings. It was probably for this reason, I believe, that the written texts in later periods translated it as *Pao* (worship of ancestors) for the purpose of paying respect. Chu Jen and Chu Kuei appeared in the oracle records as Shih Jen and Shih Kuei, with the word *shih* (ancestral tablets) changed to *chu* (ancestral tablets) in later periods.

11. For the terms *tribe*, *classical segmentary tribe*, and *composite tribe* and various issues related to the subject under discussion, see Elman R. Service, *Primitive Social Organization: An Evolutionary Perspective* (New York: Random House, 1971), and *Origins of the State and Civilization: The Process of Cultural Evolution* (New York: Norton, 1975); Ronald Cohen and Elman R. Service, eds., *Origins of the State: The Anthropology of Political Evolution* (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1978); Morton H. Fried, *The Evolution of Political Society: An Essay in Political Anthropology* (New York: Random House, 1967), and *The Notion of Tribe* (Menlo Park, CA: Cummings, 1976), and "The State, the Chicken, and the Egg; or Which Came the First?" in Cohen and Service, *Origins of the State*, pp. 35-47; Morton H. Fried, ed., *Readings in Anthropology* (New York: Crowell, 1968), vol. 2, pp. 370-408 (essays by Paul Kirchhoff, Harumi Befu, and Leonard Plotnicov, and William E. Mitchell); and Marshall Sahlins, *Tribesmen* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968).

12. For the development of the Shang under Ch'eng T'ang's reign, see *Shih-chi* (1963; this edition throughout this study unless noted otherwise), pp. 93-98; *Shih-ching* (*Wu-ching tu-pen* ed.), pp. 165-69, or XX:4 in the *Shih-san ching chu-shu* ed. (with more detailed analysis of the various possible datings of the "Shang-sung"); *Meng Tzu*, pp. 215, 268; *Chu-shu chi-nien*, pp. 15-17; *Sheng-shu cheng-tu* (including *Shu-hsu*), pp. 88-94; *Ti-wang shih-chi chi-ts'un*, pp. 61-69. Perhaps the most systematic compilation of data about the Ch'eng T'ang and his reign is Yen I-p'ing, *Yin-Shang shih-chi*, pp. 49-79.

13. The basic characteristic of a "centralized chieftainship" or "chiefdom" is that the tribal kinship system has been replaced by a competitive power system and the principles of coercion and manipulation have replaced the principles of ascription and custom. In practical terms, in such a structure power is centralized in the hands of a single leader, who is assisted by a highly organized administrative machine, in which subordinate officials are often appointed by the individual or lineage in power. See the references cited in note 11. For a comparative study of chiefdom, one may read George Milner, *The Cahokia Chiefdom* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998).

14. Yang-ch'eng was the last Hsia capital after Hsia expanded to the east from west. An-i was the old capital and home base of the Hsia in the west. It is a misunderstanding that the Hsia capital was still in An-i at end of its power. For a different view on this issue, see Fang Yu-sheng's article in *Chung-kuo shih yen-chiu* 4 (1980): 22-24.

15. I have reconstructed Chieh's line of retreat from Yang-ch'eng to Ming-t'iao as from the southeast to northwest, Honan to Shansi. Other scholars offer different interpretations. See Yen I-p'ing, *Yin-Shang shih-chi*, pp. 61-65. For a general view of Hsia-Shang geography, see T'an Ch'i-hsiang, ed., *Chung-kuo li-shih ti-t'u chi* (Historical Maps of China), vol. 1 (Shanghai: Ti-t'u ch'u-pan she, 1982), maps 9-10, 13-14. A more detailed treatise on Hsia and Shang geography is found in Chao T'ieh-han, *Ku-shih k'ao-shu*, pp. 62-73; Chung-kuo Hsien-Ch'in shih hsueh-hui, ed., *Hsia-shih lun-ts'ung* (Essays on Hsia History) (Chinan: Ch'i-Lu shu-she, 1985), pp. 266-334 (five articles on different aspects of Hsia geography from its origins to the identification of Erh-li-t'ou of Yen-shih in Honan as a Hsia capital); Li Hsueh-ch'in, *Yin-tai ti-li chien-lun* (Introduction to Yin Geography) (Peking: K'o-hsueh ch'u-pan she, 1959); Sun Miao, *Hsia-Shang shih kao*, pp. 101-12, 185-207; and Tsou Heng, *Hsia Shang Chou k'ao-ku hsueh lun-wen chi*

(Archaeological Studies in the Hsia, Shang, and Chou periods) (Peking: Wen-wu, 1980), pp. 253–93. For a different view of the development of the Hsia state (*kuo-chia*) based on archaeological discoveries, see Tu Cheng-sheng, “Hsia-tai kuo-chia chi ch’i fa-chan te t’an-so” (Hsia Archaeology and the Development of the Hsia State), *K’ao-ku* 1 (1990): 1–45. For an earlier study of the Hsia, see Ch’ien Mu, *Hsia-tai ta-shih shih-i* (Sources for the Study of the Major Events of the Hsia Period) in *Chung-kuo t’ung-shih ts’an-k’ao tzu-liao* (Sources for the Writing of A General History of China) (Macao: Tung-sheng ch’u-pan she, 1982).

16. I see this as the reason that T’ang banished Chieh to Nan-ch’ao. It was a political move. Scholars since early times have offered different views about where and why Chieh was banished by T’ang. One school held that Chieh retreated to Nan-ch’ao after his defeat. That seems unlikely in my view, since the southeast was T’ang’s stronghold. After Ch’ieh’s surrender, T’ang did not kill him by following the well-established tradition at the time. Evidently the code of ethics in war held that a surrendered leader must be treated with honor and dignity and not killed. Heaven would not permit that, so it was said. The treatment of lesser leaders was generally not the same; sometimes they were even used as sacrifices as a symbol of victory.

17. Different sources indicate that Chieh retreated to the Tsung area in Shantung. I do not believe that would make sense since the east was T’ang’s home base.

18. The issue here is about the number 500 *kuo*. Although the word *kuo* has been generally translated as “state,” at this time none but a few, at the most, of these *kuo* were really states in the sense of our definition of the term. These *kuo* were really various types of polities ranging from composite tribes to chiefdoms to at best feudal states, although all had walled towns (*i* or *yi*) or cities (*ta-i* or *ch’eng*) as the center of command and activity, either sedentary or seasonally nomadic. That is why they were so numerous. The numbers should not be considered an exaggeration, though it may not be exact. At the end of the Shang dynasty, when the Chou defeated the Shang, King Wu actually conquered 99 *kuo* by military action and received the submission of 652 *kuo*, that is, there were 751 *kuo* at the end of the Shang dynasty. Evidently there were a large number of *kuo*, scattered over the “Chinese” domain, and each could only have been very small—such as a tribe and chiefdom—because China at that time was also very small, about only one-fourth the size of the country today. For the Chou conquest, see *I Chou shu* (Yi Chou shu [History of the Chou], *Ssu-pu pei-yao* ed.), a fourth-century B.C. work, *chüan* 4, p. 11. The figures in the book must be corrected in light of Ch’ü Wan-li’s study in *Shu-yung lun-hsueh chi*, pp. 427–28. The Ti and Ch’iang issue is mentioned in the poem “Yin Wu” (The Mighty Yin) in *The Book of Poetry* (*Wu-ching tu-pen* ed., p. 169). They were in early times in Shansi, Shensi, and the eastern Kansu region, bordering the Hsia and Shang in the west. See Pulleyblank’s interesting study of the Ti and Ch’iang as Tibeto-Burman people in Hsia and Shang times who had their common homeland in the Yangshao neolithic culture in northwestern China and moved southwest (“The Chinese and Their Neighbors in Prehistoric and Early Historic Times,” in Keightley, *The Origins of Chinese Civilization*, pp. 416–23, 459). See Yü Wei-ch’ao’s different view in his *Hsien-Ch’in Liang-Han k’ao-ku hsueh lun-chi* (Essays on the Archaeology of Pre-220 A.D. China) (Peking: Wen-wu, 1985), pp. 180–92.

19. For the territorial dimensions of the Shang, see T’an Ch’i-hsiang, *Chung-kuo li-shih ti-t’u chi*, maps 13–14; Li Hsueh-ch’in, *Yin-tai ti-li chien-lun*; Ch’ü Wan-li, “Yin Chou p’ien” (The Historical Geography of Yin and Chou), in *Chung-kuo li-shih ti-li* (Studies in the Historical Geography of China), written by Shih Chang-ju et al. (Taipei: Chung-

hua wen-hua, 1954), esp. pp. 4-5; Ch'en Meng-chia, *Yin-hsu pu-tz'u tsung-shu*, pp. 313-32; Sun Miao, *Hsia-Shang shih kao*, pp. 376-84 (Sun holds that the Shang domain extended to northern Hopei in the north and to the south of the Han River in Hupei in the south); and Kwang-chih Chang, *Shang Civilization*, pp. 210-59. See also Tsou Heng's study, cited in note 15; and David N. Keightley, *The Origins of Chinese Civilization*, pp. 537-38 ("The Late Shang State: When, Where, and What?" by Keightley, who refers to a regime such as the Shang as a "dynastic state").

20. T'ang took Po as his capital for reasons besides its being his home base. Economics was one; it was at that time agriculturally a very rich area, with land so fertile that T'ang composed a special document praising its fertility when he made it his central walled town at the beginning of his reign (*Shang-shu cheng-tu*, pp. 88-89).

21. *Shih-chi*, p. 98. Cf. *Li-chi* (*Wu-ching tu-pen* ed.), p. 29; and *Lun-yü* (*The Analects of Confucius*, *Ssu-shu chang-chü* ed.), p. 164. I think the change to carriages drawn by horses marked a new beginning in Chinese civilization. Horseback riding, which perhaps began with *Hsiang-t'u*, was replaced with the carriage as a means of transportation, a new "vehicle" with a larger capacity and a relatively higher degree of safety that also led to the development of chariot fighting. Although it may not have been introduced by T'ang, its significance should not be overlooked.

22. The divine power of T'ang, which was inherited by later Shang kings, is mentioned by Ssu-ma Ch'ien in his *Shih-chi* (pp. 95-97) and the "P'an Keng" chapter in the *Book of History* (*Shang-shu*, *Shu-ching*, *Wu-ching tu-pen* ed., pp. 53-58), generally believed to date from the eleventh century B.C. But it is also proved by the massive records in the oracle bone and shell inscriptions. See Ch'en Meng-chia, *Yin-hsu pu-tz'u tsung-shu*, pp. 561-81. In ancient China, religion was comprised of two critical parts. One was the ritual component (*chi-ssu*), the essence of which was ancestor worship, which served to legitimize a regime, that is, the divine power of the ruler. The other was the *she* institution, a form of worship that signified the identity of a regime (a state, a dynasty, and so forth), that is, the symbolic representation of it. The latter will be discussed later. One then should note that in Ch'eng T'ang's time religion as a belief system had already been institutionalized as a tool to establish political legitimacy, and it was so powerful that it invoked awe and fear and persuaded Tang's people to follow him in his campaign against the Hsia king Chieh.

23. See Ch'en Meng-chia, *Yin-hsu pu-tz'u tsung-shu*, pp. 313-32, 505-22; and Chang Kwang-chih, *Shang Civilization*, pp. 210-60.

24. Ssu-ma Ch'ien, *Shih-chi*, p. 145, see also pp. 45, 89. The system evidently had a long tradition dating back to the Hsia and before, at least as it was stated by Ssu-ma Ch'ien. In this light, as was discussed earlier, the term *tsu* was clearly associated with the geographical location (*shih*) of a tribal branch and did not carry the modern meaning of "race." Both Ssu-ma Ch'ien and the *Tso-chuan* made this point quite clear (*Shih-chi* [1963], p. 35; *Tso-chuan*, *Wu-ching tu-pen* ed., p. 56, entry under 715 B.C.). Therefore, the word *tsu* here should be rendered as "clan," not "race." *Hsing* is the clan name (later the family name). See also Ting Shan, *Chia-ku wen so-chien shih-tsu chi ch'i chih-tu* and *Yin-Shang shih-tsu pang-kuo chih*; Hu Hou-hsuan, *Chia-ku hsueh Shang-shih lun-ts'ung ch'u-chi* (*Studies in Shang History Based on the Oracle Bone Records*) (Chengtu: Ch'i-lu ta-hsueh, 1945; reprinted in Hong Kong by Wen-yu t'ang, n.d.), 1:1-41; and Chung Pai-sheng, *Wu-ting pu-tz'u chung te fang kuo ti-wang k'ao* (*The Geography of the Various Fang Kuo as Seen in the Oracle Records of the Wu-ting Period*) (Taipei: Shu-heng ch'u-pan she, 1978).

25. As was discussed earlier, there were actually 751 *kuo*. Ting Shan and others found more than 300 such units recorded in the oracle bone records. See note 18; and Ting Shan's two essays cited in note 24.

26. There are aberrations in this line of societal evolution. Morton Fried holds, for example, that tribes arose from interactions with existing states. See Fried's works cited in note 11; and the works of Elman Service and Marshall Sahlins in the same note. However, it should be noted that I believe the difference between Service and Sahlins' theory and Fried's comes from the nature of the subject, not from the structure of analytical approaches. That is, if one takes a single race as the subject matter of analysis then the band-tribe-state line is valid in most cases, but if the subject is changed to a group of people already under the overlordship of a strong state then the regressive state-tribe line is possibly valid. For in times past that weak state may have been defeated and forced to split into fragments, then becoming either a small tribal-type group or scattered smaller tribal-type groups. Therefore, the state-tribe line is really irregular and complementary, at least in the Chinese case, and not a regular full-circle development. In ancient China and later periods, both strands of societal evolution existed, and one has to understand the historical context before reconstructing a specific line of evolution. In this study, I focus on the regular line of band-tribe-state evolution. For both the Shang and Chou lineages, traditional sources indicate that both of them began as states and under the sage-kings Yao, Shun, and Yü (as stated in the *Shih-chi* with identical wording), but modern studies have long proved that to be the fabrication of the descendants of the two ruling houses. Neither began as a state at all.

27. The main sources for the evolution of the Chou lineage are Ssu-ma Ch'ien's *Shih-chi*, esp. pp. 111-31; Pan Ku (32-92), *Han-shu* (1964 ed.), pp. 872-94; *Shih-ching* (*Wu-ching tu-pen* ed.), esp. pp. 119ff.; *Shang-shu* (*Wu-ching tu-pen* ed.), esp. pp. 62ff., (*Shang-shu cheng-tu* ed., including *Shu-hsu*), esp. pp. 113ff.; *I-Chou shu* (*Ssu-pu pei-yao* ed.); *I-Chou shu fen-p'ien chü-shih* by T'ang Ta-p'ei (Taipei: Hsueh-sheng shu-chü, 1969; reprint of 1836 handwritten copy); *Ta-Tai Li-chi*, pp. 263-64; *Ku-pen chu-shu chi-nien*; *Tso-chuan*, esp. entries under 625, 535, and 533 B.C.; *Kuo-yü*, esp. "Chou-yü" and "Lu-yü"; *Shih-pen*, esp. Sun ed., pp. 10-11, Mao ed., p. 14, and sections on *shih* and *hsing* in all editions; *Ch'u-tz'u* (*Wan-yu* ed.), pp. 39-51; *Shan-hai ching* (*Chiao-chu* ed.), 370-71, 392-94; and *Ti-wang shih-chi chi-ts'un*, esp. pp. 78-90.

28. The word *k'u* in Pu K'u can be read *k'u* (meaning "cave") or *Chuo* (meaning "something in the cave"). I favor the *k'u* reading for reasons that will become clear in my interpretation of the evolution of the Chou lineage. (It has been sometimes misread as *ch'ü* by scholars.)

29. *Han-shu* (1964 ed.), pp. 886-87. In addition to the three extra lords, several of Pan Ku's names of the predynastic Chou lords differ from Ssu-ma Ch'ien's. See also Chai Yun-sheng, *Chiao-cheng ku-chin jen-piao*, p. 377.

30. *Han-shu* (1964 ed.), p. 2119.

31. For the origin of millet in China, see Ho Ping-ti, *Huang-t'u kao-yuan yü Chung-kuo nung-yeh te ch'i-yuan* (The Yellow Loess and the Origins of Chinese Agriculture) (Hong Kong: Chung-wen ta-hsueh ch'u-pan she, 1969), pp. 121-33, and *The Cradle of the East*, pp. 18, 50, 57, 380-84; Te-tzu Chang, "The Origin of Early Cultures and the Cereal Grains and Food Legumes," in Keightley, *The Origins of Chinese Civilization*, pp. 65-70. Of course, the millet was one of the grains whose domestication started the process of the "agricultural revolution" in China in the Neolithic Age. Some scholars have unnecessarily translated Hou Chi as "The Lord of Agriculture."

32. *Shih-chi* (1963 ed.), pp. 91, 111, 488–89; *Han-shu* (1964 ed.), pp. 867–72. See also *Ta-Tai Li-chi*, pp. 258–64; and *Shih-pen* (Sun ed.), pp. 2–7.

In an interesting analysis of the language groups in ancient China, E. G. Pulleyblank has suggested that the Hsia, Shang, and Chou peoples all belonged to the Sino-Tibetan language family and probably had their common homeland in the Yangshao neolithic culture in northwestern China (“The Chinese and Their Neighbors in Prehistoric and Early Historic Times,” in Keightley, *The Origins of Chinese Civilization*, pp. 411–66, ref. on 416–23, 459–60). The ancient Chinese genealogical line as seen in the early literary texts also portrayed the three groups of people(s) as of one origin, Shao-tien and the Yellow Emperor. Moreover, this idea of all the people being of one origin had what I would venture to call a snowball effect, including in this big “melting pot” all peoples the Chinese came to have close contact with in peace or conflict in later ages until the Han march to the Hsi-yü region (Central Asia and beyond), where they encountered peoples whose physical appearance was markedly different. See *Ta-Tai Li-chi*, pp. 258–64; *Shih-chi*, pp. 488–500; *Shih-pen* (Lei Hsueh-ch’i ed.), pp. 1–43; and *Kuo-yü*, p. 356 (tracing the Chi clan to Huang-ti [the Yellow Emperor] and the Chiang clan to Yen-ti, both of whom were Shao-tien’s sons). This view was the foundation of the Chinese conception of ethnicity through the ages. One should further note that such thinking is not merely an imaginative mythology or jingoistic nationalist myth; it was actually a functional historical reality in Chinese history in that such a myth was believed to be true and was taken as such in the structure of Chinese political culture and worldview. This was particularly so because the Chinese in traditional times believed that the classics in which such stories were recorded were the ultimate repositories of their culture’s universal values and norms. In the end, these myths became an institutionalized system of ideologies that guided them in their interracial and international relations. Modern scholars have of course held that the “Chinese” of China were of multiracial origin and “Chinese culture” was the result of the fusion of different regional cultures. See, among others, the works of Li Chi, Ruey Yih-fu (Jui I-fu), Chang Kwang-chih, Yü Wei-ch’ao, Wei Hui-lin, Meng Wen-t’ung, Yang Hsi-mei, and Ch’en Pan cited earlier. See also Wolfram Eberhard, *The Local Cultures of South and East China*, trans. Alide Eberhard (Leiden: Brill, 1968). See also Hiraoka Takeo, “Gotei hongii no shin kenkyū” (A New Study of the *Annals of the Five August Emperors* [in the *Shih-chi*]), *Shinagaku* 8, no. 2 (1936): 125–66.

33. For investigations and studies of the numerous prehistoric sites of the Chou, see Shih Chang-ju, “Ch’uan-shuo chung Chou tu te shih-ti k’ao-ch’a” (Archaeological Investigations of the Chou Capitals as Recorded in Ancient Literary Texts), *Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica* (hereafter BIHP) 20, no. 2 (1948): 91–122, and “Kuan-chung k’ao-ku tiao-ch’a pao-kao” (Report of Archaeological Investigations in the Kuan-chung Region), BIHP 27 (1956): 205–323, and “Chou-tu i-chi yü ts’ao-t’ao I-ts’un” (Ruins of the Chou Capitals and Painted Pottery), *Ta-lu tsa-chih t’e-k’an*, special issue (1952): 357–86; Shih Nien-hai, *Ho-shan chi* (Studies on the Economic Geography of Early China) (reprint; Hong Kong: Kuang chueh ching, 1977), pp. 26–57; and Kwang-chih Chang, *The Archaeology of Ancient China*, 4th ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), chaps. 3–4, and *Art, Myth, and Ritual* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 1–32.

Many scholars have argued that the Chou people actually originated in the east, in modern Shantung and Shansi. See Ch’ien Mu, “Chou ch’u ti-li k’ao” (The Geographical Locations of Certain Important Events and Peoples of Predynastic History), *Yenching Journal* (*Yen-ching hsueh-pao*) 10 (December 1931): 1958–85. Still other studies hold that

the Chou originated in the eastern Kansu-Tsinghai region, the loess plateau region of central Shensi and eastern Kansu, western Honan, or the Ordos region. As my discussion will show, these views are mostly based on the later Chou migrations and the interpretation of the location of the Ch'i-Chü and Ch'i rivers. My interpretation and account of the origins of the Chou people take a different approach. Second, in recent decades archaeological excavations and studies in Wu-kung, Fu-feng, Ch'i-shan, the Feng region, and Pin Hsien have recovered the core sites of the earliest Chou predynastic settlements and confirmed most of the statements about Chou events and activities in the Feng-Ch'i-Pin territory of central Shensi as recorded in the *Shang-shu*, *Shih-ching*, and *Shih-chi*. For a convenient summary of the different theories of the Chou origins and archaeological works, see Li Ming and Chang Kuo-shuo, *Hsia-Shang-Chou san-tsu yuan-liu t'an-so* (Research on the Origins of the Hsia, Shang, and the Chou) (Cheng-chou: Ho-nan jen-min ch'u-pan she, 1998), pp. 117-30 (the two authors, however, believe that the Chou were from southern Shansi); and Pei-ching ta-hsueh li-shih hsi k'ao-ku chiao-yen shih, *Shang Chou k'ao-ku* (Archaeology of the Shang and Chou Periods) (Peking: Wen-wu ch'u-pan she, 1980), pp. 144-49.

34. To resolve the incomprehensible puzzle in the early Chou genealogy, many scholars have tried to date Ch'i's (Hou Chi's) time to the transition from the Hsia to the Shang, that is, the beginning of the dynastic Shang in about 1600 B.C. But some other scholars have dated the beginning of the Chou people as far back as the beginning or middle of the Hsia dynasty. I think the late Hsia date is well grounded, and I will examine this issue later in detail. I also think Liu Ching's words make a strong case and have decided to follow them in this study of the predynastic development of the Chou lineage. The *Shan-Hai ching* also mentions that Ch'i's grandson Shu Chün succeeded Ch'i as a "lord of millet" and taught his people farming (pp. 392-93). This further indicates that there were others between Ch'i and Pu K'u and that agriculture was believed to have been associated with the Chou culture in some way. Ch'i might not be the only Hou Chi in the ancient tradition.

35. These Jung and Ti were the Hsun-yü, part of the Ch'iang people. They occupied the northern Shensi and northwestern Shansi regions. See Jen Nai-ch'iang, *Ch'iang-tsu yuan-liu t'an-so* (A Study of the Origins of the Ch'iang People and Other Ethnic Groups in Ancient China) (Chungking: Ch'ung-ch'ing ch'u-pan she, 1984), pp. 50-68. Also see Yü Wei-ch'ao (1985, cited in note 18) for an archaeological inquiry into the origins of the Jung, Ch'iang, and Hu. Yü concludes that the Jung originally lived in Tsinghai and later branched out as Hu (later Hsiung-nu) and others. It should be noted here that the Jung and Ti in the reference in the text were two ethnic groups of the same Ch'iang people. In their economic lifestyle, the Jung, who lived mostly in western and northwestern Shensi and eastern Kansu, were those Ch'iang people who were less sedentary than the Ti (Ch'iang), who were in northern Shensi and Shansi. Sometimes the two were similar in their lifestyles, both being seminomadic, and were referred to as Jung Ti. I believe that the Chou were more Jung than Ti up to Kung Liu's time because they were primarily nomadic with some limited agricultural activities.

I have taken the Ch'i-Chü River to exist concurrently with the Ch'i River. The Ch'i-Chü River formed when the Ch'i River (flowing from northeast) and the Chü River (from the northwest) merged in modern Yao hsien. It cut through central Shensi and flowed in a southeasterly direction into the Wei River in the modern Wu-kung area. The Ch'i River then was in the modern Pin hsien area by the Ching River in northeastern Shensi and followed a southwesterly course. Since ancient times, scholars have been

confused about the difference between the two rivers and often have difficulty reading the passages in the Chou and Han texts (e.g., *Shih-ching* and *Shih-chi*), where both rivers mentioned.

My reconstruction of the Kung Liu event is based on the *Shih-ching*, pp. 122, 228–29; *Meng-tzu*, pp. 218–19, 254; and *Shih-chi*, p. 112. *Shih-ching* is the most important and primary source for my reconstruction, due to its details and much earlier dating than the other two. For my interpretation of the land system and the use of “exchange media,” I rely more on the *Meng-tzu* than on the *Shih-chi*. I have interpreted the lines in the *Shih-ching* from a new perspective. For various earlier interpretations, I have relied heavily on Wang Yin-chih (1766–1834), *Ching-i shu-wen* (1817 ed.); and Ch’ü Wan-li, *Shih-ching shih-i* (Taipei: Chung-hua wen-hua shih-yen ch’u-pan wei-yuan hui, 1954), which sums up the most important classical annotations and earlier studies. For P’u Yuan, see Wang Kuo-wei, *Kuan-t’ang chi-lin*, p. 889 (also Wang’s view on the location of Pin). For a detailed study of the issue of the Ch’i-Chü and Ch’i Rivers, see Hsin Shu-chih, *Yü-kung hsin chieh* (A New Study of the Yü-kung [in the *Shang-shu*]) (Hong Kong: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1973), pp. 140–56. His views on the number and locations of these rivers are different from mine, and I think that he basically reads the classical sources differently. It should also be pointed out that T’an Ch’i-hsiang and his editors were incorrect in locating the Chou places in the *Chung-kuo li-shih ti-t’u chi* (map 17–18).

36. My description of the Ku Kung T’an-fu event is mainly based on the *Shih-ching* (*Wu-ching tu-pen* ed., pp. 119–65; *Shih-san ching chu-shu* ed., *chüan* 16–22, esp. “Mien” poem); *Meng-tzu* (pp. 215, 219, 225); and *Shih-chi* (esp. pp. 113–15). Other pre-Ch’in (pre-221 B.C.) sources consulted include *Kuo-yü* (pp. 166, 351); *Li-chi* (*Wu-ching tu-pen* ed., pp. 276–77); *Lü-shih ch’un-ch’iu*, p. 1453; Chuang Chou (365–290 B.C.), *Chuang-tzu* (The Works of Chuang-tzu [Chuang Chou], *Chiao-cheng Chuang Tzu chi-shih* ed.) (reprint; Taipei: Shih-chieh, 1962), p. 967; and *Ch’u-tz’u*, pp. 48–49. But *Meng-tzu*, *Chuang Tzu*, *Ch’u-tz’u*, and *Lü-shih ch’un-ch’iu* all merely quote or sum up the lines in the *Shih-ching* (the “Mien” poem, of the earliest group of poems, probably composed in the eleventh century B.C.) and add no new information except some textual variations. On the critical issue of the river that Ku Kung T’an-fu crossed in his move to the Ch’i area, the *Shih-ching* merely refers to it as a *shui* (river). All other pre-Ch’in texts add no further information to clear up the issue. The later *Shih-chi* indicates that Ku Kung T’an-fu led his people “ch’ü Pin tu Ch’i Chü yü Liang-shan chih yü Ch’i hsia,” meaning “left Pin, crossed the Ch’i-Chü River, passed over Mount Liang, and stopped [reached] the foot of Mount Ch’i.” However, the order of these geographical marks—Pin to Ch’i-Chü to Mount Liang to Ch’i *hsia*—is incorrect: From Pin to Mount Ch’i, Mount Liang comes before the Ch’i-Chü River. This has caused confusion about the location of the river and also contradicts the order given in the *Shih-ching* (also quoted in the *Meng-tzu*): It indicates that in his migration to the Ch’i area Ku Kung T’an-fu first encountered the western bank of a “river” after leaving Pin to go eastward. On the basis of the Ch’i River being west of Pin (as discussed in note 35), I have reconstructed the event as presented in the text here, assuming that the first Ch’i River was either missed in the process of copying in the transmission of the *Shih-chi* or simply overlooked by Ssu-ma Ch’ien himself. For other lengthy discussions on this issue, see Hsin Shu-chih’s work cited in note 35.

The word *kan* in the *Shih-ching* text has been rendered “shield” by scholars. Yang Shu-ta, however, holds that it was actually a long spear for attacking the enemy. Here I have followed this interpretation. See Yang Shu-ta, *Chi-wei-chü hsiao-hsueh shu-lin* (Etymo-

logical Studies from the Chi-wei Studio) (reprint; Taipei: Ta-t'ung shu-chü, 1971), pp. 68-69.

37. The name Chou-yuan had two connotations, one being the name of a walled town located in modern Ch'i-shan *hsien* and the other a large plain of fertile land in a round shape (*chou*). I have used the latter in this particular context. Scholars have argued that Ku Kung T'an-fu did not leave the Pin region to avoid a confrontation with the Hsun-yü or under pressure from the Jung Ti groups; he left because he wanted to gain control of the Ch'i area in order to attack the Shang in the east by convenient route of the Wei River to Yellow River line. I think this view is based on a misunderstanding of the differences among the Jung Ti groups. It is true that from Pu K'u to T'an-fu the Chou people lived with the Jung Ti, but those Jung Ti were the western groups, not the more advanced northern groups such as the Hsun-yü, who occupied the Ordos region and northern Shensi and Shansi. In late Shang times, these groups were already part agricultural and periodically moved southward to challenge the Shang and other southern neighbors. The Chou in Ku Kung T'an-fu's time evidently belonged to the advance group on the front of their southward move. They were evidently stronger at that time and forced the Chou to appease (*shih*) them, as stated by Meng Tzu ("T'ai-wang [Ku Kung T'an-fu] shih Hsun-yü" [T'ai-wang Submitted to the Hsun-yü]). For the other view, see T'an Chieh-fu, "Hsien Chou tsu yü Chou-tsu te ch'ien-hsi chi ch'i she-hui fa-chan" (Predynastic Chou and Their Migrations and Social Evolution), *Wen-shih* 6 (1979): 41-64, though his view of eight migrations is questionable and some of his interpretations of the related lines in the *Book of Poetry* are forced. One should also note the vital relationship between geography (location) and history (events). The former has played a critical role in shaping the direction and consequences of historical events in both ancient and modern times. The rise of the Chou is a good example. As the history of the Chou gradually unfolded, this point presented itself even more forcefully. Our earlier discussion of the rise and development of the Shang also fully illustrates this point. For comparative perspectives, see W. Gordon East, *The Geography behind History*, rev. and enlarged ed. (New York: Norton, 1965); E. Hirsch and M. O. Hanlon, *The Anthropology of Landscapes: Perspectives on Place and Space* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995); and Wendy Ashmore and A. Bernard Knapp, eds., *Archaeologies of Landscapes* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), esp. pp. 1-30.

38. For the origins, organization, function, and religious importance of the *she* institution in ancient China, see Chang Ch'un-shu (Chun-shu Chang), *Chung-kuo ku-tai te She-shen* (The God of Soil in Ancient China) (Taipei: T'ai-wan ta-hsueh, 1956; rev. ed., 1957); Édouard Chavannes, *Le dieu du sol dans la Chine antique* in *Le Tai Chan* (Taipei: Ch'eng-wen, 1970; reprint of 1919 ed.), pp. 437-525; Li Hsuan-po (Tsung-t'ung), *Chung-kuo ku-tai she-hui hsin-yen Ch'u-kao* (A Draft History of Chinese Ancient Society: New Researches) (Peking: Lai-hsun ko shu-tien, 1930), pp. 9-11; and Bernhard Karlgren, *Legends and Cults in Ancient China* (reprint; Stockholm: Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities, 1946), p. 240, and *Some Fecundity Symbols in Ancient China* (reprint; Stockholm: Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities, 1930), pp. 11-20. The use of oracle shell divination in Ku Kung Tan-fu's Chou mentioned in the *Shih-ching* (the "Mien" poem) is supported by the recent discovery of oracle records in the Chou-yuan area. See Hsiao Liang-ch'ung, "Chou-yuan pu-tz'u ho Yin-hiu pu-tz'u chih i-t'ung ch'u-t'an" (A Preliminary Comparative Study of the Chou-yuan and Yin-hsiu Oracle Records), in *Chia-ku wen yü Yin-Shang shih* (Studies in the Oracle Bone and Shell Records and the Yin-Shang History), ed. Hu Hou-hsuan (Shanghai: Ku-chi, 1983), pp. 261-84; and Shensi Chou-

yuan k'ao-ku tui, "Shensi Ch'i-shan Feng-chou ts'un fa-hsien Chou ch'u chia-ku wen" (A Report of the Discovery of Oracle Records in Feng-chou Village of Ch'i-shan in Shensi), *Wen-wu* 10 (1979): 38–43. Other finds of oracle records will be discussed later. On the possible origins of the oracle divination (scapulimancy, plastronomy) in China, see David N. Keightley, *Sources of Shang History: The Oracle-Bone Inscriptions of Bronze Age China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 7–8. The dating of these Ch'i-shan oracle records is in the range of the last two Shang rulers, Ti I and Ti Hsin (King Shou), and no later than that. For the development of the central region in history, including the larger Chou-yuan and its surrounding areas, see the large number of bronzes discovered in the region and listed in Chung-kuo she-hui k'o-hsueh yuan Kao-ku yen-chiu so, comp., *Hsin ch'u-t'u chin-wen fen-yü chien-mu* (A Brief Catalog of the Recently Unearthed Bronzes by Geographical Units, 1950–1981) (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1983), pp. 43–115. See also note 22.

I have reconstructed the "government offices" under Tan-fu from the government system under Chi-li (later Wang Chi), Ch'ang (later King Wen), Fa (later King Wu), and the duke of Chou, which will be discussed later. Ssu-ma Ch'ien's account of this issue in the *Historical Records*, which was followed by later historians and scholars of modern times, seems to be questionable and reflects the later Chou system. One such recent translation is in *The Grand Scribe's Records*, trans. William H. Nienhauser Jr., vol. 1 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), p. 57. One should note that this new translation of the *Shih-chi* is generally good and fully annotated, but its rendering of historical institutions is often problematic. For a detailed discussion of the problems in reading and interpreting classical texts (such as the *Shih-ching*), see Steve Van Zoeren, *Poetry and Personality: Reading, Exegesis, and Hermeneutics in Traditional China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991).

39. *Li-chi*, pp. 276–77.

40. The K'un-i had occupied the northern part of the Ch'i area since late Hsia–early Shang times. See *Ku-pen chu-shu chi-nien*, p. 15. See also Fan Yeh (398–445), *Hou Han shu* (The History of the Later Han Dynasty, 25–220) (Peking: Chung-hua, 1965), p. 2870, which sums up some of the early sources and references to K'un-i as Ch'üan-i.

41. *Ti-wang shih-chi (Chi-ts'ung)*, pp. 80–81. It seems that Huang-fu Mi (215–82) based his statement on early sources that still existed in his time.

42. The dating of the Shang dynasty has been an enormously complex matter and a topic of debate for ages. Neither the Shang nor the Chou left any sources of direct information on this matter. The central issue is the exact year of the Chou defeat of the Shang at the Mu-yeh battle (southwest of the longtime Shang capital at Yin in modern An-yang and the Shang capital of the last two reigns [Ti-i and Ti-hsin], all in northern Honan). There have been over thirty different proposals (or suggestions). It is beyond the scope of this study to give another, nor it is sensible to get into this endless debate. Someday a new discovery may resolve this age-old debate. On the other hand, the differences in the various suggestions do not range over 110 years, between 1127 and 1017. In the long historical perspective, such a difference in the exact dating of the Shang and Chou periods, 1766–256 B.C. at the maximum range, does not really impair our study in any meaningful way. Here I have followed most of the time the Tung Tso-pin school, which holds with the 1751–1111 B.C. dating, but with a revision of the dating of the last three Shang reigns—those of Wu-i, Ti-i, and Ti-hsin—by Yen I-p'ing. However, the date given by Ch'en Meng-chia is also listed for comparison. For a small sample of a few representative suggestions, see Tung Tso-pin, *Chung-kuo nien-li tsung-p'u* (A Chronology

of China from the Yellow Emperor to 2000 A.D.), 2 vols. (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960), pp. 58–156 (for the Shang); and Yen I-p'ing, *Yin-Shang shih-chi*, pp. 193–219. For a discussion of the different schools and their views, see Kwang-chih Chang, *Shang Civilization*, pp. 15–21; Ch'en Meng-chi, *Hsi-Chou nien-li p'u* (A Chronology of the Western Chou Dynasty), rev. ed. (Peking, 1955), suggesting 1027 B.C. as the date of the demise of the Shang, and *Yin-hsu pu-tz'u tsung-shu*, pp. 214–16 (suggesting 1600–1028 B.C. for Shang dating and 1027 B.C. for the year of the Shang's demise under King Hsin [Chou]); and Ch'ü Wan-li, "Shih-chi Yen pen-chi," p. 105 (suggesting 1630–1028 B.C. for Shang datings starting with T'ang's ascendancy). For other major suggestions for the dating of the Shang, see Lei Hai-tsung, "Yin-Chou nien-tai k'ao" (On the Dating of the Yin-Chou Period), *Wen-che chi-k'an* 2, no. 1 (1931): 1–14 (suggesting 1027 B.C. as the year of the Shang demise); Ping-ti Ho, *The Cradle of the East*, pp. 1–12 (suggesting that the Shang lasted from 1600 B.C. [upper limit] or 1523 B.C. [lower limit] to 1027 B.C. [following Lei Hai-tsung]), and "Chou-ch'u nien-tai p'ing-i," *Journal of the Chinese University of Hong Kong* 1 (1973): 17–35; T'ang Lan, *Hsi-Chou ch'ing-t'ung ch'i ming-wen fen-tai shih-cheng* (The Historical Significance of the Inscriptions of the Bronze Vessels of the Western Chou Period) (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1986), pp. 2–3 (holding that the Shang conquest was in 1075, and that Ch'ang received the mandate [*shou-ming*] in 1088); Chou Fa-kao, "Chronology of the Western Chou Dynasty," *Journal of the Institute of Chinese Studies*, 4, no. 1 (September 1971): 173–205 (suggesting 1018 B.C. as the year of the fall of the Shang), which sums up and critiques the theories (suggestions) of Shinjô Shinzô (1928; dates the fall of Shang in 1066 B.C.), Wu Ch'i-ch'ang (1936; 1122 B.C.), Tung Tso-pin, Ch'en Meng-chia (1955; 1027 B.C.), and Perceval Yetts (1957; 1050 B.C.); Chou Fa-kao, "On the Date of the Chou Conquest of the Shang," *Bulletin of the National Central Library* 19, no. 2 (1986): 21–34 (suggesting 1045 B.C. as the date of the Chou conquest); David S. Nivison, "1040 as the Date of the Chou Conquest," *Early China* 8 (1982–83): 76–78, and "The Dates of Western Chou," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 43, no. 2 (1983): 481–580 (suggesting 1045 B.C. as the date of the Chou conquest); Edward L. Shaughnessy, "The Absolute Chronology of the Western Zhou Dynasty," in his *Sources of Western Zhou History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 271–87 (suggesting 1045 B.C. as the date of Chou conquest), which also examines various types of evidence and the many proposals (listed on pp. 219, 237–38); Li Chung-ts'ao, *Hsi-Chou nien-tai* (On the Dating of the Western Chou Dynasty from King Wen to King P'ing) (Peking: Wen-wu, 1991), esp. pp. 32–38 (taking 1074 B.C. as the year of King Wen's death and 1070 B.C. as the year of King Wu's conquest of the Shang—the thirteenth year of King Wen's claim to be a *wang* [*shou-ming*]); Chang P'ei-yü, "Jih-yueh shih pu-tz'u te cheng-jen yü Yin-Shang nien-tai" (Identification of the Oracle Bone Inscriptions Related to Solar and Lunar Eclipses and the Dating of the Shang Dynasty), *Chung-kuo she-hui k'o-hsueh* 5 (1999): 172–97 (suggesting the range of dating for the Chou conquest as 1050–1020 B.C.), which examines twenty-five other proposals, including those of Ch'ang Yü-chih, Hsu Chin-hsiung, Shima Kunio, Lao Kan (1025 B.C.), and Liu Shun-ch'in, and dates Wu-ting's reign as 1250–1192 B.C. based on the record of solar and lunar eclipses; Chang P'ei-yü, *Chung-kuo hsien-ch'in shih li-piao* (The Calendar of Ancient China, 1500–105 B.C.) (Chinan: Ch'i-Lu shu-she, 1987); Huang Chang-chien, "Shih-lun 'Wu-ch'eng' yü chin-wen yueh-hsiang" (On the "Wu-ch'eng" chapter [of the *Shang-shu*] and Related Issues), *Li-shih yen-chiu* 2 (1998): 1–24 (suggesting 1106 B.C. as the date of the Chou conquest), and his *Wu-wang fa-Chou nien hsin-k'ao* (A New Study on the Year of Chou Wu-wang's Defeat

of the Shang King Chou) (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1999), esp. pp. 231–36; and Hsia-Shang-Chou tuan-tai kung-ch'eng chuan-chia tsu, "Hsia-Shang-Chou tuan-tai kung-ch'eng 1996–2000 nien chieh-tuan ch'eng-kuo kai-yao" (Results from the Hsia-Shang-Chou Projects from 1996 to 2000), *Wen-wu* 12 (December 2000): 55, 60–61. See also Ho Yu-ch'i, "Ti-i Ti-hsin chi-nien ho cheng I-fang te nien-tai" (The Dating of Kings Ti-i and Ti-hsin and the Dating of the Shang Campaigns against I-fang), *Yin-tu hsueh-k'an* 3 (1990): 1–9; and Pei-ching shih-fa ta-hsueh, comp., *Wu-wang k'o-shang chih-nien yen-chiu* (Studies on the Year of Chou Wu-wang's Conquest of the Shang) (Peking: Shih-fan ta-hsueh, 1997), which sums up the many suggestions for the critical year of the downfall of the Shang dynasty.

43. This dating is discussed in Ch'en Meng-chia, *Pu-tz'u tsung-shu*, pp. 207–16, esp. 214–15.

44. The last set of dates about T'an-fu is based on (*Chin-pen*) *Chu-shu chi-nien* (Kuo-hsueh *chi-pen ts'ung-shu* ed., collated by Hung I-hsuan, completed in 1802), pp. 32–33. This edition of the *Chu-shu chi-nien* has been proved to be a forgery of the Ming period (A.D. 1368–1644) by Hung I-hsuan and others of the early Ch'ing period (A.D. 1644–1911), but some of the items retained by Hung after careful study may be surviving fragments of the lost original. At least some of them can be verified to be authentic either by earlier texts or historical context as recorded in earlier historical works. I have incorporated some of them into my study after careful examination and will so note where appropriate. James Legge translated the book into English under the title *Annals of the Bamboo Books*, vol. 3 of his *Chinese Classics* (reprint; Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press, 1985), pt. 1, chap. 4 (pp. 108–76), and included a careful study of the authenticity of the book and some good annotations. Some scholars have argued strongly for the reliability and usefulness of the new text of the *Chu-shu chi-nien*, although the issue remains questionable. See Edward L. Shaughnessy, "On the Authenticity of the Bamboo Annals," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 46, no. 1 (June 1986): 149–80. Another early text indicates that T'an-fu died in the twenty-eighth year of King Tsu-chia's reign, that is, either 1246 or 1145 B.C. But that theory has been dismissed by modern scholars. See Yen I-p'ing, *Yin-Shang shih-chi*, pp. 187–89.

45. I have basically followed the records in the *Chu-shu chi-nien* in reconstructing this part of the predynastic Chou history. See *Ku-pen chu-shu chi-nien*, pp. 22–23; and *Chin-pen chu-shu chi-nien*, pp. 33–34. Both texts confirm and complement each other and thus increase the degree of authenticity of those items in the latter. I have also consulted Yen I-p'ing, *Yin-Shang shih-chi*, pp. 187–200. The two dates given in the text are by the Tung-Yen and Ch'en Meng-chia systems of dating, respectively. The geographical locations of the various events are my own estimates. The translation of the title *mu-shih* is also based on my study of Shang-Chou social and governmental systems. Earlier English renderings of the term failed to understand the importance of the horse in Shang China and the nature of the early governmental structure. Our present understanding of the Shang system of officials is not complete, and interpretation of the function and even reading of the various offices in the oracle records are often not correct, even among the leading experts in the field. See a more recent examination of the issue by Wang Kuei-min in *Li-shih yen-chiu* 4 (1986): 107–9.

It is uncertain when the Chou as a power first came to attention of the court. There is a strong possibility that some contact, either direct or indirect, between the two developed during the time of Ku-kung T'an-fu, but no reliable evidence has been found. Some scholars have suggested that the Shang oracle bone records provide such evidence and it

was in the Shang king Wu-ting's time (1238–1180 B.C. in Ch'en Meng-chia's account; 1339–1281 B.C. in Tung Tso-pin's, and 1250–1192 B.C. in Chang P'ei-yü's) because some of the records contain the word *chou*. This is impossible because the term *chou* did not yet mean "people" or "walled town" in Wu-ting's time. For an example of the Wu-ting theory, see Tsou Heng, *Hsia Shang Chou k'ao-ku hsueh lun-wen chi*, pp. 332–33; Hu Hou-hsuan, *Chia-ku hsueh Shang-shih lun-ts'ung ch'u-chi*, pp. 24–34; Ch'eng Meng-chia, *Yin-hsu pu-tz'u tsung-shu*, pp. 291–93; and Shima Kunio, *Inkyo bokuji kenkyū* (Study of the Oracle Bone Records from Yin) (Tokyo: Kyuko shoin, 1958), pp. 409–13.

The oracle records unearthed in the Chou-yuan region (at Feng-chou Village of Ch'i-shan) in 1977, 1979, and 1980, as mentioned earlier, reveal no information about possible Shang-Chou contacts prior to Chi-li either. But they show the close contacts in King Shou's (Ti-hsin) time. While the Shang king (Ti Hsin) was the *wang*, the records refer to the Chou leader as Hsi-po (Lord of the West). Thus, the Shang-Chou contacts can only be traced back to the times of Chi-li (late stage) and Fa (early stage). These records actually included both Shang and Chou divinations, and, very importantly, they used the same writing (script) and grammar. This proves that whatever the difference in their spoken language the Shang and Chou, at least in Ti-hsin's time, used the same written language. For the decipherments and study of the Chou-yuan oracle records, see Li Hsueh-ch'in and Wang Yü-hsin, "Chou-yuan pu-tz'u hsuan-shih" (Annotations and Studies on Selected Oracle Records Discovered in Chou-yuan), *Ku wen-tzu yen-chiu* 4 (1980): 245–57, esp. 245–46, 255–56; Hsu Hsi-t'ai, "Chou-yuan pu-tz'u shih-p'ien hsu-shih chi tuan-tai" (Decipherments and Dating of Ten of the Chou-yuan Oracle Records), *Ku wen-tzu yen-chiu* 6 (1981): 401–2, including five pieces unpublished before; and Ch'ang Yü-chih, "Shuo Wen-wu ti" (On the Meaning [Reference] of "Wen-wu ti"), *Ku wen-tzu yen-chiu* 4 (1980): 205–33. See note 38 for the discovery of the oracle records in Chou-yuan.

For a comparative perspective on the issue of order, legitimacy, and material goods, see Janet Richards and Mary Van Buren, eds., *Order, Legitimacy, and Wealth in Ancient Societies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), esp. pp. 3–12 (for a theoretical construct).

A theory of possible Chou colonization first of some regions in the middle Yangtze and Han river valleys (Hupei and Kiangsi) and later of the modern lower Yangtze Valley region (mainly modern eastern Kiangsu) as the state of Wu by Chi-li's two elder brothers, T'ai-po and Yung-chung, was advanced by Hsu Chung-shu in 1936. This presumably took place, if it indeed happened, in T'an-fu's later years. But many other scholars have questioned the validity of such a suggestion. A few have even suggested that the state of Wu was originally established by Chi-li's two brothers in Shansi in the area later called Yü. For the controversy, see Hsu Chung-shu, *Shang-ku shih lun* (Studies on the History of Ancient China) (reprint; Taipei: T'ien-shan ch'u-pan she, 1986), pp. 5–8 (article originally published in 1936). Ku Chieh-kang further explored Hsu's view in an article on the rise of the Chou and its conquest of the Shang published in 1941. See his *Ku Chieh-kang ku-shih lun-wen chi* (A Collection of Important Studies in Ancient Chinese History by Ku Chieh-kang), vol. 2 (Peking: Chung-hua, 1988), pp. 314–15, 321–22. For a different view, see Wang Yü-che, "Hsien Chou tsu tsui-tsao lai-yuan yü Shan-hsi" (The Chou People Originated in Shansi), *Chung-hua wen-shih lun-ts'ung* 3 (1982): 1–24.

46. Shih-hu and I-t'u cannot be geographically located with certainty. But Ch'en Mu suggests that they were north of Yen-ching in Shansi. Judging from the fact that the Shang king Wen-ting felt threatened by Chi-li's success, they seemed to be on the east-

ern side of the Chou and on the Shang western borders, so Ch'ien's suggestion is reasonable. See Ch'ien Mu, "Chou ch'u ti-li," pp. 1999-2000.

47. *Shang-shu* (Cheng-tu ed.), pp. 152, 192; *I-ching* (Kao Heng ed.), pp. 194-95 (a discussion of the issue under consideration), 349 (Kao, however, is mistaken in his dating of the event). Yen I-p'ing and other scholars also hold that the conquest of the Kuei-fang (Kei-jung of Hsi-lo) mentioned in the *I-ching* reference actually took place in the reign of the Shang king Wu-i (*Yin-Shang shih-chi*, p. 192). I have followed this view but question the suggestion that the event took place in the thirty-fourth year, instead of the thirty-fifth, of King Wu-i.

48. *Shih-ching* (Wu-ching tu-pen ed.), p. 119. For the various interpretations of this line in the *Book of Poetry*, see *Shih-san ching chu-shu* ed., 16:2; and Ch'ü Wan-li, *Shih-ching shih-i*, p. 206. Ku Chieh-kang suggested in 1930, based on a line in the *Book of Changes* ("T'ai" [no. 11]), that Fa was actually married first to the daughter of the Shang king Ti-i, for the latter tried to use that marriage as an offer of appeasement to Fa's father Chi-li when the Chou became powerful in the west. This line of thinking was further explored in 1940 by Kao Heng in his commentary on the *Book of Changes*. I find no strong evidence to support this theory and have decided not to follow it. See Ku Chieh-kang, "Chou I kua-yao tz'u chung te ku-shih," pp. 11-15; and Kao Heng, *Chou I ku-ching chin-chu* (1984 ed.), pp. 194-95.

49. Ssu-ma Ch'ien made this incisive analysis of Ch'ang's leadership styles. See *Shih-chi*, p. 116. An interesting examination of the portrayal of Chiang T'ai-kung (Wang) from Chou to Han is given in Sarah Allan, "The Identities of Taigong Wang in Zhou and Han Literature," *Monumenta Serica* 30 (1972-73): 57-99.

50. For this particular point, see Hsu Chung-shu, *Shang-ku shih lun*, pp. 8-10. See also Ku Chieh-kang's work cited in note 45, esp. pp. 314-15.

51. *Shih-chi*, pp. 116-17. The story evidently followed certain historical facts, though some exaggerated elements were made up by the Chou people to glorify the Chou king Wen (Ch'ang). Almost all early texts mention the story in some form. The *Han Fei Tzu*, however, suggests that the Shang king Hsin's move was based on the fact that Ch'ang had already seized so much territory in Shansi and Honan that the Shang were directly threatened. It seems that Han Fei's (280?-233 B.C.) suggestion was the most sensible in view of the long-term territorial ambitions of the Chou as recorded in the *Book of Poetry*. See Han Fei, *Han Fei Tzu* (The Works of Han Fei, Ch'en Ch'i-yu ed.), p. 823.

52. See *Shih-ching shih-i*, pp. 214-17, 220-21. The Feng area (covering about 2.3 square miles) is about 8 miles southwest of modern Sian (Hsi-an). For recent archaeological work in the Feng area, see Chung-kuo k'o-hsueh yuan, *Feng hsi fan-chueh pao-kao* (Report on the Archaeological Excavations West of the Feng River) (Peking: Wen-wu Ch'u-pan she, 1962); Tsou Heng, *Hsia Shang Chou k'ao-ku hsueh lun-wen chi*, pp. 297-303; and Chung-kuo k'o-hsueh-yuan k'ao-ku yen-chiu so Feng hsi fa-chueh tui, "Shensi Ch'ang-an Hu-hsien t'iao-ch'a yü fa-chueh pao-kao" (Report on Archaeological Surveys and Excavations in Hu District of Ch'ang-an in Shensi), *K'ao-ku* 6 (1962). See also Pei-ching ta-hsueh li-shih hsi k'ao-ku chiao-yen shih, *Shang Chou k'ao-ku*, esp. pp. 144-49; a map showing the many survey and excavation sites in the Feng and Hao areas, is on page 148. The Shang did threaten the Chou with some form of military action under the guise of "hunting" called *ta-sou* (grand hunting), originally a form of major "military exercises and maneuvers" showing the power of the king's military force. For an analysis of the original meaning of *ta-sou*, see Yang K'uan, *Ku-shih hsin-t'an* (New Studies in Ancient Chinese History and Culture) (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1965), pp.

256-79, esp. 278-79. The many "hunting" exercises (*i-[Wang]-t'ien*) were also recorded in the oracle records recently found in the Chou-yuan region. See Hsu Hsi-t'ai, "Chou-yuan pu-tz'u shih-p'ien hsu-shih chi tuan-tai," pp. 401-2.

53. Hao was about 25 *li* (about 7 miles) northeast of Feng across the Feng River. For archaeological investigations of the Hao site, see Chung-kuo k'o-hsueh yen-chiu yuan k'ao-ku yen-chiu so Feng Hao k'ao-ku tui, "1961-1962 Shen-hsi Ch'ang-an Feng-tung shih-chueh chien-pao" (A Preliminary Report of the Archaeological Excavation in the East of the Feng River, 1961-1962), *K'ao-ku* 8 (1963); and Pei-ching ta-hsueh li-shih hsi k'ao-ku chiao-yen shih, *Shang Chou k'ao-ku*, esp. pp. 144-49. Some of the Feng-Hao sites cover nearly 4 square miles. See also Hu Ch'ien-i, "Feng-Hao k'ao-ku kung-tso san-shih nien (1951-1981) te hu-ku" (A Review of the Archaeological Work in the Feng-hao Area for the Thirty Years from 1951 to 1981), *Wen-wu* 10 (1982).

54. The Chou institutional system was based on the existing Shang system, albeit with some differences in emphasis and functional distribution. See *Lun-yü*, pp. 59-60. An examination of this issue is given in Ku Chieh-kang, "Chou-kung chih-li te ch'uan-shuo ho Chou-kuan i-shu te ch'u-hsien" (The Tradition of the Duke of Chou's 'Making Institutions' and the Formation of the Book *Chou Institutions*), *Wen-shih* 6 (1979): 1-40, esp. 1-4. A different view on the dating and authenticity of the *Chou-kuan* (*Chou-li*) as the basis of inquiry into early Chou institutions is given in Li Ling, "Hsi-Chou chin-wen chung te chih-kuan hsi-t'ung" (The Western Chou System of Officials in the Bronzes), in *Chin-hsin chi: Chang Cheng-lang hsien-sheng Pa-shih ch'ing-shou lun-wen chi*, ed. Wu Jung-tseng (Peking: She-hui k'o-hsueh ch'u-pan she, 1996), pp. 202-14 (Li considers that the system of officials in the *Chou-li* represents a later structure and that in the bronzes an earlier one). I have put together the Chou institutional system under King Wen from various sources and made special consideration of the context of the development of the Chou state. See *Shang-shu cheng-tu*, pp. 199-213, esp. 247-58; *Shih-ching shih-i*, pp. 284-87; and *Tso-chuan* (Yang Po-chün ed.), pp. 633-36 (Yang's view about the authenticity of the *Chou-kuan* [*Chou Institutions*] is an interesting one and complements the traditional understanding).

The Chou military system has long been under debate. Two important studies may be given here: Shih Chang-ju, "Chou-tai ping-chih t'an-yuan" (On the Origins of the Chou Military System), in *Hsien-Ch'in shih yen-chiu lun-chi* (Essays on Pre-Ch'in History) (Taipei: Ta-lu tsa-chih she, 1960), pp. 80-88; and Hsiao Nan, "Shih-lun pu-tz'u chung te shih ho lü" (A Preliminary Discussion of the Military Units *Shih* and *Lü* in the Oracle Records), *Ku wen-tzu yen-chiu* 6 (1981): 128-29. Hsiao suggests that in the Chou military system a *shih* unit had 10,000 men and a *lü* unit 1,000 men and that by King Wu's time the Chou had six *shih* and 60,000 men before the conquest of the Shang. Shih Chang-ju, however, suggests that in the early Chou military system a *shih* unit had 2,500 men and a *lü* unit only 500. I am inclined to follow Hsiao's system and suggest that the *shih* system reflected the system of the early dynastic Chou, in which a *chün* unit with 12,500 men above the *shih* unit was created and that the Chou Court commanded six *chün* units and 81,000 men.

55. The institutional and cultural meaning of the title *wang* in predynastic Chou times needs further explanation. In a word, it meant the highest overlord of the land; it was hereditary and usually within the ruling royal clan unless that clan was replaced and the *wang* deposed in any fashion, violent or peaceful. However, the position designated by the term *wang* may have gone under different names in various regions or political units or among different ethnic/racial groups, depending on the cultural, religious, and

social structure of the people. For example, in the Hsia, it was *wang*; in the Shang *wang* or *ti*, though the latter was used only in the last two or three reigns at most; and in the Chou *wang*. But the Chou referred to the overlord (king) of the Shang as *wang* (Shang *wang* or Yin *wang* for Ti Hsin or Shou) and not *ti*, as the Shang referred to their own rulers. The Shang referred to the overlord (king) of the Hsia as *wang* (Hsia *wang* for Hsia Chieh) and not *ti*. This was because the Hsia, Shang, and Chou were all *kuo* as a political-territorial unit, and so the Shang referred to the Hsia as Hsia *kuo* and the Chou referred to the Shang as Shang *kuo*. To the Shang and to the Chou, the king of the Hsia and the king of the Shang were properly called *wang*, for that was the common designation for the overlord of a *kuo* and by using that title it put itself on an equal footing. It was recently suggested by Kao Ming and others that the difference between Shang title *ti* and the Chou title *wang* was the difference in the structure of kingship between the two. The Shang rulers believed in a blood and direct kinship tie to the Supreme God Shang-ti (Lord on High) and based their "divine right" on a direct ancestor-descendant relationship, whereas the Chou did not subscribe to such a strongly religious frame of kingship. This is questionable because all the Shang rulers except the last three—Wen-wu ti, Ti I, and Ti Hsin—were referred to by their kinship titles. The difference between *ti* and *wang* as a ruler's designation was regional, cultural, racial, and contextual. It was not due to the difference in the source of the king's ruling rights and power. It is true that, as was discussed earlier, the Shang rulers claimed to be the descendants of the Shang-ti and their first ancestor had a divine "miracle birth," but the Chou rulers also claimed a divine right to rule by tracing their first ancestor to a miracle birth as well. In their earliest documents, the Chou rulers also appealed to Shang-ti and Ti for justice and protection because they were the offspring of the Supreme Lord in Heaven. In short, the designations *ti* and *wang* for a king in a *kuo* in predynastic Chou times had no discriminatory political difference among the many *kuo* who considered themselves to be equal to one another; nor were there such differences in the degree of their individual power. The discrepancy came from the peculiar tradition of each individual *kuo* and not from a common understanding or convention. As will be discussed later, the terms *ti* and *wang* were no longer synonymous under the Eastern Chou in the fourth century B.C. and thereafter, with each carrying a special meaning according to context, which has often led scholars to misinterpret the earlier meaning(s) of the two key terms as titles for rulers. As their views hold, while the original etymological "godlike" or "divine" sense of the word *ti* (as in Shang-ti) resurged to become its cardinal meaning, the primary semantic recognition or primacy of the word *wang* as a secular political title remained unchanged and even became less religiously latent. A *ti* drew his power from the Supreme God in Heaven (Shang-ti), and hence his power was divine and beyond human challenge; a *wang* drew his power from the people, though he nominally received the Mandate of Heaven and by theory he was the Son of Heaven. While a *ti*'s primary concern was God and his primary business was to attend God's pleasure, a *wang*'s primary concern was his subjects and his primary business was to attend to the livelihood of his subjects.

The major sources for the key issues raised in this discussion are *Shih-chi*, pp. 93–97, 116–28 (Hsia *kuo*, Hsia *wang*, Shang *kuo*, Shang *wang*, Ying *wang*, Chou *kuo*, Chou *wang*); *Shang-shu cheng-tu*, pp. 91–236; and Kao Ming, "Shang-tai pu-tz'u chung so-chien wang yü ti" (The Difference in Connotation of the Terms *Wang* and *Ti* in the Oracle Records of the Shang Period), in *Chi-nien Pei-ching ta-hsueh k'ao-ku chuan-yeh san-shih chou-nienlun-wen chi* (Peking: Peking University, 1990), pp. 243–55. On the etymological origins of *wang* and other terms, see Hsu Chung-shu, *Shang-ku shih lun*, pp. 281–86.

The issue of using religion (Ti, Shang-ti, and so forth) as a political tool (the idea of *shou-ming* [receiving the mandate])—meaning the beginning of independence and a new state—from T'ien [Heaven] by King Wen is recorded in *Shih-ching* (*Wu-ching* ed.), pp. 125-27; Ch'ü Wan-li's notes in *Shih-ching shih-i*, pp. 214-17; and a short comment in Ku Chieh-kang, *Ku Chieh-kang ku-shih lun-wen chi*, vol. 2, p. 460. See also the previous discussions of this issue, especially in note 22 and some parts of the text. It should be noted that this tradition was inherited by his son Fa, who certainly made tremendous application of the Divine Power of the Supreme God in his military campaign against the Shang king Shou (Ti Hsin). See Ku Chieh-kang, pp. 460-61. For the issues of *ti* as a king's title and Wen-wu *ti*, see Ch'en Meng-chia, *Yin-hsu pu-tz'u*, pp. 408-9; Ch'ang Yü-chih, "Shuo Wen-wu ti"; and Ping-ti Ho, *The Cradle of the East*, pp. 294-95 (for a different view of the question under discussion).

56. See notes 42 and 43. On the length of Ch'ang's (King Wen's) reign, see Tung Tso-pin, *Chung-kuo nien-li ts'ung-p'u*, pp. 18-19 (which suggests a reign from 1165 to 1122 B.C.); Ch'en Meng-chia, *Yin Hsu pu-tz'u tsung-shu*, p. 215 (1083 to 1033 B.C.); Edward L. Shaughnessy, *Sources of Western Zhou History*, p. xix (1099 to 1050 B.C.); and Li Chung-ts'ao, *Hsi-Chou nien-tai*, pp. 32-38, 107-8 (1113 to 1074 B.C.).

57. The question of the number of generations and leaders from Hou Chi to King Wen was discussed in note 42. More sources and studies include Wang Ying-lin (A.D. 1223-96), *K'un-hsueh chi-wen* (Notes and Queries about What Was Learned and Heard, *Kuo-hsueh chi-pen ts'ung-shu* ed.), p. 980 (citing Wang Lai's view that the period between the Hou Chi and T'an-fu was five to six hundred years); and Liang Yü-sheng (A.D. 1744-1819), *Shih-chi chih-i* (Questionable Issues Stated in the *Historical Records* by Ssuma Ch'ien, *Hsu-hsiu Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu* ed.) (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1981), *chüan* 3 (entry on *Chou pen-chi* [Annals of Chou, pp. 2-4], suggesting that there were at least twenty-five generations between the two leaders Kung Liu and King Wen). For the dating of prehistoric and predynastic Chou sites, see Shih Chang-ju, "Chou-tu i-chi yü ts'ai-t'ao i-ts'un," pp. 381-84.

58. See *I-Chou shu* (*Ssu-pu pei-yao* ed.), 4:11. Analysis of dating and correction of the figures in the book are made in Ch'ü Wan-li, *Shu-yung lun-hsueh chi*, pp. 427-31; and Ku Chieh-kang, "I-Chou shu Shih-fu p'ian chiao-chu yü hsieh-ting p'ing-lun" (A Collated and Critical Edition of the Text with Commentary on the "Shih-fu" [Great Conquest] Chapter of the *I-Chou shu*), in his *Ku Chieh-kang ku-shih lun-wen chi*, vol. 2, pp. 253-54 (original publication in 1963). An annotated English translation and analysis of the same material in the *I-Chou shu* can be found in Edward L. Shaughnessy, "New Evidence on the Zhou Conquest," *Early China* 6 (1980-81): 59. See also *Shang-shu cheng-tu*, pp. 122-26; *Shang-shu* (*Wu-ching tu-pen* ed.), pp. 70-71 (cf. the *Shih-chi* citation); and *Meng-tzu*, pp. 364-65.

59. *Shih-chi*, pp. 126-27; *Ti-wang shih-chi*, p. 90. The latter reference refers to more 455 *kuo* of various sizes and statuses established for King Wu's assistants, allies, brothers, and members of the Chou clan. For an interesting discussion of the nature of this last group of *kuo*, especially those based on kinship ties see Jui I-fu, *Chung-kuo min-tsu chi-ch'i wen-hua lun-kao*, pp. 991-1025.

60. There has been a continuing debate about the age of King Wu at his death. Scholars have recently suggested that he died somewhere between the ages of forty-three and fifty, most likely at forty five, but no direct evidence has been found. See Li Yü-min, "Chou Wu-wang nien-shou k'ao" (The Age of King Wu at His Death), *Wen-shih* 25 (1985): 32.

The campaign to gain the control of the various regions by the Duke of Chou and the crisis in the young Chou dynasty after the initial Shang conquest by King Wu are examined in Fu Ssu-nien, *Fu Meng-chen Hsien-sheng chi*, pp. 22-31 (original publication in 1934); Tu Cheng-sheng, *Chou-tai ch'eng-pang* (The City-States in the Chou Period) (Taipei: Lien-ching, 1979), pp. 160-218 (originally an M.A. thesis in 1973); Ku Chieh-kang, "Chou-kung tung-cheng yü tung-fang ke-tsu te ch'ien-hsi" (The Eastern Campaigns of the Duke of Chou and the Removal of the Various Eastern Peoples), *Wen-shih* 27 (December 1988): 1-14; Yang Shan-ch'ün, "Chou-kung Tung-cheng shih-chien ho lu-hsien te k'ao-ch'a" (Studies on the Dating and Routes of the Eastern Campaigns of the Duke of Chou), *Chung-kuo shih yen-chiu* 3 (1988): 99-109; and Ch'ien Mu, trans., *Chou Kung* (The Duke of Chou) (reprint; Taipei: Shang-wu, 1965), pp. 12-53. See also *Shih-chi*, pp. 132-33; *Shang-shu cheng-tu*, pp. 139-57; *I-Chou shu*, pp. 7-9; and *Shih-ching* (*Wu-ching tu-pen* ed.), pp. 63-64. An interesting and profound interpretation of a poem about the Duke of Chou's eastern campaign in the *Book of Poetry* is given in Chow Tse-tsung (Chou Ts'e-tsung), "P'o-fu" *hsin-ku* (A New Study of the Poem "Broken Axes" in the *Book of Poetry*) (Singapore: Island Society, 1969; original ms. in 1956); and another erudite exegesis of the same "Po-fu" is given in Hung Yeh, *Hung Yeh lun-hsueh chi* (Collected Papers and Studies of William Hung) (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1981), pp. 350-75 (original publication in 1956). The section on the Duke of Chou's eastern campaign is on pages 252-55.

There has been a continuing debate about the question of the Duke of Chou's temporary ascendancy to the throne in place of the young King Ch'eng to deal with the emergency facing the unstable Chou Court after King Wu's death. Some of the earliest sources clearly indicate or record (in the case of the *Book of History*) that the Duke of Chou ascended to the position of T'ien-tzu (Son of Heaven) and was called *wang* (king) and that he remained king for seven years before stepping down, returning that authority to his nephew, King Ch'eng. These sources include *Shang-shu* (*Shang-shu cheng-tu* ed.), pp. 147-72, 199-213, esp. 149, 157; *Li-chi* (*Wu-ching* ed.), pp. 176-77; *Hsun Tzu* (Wang Hsien-ch'ien ed.), p. 73; *Han Fei Tzu* (Ch'en Ch'i-yu ed.), p. 830; and *Shih-chi*, p. 132. Recently discovered bronze inscriptions also provide evidence on this point. See T'ang Lan, *Hsi-Chou ch'ing-t'ung ch'i ming-wen fen-tai shih-cheng*, pp. 21-23; and Ku Chieh-kang, "Chou-kung she-cheng ch'eng-wang" (The Duke of Chou Temporarily Assumed the Title of Wang and Directed Court Affairs), *Wen-shih* 23 (1984): 1-30 (original work completed in 1966). Ku also held that while Chou-kung assumed the title of *wang*, he was also referred to as Chou-kung (the duke of Chou) at times and that caused the later confusion. A different perspective on the issue is given in Edward L. Shaughnessy, "The Duke of Zhou's Retirement in the East and the Beginnings of the Minister-Monarch Debate in Chinese Political Philosophy," *Early China* 18 (1993): 41-72. While many scholars have written extensively in favor of this view, and equally many have argued against it, I believe that these early primary sources present enough evidence for a firm conclusion. This is the primary reason for my point of view in the text.

61. See *Chung-kuo li-shih ti-li*, pp. 6-7; Chao Sung-ch'en, *Chung-kuo te pan-t'u* (Taipei: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1955), pp. 22-25; Ku Chieh-kang, *Ku Chieh-kang ku-shih lun-wen chi*, pp. 331-33; Hsu Cho-yun, *Hsi-Chou shih* (History of the Western Chou) (Taipei: Lien-ching, 1984), pp. 107-36; and Yang K'uan, *Hsi-Chou shih* (History of the Western Chou) (Shanghai: Jen-min, 1999), pp. 106-82.

62. *Tso-chuan* (*Wu-ching tu-pen* ed.), p. 480; *Hsun Tzu* (*Hsun Tzu Ku-i* ed.), p. 149.

63. On the importance of the Hsia She and Po She, see *Shih-chi*, pp. 96, 125–26; *Shang-shu* (cheng-tu ed.), pp. 158–71; Fu Ssu-nien, *Fu Meng-cheng hsien-sheng chi*, pp. 24–25; and Chang Ch'un-shu, *Chung-kuo ku-tai te she-shen*, chapters on the *she* symbols and *she-yueh* (*she* music) in Shang-Chou times. Also see the works on *she* by B. Karlgren, E. Chavannes, Li Hsuan-po, and others cited earlier; and Yü Wei-ch'ao (1985), pp. 54–61 (about Shang and Tung I). See also note 22 above about the Shang use of religion as a political tool and note 55 about its use by King Wen and King Wu. *Pi* also referred to a “border walled town” (*pien-i*). See Tu Yü's (228–84) commentary on the *Tso-chuan* in *Saden kaisen* (*Tso-chuan hui-chien*, Collected and New Annotations and Commentaries on the Tso Commentary), by Takezoe Koko, 2 vols. (reprint; Taipei, 1970), *chüan* 3, p. 81; and *Tso-chuan* (Yang Po-chün ed.), p. 240 (under 666 B.C.). On the issue of the time and context of the building of the Lo capital, see T'ang Lan, *Hsi-Chou ch'ing-t'ung ch'i fen-tai ming-wen shih-cheng*, pp. 20–23. T'ang dismissed the various misinterpretations since ancient times and concluded that the eastern capital (Tung-tu, i.e., Lo-i) was built in the fifth year of the duke of Chou's short reign as “king” (*wang*). See also *Chou Kung*, pp. 62–70.

For a comparative perspective on late Shang China from about 1200 B.C. on, see David N. Keightley, *The Ancestral Landscape: Time, Space, and Community in Late Shang China, ca. 1200–1045 B.C.* (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, 2000). Since this important work was published after the completion of my work, I regret being unable to make full use of it. See also Keightley's article on the Shang dynasty in *The Cambridge History of Ancient China: From the Origins of Civilization to 221 B.C.*, ed. Michael Loewe and Edward L. Shaughnessy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 232–91. This book was also published after the completion of my work.

64. On the issue of *kuo* and *yeh* and Chou society, see the pioneering study by Fu Ssu-nien, *Fu Meng-cheng hsien-sheng chi*, pp. 27–29. Detailed analyses are provided in Tu Cheng-sheng, *Chou-tai ch'eng-pang*, pp. 29–92; and Chao Shih-ch'ao, *Chou-tai kuo-yeh kuan-hsi yen-chiu* (Taipei: Wen-chin, 1993), pp. 1–129. A fresh analysis of the distribution of the walled towns and cities and their political significance is given in Kwang-chih Chang 1982b, pp. 65–75 (applying the theory of spatial archaeology to his analysis). A different estimate of the size of the territories of the earliest kingdoms in ancient China is made by Edward L. Shaughnessy in “Historical Geography and the Extent of Early Chinese Kingdoms,” *Asia Major*, 3d ser., 2:2 (1989): 1–22.

65. See appendix 3 for an analysis of the importance of the *wang-chi* and related issues.

66. For a detailed analysis of the Chou measures of control and cultural hegemony in the new land, see Fu Ssu-nien, *Fu Meng-cheng hsien-sheng chi*, pp. 1–30, 97–129, esp. on the state of Lu; Ku Chieh-kang, *Ku Chieh-kang ku-shih lun-wen chi*, pp. 331–36, esp. on the Lo-i region; Wang Hsien-t'ang, *Shan-tung ku-kuo k'ao* (The States [*kuo*] in Shantung in Ancient Times) (Chinan: Ch'i-Lu ch'u-pan she, 1983), pp. 215–24; Tu Cheng-sheng, *Chou-tai ch'eng-pang*, pp. 21–45; and *Chou Kung*, pp. 53–70. See also Yang Chao-ming, “Lu-kuo li-yueh ch'uan-t'ung yen-chiu” (The *Li-yueh* Tradition of the State of Lu), *Li-shih yen-chiu* 3 (1995). Since the state of Lu (in modern Shantung) was the fief of the Duke of Chou, it has been generally considered the representative Chou state that reposed, practiced, continued, and preserved the Chou *li-yueh* system instituted by the duke.

For the attempt to standardize the weights and measures (*tu-liang*), see *Li-chi* (Wu-

ching ed.), p. 177. This measure of control was probably limited to the core regions firmly under the control of the Chou Court; it was instituted by the Duke of Chou after his successful eastern campaigns in the sixth year of his temporary reign. The duke seems to have used this and other institutional measures (broadly referred to as *chih-li*, "making institutions"), such as uniform governmental institutions, new court rituals and protocols, and religious sacrifices and ceremonies, to mark the commencement of the new "unified" dynasty. These various measures, mentioned in such early texts as the *Book of History*, the *Book of Poetry*, *Tso's Commentary*, and the *Book of Rites*, have been validated by archaeological discoveries in modern times. See *Shang-shu cheng-tu*, pp. 199–213, and esp. 247–58; *Shih-ching shih-i*, pp. 284–87; and *Tso-chuan* (Yang Po-chün ed.), pp. 633–36 (Yang's view of the authenticity of the *Chou-kuan* [Chou Institutions] is an interesting one and complements the traditional understanding). For the controversy on the dating of the *Chou-kuan*, see Ch'ien Mu, *Liang Han Ching-hsueh chin-ku wen p'ing-i* (On the Issue of Modern Text and Ancient Text Controversy in the Confucian Classics in the Han Dynasty) (Hong Kong: Hsin-ya, 1958), pp. 285–434 (original publication 1931); and the more recent work by P'eng Lin, *Chou-li chu-t'i ssu-hsiang yü ch'eng-shu nien-tai te yen-chiu* (The System of Thought and the Dating of the Chou Institutions) (Peking: She-hui k'o-hsueh, 1991), holding that the book was composed in early Han times. See also *Chou Kung*, pp. 70–83. A technical analysis of the various measures and their later misunderstanding and influence is given in Ku Chieh-kang, "Chou-kung chih-li te ch'uan-shuo ho Chou-kuan i-shu te ch'u-hsien," pp. 1–40. For the archaeological sources, see *Shang Chou k'ao-ku*, *Hsia-Shang-Chou k'ao-ku hsueh lun-wen chi*, *Hsia-Shang-Chou san-tsu yuan-liu t'an-so*, *Hsi-Chou ch'ing-t'ung ch'i ming-wen fen-tai shih-cheng*, all cited in the preceding notes; and Ch'iu Te-hsiu, comp., *Shang-Chou chin-wen chi cheng* (The Bronze Vessels and Inscriptions of the Shang and Chou Periods), 20 vols. (Taipei: Wu-nan, 1983–), esp. vol. 16.

It should be pointed out here that *li* in the Duke of Chou's words really referred to a special system or pattern of culture—a political, institutional, ethical, and religious superstructure. (This superstructure had each specific item of its contents written down in detailed texts in Chou times.) The term was also broadly referred to as *li-yueh*. We should note that the *li* system constructed by the Duke of Chou was really the formal codification of the political, institutional, and religious ideas, ideals, and practices that had gradually developed from the Chou beginnings to the Shang conquest. The new *li* system was, however, structured to fit the new context of a much larger state with greater cultural diversity without compromising its uniqueness and its proven ability to function. The Chou religious system, for example, was comprised of two critical components—an institutional construct sanctioning the divine power of the king (Heaven and the miracle birth myth) and the She worship and ritual system—both of which paralleled but were different from the Shang and earlier Hsia systems, but at the same time the Chou Court allowed the descendants of the Hsia and the Shang royal lines to continue to practice their own religions, for example, in such areas as the Ch'eng Chou region (eastern capital Lo-i) and the state of Lu (the fief state of the Duke of Chou).

On the complex issue of Shang and Chou religions and states, my view is based on the reading and analysis of various documents and studies, but I firmly hold that the debate will continue and no conclusive understanding will ever be reached among scholars until some new, key documents appear to provide clear answers to several critical questions. I present my argument with some key assumptions. First, the oracle records are only a small part of the oracle sources left by the Shang royal house and therefore should be

considered as such and not used as “negative evidence,” that is, making an argument based on the absence of oracle records. Second, the literary texts written after the Shang up to the Han period should be considered reliable sources until proved otherwise if parts of these texts have been proved authentic by archaeological discoveries, oracle records, bronze inscriptions, or other earlier sources. Third, recently discovered ancient texts should be used to reconstruct earlier history. Fourth, recent theories and interpretive perspectives in the social and natural sciences and the humanities should be utilized to construct analytical and interpretive frameworks. Following all these guidelines, I have ventured to reconstruct the larger issue of Shang and Chou religions and states in this section. In addition, I believe that the Shang religion descended from four basic religious beliefs of prehistoric times: fertility cults, nature cults (animism, totemism, fetishism, and so on), ancestor worship, and the world of the beyond. All four concerned the issues of life and its extension (reproduction or fertility), power and knowledge for survival (ancestors and traditions left behind by the deceased), and the meaning of all natural phenomena, everyday existence, and human fate. The four basic beliefs, as shown in the structure and artifacts in almost every prehistoric site, became part of everyday life after a long process of evolution in neolithic China, ca. 8000–2000 B.C. Furthermore, as the remains uncovered at archaeological excavations have shown, these beliefs were associated with three major “culture regions” in the type sites in neolithic China: (1) the North, the Yellow River region from Shantung to Kansu and the Liao River regions in the northeast; (2) the Southwest, the middle and upper Yangtze Valley; and (3) the Southeast, the lower Yangtze Valley, the T'ai Lake region, and the Hangchow Delta. With respect to specific culture types, the North includes the P'ei-kang, Yang-shao (differs from Yangshao), and Ta-ho-ts'un cultures in Honan; the Ta-ti-wan culture in Kansu; the Li-chia-ts'un and Pan-p'o cultures in Shensi; the Tz'u-shan culture in Hopei; the Ta-wen-k'ou and Lung-shan (differs from Lungshan) cultures in Shantung; the Hung-shan and Hsing-lung cultures in Jehol and the Hsin-lo culture in Liaoning. The Southwest includes the Ta-hsi culture in Szechwan and Ch'ü-chia-ling culture in Hupei. The Southeast includes the Ma-chia-pang and Sung-tze cultures in Kiangsu and He-mu-te and Liang-chu cultures in Chekiang. These “culture regions” represent different natural environments and economic geographies. The north was, and still is, a relatively harsh environment and the people worked hard for survival. Such an environment easily induced its inhabitants to think about the continuation of life through reproduction. So there grew the ideas of the fertility cult. They also needed guidance and teaching to survive, and then there grew the tradition of the worship of ancestors, from whom they learned to live and survive and to whom they prayed for protection and blessings. The harsh environment also made these early farmers think about the existence of “the world of the beyond,” where they were going to go, as supposedly did their deceased ancestors. But on this issue their beliefs hardly went beyond the basic level of the human imagination. In the south, which was endowed by nature with a mild climate, abundant natural “foods,” easy travel via the endless rivers, and a chain of huge mysterious mountains, the inhabitants could easily imagine the mysterious “world of the beyond” and the heavenly way of life of its supernatural residents. And there grew shamanism and shamans, who had, by various magic means, the secrets and power to communicate with and contact the world of the beyond. In the north, although the conception of the world of the beyond as the heavenly domicile of the immortals, and hence the origin of shamanism, had also been conceived along the seacoast, where mirages and the immense sea seemingly formed a bridge to the other world, such a religious imagination had not made a

noticeable impact on the religious minds of the ancestors of the Hsia and Shang people since they were predominantly “inland,” sedentary farmers preoccupied with the problems associated with their fields and crops.

Second, I hold that T'ien existed as a deity in Shang times and was interchangeable with *shang-ti* in the late Shang, particularly in the short period concurrent with the time of Kings Wen and Wu of the Chou. Third, *ti*, according to my research, indeed referred, at certain times, to both the deceased ancestors of the Shang king(s) and the living, god-like Shang kings. Fourth, I have come to understand that *wang-ti* can be either a living king or a deceased king turned god in the other world, depending on the context.

The primary and secondary sources employed to reach these grand hypotheses and conclusions are numerous. It is meaningless and unfeasible to list all of them here. A few, however, are given to show the scope and dimension of the issues in question. These include Kuo Mo-jo, *Liang-Chou chin-wen-tz'u ta-hsi k'ao-shih*; Chia-ku-wen pien; Li Hsiao-ting, *Chia-ku wen-tzu chi-shih*; Shima Kunio, *Inkyo bokuji sōrui*; Shirakawa Shizuka, *Kinbun tsūshaku* (Comprehensive Collection of Bronze Inscriptions), vol. 1 (Kobe: Hakutsuru bijutsukan, 1962); Ch'en Meng-chia, *Pu-tz'u tsung-shu*; Wang Kuo-wei, *Kuan-t'ang chi-lin*, vol. 2; Yen I-p'ing, *Yin-shang shih-chi*, esp. vol. 3; Hu Hou-hsuan, *Chia-ku wen yü Yin-Shang shih*; Chu Fang-p'u, *Yin-Chou wen-tzu shih-ts'ung*; Wen Shao-fang and Yuan T'ing-tung, *Yin-hsu pu-tz'u yen-chiu*; Ting Shan, *Chung-kuo tsung-chiao yü shen-hua k'ao* (Studies in Chinese Religion and Mythology) (Shanghai: Wen-i, 1988); Tu Erh-wei, *Chung-kuo ku-tai tsung-chiao yen-chiu* (Studies in Ancient Chinese Religion) (Taipei: Hsueh-sheng, 1976); Kuo Mo-jo, *Ch'ing-t'ung shih-tai* (Studies in the Chinese Bronze Age) (Peking: K'o-hsueh, 1965 ed.), including a revised version of his early monograph on T'ien in ancient China (pp. 1–52); Ku Li-ya (H. G. Creel), “Shih T'ien” (On T'ien [Heaven]), *Yen-ching hsueh-pao* 18 (1935): 59–71; Ling Shun-sheng, “Chung-kuo te shen-chu yü yin-yang hsing-ch'i ch'ung-pai” (Ancestral Tablets and Genital Symbolism in Ancient China), *Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica* 8 (autumn 1959): 1–46 (English summary and plates), and “Chung-kuo tsu-miao te ch'i-yuan” (Origins of the Ancestral Temple in China), *Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica* 7 (spring 1959): 141–84 (English summary and plates); Chang Kuang-chih (Kwang-chih Chang), “Chung-kuo ch'uang-shih shen-hua chih fen-hsi yü ku-shih yen-chiu” (The Chinese Creation Myths: A Study in Method), *Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica* 8 (autumn 1959): 47–79; Wen Ch'ung-i, *Ch'u wen-hua yen-chiu* (Aspects of the Culture of Ch'u) (Nankang, Taipei: Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, 1967), esp. pp. 117–65; Lin Shou-chin, *Pan-p'o i-chih tsung-shu* (A Comprehensive Study of the Pan-p'o Culture) (Hong Kong: Chung-wen ta-hsueh, 1981), pp. 85–92; Hu Hou-hsuan, “Yin pu-tz'u chung te Shang-ti ho Wang-ti” (The *Shang-ti* and *Wang-ti* as Seen in the Yin Oracle Records), *Li-shih yen-chiu* 9 (1959): 23–50; 10 (1959): 89–110; and Ch'en Shu-ying, “Chung-kuo hsin-shih-ch'i shih-tai yü-ch'i shang te shen-mi fu-hao” (The Mysterious Symbols on Jade Artifacts of the Neolithic Period in China), *Ku-kung hsueh-shu chi-k'an* (National Palace Museum Research Quarterly) 10, no. 3 (spring 1993): 1–49. My view is that the forty-five mysterious symbols in the article were religious expressions and objects, some of which were actually the genital symbols discussed in Lin Shun-sheng's article cited in note 48. See Akatsuka Kiyoshi, *Chūgoku kodai no shūkyō to bunka*; Kwang-chih Chang, “T'ien-kan: A Key to the History of the Shang,” in *Ancient China: Studies in Early Civilization*, ed. David Roy and Tsuen-hsuin Tsien (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1978), pp. 13–42; *Shang Civilization*, esp. chap. 3 and *The Archaeology of Ancient China*, esp. chaps. 3–6; Kwang-chih Chang,

ed., *Studies of Shang Archaeology* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), pp. 49-64; Ping-ti Ho, *The Cradle of the East*, esp. pp. 313-38; Chung-kuo k'o-hsueh yuan K'o-ku yen-chiu so, *Hsi-an Pan-p'o* (The Pan-p'o Culture of Hsi-an) (Peking: Wen-wu, 1963); David N. Keightley, *The Ancestral Landscape*; Bernhard Karlgren, *Some Fecundity Symbols in Ancient China*, and *Legends and Cults in Ancient China*; Marcel Granet, *Chinese Civilization* (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1958, original ed. 1930), and *La religion des Chinois*, 2d ed. (Paris: Éditions Imago, 1980); and Arthur Waley, ed. and trans., *The Nine Songs: A Study of Shamanism in Ancient China* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1955). In formulating my views of religion in prehistoric and early China, I have benefited from many classic works in the study of religion, among them Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, trans. Joseph W. Swain (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1954); Bronislaw Malinowski, *Magic, Science, and Religion* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1954); Joachin Wach, *Sociology of Religion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944); Max Weber, *The Religion of China*, trans. Hans H. Gerth (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1951); William J. Goode, *Religion among the Primitives* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1951); Talcott Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1958); Thomas F. O'Dea, *The Sociology of Religion* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966); Mircea Eliade, *Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964 ed.), and *The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972 ed.).

67. Appendix 3 examines the development of these concepts and related issues.

68. For an account of the *kuo* (of various sizes and structures) in early Chou times, see Fu Ssu-nien, *Fu Meng-chen chi*, pp. 71-88; and Ch'eng Fa-jen, *Ch'un-ch'iu Tso-shih chuan ti-ming t'u-k'ao* (Place-Names in the Tso Commentary on the *Ch'un-ch'iu*) (Taipei: Kuang-wen shu-chü, 1967), pp. 1-271. The most comprehensive studies are Ch'en P'an, "Lieh-kuo chien-k'ao" (A Study of the States [*kuo*] in Chou Times), in *Chung-kuo Shang-ku shih tai-ting kao* (Draft History of Ancient China) (Taipei: Chung-yang yen-chiu yuan, 1985), pp. 207-79; Ch'en P'an, *Ch'un-ch'iu ta-shih piao lieh-kuo chueh-hsing chi ts'ung-mieh piao tsuan-i* (A New Study of the Existing and Defunct States in the *Ch'un-ch'iu ta-shih piao* [Major Events of the Spring and Autumn Period]), 7 vols. (Nankang, Taipei: Chung-yang yen-chiu yuan, 1966); Ch'en P'an, *Pu-chien yü Ch'un-ch'iu ta-shih piao chih Ch'un-ch'iu fang-kuo k'ao* (On the *kuo* Missing from the *Ch'un-ch'iu ta-shih piao*), 2 vols. (Nankang, Taipei: Chung-yang yen-chiu yuan, 1970), including maps; and Ku Tung-kao (A.D. 1679-1759), *Ch'un-ch'iu ta-shih piao* (Major Events of the Spring and Autumn Period), *Wan-chüan lou* ed., fifty *chüan*, which was the basic source for Fu Ssu-nien's and Ch'en P'an's studies and additions. Although these works focused on the *Ch'un-ch'iu* period as their subject matter, they all started their examinations and analyses with the beginning of the Chou dynasty. To these sources, the following should be added in my account: Wang Hsien-t'ang, *Shan-tung ku-kuo k'ao*, pp. 1-275, which includes a discussion of certain ancient *kuo* not recorded in ancient texts and other works; Ku Chieh-kang, *Ku Chieh-kang Ku-shih lun-wen chi*, pp. 328-56 (original publication 1941); Barry B. Blakeley, *Annotated Genealogies of Spring and Autumn Period Clans* (Taipei: Chinese Materials Center, 1980), tracing the origins of the numerous clans; Steven F. Sage, *Ancient Sichuan and the Unification of China* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), pp. 35-40, on ancient states in Szechwan; and Niu Wu-ch'eng, *Ch'un-ch'iu pai-kuo t'an-wei* (The One Hundred *Kuo* [States] in *Ch'un-ch'iu* Times) (Chengchou: Chung-chou ku-chi ch'u-pan she, 1991), which actually covers more than 160 *kuo*.

For the geopolitical significance of Hsi-t'u, where the original Chou land was located, and Tung-t'u, which was the original land under the control of the Shang, see *Shang-shu cheng-tu*, pp. 147-71, 199-213.

As was discussed earlier, early records indicate that there were some 750 *kuo* within the larger Chou dynasty, but many of these must have been chiefdoms or even large composite tribes of what the Chou termed the I (Yi), Man, Jung, and Ti peoples and the like in the border and remote peripheral regions. Most of them gave their allegiance to the empire only when the Chou were strong, much like the relationship between the Chou and Shang during Chi-li's time.

No population figures were ever recorded for the late Shang and early Chou periods. Estimates have been made by various scholars since Han times, ranging from 2 to 13 million, but these are mere guesses. My own "estimate" is about 3.5 million. This is based on the number of soldiers and chariots involved in the Chou conquest of the Shang as recorded in the *Historical Records*, *Meng-tzu*, *I-Chou shu*, and other sources. It is also based on the theory that the ratio between the number of soldiers and the total population in the more advanced Chou and Shang states was 1 to 4, that the ratio for the less advanced *kuo* and groups (chiefdoms and others) was 3 to 1, and that for every chariot there were ten soldiers. I further assume that there were hundreds of thousands killed during the two Chou campaigns of conquest, which resulted in the reduction from the population of the late Shang period. After all of these factors are taken into account, I estimate the early Chou population to have been about 3.5 million or slightly more. For other estimates ranging from 2.5 to 10 million, see Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, "Chung-kuo shih shang chih jen-k'ou chih t'ung-chi" (Population Figures in Chinese History), in *Chung-kuo li-tai jen-k'ou lun-chi* (reprint; Hong Kong: Lung Men shu-tien, 1965), pp. 300-311; Liang Fang-chung, *Chung-kuo li-tai hu-k'ou t'ien-ti t'ien-fu t'ung-chi piao* (Statistical Tables of Population, Land, and Taxes in Chinese History) (Shanghai: Jen-min ch'u-pan she, 1980), pp. 1-6 (provides a good discussion of the major problems of general estimates); and Yuan Tsu-liang, "Chung-kuo ku-tai jen-k'ou shih yen-chiu hui-ku yü chan-wang" (The Current State and Future of Population Studies of Ancient China), *Li-shih yen-chiu* 5 (1996): 144-60.

69. The causes of the decline of the Western Chou were many and complex, but the inevitability of the downfall of this feudal state was built in. Like its predecessor, the Shang, it was only a matter of time before it could no longer maintain the basic strengths that had created it. For a monumental study of the Western Chou government, see H. G. Creel, *The Origins of Statecraft in China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970). For a general history of the Western Chou, see Yang K'uan, *Hsi-Chou shih* (The History of the Western Chou Period) (Shanghai: Jen-min, 1999), which also covers the late Shang and early Ch'un-ch'iu, including traditional and new views on the fall of the Shang and the Western Chou (pp. 837-53); Hsu Cho-yun, *Hsi-Chou shih*; and Hsu Cho-yun and Katheryn M. Linduff, *Western Chou Civilization* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988). See also *The Cambridge History of Ancient China*, ed. Michael Loewe and Edward L. Shaughnessy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 292-351 (article by Shaughnessy). The last volume of the *Cambridge History* was published after the completion of this study. See my review in *The Historian* 63, no. 2 (winter 2001).

70. The most important primary sources for this topic are the *Ch'un-ch'iu Tso-chuan chu* (Yang Po-chün ed.), *Kuo-yü*, and *Chu-shu chi-nien* (both *ku-pen* and *chin-pen*), but the most comprehensive studies are the works of Ku Tung-kao (A.D. 1679-1795), Ch'en P'an, Ch'eng Fa-jen, Wang Hsien-t'ang, and Kuo Mo-jo cited in notes 62, 65, 66, 67,

and 68; and Ch'en P'an, *Ch'un-ch'iu lieh-kuo te chien-ping ch'ien-hsi yü min-tsu hun-t'un ho lo-hou ti-ch'ü te fa-chan* (The Annexation of States, Removal of States, Racial Assimilation, and Development of the Border Regions) (Nankang, Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1985), later reprinted in *Chung-kuo shang-ku shih tai-ting kao* 3 (1985): 281–333. For detailed Chinese studies of other changes in the Eastern Chou period, see T'ung Shu-yeh, *Ch'un-ch'iu shih* (A History of the Spring and Autumn Period) (reprint; Hong Kong: T'ai-p'ing, 1964, originally published in 1941), and *Ch'un-ch'iu tso-chuan yen-chiu* (Studies in the History of Ancient China according to the Tso's Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals) (Shanghai: Jen-min, 1980); Yang K'uan, *Hsi-Chou shih* (including the early Eastern Chou, especially the Ch'un-ch'iu period), and *Chan-kuo shih* (History of the Warring States Period), 3d ed. (Shanghai: Jen-min, 1981); Lü Ssu-mien, *Hsien-Ch'in shih* (History of Pre-Ch'in China) (reprint; Shanghai: Ku-chi, 1983, originally published in 1945); Li Tsung-t'ung, *Chung-kuo ku-tai she-hui shih* (Taipei: Shangwu, 1988); Liu Po-chi, *Ch'un-ch'iu hui-meng cheng-chih* (A Study of the Political Alliances and Leagues during the Spring and Autumn Period) (Taipei: Chung-hua ts'ung-shu, 1962), esp. pp. 55–459; Kao Jui, *Chung-kuo shang-ku chün-shih* (The Military History of Ancient China) (Peking: Chün-shih k'o-hsueh, 1995); and Lan Shui-wei, *Ch'un-ch'iu shih-ch'i te pu-ping* (Chinese Infantry in the Spring and Autumn Period) (Peking: Chung-hua, 1979).

71. The most important sources about these measures are *Shih-chi*, pp. 223–43, 2539–57; Shui-hu-ti Ch'in-mu chu-chien cheng-li hsiao-tsu, comp., *Shui-hu-ti Ch'in mu chu-chien* (Ch'in Bamboo Documents Discovered in Shui-hu-ti [of Yun-meng in Hupei]) (Peking: Wen-wu ch'u-pan she, 1978), which includes the most important texts of the Ch'in legal codes and administrative laws; *Ch'in Shih-huang k'o-shih tzu-liao*; Jung Keng, "Ch'in Shih-huang k'o-shih k'ao" (A Study of Ch'in Shih-huang's Stone Inscriptions), *Yen-ching hsueh-pao* 17 (June 1935): 125–75; Wang Chuang-hung, *Tseng-pu chiao-pei sui-pi* (Studies with Additions and Collations of Stele Inscriptions [from Chou to T'ang Times, A.D. 618–907]), an original work by Fang Jo (Shanghai: Shu-hua ch'u-pan she, 1981), pp. 12–23; Sun K'ai (A.D. 1861–1907), *Ch'in hui-yao* (A Complete Compilation of the Records of Ch'in History, Culture, and Institutions), *ting-pu* (collations and additions) by Hsu Fu in 1943 (rev. ed.; Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1959), pp. 65–354; and Yen K'o-chün (A.D. 1762–1843), *Ch'üan Shang-ku San-tai Ch'in-Han San-kuo Liu-ch'ao wen* (A Comprehensive Collection of the Writings from High Antiquity through the Six Dynasties [A.D. 220–589]) (reprint; Taipei: Shih-chieh shu-chü, 1963), esp. "Ch'üan-Ch'in wen" (Complete Ch'in Writings). The *Han-shu* also includes important materials, especially *Han-shu* 24, which compares Tung Chung-shu's view on HS (1962), pp. 1137 and 1152 (on coins). On the Ch'in land system as recorded in a recently discovered document, see T'ien I-ch'ao and Liu Chao, "Ch'in t'ien-lü k'ao-shih" (A Study of the Ch'in Land System), *K'ao-ku* 6 (1983); and *San-chien Han-chien*, pp. 51–83. The most comprehensive studies of this issue, however, are Ma Fei-pai's two monumental works, *Ch'in Shih-huang-ti chuan* (A Biography of Ch'in Shih-huang) (Kiangsu, Yangchou: Ku-chi, 1985) (hereafter cited as Ma Fei-pai 1982b); and *Ch'in chi shih* (A Comprehensive History of the Ch'in), 2 vols. (Peking: Chung-hua, 1982), also called *Ch'in kuo shih*. See also Lin Chien-min, *Ch'in-shih kao* (A Draft History of the Ch'in) (Shanghai: Jen-min, 1981). For the organization and development of the Ch'in bureaucratic system, see Tseng Tzu-sheng, *Chung-kuo cheng-chih chih-tu shih* (History of Chinese Political Institutions) (reprint; Taipei: Ch'i-yeh, 1969), pp. 31ff., esp. 31–175; and the monumental *Ch'in-Han kuan-chih shih kao* (A Draft History of the Ch'in and

Han Governments), by An Tso-chang and Hsiung T'ieh-chi, 2 vols. (Chinan: Ch'i-Lu shu-she, 1984). The important English-language works include Derk Bodde, *China's First Unifier* (Leiden: Brill, 1938), pp. 1–88; A. F. P. Hulsewé, trans., *Remnants of Ch'in Law* (Leiden: Brill, 1985), pp. 21–92; and Li Yu-ning, ed. and trans., *The First Emperor of China* (White Plains, NY: Sharpe, 1975), esp. pp. 91–115. See also Derk Bodde's "The State and Empire of the Ch'in," in *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 1, pp. 20–102, for a different interpretation of the issues in question. The *pan-liang* coins weighed 7.625 grams (copper).

For the basic definition and functional aspects of the term *bureaucracy*, I have followed Max Weber and Peter M. Blau. See Max Weber, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 196–244; and Peter M. Blau, *Bureaucracy in Modern Society* (New York: Random House, 1956), pp. 13–43. See also Ezra N. Suleiman, *Politics, Power, and Bureaucracy in France: The Administrative Elite* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 3–40. An otherwise excellent study of bureaucratic empires, S. N. Eisenstadt's *The Political Systems of Empires: The Rise and Fall of Historical Bureaucratic Societies* (New York: Free Press, 1963), pp. 10–11, classifies the Han, but not the Ch'in, as a bureaucratic empire.

A document entitled *Pien nien chi* (also called *Ta-shih chi*) unearthed from a tomb dated 217 B.C., which covers the major events of the Ch'in from 306 to 217 B.C., records that its compiler was named Hsi and he had registered (*fu*) at age seventeen (*sui*). Many scholars have concluded from this record that the Ch'in government required its male subjects to register for the draft at that age, contrary to the age of twenty recorded in literary texts by such scholars as Meng K'ang (fl. A.D. 180–260) and Ju Shun (fl. A.D. 189–265). Such views are mistaken. They overlook the fact that Hsi was drafted at age twenty-seven (*sui*). It suggests that the term *fu* did not mean "draft registration" in the Ch'in system but registration for "labor service" (*li-i*) for the state. Therefore, my view, on the basis of many archaeological and textual sources, is that the Ch'in eligibility for military service began at age twenty and ended at fifty-six (*sui*), or sixty under special circumstances such as war, and the labor service age was from seventeen to sixty (*sui*). During times of national emergency (war, expeditions, shortages of manpower, and so forth), these rules could be ignored. It was generally this system that was followed in early Han times, and a recently discovered Han ordinance issued in 186 B.C. confirms this point and the Ch'in system as revealed by Hsi's case in the Yun-meng documents. See "Shih-lü" (Ordinance on the Education and Examination of Officeholders), in *Chang Chia-shu Han-mu chu-chien erh-ssu-ch'i hao mu* (The Bamboo Documents of the Han Dynasty Unearthed in Tomb No. 247 in Chang Chia-shan [of Chiang-ling, Hupei Province]), comp. Chang Chia-shan erh-ssu-ch'i hao Han-mu chu-chien cheng-li hsiao-tsu (Peking: Wen-wu, 2001). The tomb, dated 186 B.C., was excavated in 1983. For the views of various scholars on Ch'in draft age and interpretations of the term *fu*, see Chung-hua shu-chü pien-chi pu, ed., *Yun-meng Ch'ien-chien yen-chiu* (Studies on the Ch'in Bamboo Documents Discovered in Yun-meng [of Hupei]) (Peking: Chung-hua, 1981), pp. 7–8 (article by Shu Chih-mei), 152–56 (article by Yü Hao-liang and Li Chün-ming); and Kao Min, *Yun-meng Ch'in-chien ch'u-t'an* (Essays on Ch'in Institutions and Society as Seen in the Ch'in Bamboo Documents from Yun-meng [of Hupei]) (Chengchou: Jen-min, 1979), pp. 18–28 (suggesting that fifteen was the draft age). For the reference in the *Pien nien chi*, see *Shu-hu-ti Ch'in-mu chu-chien*, pp. 5–7. It should also be pointed out that *fu* also referred to the registration of young men for the pursuit of civil official careers. In the Ch'in system, the institution was such that when a young man reached seventeen *sui*

(age seventeen) he would register (*fu*) to take a test; if he passed, he would receive an official appointment as a low-ranking officer. See Hsu Shen, *Shuo-wen chieh-tzu* (Tuan Yü-ts'ai ed.), vol. 16, pp. 22-25 (including Tuan's learned commentary). In the *Pien nien chi*, Hsi's career showed this rule in practice under Shih huang-ti.

Among the documents on bamboo tablets unearthed together with the *Pien nien chi* in the 217 B.C. tomb were the Ch'in legal codes, administrative laws, and handbooks and guides for officials, all in seven groups. In my view, two of them, *Wei-li chih-tao* (Guide for Officials), written on 51 tablets, and *Yü-shu* (Proclamation), dated 227 B.C. and written on 14 tablets, were guides covering the moral, intellectual, bureaucratic, and documentary duties of an official. Two of them, *Fa-lü ta-wen* (Penal Code: Explanations and Precedents), written on 210 tablets, and *Feng-chen shih* (Penal Code: Cases and Trials), written on 98 tablets, were administrators' practical handbooks. These works represent parts of the interpretation of the well-formulated, systematic Ch'in norms and rules that were followed in the organization and operational practices of the Ch'in government's primary laws. For the primary documents, see *Shui-hu-ti Ch'in-mu chu-chien*. For various and mostly different interpretations of these documents, see the articles in *Yun-meng Ch'in-chien yen-chiu*; Huang Liu-chu, *Ch'in-Han shih-chin chih-tu* (A Study of the Recruitment System of the Ch'in and Han Governments) (Sian: Hsi-pei ta-hsueh, 1985), pp. 7-78; A. F. P. Hulseyé, *Remnants of Ch'in Law*; Katrina C. D. McLeod and Robin S. Yates, "Forms of Ch'in Law: An Annotated Translation of the *Feng-chen shih*," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 41, no. 1 (June 1981): 111-63; and Ch'en Kung-jo, "Yun-meng Ch'in-mu ch'u-t'u *Fa-lü ta-wen* chien-ts'e k'ao-shu" (A Study of the *Fa-lü ta-wen* unearthed in Yun-men [of Hupei]), *Yenching hsueh-pao* (Yanqing Xuebao), new ser., 2 (1996): 171-212. While Hulseyé and Yates have made excellent translations of the titles of the unearthed Ch'in works, I have made my own based more on the content of each work than the literary meaning of the titles.

72. *Kuo-yü* (Shanghai: Ku-chi, 1978 ed.), pp. 229-31. Some of these points can also be found in the book *Kuan-tzu* (The Works of Kuan-tzu [Kuan Chung]), attributed to Kuan Chung, particularly sec. 4. See *Kuan-tzu* (Chao Shou-cheng ed.) (Nan-ming: Kuang-hsi jen-min, 1981), pp. 27-28; cf. the versions in Tai Wang's *Chiao-cheng* ed. (vol. 1) and Shih I-ts'an's *Chin-ch'üan* ed. (rearranged, in pt. 2, sec. 2.1). For a systematic study and translation of the *Kuan-tzu*, see Allen Rickett's *Kuan-tzu*, vol. 1 (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press, 1965; titled as *Guanzi*, published by Princeton University Press, 2 vols., 1985-). See also *Wen-wu* 4 (1985): 27-36. The tombs in which these documents were found were opened in 1972 and belonged to the late second century B.C., but the document in question is dated to the early fourth century B.C. See *Shih-chi*, p. 289.

73. See *Ch'un-ch'iu Tso-chuan chu* (Yang ed.), under 594 and 483 B.C. (p. 1670); and Tung Yueh (A.D. 1620-86), *Ch'i-kuo k'ao* (History of the Seven Contending States) (reprint; Taipei: Shih-chieh, 1960), p. 88.

74. See *Shang-shu* (Cheng-tu ed.), pp. 276-89 (this was a later addition, the original having been lost); *Ch'un-ch'iu Tso-chuan chu* (Yang ed.), 536 B.C., pp. 1274-76 (including the citation of earlier legal codes); and Tung Yueh, *Ch'i-kuo k'ao*, pp. 366-67. Li K'uei is also read Li K'o by some scholars. For a discussion of some aspects of Li K'o's *Fa-ching*, see Tu Cheng-sheng, *Pien-hu ch'i-ming* (Reorganization of Population by Registration) (Taipei: Lien-ching, 1990), pp. 244-60.

75. *Ch'un-ch'iu Tso-chuan chu* (Yang ed.), pp. 208-9 (the note gives a detailed history of the first *hsien* in Ch'u under King Wu), 1613-15; Kuo Mo-jo, *Liang-Chou chin-wen tz'u*

ta-hsi; Hao Chao-kung, *Chung-kuo hsien-chih shih* (A History of the Hsien Institution in China) (Taipei: Hung-yeh, 1964), pp. 1–27, which provides the most comprehensive study of the topic. See also Tseng Tzu-sheng, *Chung-kuo cheng-chih chih-tu shih*, vol. 1, pp. 146–59; and H. G. Creel, “The Beginnings of Bureaucracy in China: The Origin of the Hsien,” pp. 155–84. For the appearance of new institutions through the reforms in various states, such as Shen Pu-hai (ca. 400–341 B.C.) in Han, Li Kuei or Li K’o (fl. 450–387 B.C.) in Wei, and Wu Ch’i (fl. sixth century B.C.) in Ch’u, see Tai Chin-hsin, “Chan-kuo shih-ch’i te lie-kuo pien-fa” (Reforms in the Various States in the Warring States Period), M.A. thesis, National Taiwan University, Taipei, 1978. The evolution of the meaning of the term *ch’ien-shou* is a complex issue, and it has been a topic of continuing debate from pre-Ch’in times to modern times. Initially, the meaning of the term was interpreted differently by many scholars and thinkers, such as Chuang Chou (ca. 369–286 B.C.) and Han Fei (280?–233 B.C.). In the post-Ch’in era, scholars became more interested in and even puzzled by the First Emperor’s use of the term to describe the common people; these included Hsu Shen (A.D. 58–147) of the Han dynasty, Chang I (fl. early to mid-third century) of the Wei dynasty (220–64), K’ung Ying-ta (574–648) and Yen Shih-ku (579–654) of the T’ang dynasty (618–907), Chu Hsi (1130–1200) of the Sung dynasty (960–1279), and T’ao Tsung-i (ca. 1320–1402) of the Yuan-Ming period (1279–1644). In modern times, the interpretation of the meaning of the term *ch’ien-shou* became even more controversial and politically oriented, particularly in China during the 1960s and 1970s. See my detailed discussion of this issue in Chun-shu Chang 1975a, pp. 10–14, 17–18.

76. *Shih-chi*, pp. 201–20, 2256–61, 2285–96; *Ch’un-ch’iu Tso-chuan chu* (Yang Po-chün ed.); *Kuo-yü* (Shanghai: Ku-chi, 1978 ed.); *Chan-kuo ts’e* (Shanghai: Ku-chi, 1978 ed.), apps. 2 and 3; T’ung Shu-yeh, *Ch’un-ch’iu Tso-chuan yen-chiu*, esp. pp. 341–42, 368–70; Liu Shu, *Tzu-chih t’ung-chien wai-chi* (Shanghai: Han-fen lou ed.); Liu Po-chi, *Ch’un-ch’iu hui-meng cheng-chih*, esp. pp. 55–84, 449–59; Yang K’uan, *Chan-kuo shih*, esp. pp. 261–372; San-chün ta-hsueh, comp., *Chung-kuo li-tai chan-cheng shih* (A History of War in China), 18 vols. (Taipei: Li-ming wen-hua, 1980), vols. 1 and 2 (up to p. 246); Kao Jui, *Chung-kuo chün-shih shih-lueh* (The Military History of China) (Peking: Chün-shih k’o-hsueh, 1992), esp. pp. 131–42, 183–207, 229–32; Kao Jui, *Chung-kuo chün-shih shih*, pp. 121–454; Lan Yung-wei, *Ch’un-ch’iu shih-tai te pu-ping*, pp. 37–157 (his interpretations and speculations on the authorship of the *Ssu-ma Fa*, however, are incorrect [pp. 131–47]); Kuo Ju-huai et al., comp., *Chung-kuo chün-shih shih* (The Military History of China) (Peking: Chieh-fang chün ch’u-pan she, 1988), esp. pp. 99–115; Hsiung T’ieh-chi, *Ch’in-Han chün-shih chih-tu shih* (A History of the Ch’in and Han Military System) (Nanchang: Chiang-hsi jen-min ch’u-pan she, 1990), esp. pp. 7–17; Huang Chin-yen, *Ch’in-Han Chün-chih shih lun* (The Military History of Ch’in-Han China) (Nanchang: Chiang-hsi ch’u-pan she, 1993), pp. 221–23.

77. *Ku-shih pien* 5 (esp. Hsieh Fu-ya); Wang Yun-wu et al., eds. *Hsien-Ch’in cheng-chih ssu-hsiang* (Chinese Political Thought in Pre-Ch’in Times) (Taipei: Shang-wu, 1968); Wang Meng-ou, *Tsou Yen i-shuo k’ao* (On the Works of Tsou Yen) (Taipei: Shang-wu, 1966), secs. 6 and 7; Ku Chieh-kang, *Ku-shih pien*, vol. 2, pp. 1–31; Ku Chieh-kang, *Ku-shih lun-wen chi*, vol. 3, pp. 1–272, 460–71 (Ch’ien Mu’s views); Lei Hai-tung, *Chung-kuo wen-hua yü Chung-kuo te ping* (Essays on Chinese Culture and Soldiers) (reprint; Hong Kong: Lung Men, 1968, originally published in 1940), pp. 104–5; T’ao Hsi-sheng, *Chung-kuo cheng-chih ssu-hsiang shih* (A History of Chinese Political Thought), vol. 1, pp. 66–230; Hsiao Kung-ch’üan, *Chung-kuo cheng-chih ssu-hsiang shih* (A History of Chinese

Political Thought), 6 vols. (reprint; Taipei: Chung-hua wen-hua, 1945), vol. 1, pp. 86–162 (volume 1 of this book was translated into English by F. W. Mote under the same title and was published by Princeton University Press in 1979.) For some related topics in the broad area of political thought that became the foundation of the subject under discussion, see Y. P. Mei, trans., *The Ethical and Political Works of Meitse* (London, 1929); John Knoblock, trans., *Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works*, 2 vols. (Stanford, 1988, 1990), esp. vol. 2; Herrlee G. Creel, *Shen Pu-hai: A Chinese Political Philosopher of the Fourth Century B.C.* (Chicago, 1974); and Ho Ping-ti, “Ssu-ma T’an, Ch’ien yü Lao-tzu nien-tai” (On the Dating of Ssu-ma T’an and Ch’ien and Lao-tzu), in *Che-hsueh yen-chiu*, 1998: 12 (1999), rev. copy by the author. An interesting philosophical and religious interpretation of the ancient Chinese tradition of the sage-king ideal is given in Julia Ching, *Mysticism and Kingship in China: The Heart of Chinese Wisdom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 206–34.

78. A detailed discussion on the evolution of Ch’in written language is given in Wang Kuo-wei, *Kuo-t’ang chi-lin*, vol. 1, pp. 251–57; vol. 2, pp. 305–20. For Shang Yang’s *sheng* of 344 B.C., see Ch’iu Lung et al., comp., *Chung-kuo ku-tai tu-liang-heng t’u-chi* (An Illustrated Catalog of Instruments of Chinese Weights and Measures from the Shang to the Ch’ing) (Peking: Wen-wu, 1984), pp. 44–45. My main line of argument is based on Wang Kuo-wei’s (1877–1927) pioneering study on this issue, which was inspired by Tuan Yü-ts’ai’s (1735–1815) view contained in his annotation and commentary on the *Shuo-wen chieh-tzu* (A.D. 100) by Hsu Sheng. But I hold that *ta-chuan*, *Chou-wen*, and *hsiao-chuan* cannot be uniquely and exclusively defined with no duplications of characters (or graphs). There was also no clear temporal line that defined the end of one style and the beginning of another. Therefore, if one seeks the logical lines of demarcation among the three styles of ancient Chinese written language one will become confused and negative about the whole issue. My discussion here takes the three scripts as large categories and neglects the variations and exceptions in each. Noel Barnard in 1978 questioned the validity of Wang Kuo-wei’s view as having “practically no foundation.” Barnard’s view was advanced without the benefit of seeing and comparing the Yun-meng (227 B.C.) in *li-shu* (scribe script) and the Ch’ing-ch’uan (306 B.C.) documents. That, I believe, was the main reason for his questionable conclusion. See his “The Nature of the Ch’in ‘Reform of the Script’ as Reflected in Archaeological Documents Excavated under Conditions of Control,” in *Ancient China: Studies in Early Civilization* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1978), pp. 181–213. For Hsu Sheng’s and Tuan Yü-ts’ai’s views, see Tuan, *Shuo-wen chieh-tzu chu* (Wan-yu wen-k’u ed.), vol. 16, pp. 19–20. See also Derk Bodde, *China’s First Unifier*, pp. 151–54. Bodde quotes other leading scholars on this issue, the reform of Ch’in writing, in his book. Since space is limited, I will not list these authorities and repeat their views here.

79. For the Ch’ing-ch’uan document (written on a bamboo tablet) from a tomb dated 306 B.C., which was a new “land law,” see *Wen-wu* 1 (January 1982): 13. For the inscriptions on the many measuring instruments of standardized weights and measures under Shih Huang-ti, see *Chung-kuo ku-tai tu-liang-heng t’u-chi*, pls. 98–113, 166–95. Needless to say, the scripts inscribed on these instruments are not without variations. In fact, they vary depending on the writer and material used in each case. But they are basically in the same writing style, *hsiao-chuan*. In most cases, these vessels carried both Shih Huang-ti’s 221 B.C. edict and the edict of 209 B.C. by his successor Erh-shih Huang-ti (the Second Emperor, Hu-hai, r. 210–207 B.C.), which, reinscribed on the vessels after the First Emperor’s death in 210 B.C., reaffirmed his great achievements and the standardization

of weights and measures. See Hsueh Shang-kung (fl. 1144-1149), *Li-tai chung-ting i-ch'i k'uan-shih* (Commentary on Inscriptions on Bells, Tripods, Cups, and Vessels throughout the Ages, Hsia to Han), collated and edited by later scholars, particularly of the Ch'ing period (reprint; Taipei: Feng Yin Ko, 1967), *chüan* 16, pp. 3-4. For the various forms of the *Chou-wen* (Chou script), see the monumental work by Hsu Wen-ching, *Ku-Chou hui-pien* (A Comprehensive Collection of Chou Script Characters), 2 vols. (reprint; Taipei: Shang-wu, 1969; originally published in 1933). The book lists nearly forty thousand characters and symbols.

It should be noted here that the *li-shu* (scribe script) also became the "standard written language" of the Ch'in in the late third century B.C. For example, the Yun-meng documents were written in the Ch'in-style *li-shu*. It can be reasonably assumed that inscriptions on bronze and stone were in *hsiao-chuan* and writings on bamboo, wood, and silk were in *li-shu*; the former was inscribed with sharp, hard tools, and the latter was written with brushes. The materials for writing defined the style of language in use. But both were recognized as standardized written languages of the Ch'in empire. As time passed, the difficulty of inscribing eventually eliminated *hsiao-chuan* as the official and most commonly used written language.

80. For the institution of the *ch'eng-hsiang*, see *Shih-chi*, pp. 209, 734, 2308, 2311; and *Ch'in hui-yao ting-pu*, pp. 199-200, including many different views on the beginning of the *ch'eng-hsiang* office. For clear and learned studies of the issue, see Ma Fei-pai 1982b, pp. 856-61; and An Tso-chang and Hsiung T'ieh-chi, *Ch'in-Han kuan-chih shih-kao*, pp. 16-19.

81. *Shih-chi*, pp. 202-3, 2228-37; Han Fei, *Han Fei Tzu* (Ch'en Ch'i-yu ed.), pp. 906-8; Yang K'uan, *Shang Yang pien-fa* (Shang Yang's Reforms) (Shanghai: Jen-min, 1962), pp. 1-54; Kao Heng, *Shang-chün shu i-chu* (A Translation with Annotations of the Book of Lord Shang) (Peking: Chung-hua, 1974), pp. 1-19; Han Fei, *Han Fei tzu* (Ch'en Ch'i-yu ed.), pp. 229, 234 (various views). The *Shang-chün shu* contains most of Shang Yang's reforms. Although it has been attributed to Shang Yang, the book is not his original work, at least not the later changes and additions. For an English translation, see *The Book of Lord Shang*, trans. by J. J. L. Duyvendak (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928).

82. Tung Yueh, *Ch'i-kuo k'ao*, p. 87; *Shih-chi*, p. 1442. Neither of these sources clearly states that the round coins were *pan-liang* money. The recently discovered Ch'ing-ch'uan wooden documents and *pan-liang* coins have proved that.

83. For the discovery and study of the Ch'ing-ch'uan documents and *pan-liang* coins, see *Wen-wu* 1 (January 1982): 1-27 (report and articles by Ssu-ch'uan po-wu kuan, Yü Hao-liang, and Li Chao-ho), text on p. 11, *pan-liang* coins on p. 12; Li Hsueh-ch'in, "Ch'ing-ch'uan Hao-chia p'ing tu-tu yen-chiu" (A New Study of the Ch'ing-ch'uan Wooden Documents), *Wen-wu* 10 (October 1982): 68-72. Li correctly read "Wei T'ien Lueh" as the title of the land law under revision. For the Ch'in conquest of the Pa and Shu regions and the massive immigration of Ch'in people to the region, see Ch'ang Ch'ü (fl. 265-316), *Hua-yang kuo-chih* (A History of the Region South of Mount Hua) (Chengtu: Pa-Shu, 1984), p. 194. See also T'ung En-cheng, *Ku-tai te Pa Shu* (Pa and Shu in Ancient Times) (Chengtu: Jen-min, 1979), esp. pp. 139-43, 151-52; and Steven F. Sage, *Ancient Sichuan and the Unification of China*, pp. 112-16.

84. For a detailed examination and reading of the Yun-meng Ch'in bamboo documents, see Shui-hu-ti Ch'in-mu chu-chien chen-li hsiao-tsu, *Shui-hu-ti Ch'in-mu chu-chien*; Chung-hua shu-chü pien-chi pu, *Yun-meng Ch'in-chien yen-chiu*; and Ma Fei-pai, "Yun-meng Ch'in-chien *Ta-shih chi chi-chuan*" (Annotations and Commentaries on A

Chronology of Major Events of the Past Ninety Years [306-217 B.C.], *Chung-kuo li-shih wen-hsien yen-chiu chi-k'an* 2 (1981): 66-92 (hereafter cited as Ma Fei-pai 1981b). A. F. P. Hulsewé translated the legal and administrative rules in the Yun-meng bamboo documents into English in his *Remnants of Ch'in Law*.

85. Han Fei, *Han Fei Tzu* (Ch'en Ch'i-yu ed.), pp. 906-8. I should also point out that Shang Yang's reforms were not entirely his own creation. The legal part, for example, was based on Li Kuei's *Fa-ching* and recently unearthed pre-Shang Yang legal treatises such as the *Shou-fa shou-ling shih-san p'ien* (Thirteen Laws and Statutes Laws), discovered in 1974. See Ma Fei-pai 1982b, p. 523; and Wu Chiu-lung, *Yin-ch'ueh-shan Han-chien shih-wen* (Han Documents on Bamboo Discovered in Yin-ch'ueh shan [of Shantung]) (Peking: Wen-wu, 1985), pp. 17-18, 240.

86. For the Ch'in conquest of the Six States and the development of the thirty-six *chiün*, see Ch'üan Tsu-wang (1750-1755), "Han-shu ti-li-chih chi-i" (Questions and Additions to the Treatise on Geography in the *Han-shu*), in *Pu-pien*, pp. 1249-51; Wang Kuo-wei, "Ch'in ch'ün k'ao" (On the Number of *Chiün* in the Ch'in Dynasty), in *Kuan-t'ang chi-lin*, vol. 2, pp. 534-54; Ch'ien Mu, "Ch'in san-shih-liu chün pu-k'ao" (Additional Notes on [the Dating, Number, and Location of] the Thirty-six *Chiün*), *Yü-kung*, 7, nos. 6-7 (June 1937): 259-69; Lao Kan, "Ch'in-chün te chien-chih chi-ch'i yü Han-chiün chih pi-chiao" (A Comparative Study of Ch'in and Han *Chiün*), *Ta-lu tsa-chih t'e-k'an* (Taipei) 2 (July 1952): 423-31; and T'an Ch'i-hsiang, "Ch'in chün hsin-k'ao" (A New Study of Ch'in *Chiün*), *Che-chiang hsueh-pao* 2, no. 1 (March 1948): 1-7. These studies and numerous others focus on the total number of *chiün* in the Ch'in period and on the dating and location of the thirty-six *chiün* at the beginning of the dynasty. But the views vary. A comprehensive discussion of the dating, location, and number of *chiün* in Ch'in times is given in Sun K'ai, *Ch'in Hui-yao*, pp. 359-77; and Ma Fei-pai 1982b, pp. 546-677. For the issue of the Ch'in moving populations en masse after military conquests, see *Ch'in Hui-yao*, pp. 454-56 (Shih Chih-mien); and Ma Fei-pai, 1982b, pp. 916-29. Both sources discuss the origins, practices, benefits, and ill consequences of this institution. A contemporary record dated no later than 217 B.C. is *Pien nien chi*, also known as the *Ta-shih chi* (Chronology of the Major Events [of the Past Ninety Years]) unearthed from a tomb dated 217 B.C. from Yun-meng of Hupei Province in 1975. It records major events from 306 B.C. to 217 B.C., mostly about the Ch'in conquest of other states. The author, whose first name was Hsi, was born in 262 B.C.; from 244 to 235, he was a low-ranking official (chief clerk to a magistrate or the like) in An-lu and Yen districts (north and west of the modern Wuhan region in Hupei), which were taken from the Ch'u in 279-278 and formed part of a new Ch'in *chiün*—Nan—in 278. In 234, he was drafted into the Ch'in army. His father was born in 306 B.C. and died in 231; for a long time, he was also in the Ch'in army. Hsi and his father took part in many of the Ch'in conquests of the Six States. I believe that Hsi's father settled in An-lu when Nan *chiün* was established in 278. Thus, the *Pien nien chi* may be taken as a personal account of the Ch'in conquest, a direct source that can be used to correct and supplement the account of Ch'in conquests in Ssu-ma Ch'ien's *Shih-chi*. In fact, this source, like many other recently unearthed documents and literary texts, affirms that the *Shih-chi* is quite accurate and authentic in its account of events and issues in Ch'in and ancient periods. See *Shih-chi*, pp. 205-39; *Shui-hu-ti Ch'in-mu chu-chien*, pp. 1-8; *Yun-men Ch'in-chien yen-chiu*, pp. 14-37 (Ma Yung's article, though it contains some critical mistakes in his various suggestions about some issues of the *Pien nien chi*); and Ma Fei-pai 1981b.

87. *Shih-chi*, pp. 252-53, 757-58, 2565-66, 2886-87; Ssu-ma Kuang (A.D. 1019-1086), *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien* (Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government)

(Peking: Ku-chi, 1957), pp. 242–43. The number of troops has been variously given as one to three hundred thousand in various sources. My own view is that the earlier expedition probably sent only one hundred thousand but later that figure was increased to three hundred thousand when the building of the Great Wall commenced and more campaigns were launched. The number of districts (*ch'u-hsien*) established by the Ch'in was again variously given in Ch'in and Han sources as thirty-four and forty-four. Thirty-four was probably the number of districts set up after the first defeat of the Hsiung-nu in the north and east of the Ordos region, but ten more were added in the west northwest after the conquest of the Jung region (in Kansu and Ninghsia) in 214 B.C. On the issue of Chiu-yuan *chiün* and the new districts, I have followed Ch'üan Tsu-wang and Wang Kuo-wei (p. 534), quoted earlier. On the issue of systematic population removals and relocations after a military conquest, see Ma Fei-pai 1982b, pp. 919–29; and *Ch'in Shih-huang-ti chuan* (1941 ed.), pp. 411–16.

88. The three new *chiün* were Nan-hai (modern Kwangtung, southwestern Fukien, and eastern Kwangsi), Kuei-lin (modern Kwangsi), and Hsiang (most of Vietnam and parts of Kwangsi and Kwangtung on the north). The Ch'in first conquered part of the land controlled by the Yueh in modern Chekiang and northern Fukien and established Min-chung *chiün* in 222 B.C. (Wang Kuo-wei's view is followed here.) Thus, the Ch'in conquest of the Yueh in southern China had already begun in 222 B.C., but unexpected resistance prevented the Ch'in force from taking control of all the Yueh land until 214 B.C. The 221 expedition was Ying Cheng's second attempt to conquer all of the Yueh land in the south. See *Shih-chi*, pp. 253, 2565–66; Ssu-ma Kuang, *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien*, pp. 242–43; Ma Fei-pai, *Ch'in Shih-huang-ti chuan*, pp. 162–64; Wang Kuo-wei, *Kuo-t'ang chi-lin* (essay on Ch'in *chiün* cited note 83); Mou Jun-sun, "Ch'in-Han Pien" (Studies on Ch'in and Han Historical Geography), in *Chung-kuo li-shih ti-li*, pp. 1–4; Li Cheng-fu, *Chiün-hsien shih-tai chih An-nan* (Vietnam under Imperial China) (Shanghai: Shang-wu, 1945); and Feng Ch'eng-chün, trans, *Ch'in-tai ch'u-p'ing Nan-yueh k'ao* (Shanghai: Shang-wu, 1934), esp. pp. 23–105. The latter work is a Chinese translation, with commentaries and analysis, of Léonard Aurousseau's "Le première conquête chinoise des pays annamites, iiiie siècle avant notre ère," *Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême Orient* 23 (1923): 137–264. Aurousseau held that Min-chung *chiün* was set up in 221 B.C. and the Ch'in army seized the Yueh land in Kwangtung and most of Kwangsi in 221–220. It was not able to conquer the Yueh land in modern Vietnam, and the commander of the troops, T'u Sui, was killed by the Yueh in 219. The Ch'in court sent reinforcements gradually from 218 to 214 and finally succeeded in conquering all of the Yueh land from Fukien to Vietnam. I should note that both the chronology and the number of troops in these campaigns have been under debate since the Han dynasty. My reconstruction of the Ch'in conquest and colonization of the Yueh land from South China to Vietnam is primarily based on the *Shih-chi* and the *Huai-nan tzu* (The Works of King Huai-nan) by Liu An (179–122 B.C.). See Liu's *Huai-nan Wang shu* (Liu Wen-tien *chi-chieh* [Comprehensive Commentary and Annotations]) (Shanghai: Shang-wu, 1921), *chiün* 18, pp. 23a–b.

89. The Ch'in imposed their state system (*Chiün-hsien*) on the Yueh land in 213 B.C., sending over five hundred thousand people from the interior to guard and colonize it. The new land was under the command of Chief Commandant Jen Hsiao until his death in 208 B.C. Chao T'uo from North China (Hopei), one of the leaders of the Ch'in expeditionary forces, was appointed as Jen's successor and headquartered in P'an-yü (modern Kwangchou). The recently unearthed tomb (1983) of the king of Nan Yueh shows that

the institutional structure in the Yueh region after the conquest followed the Ch'in system exactly and that all official documents were of the Ch'in format and style. Both the written language and the system of weights and measures were also Ch'in. The population removals are extensively documented in Ma Fei-pai 1982b (pp. 919-29). For example, the family of the great Han historian Pan Ku (A.D. 32-92), author of the *Han-shu* (History of the [Former] Han Dynasty), was originally one of the nobles of the Ch'u state in the south, which controlled the Yueh people until they were conquered by the Ch'in in 222 B.C. Following the conquest, the Pan clan was moved to the northwest in modern Shansi. This is comparable to the earlier removal of the nobles and wealthy people of the Chao state in the north (Shansi) to the southwest (Szechwan) after the Chao were defeated by the Ch'in. Also the family of the great Han general and chancellor Chou Po was originally from Ch'üan (in Wei state) in modern Honan but was moved to P'ei (in Ch'u) in modern Kiangsu after the Ch'in conquest of the Ch'u. In the case of the Yueh conquest, Shih Huang-ti moved the Yueh to Chekiang and other places while moving five hundred thousand people to the Yueh land. The last such moves were made before his death in 210 B.C. Other references on these issues include *Shih-chi*, pp. 253, 2065; *Han-shu* (1962 ed.), p. 4197; Ssu-ma Kuang, *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien*, p. 242; Feng Ch'eng-chün, trans., *Ch'in-tai ch'u-p'ing Nan-yueh k'ao*, pp. 16, 53, 73, 99-103; and *Hsi-Han Nan-yueh wang mu*, vol. 1, pp. 300-317.

90. See *Shih-chi* (pp. 239, 245) for this description of the Ch'in territory as a unified empire. For extensive modern studies, see Ku Chieh-kang and Shih Nien-hai, *Chung-kuo chiang-yü yen-ko shih* (The History of the Evolution of China's Territory) (Changsha: Shang-wu, 1938), pp. 76-85; T'an Ch'i-hsiang, ed., *Chung-kuo li-shih ti-t'u chi*, vol. 2 (Shanghai: Ti-t'u ch'u-pan she, 1982), maps 3-4; and Lao Kan, "Ch'in te t'ung-i yü ch'i fu-wang" (The Unification of China by the Ch'in and Their Demise), in *Chung-kuo shang-ku shih tai-ting kao*, pp. 690-710. Needless to say, all of these scholars' estimates of the Ch'in territory are based on their views on the number of *chün* in the Ch'in empire. See also *Ch'in hui-yao ting-pu*, map following p. 354; Liu Kuang-sheng, *Chung-kuo ku-tai yu-i shih* (The History of Chinese Postal System and Communications Network in Ancient [Traditional] Times) (Peking: Jen-min yu-tien, 1986), pp. 36-47; T'an Tsung-i, *Han-tai kuo-nei lu-lu chiao-t'ung kao* (Communications through Land Routes in Han China) (Hong Kong: Hsin-ya, 1967), a reconstruction of almost all the Ch'in highways; and Chang Chia-shan *Han-mu chu-chien*, "Hsing-shu lü" (Ordinance on the Postal System), which assumes that the Han system of 186 B.C. was based on the Ch'in system.

91. See *Shih-chi*, pp. 239, 252, and the various notes by P'ei Yin (fl. A.D. 465-472), Ssu-ma Cheng (fl. A.D. 713-742), and Chang Shou-chieh (fl. mid- to late eighth century A.D.), which serve to elucidate the general statement by Ssu-ma Ch'ien in the *Han-shu* (1964 ed.), pp. 2328-32 (Chia Shan). All of the other issues were discussed in our examinations of the Ch'ing-ch'uan documents (n. 83) and Shang Yang's square *sheng*. In addition, see Ch'iu Lung et al., *Chung-kuo ku-tai tu-liang heng t'u-chi*, pls. 98-108 (pp. 58-67); Fu K'ai-sen (John C. Ferguson), *Li-tai chu-lu chi-chin lu* (An Annotated Catalog of Bronzes) (Shanghai: Shang-wu, 1939; reprint, Taipei: Shang-wu, 1971), pp. 1066-91, which lists forty-eight Ch'in bronze pieces with inscriptions by the First and Second Emperors; and Huang Lin-shu, *Chung-kuo pien-sai yen-chiu* (Studies on Chinese Frontiers) (Hong Kong: Tsao-yang wen-hsueh, 1979), pp. 11-30.

92. *Shih-chi*, pp. 241-64. There has been an enormous amount of secondary literature on the motives of and specific geographical regions covered by Shih Huang-ti's tours, but views have been divided on both issues. The most comprehensive discussion is in Ma

Fei-pai 1982b, pp. 92-97, 762-71, 1022-43. For the location of Chieh-shih, I have followed Ch'ien Mu, *Shih-chi ti-ming k'ao* (Studies on the Geographical Locations of Place-Names Mentioned in the *Shih-chi*), rev. ed. (Taipei: San-min shu-chü, 1984), pp. 82-84. For another detailed study of the location of Chieh-shih, see Huang Sheng-chang, *Li-shih ti-li lun-chi* (Essays on Historical Geography) (Peking: Jen-min, 1982), pp. 556-61. It should be pointed out that this was the Yu Chieh-shih (Right Chieh-shih); the Tso Chieh-shih (Left Chieh-shih) was located in the modern Pyongyang region in North Korea, where the Great Wall ends.

93. An up-to-date systematic treatise on the structure and location of the Ch'in Great Wall is lacking in both Chinese and Western languages, but a good number of monographs and technical studies are available. My discussion here is based on these works, related reports, and my own investigations of the Ch'in, Han, and Ming Great Walls in Kansu in 1982, 1985, and 1991. For the primary sources, see *Shih-chi*, pp. 253, 757-58, 2565-66, 2886-87, 3088; and Ssu-ma Kuang, *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien*, pp. 242-43. The most useful monographs are Huang Lin-shu, *Ch'in Han ch'ang-ch'eng k'ao* (Studies on the Great Wall of Ch'in Shih huang-ti) (Hong Kong: Tsao-yang, 1972), and *Chung-kuo pien-sai yen-chiu*, esp. pp. 1-30; Wang Kuo-liang and Shou P'eng-fei, *Ch'ang-ch'eng yen-chiu tzu-liao liang-chung* (Two Studies on the Great Wall) (reprint; Hong Kong: Lung Men, 1978) (Wang's work is dated 1928 and Shou's 1941); Chang Wei-hua, *Chung-kuo Ch'ang-ch'eng chien-chih k'ao* (Studies in the History of the Chinese Great Wall) (Peking: Chung-hua, 1979), pp. 129-36; Yü Chin, *Ch'ang-ch'eng* (Great Wall) (Peking: Wen-wu, 1986), a popular work illustrated with photos; Wu Hsiang-hsiang, *Ch'ang-ch'eng* (Taipei: Cheng-chung, 1957); Lo Che-wen, *Wan-li Ch'ang-ch'eng* (The Ten-Thousand-Li Great Wall) (Peking: Wen-wu, 1980), a popular work; and Wen-wu pien-chi pu, ed., *Chung-kuo Ch'ang-ch'eng tiao-ch'a pao-kao chi* (A Collection of Reports on Field Investigations of the Remaining Sites of the Great Wall) (Peking: Wen-wu, 1981). A delightful and learned examination of the functions and myths of the Great Wall in English is Arthur Waldron, *The Great Wall of China: From History to Myth* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 13-21. See also Sun K'ai, *Ch'in hui-yao*, pp. 411-12.

94. Liu An, *Huai-nan tzu*, *chüan* 18, p. 23a.

95. *Shih-chi*, pp. 253-54, 259, 3086 (quote from Wu Pi); *Han-shu* (1962), p. 2830 (indicating the number of people in a new district in Ch'in and Han times); Ma Fei-pai 1982b, pp. 928-29; Yuan K'ang (fl. first century B.C.), *Yueh chueh shu* (The History of Yueh), *Ssu-pu pei-yao* ed., *chüan* 8, p. 6b. Also see Liu An, *Huai-nan tzu*, *chüan* 18, p. 23b; and note 88.

96. *Shih-chi*, p. 251 (Hsu Kuang's [A.D. 352-425] addition); Ssu-ma Kuang, *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien*, p. 241; *Ch'in hui-yao*, p. 273. Li Chien-nung, *Hsien-Ch'in Liang-Han ching-chi shih-kao* (A Draft Economic History of Pre-Ch'in and Han China) (Peking: Chung-hua, 1962), p. 125, offers a different interpretation.

97. *Shih-chi*, pp. 248, 256 (seven hundred thousand convicts mentioned); *Ch'in hui-yao*, pp. 342-43; Ma Fei-pai 1982b, pp. 846-47.

98. *Shih-chi*, pp. 342, 2013, 2021; *Shui-hu-ti Ch'in-mu chu-chien*, pp. 6, 12.

99. Hsi-Han Nan-yueh wang mu, pp. 300-318, 345-48 (road system), 349-50 (weights and measures); Kuang-chou shih wen-wu k'ao-ku yen-chiu so, "Kuang-chou Nan-yueh kuo kung-shu i-chih 1995-1997 nien fa-chueh pao-kao" (Report of the Excavation of the Site of the Palace of the Nan-yueh King in Kuang-chou from 1995 to 1997) *Wen-wu* 9 (September 2000): 4-24 (including the discovery of Ch'in shipyard sites and *pan-liang* coins). The reader may be surprised to learn that Chao T'uo lived for 102 years.

This conclusion was reached after long and extensive studies of all the relevant written and archaeological materials by many scholars, particularly the experts who composed this report (pp. 323-24). The mausoleum belonged to Chao Mei (Chao T'uo's grandson, ca. 162-122 B.C. [Han literature misread Mei as Hu]), who was the second king of Nan-yueh. It should be noted that when Chao T'uo declared his independence in 203 B.C. he had already conquered Hsiang and Kuei-lin *chiün* in the same year and the interior of China was in the midst of a bitter struggle between Liu Pang (the first Han dynasty emperor, 202-195 B.C.) and Hsiang Yü (232-202 B.C.), who ruled most of China after the fall of the Ch'in dynasty in 207 B.C. as the king of Ch'u from 206 to 202. Also see *Shih-chi*, pp. 2958, 2967-71, 3086; and Lü Ssu-mien, *Tu-shih cha-chi* (Random Notes on the Dynastic Histories), 2 vols. (Shanghai: Ku-chi, 1982), pp. 620-21. For a systematic treatment of the history of Nan-yueh, see Yü T'ien-shih et al., *Ku Nan-yueh kuo shih* (History of the Ancient Nan-yueh Kingdom) (Kueilin: Kuang-hsi jen-min, 1998).

100. Shang Yang's reforms, for example, were based on changes and ideas that came before. As noted in note 85, among his important resources were Li K'uei's *Fa-ching* and *Shou-fa shou-ling shih-san p'ien*. For other issues concerning Shang Yang's sources, see Fang Hsuan-ling (A.D. 574-648) et al., comp., *Chin-shu* (The History of the Chin Dynasty, A.D. 265-420) (Taipei: I-wen, 1955), p. 654; Chang-sun Wu-chi (d. A.D. 659), comp., *T'ang-lü shu-i* (The T'ang Code with Commentaries; *Kuo-hsueh chi-pen ts'ung-shu* ed.), *chüan* 1, p. 8. The origins of Shang Yang's other critical measures, such as the registration and control of the population and the administrative, bureaucratic, and land systems, were examined earlier.

101. *Ch'un-ch'iu Tso-chuan chu* (Yang ed.), pp. 112-13 (770 B.C.). The various commentaries elucidate the profound institutional implications of the two worlds.

102. Perhaps Confucius (K'ung Ch'iu, 551-479 B.C.) best described the tenet of this "state without the people" by saying that the best way to rule a state was to make the people (*min*) work according to the season, to pay close attention to the nobility (*jen*), and to issue orders but never allow the people to understand them. See *Lun-yü* (*Ssu-shu chang-chü chi-chieh* ed.), pp. 49, 105. Cf. D. C. Lau, trans., *The Analects*, by Confucius (London and Baltimore: Penguin 1979), pp. 1, 93. A brilliant reinterpretation of the words *min* and *jen* as meaning "common people" and "nobility" is given in Chao Chi-pin, *Lun-yü hsin-t'an* (A New Study of *The Analects*) (reprint; Peking: Jen-min, 1974; originally published in 1959), pp. 1-27. I also hold that the line in question truly represents the political views of Confucius and was expressed early in his life.

103. These changes during the Eastern Chou period (770-222 B.C.) were examined earlier. Relevant modern Chinese studies on these issues were cited as well. For important Western-language discussions of events that either fomented these changes or reflected their impact and consequences, see Richard L. Walker, *The Multi-state System of Ancient China* (Hamden, CT: Shoe String Press, 1953); Li Xueqin, *Eastern Zhou and Qin Civilizations*, trans. K. C. Chang; Cho-yun Hsu, *Ancient China in Transition* (Stanford, 1965) (hereafter cited as Cho-yun Hsu 1965a; Mark Edward Lewis, *Sanctioned Violence in Early China* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1990); Barry B. Blakeley, *Functional Disparities in the Socio-political Traditions of Spring and Autumn China* (Leiden: Brill, 1980); Benjamin I. Schwartz, *The World of Thought in Ancient China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985); and *The Cambridge History of Ancient China*, pp. 545-644 (articles by Cho-yun Hsu and Mark Edward Lewis) and 745-966 (David S. Nivison, Donald Harper, and Nicola Di Cosmo).

104. *Meng-tzu* (*Chi-chu* ed.), p. 371. I also believe that Mencius's view came in the

later part of his life. Cf. D. C. Lau's interpretation of this line in his *Mencius* (London and Baltimore: Penguin, 1970), p. 199.

105. Meng-tzu, pp. 366–67.

106. The increase in the importance of the *min* in the late Spring and Autumn period is discussed in T'ung Shu-yeh, *Ch'un-ch'iu Tso-chuan yen-chiu* (Studies on the *Spring and Autumn Annals* and *Tso's Commentary*) (Shanghai: Jen-min, 1980), pp. 214–16.

107. The total strength of Ch'in armed forces included the troops that guarded the northern frontier, those garrisoned in the south (discussed earlier), and at least 100,000 more stationed in the capital region to guard the capital (the Capital Guards) and the court (the Imperial Guards). I have not included the 1 million plus convicts whose status was between the military and the labor force. The size of the Ch'in bureaucracy is my estimate based on the Former Han scale of 120,000 to 130,000 persons in the context of the population, territory, and degree of political control of the two regimes.

The First Emperor's personal charisma was a critical factor in his success in military conquest and the unification and reconstruction of China from his early years until his death in 210 B.C. There is an enormous amount of literature on his personality. It would be futile to even try to list the most important works here. However, I think the following will give the reader some ideas about Shih Huang-ti the man and his character: Ssu-ma Ch'ien (145–86 B.C.), *Shih-chi*, esp. pp. 223–63 (presents the most vivid portrayal of his character in stories about his dealings with his generals and advisers); Sun K'ai, *Ch'in hui-yao*, pp. 20–23; Ma Fai-pei, *Ch'in shih-huang-ti chuan*, pp. 11–12; Kuo Mo-jo, *Shih p'i-p'an shu* (Ten Critical Essays on Ancient Thought and Thinkers) (Peking: K'o-hsueh, 1959), pp. 377–407 (Kuo's view of Ying Cheng's political thought is quite different from that of other scholars); and Chun-shu Chang, *Ch'in shih-huang hsin-chuan*, chap. 1.

The Ch'in population has variously been estimated at 20, 25, 30, and 40 million. My own estimate is 27 to 28 million. The variation among these estimates is a matter of time reference. My own number refers to the year of the emperor's death, 210 B.C. Although the Ch'in dynasty lasted only about fourteen years, the population changed drastically during this short period because these years saw an enormous loss of life in the military campaigns in the north and the south, huge construction projects—the Great Wall, the A-p'ang Palace, the imperial highways, the seven-hundred-plus imperial palaces, and the Imperial Mausoleum (which covered an area of 21.7 square miles)—and massive relocations of the population. Therefore the Ch'in population in 221 B.C., when the dynasty was established, would have been much larger than the population in 210 or 207 B.C. For a detailed discussion of the change in population in Ch'in and Han times, see chapter 1 of this volume; and particularly Ko Chien-hsiung, "Kuan-yü Ch'in-tai jen-k'ou te hsin ku-chi" (A New Estimate of the Ch'in Population), in *Ch'ing-chu Yang Hsiang-ku hsien-sheng chiao liu-shih nien lun-wen chi* (Hopei: Shih-chia-chuang chiao-yü ch'u-pan she, 1998), pp. 200–205.

My presentation of Ying Cheng's Confucian thought is based on stone inscriptions he had made during his five major inspection tours. My analysis follows only the six inscriptions contained in the *Shih-chi* (pp. 242–62) since their authenticity has raised no questions. However, the issue of authenticity has been examined in Wang Ch'ang, *Chin-shih ts'ui-pien* (Collection of Bronze and Stone Inscriptions) (Ching-hsun t'ang, 1805 ed.) and Wang Yun, *Shih-erh yen-chai chin-shih kuo-yan lu* (Studies of Bronze and Stone Inscriptions Examined) (I-cheng, 1875 ed.).

CHAPTER I

1. Pieces of information about the Han military expansion during Wu-ti's reign can be found in Pan Ku (A.D. 32-92) et al., *Han-shu*, 12 vols. (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1962; hereafter HS [1962]), pp. 160-205, 3765-80, 3839-42, 3853-67, 3873-929; Ssu-ma T'an (180?-110 B.C.) and Ssu-ma Ch'ien (145-86 B.C.), *Shih-chi*, 10 vols. (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1959; hereafter SC [1959]), pp. 2905-18, 2923-46, 2970-76, 2980-83, 2987-90, 2993-97; *Shih-chi* (*Shiki kaichū hōshō* ed.), 10 vols. (Peking: Wen-hsueh ku-chi k'an-hsing she, 1955; hereafter SC [1955]), pp. 4972-99; and Chun-shu Chang, "Military Aspects of the Han Wu-ti's Northern and Northwestern Campaigns," *HJAS* 26 (1966): esp. pp. 148-67. For secondary Chinese and Japanese studies, see Chang Wei-hua, *Lun Han Wu-ti* (Shanghai: Jen-min, 1957), pp. 133-71; Yoshikawa Kojirō *zenshu*, vol. 6 (Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 1968), pp. 76-102, 129-36; Chang Chün-yueh, *Li-tai t'un-t'ien k'ao*, 2 vols. (Changsha: Shang-wu, 1939), pp. 47-49; Tseng Wen-wu, *Chung-kuo ching-ying hsi-yü shih* (Shanghai: Shang-wu, 1936), pp. 19-27; and Ise Sentarō, *Seiki keieishi no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Gannandō, 1955), pp. 1-7. China's southern expansion under Wu-ti is only briefly mentioned in Herold J. Wiens, *China's March toward the Tropics* (reprint; Hamden, CT: Shoe String Press, 1967; originally published in 1954), chap. 4; and Charles P. Fitzgerald, *The Southern Expansion of the Chinese People* (New York: Praeger, 1972), chaps. 2-3. About 85 percent of the land acquired under Wu-ti's reign was consolidated as *chün*, part of the regular Han administrative system.

2. HS (1962), pp. 2461-62, 2618-19, 2799-801, 3913-14, 3929; Hsun Yüeh (A.D. 148-209), *Ch'ien-Han-chi* (*Kuo-hsüeh chi-pen ts'ung-shu* ed.), p. 154; Li Chih (A.D. 1527-1602), *Ts'ang-shu* (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1959), vol. 2, p. 545. A more recent, and laudatory, evaluation of Wu-ti is Lin Chien-ming, *Hsiung-ts'ai ta-lueh te Han Wu-ti* (Sian: Shensi jen-min ch'u-pan she, 1987). See also Chang Wei-hua's and Yoshikawa Kojirō's works cited in note 1.

3. One of the most urgent factors was of course the continuous and damaging Hsiung-nu raids over the Chinese border. Even in the period of Wu-ti's reign, there were fifteen Hsiung-nu raids. See *Han-shu* (various editions compared), chaps. 6, 55, and 94; *Shih-chi* (various editions compared) chaps. 110 and 111. These raids were in the years 129, 128, 127, 125, 124, 123, 122, 121, 120, 112, 107, 102, 98, 91, and 90 B.C.

4. See HS (1962), pp. 49-80 (202-195 B.C.).

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 105-6, 111. A recent comprehensive study of the Han feudal kingdoms is given in Liu Ch'un-fan, *Ch'in-Han feng-kuo shih-i ssu-chueh chih* (Shengyang: Liao-ning jen-min, 1984), esp. pp. 33-107.

6. HS (1962), p. 1906.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 120-21.

8. A brief account of the rebellion is given in Homer H. Dubs, trans., *The History of the Former Han Dynasty*, by Pan Ku, 3 vols. (Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1938, 1944, 1955; hereafter Dubs), vol. 1, pp. 292-97.

9. HS (1962), p. 120.

10. Chang Wei-hua, *Lun Han Wu-ti*, pp. 20-21, 56-59; Wang Yü-ch'üan, "An Outline of the Central Government of the Former Han Dynasty," *HJAS* 12, nos. 1-2 (June 1949): 135. Also see Liu Ch'un-fan, *Ch'in-Han feng-kuo shih-i ssu-chueh chih*, pp. 84-87.

11. There are many outstanding studies on the problems under consideration. A few of these may be mentioned here: Wang Yü-ch'üan, "An Outline of the Central Govern-

ment of the Former Han Dynasty," esp. pp. 135–50, 156–84; Kamada Shigeo, "Kandai no shōshō kan," TK 26, no. 4 (March 1968): esp. pp. 115–17; Ch'ien, *Chung-kuo Ch'in-Han cheng-chih chih-tu shih* (reprint; Taipei: Ch'i-yeh Shu-chü, 1969), pp. 125–31, 146–73; Fu Lo-ch'eng, "Hsi-Han te chi-ko cheng-chih chi-t'uan," in *Kuo-li Tai-wan Ta-hsüeh Fu Ku hsiao-chang Ssu-nien hsien-sheng chi-nien lun-wen chi* (Taipei: Tai-wan ta-hsueh, 1952), esp. pp. 63–76; Lao Kan, "Han-tai cheng-chih tsu-chih te t'e-chih chi ch'i kung-neng," TH, new ser., 8, nos. 1–2 (August 1970): esp. 228–40; Ch'ien Mu, *Ch'in-Han shih* (Hong Kong: Ch'ien Mu, 1957), p. 74; Sa Meng-wu, *Chung-kuo she-hui cheng-chih shih*, vol. 1 (Taipei: San-min, 1961), pp. 109–25; and Kamada Shigeo, "The Han Emperor's Policy of Oppressing Kingdoms," *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko* 21 (1962): 77–95, and *Shin-Kan seiji seidō no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Nippon-Gakujutsu Shinkōkai, 1962), pp. 188–232.

12. Hsu T'ien-lin (fl. A.D. 1211), *Hsi-Han hui-yao* (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1955), p. 499. As discussed in the prologue, in 221 B.C. the First Emperor of the Ch'in moved 120,000 rich and powerful families from different parts of the empire to the capital at Hsien-yang. See SC (1959), p. 239. For other forced migrations under the Ch'in during the periods of state and empire, see Sun K'ai (1871–1907), *Ch'in hui-yao*, ed., with additions and corrections, by Hsu Fu (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1959), pp. 264–65; Shih Chih-mien, "Ch'in chih ch'ien-jen shuo," in Sun K'ai, *Ch'in hui-yao*, pp. 454–56; Ma Fei-pai 1982b, pp. 916–29; and the prologue.

13. HS (1962), p. 1642. The original text is somewhat unclear. My interpretation is made on the basis of other references in the *Shih-chi* and *Han-shu*. See also Fan Yeh (A.D. 398–445), *Hou-Han shu*, 12 vols. (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1965; hereafter HHS [1965]), p. 1338, and the commentary on this passage on p. 1339.

14. HS (1962), p. 1642; Hsu T'ien-lin, *Hsi-Han hui-yao*, pp. 499–501. For a detailed discussion of the institution of hostages in Chinese history from 720 B.C. to A.D. 1645, see Lien-sheng Yang, *Studies in Chinese Institutional History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 43–57. It must be pointed out that forced migration was quite different from voluntary migration, which drew a number of people to reside in Ch'ang-an, the glamorous capital of the Han empire.

15. A slightly different view of this aspect of early Han history was presented by Hsu Cho-yun in his "Hsi-Han cheng-ch'üan yü she-hui shih-li chiao-hu tso-yung," CYYY 35 (1964): 267–68; an English translation of the article, under the title "The Changing Relationship between Local Society and the Central Political Power in Former Han, 206 B.C.–8 A.D.," appeared in *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 7, no. 4 (July 1965): 358–70 (ref. on pp. 361–62). My conclusion is based on the statement in *Han-shu* 28b (HS [1962], p. 1642), which was not mentioned by Hsu.

16. HS (1962), pp. 158, 170, 2802; SC (1959), p. 2961 (Chu-fu Yen). Wu-ti acted at the suggestion or reminder of Chu-fu Yen. It is of relevance to note that, judging from Mou-ling's population in A.D. 2, Wu-ti seems to have moved a rather large number of people there. The Three Capital Regions (or Provinces) (San-fu: Ching-chao-yin, Tso-p'ing-i, and Yu-fu-feng) then had fifty-seven districts with a population of 2,436,361. As one of the fifty-seven districts, Mou-ling had a population 277,277, easily the largest of all, including Ch'ang-an, the capital district, which had 246,200. Ch'ang-ling, Kao-tsu's tomb district, ranked third, behind Mou-ling and Ch'ang-an, with a population of 179,469. See HS (1962), pp. 1543–47. Throughout this chapter, I have translated *chün* as "province." It could also be translated as "commandery" or "prefecture," depending on the specific time of reference.

17. Some of these measures are discussed in Yoshinami Takashi, "Kan-Kan kōhanki ni okeru kōtei shikai to kanryōsō no dōkō," TK 26, no. 4 (March 1968): 138-59.

18. SC (1959), p. 3133.

19. HS (1962), pp. 3648-57, 1160.

20. Ibid., p. 3651; SC (1959), p. 3138. The new documents in 740 plus bamboo slips, were discovered in 1983-84 in tombs dated 186-175 B.C. in Chang-chia Shan of Chiang-ling, Hupeh. See *Wen-wu* 1 (1985): 1-15.

21. HS (1962), pp. 1168, 3647-75; SC (1959), pp. 3132-54. The other five were two in Ching-ti's reign and one each in the reigns of Chao-ti, Hsuan-ti, and Ch'eng-ti. A different institutional analysis of the function of harsh officials in Wu-ti's time, as revealed in *The Biographies of the Harsh Officials* in the *Shih-chi*, is given in Masubuchi Tatsuo, *Chūgoku kōdai no shakai to kokka* (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1960), pp. 235-46.

22. HS (1962), pp. 1158, 1161. Cash refers to copper coins. For a detailed discussion of early Han monetary units, see Nancy Lee Swann, ed. and trans., *Food and Money in Ancient China* (*Han-shu* 24) (Princeton, 1950), pp. 378, 382-84. See also Dubs, vol. 1, p. 175; and Sung Hsu-wu, *Hsi-Han huo-pi shih ch'u-k'ao* (Hong Kong: Chung-wen ta-hsueh, 1971), chaps. 6-8 (pp. 61-107).

23. HS (1962), p. 1159; Swann, *Food and Money in Ancient China*, p. 251. Ten thousand Han copper coins had a value of 1 catty of gold.

24. HS (1962), p. 1127; the English translation follows Swann, *Food and Money in Ancient China*, pp. 148-49, but with minor changes.

25. The *Shih-chi* reads "ten thousand cash for a bushel of husked grain." See SC (1959), chap. 30, p. 1417. In a different passage, the *Han-shu* reads "ten thousand cash for a bushel of husked grain." See HS (1962), p. 1153.

26. SC (1959), p. 1417; see also HS (1962), p. 1153.

27. SC (1959), p. 2058.

28. HS (1962), p. 527.

29. Tu Yu (A.D. 735-812), *T'ung-tien* (Shih-t'ung ed.) (Shanghai: Shang-wu, 1936), p. 39; Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, *Yin-ping shih wen-chi*, 48 vols. (Shanghai: Chung-hua shu-chū, 1916), vol. 44, p. 22b. For recent reexaminations, see Kuan Tung-kuei, "Han-ch'u ching-chi fa-chan te li-shih pei-ching," in *Ch'ü Wan-li ch'i-chih jung-ch'ing lun-wen chi* (Taipei: Lien-ching, 1978), "Conclusion" (8.8 million), and "Chan-kuo chih Han-ch'u te jen-k'ou pien-ch'ien," CYYY 50, no. 4 (1979): 665 (8.8 million); Ko Chien-hsing, *Hsi-Han jen-k'ou ti-li* (Peking, 1986), p. 62 (15-18 million), and *I-chao ssu-min: Chung-kuo jen-k'ou tsai jen-shih* (Hong Kong, 1989), p. 92 (15-18 million for 202-134 B.C.), and "K'uan-yü Ch'in-tai jen-k'ou shu-liang te hsin t'ung-chi," *Ch'ing-chu Yang Hsiang-k'uei Hsien-sheng chiao-yen liu-shih nien lun-wen chi* (Shih-chia-chuang) (Hopen: Jen-min chiao-yü, 1998), pp. 203-5 (15-18 million); and Yuan Tsu-liang, *Chung-kuo ku-tai jen-k'ou shih chuan-t'i yen-chiu* (Chengchou: Chung-chou, 1994), pp. 398-99 (14 million). My own view is that the Han population was 12 to 16 million in Kao-tsu's time but that not everyone was registered. This explains the smaller figure given by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and others. My estimate of the early Han population is based on my estimate of the Ch'in population (27-28 million) at the end of the dynasty and early Han statements of the rate of population loss due to war, dislocation, and enslavement. Based on these figures and Han sources about the empirewide average rate of population increase from 202 to 150 B.C. (about three times), I estimate that the Han population would have reached 40 to 45 million before 150 B.C. and in the range of 50 million in Wu-ti's time. See HS (1962), pp. 363-857, 1543-1669; Hu Huan-yung and Chang Shan-yü, comps., *Chung-*

kuo jen-k'ou ti-li, 2 vols. (Shanghai: Hua-tung shih-fan ta-hsueh, 1984-86), pp. 19-23; T'ao Ch'un-fan, *Ch'in-Han feng-kuo shih-i ssu-chueh chih* (Shenyang: Liao-ning jen-min, 1984), pp. 73-147, 215-23; and Cho-yun Hsu, *Han Agriculture: The Formation of the Early Chinese Agrarian Economy (206 B.C.-A.D. 220)* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1980), chap. 1, esp. p. 18.

However, the issue of early Han population depends on knowledge of the size of the Ch'in population at the end of that dynasty. Scholars have estimated the Ch'in population variously at 20, 25, 30, and 40 million. As was explained in the prologue, my own estimate of the Ch'in population is 27 to 28 million at the end of the dynasty, though I accept that all such figures depend on the specific stage of the Ch'in empire. If we follow Tu Yu's observation, which was based on sources no longer available in later periods, the early Han population in Kao-tsu's time would have been 9 to 10 million in my estimate.

30. *Erh-nien lü-ling*, in *Chang Chia-shan Han-mu chu-chien Erh-ssu-ch'i hao mu*, ed. Chang Chia-shan *Erh-ssu-ch'i hao Han-mu chu-chien cheng-li hsiao-tsu* (Peking: Wen-wu, 2001), esp. doc. nos. 310-13, 314-16. Chang Chia-shan is located about 1.5 kilometers northwest of Chiang-ling District in south-central Hupei. Tomb 247, excavated in 1983, is dated 186 B.C., the second year of Empress Lü's reign. For a brief discussion of the importance of the discovery of early Han laws (ordinances and orders) on over 540 bamboo slips, see Chun-shu Chang, "Pa-shih nien-lai Han-chien te fa-hsien cheng-li yü yen-chiu" (1989), pp. 430-31.

31. Hsu T'ien-lin, *Hsi-Han hui-yao*, p. 517; HS (1962), pp. 85, 87, 1127 (Teng Chan's [fl. ca. A.D. 208] commentary); Li Chien-nung, *Hsien-Ch'in Liang-Han ching-chi shih kao* (Peking: Chung-hua, 1962), pp. 243-44; Ssu-ma Kuang (A.D. 1019-86), *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien* (Shanghai: Chung-hua, 1957), vol. 1, p. 511; Dubs, vol. 1, pp. 175, 311. For a comprehensive discussion of Han taxes, see Yoshida Torao, *Ryo Kan sozei no kenkyū* (Osaka, 1932), esp. pp. 1-14, 28-36; and Hiranaka Reiji, *Chūgoku kodai no densei to zeisei* (Kyoto, 1967), esp. pp. 98ff. For more recent studies on the Ch'in and Han tax systems and related issues, see Huang Chin-yen, *Ch'in Han fu-i chih-tu yen-chiu* (Nanchang: Chiang-hsi chiao-yü ch'u-pan she, 1988), pp. 196-239; Ch'ien Chien-fu, *Ch'in Han fu-i chih-tu k'ao-lueh* (Wuhan: Hu-pei jen-min, 1984), chaps. 2, 5; and Kao Min, "Ts'ung Chiang-ling Feng-huang shan shih-hao Han-mu ch'u-t'u chien-tu k'an Han-tai te k'ou-fu suan-fu chih-tu," *Wen-shih* 20 (September 1983): 25-39. These works have raised more questions than provided answers regarding the origins, nature, and amount of certain key taxes in Han times. For the poll taxes, taxes on children, and other taxes, see HS (1962), pp. 46, 229, 2832-33, and Ju Shun's (fl. A.D. 189-265) commentary on pp. 46 and 230. For comprehensive discussions of the origins and military nature of the poll taxes, which dated from the Shang Yang Reform under the Ch'in in 348 B.C., see Katō Shigeshi, *Shina keizai-shi kosho* (Tokyo, 1952), vol. 1, pp. 51-68; Li Chien-nung, *Hsien-Ch'in Liang-Han ching-chi shih kao*, pp. 245-46; and Swann, *Food and Money in Ancient China*, pp. 366-68. Throughout this chapter I have adopted the customary Chinese system for counting age (*sui*).

32. It must be pointed out that the draft age was lowered to twenty after 155 B.C. and that the commutation payment of 300 in cash varied at times. At one time it may have been as high as 2,000. For a comprehensive discussion of the labor and military services requirement (two years usually) of the Former Han period, see Chun-shu Chang, "The Colonization of the Ho-hsi Region: A Study of the Han Frontier System," (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University; 1963), pp. 184-200, 223-27. It must be noted that in the case of a feudal state the enfeoffed lord paid 63 of the 120 cash of *suan-fu* he collected to the

emperor as *hsien-fu* and retained 57. For details, see Lao Kan, "Han-tai ping-chih chi Han-chien chung te ping-chih," CYYY 10, no. 1 (1942): 41 (hereafter cited as Lao Kan 1942a).

33. For example, see Hsun Yueh, *Ch'ien-Han chi* (*Kuo-hsueh chi-pen ts'ung shu* ed.), pp. 70-71; Chou Mi (A.D. 1232-1308), *Ch'i-tung yeh-yü* (Shanghai: Shang-wu, 1935), pp. 7a-7b; and Huang Tsung-hsi (A.D. 1610-95), *Ming-i tai-fang lu* (*Kuo-hsueh chi-pen ts'ung-shu* ed.), p. 23.

34. This point is a controversial one. Various scholars have done studies on the problem, but no simple conclusion has been accepted by all. My view here is a result of careful examination of all relevant documents and secondary studies of both similar and contrary views. See Huan K'uan (first century B.C.), *Yen-t'ieh lu* (*Yen-t'ieh lun chiao-chu* ed., by Wang Li-ch'i) (Shanghai: Ku-tien wen-hsueh ch'u-pan she, 1958), p. 106; HS (1962), p. 1140 (Comments by Teng Chan, fl. ca. A.D. 208); Hsu Shen (30-124), *Shuo-wen chieh tzu* (*Wan-yu wen-k'u* ed., annotated by Tuan Yü-ts'ai, 1735-1815) (Shanghai: Shang-wu, 1930), vol. 14, pp. 86-87; Tu Yu (735-812), *T'ung-tien* (*Shih-t'ung* ed.), p. 924; K'ao Ch'eng (fl. 1078-85), *Shih-wu chi-yuan* (reprint of 1447 ed.) (Taipei: Hsin-hsing, 1969), p. 607; *Chiu-chang suan-shu* (between A.D. 50 and 100), in *Suan-ching shih-shu*, collated by Tai Chen, 1724-77, *Wan-yu wen-k'u* ed., vol. 1, pp. 67-68; Ch'en Meng-chia, "Mu-chih yü li-chi," *K'ao-ku* 1 (1966): 36-38; Wan Kuo-ting, "Ch'in-Han tu-liang-heng-mu k'ao," *Nung-yeh i-ch'an yen-chiu chi-k'an* 2 (1958): 141-55; Dubs, vol. 3, p. 160; Swann, *Food and Money in Ancient China*, pp. 361-64; Hamaguchi Shigekuni, *Tōōchō no senjin seido* (Kyoto: Tokyoshi kenkyūkai, 1966), pp. 562-65; Amano Motonosuke, "Chūgoku bōshi ko," *Tōa keizai kenkyū*, new ser., no. 3 (December 1958): 1-36. Itō Tokuo, "Nihyaku shijū ho ichi-bo-sei shiko no igi," *Bunka kiyō* 4 (October 1959): 113-25, "Nihyaku shijū ho ichi-bo sei no kigen," *Shukan Tōyōgaku* 2 (1959): 24-40 (hereafter cited as Itō Tokuo 1959c); Utsunomiya Kiyōyōshi, *Kandai shakai keizai shi kenkyū* (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1955), pp. 371-74; Wu Ch'eng-lo, *Chung-kuo tu-liang-heng shih* (reprint; Taipei: Shang-wu, 1966), p. 145; Wan Kuo-ting, *Chung-kuo t'ien-chih shih* (Nanking: Nanching shu-tien, 1933), p. 65; Hiranaka Reiji, *Chūgoku kodai no densei to zeisei* (Kyoto: Tokyoshi kenkyūkai, 1967), pp. 152-60; and Yoneda Kenjiro, "Nihyaku shiju ho ichi-bō sei no seiritsu ni tsuite," TK 26, no. 4 (March 31, 1967): 33-66.

35. HS (1962), pp. 118, 124.

36. Ibid., p. 2832.

37. The beginning of the use of metallic iron and iron implements and tools in Chinese history is a topic of great controversy. In the 1920s, scholars such as Chang Hung-chao generally believed that in China the use of iron began sometime between the Ch'un-ch'iu and Chan-kuo periods. Further studies and archaeological finds considerably revised such views. Kuo Mo-jo (1956) maintains that metallic iron appeared in China in the Western Chou period and iron implements in the seventh century B.C. Umehara Sueji (1954) holds that the use of iron in China dates to about 1000 B.C. Sugimura Yuzo (1954) contends that iron implements were first used in the Western Chou. Li Ya-nung (1961) dates the beginning of iron forging from the Shang dynasty and asserts that while iron implements were in use in the Western Chou period their wide use in farming tools commenced in the seventh century B.C. Yang K'uan (1954, 1956) believes that metallic iron appeared in the Western Chou period, iron implements appeared in the sixth and seventh centuries B.C., and iron tools became common afterward. T'ung Shu-yeh (1955) advances the view that the Shang probably had metallic iron, while iron farming tools appeared during the Western Chou and became common

in the Chan-kuo period. Sekino Takeshi (1963) dates the development of iron forging to the mid-Ch'un-ch'iu or the seventh to sixth centuries B.C. Satō Taketoshi (1960) concludes that iron implements were first forged in the Ch'un-ch'iu period, with their manufacture in the hands of government, and that new methods of manufacture and improved management of iron production in the Chan-kuo led to a great increase in iron output and its use in farming tools. Joseph Needham (1956) believes that in China metallic iron was known from about the sixth century B.C. and cast iron appeared in the fourth century B.C. at the latest. Noel Barnard (1961) concludes that cast iron dates to the sixth century B.C. Cheng Te-k'un (1963) holds that iron weapons were already known in Western Chou times. According to Chang Kwang-chih (1968), the emergence of iron metallurgy as a major industry for toolmaking should be placed in the sixth century B.C. at the latest, although the techniques probably were not perfected and widely used until the fifth century B.C. Still others offer different views and conclusions. Reviewing all these views and examining all the relevant archaeological and literary evidence, I have come to believe that iron forging began in Western Chou times and maybe slightly earlier, the practical use of iron—that is, in toolmaking—began in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C., and iron farming tools appeared in the fifth century B.C. and gradually became common from the late fourth century B.C. onward. In Ch'in and early Han times, the use of iron tools became widespread and iron production developed into a major private as well as government enterprise. For the various problems discussed, see, for example, Li Ya-nung, *Chung-kuo te feng-chien ling-chu ho ti-chu chih*, in *Hsin-jan-chai shih-lun chi* (Shanghai: Jen-min ch'u-pan she, 1962), pp. 924–47; Sekino Takeshi, *Chūgoku kōkōgoku kenkyū* (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1956), pp. 159–228; Amano Motonosuke, *Chūgoku nogyō shi kenkyū* (Tokyo: Ochanomizu shobō, 1962), pp. 715–23; Chung-kuo k'o-hsueh yuan k'ao-ku yen-chiu-so, comp., *Hsin Chung-kuo te k'ao-ku shou-huo* (Peking: Wen-Wu, 1962), pp. 60–65, 75–79; Satō Taketoshi, “Shunju Sengoku jidai no seitetsugyō,” in *Chūgoku kodaishi kenkyū* (Tokyo: Toyoshi kenkyūkai, 1960), pp. 103–28, esp. p. 124; Yang K'uan, “Chan-kuo shih-tai te yeh-t'ieh shou-kung yeh,” *Hsin-chien-she*, June 1954, pp. 32–37, and “Shih-lun Chung-kuo ku-tai yeh-t'ieh chi-shu te fa-ming ho fa-chan,” *Wen-shih-che* 2 (1955): 26–30, and *Chung-kuo ku-tai yeh-t'ieh chi-shu te fa-ming ho fa-chan* (Shanghai: Jen-min, 1956), pp. 1–48; Yuan Hung-i, “Ts'ung yeh-chin te kuan-tien shih-lun Chung-kuo yung-t'ieh te shih-tai wen-t'i,” *Wen-shih-che* 6 (1955): 59–60; T'ung Shu-yeh, “Ts'ung Chung-kuo k'ai-shih yun-t'ieh te shih-tai p'ing Hu Shih p'ai te shih-hsueh fang-fa,” *Wen-shih-che* 2 (1955): 30–33; Tseng Yung, “Han-tai te t'ieh-chih kung-chü,” *Wen-wu* 1 (1959): 16–19; Wang Chung-shu, “Han-tai wu-chih wen-hua lueh-shuo,” *K'ao-ku t'ung-hsun* 1 (1956): 62; Hu-nan sheng wen-wu kung-tso tui, “Ch'ang-sha, Heng-yang ch'u-t'u Chan-kuo shih-tai te t'ieh-ch'i,” *K'ao-ku t'ung-hsun* 1 (1956): 77–79, esp. 77–78; Ho-nan sheng wen-hua chü wen-wu kung-tso tui, “Ts'ung Nan-yang Wan-ch'eng i-chih ch'u-t'u Han-tai li-hua mo ho chu-fan k'an li-hua te chu-tsao kung-i kuo-ch'eng,” *Wen-wu* 7 (1965): 1–11, esp. p. 3, and “Nan-yang Han-tai t'ieh kung-ch'eng fa-chüeh chien-pao,” *Wen-wu* 1 (1960): 58–60; Shen-hsi sheng po-wu kuan, Wen-wu kuan-li wen-yuan hui, “Shen-hsi sheng fa-hsien te Han-tai t'ieh-hua ho p'i-t'u,” *Wen-wu* 1 (1966): 19–24, esp. p. 24; Noel Barnard, *Bronze Casting and Bronze Alloys in Ancient China* (Tokyo and Canberra: Australian National University, 1961), pp. 13–47; Cheng Te-k'un, *Archaeology in China III: Chou China* (Cambridge, England: Heffer, 1963); Joseph Needham, *The Development of Iron and Steel Technology in China* (London: Heffer, 1964), pp. 2–9, 46–47; and Chang Kwang-chih, *The Archaeology of*

Ancient China, 2d ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 4th ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), pp. 313–16.

38. Amano Motonosuke, *Chūgoku nogyōshi kenkyū* (Tokyo: Ochanomizu shobō, 1962), pp. 716ff.; Liu Hsien-chou, *Chung-kuo ku-tai nung-yeh chi-chieh fa-ming shih* (Peking: K'o-hsueh, 1963), pp. 11ff.; Hsu Hung-chieh, "Ch'in-Han she-hui chih t'u-ti chih-tu yü nung-yeh sheng-ch'an," *Shih-huo pan-yueh k'an* 3, no. 7 (March 1, 1936): 22–24; Yang Lien-sheng, "Ts'ung Ssu-min yueh-ling so-chien te Han-tai chia-tsu te sheng-ch'an," *Shih-huo pan-yueh k'an* 1, no. 6 (February 16, 1935), esp. 8; Tseng Yung, "Han-tai te t'ieh-chih kung-chü"; Ho-nan sheng wen-hua chü wen-wu kung-tso tui, "Ts'ung Nan-yang Wan-ch'eng i-chih ch'u-t'u Han-tai li-hua mo ho chu-fan k'an li-hua te chu-tsao kung-i kuo-ch'eng" and "Nan-yang Han-tai t'ieh kung-ch'eng fa-chüeh chien-pao"; Shen-hsi sheng po-wu-kuan, Wen-wu kuan-li wei-yuan hui, "Shen-hsi sheng fa-hsien te Han-tai t'ieh-hua ho p'i-t'u"; and Hsin *Chung-kuo te k'ao-ku shou-huo*, cited in note 37. It is of interest to note that many modern scholars, such as Hu Hou-hsüan, date the use of oxen to draw plows to the Shang dynasty, although its wide adoption came much later.

39. Ma Tuan-lin (ca. A.D. 1250–1325). *Wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao* (Shih-t'ung ed.), *chüan* 1, p. 67; Ch'ang chü (fl. 265–316), *Hua-yang kuo chih* (Ts'ung-shu chi-ch'eng ch'u-pien ed.), p. 31; Li Tao-yuan (d. 527), *Shui-ching chu* (Kuo-hsueh chi-pen ts'ung-shu ed.), *chüan* 6, p. 5; SC (1959), pp. 1407–9, 3278; HS (1962), pp. 1677–78, 3691. See also Kimura Masao, *Chūgoku kodai teikoku no keisei* (Tokyo: Fumai-do shōten, 1965), pp. 170, 181–82; and Ma Fei-pai, "Ch'in-Han ching-chi shih tzu-liao, part 3: Nung-yeh," *Shih-huo pan-yueh k'an* 3, no. 1 (December 1, 1935): 16–17. Recent studies indicate that deliberate irrigation endeavors appeared in China in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. The two largest and most profitable irrigation projects in ancient China were Li Ping's irrigation system in the Ch'eng-tu area (in modern Szechwan) and Cheng Kuo's canal in the Kuan-chung area (in modern central Shensi). Both were in the state of Ch'in. The former was completed under the superintendence of Li Ping, the governor of Shu, in the last years of the fourth century B.C. and watered 10,000 *ch'ing* or 1 million *mu*. The latter was constructed under the direction of Cheng Kuo in 247 or 246 B.C. and irrigated 40,000 *ch'ing* or 4 million *mu*. These canals were indeed the crowning achievements of pre-Ch'in irrigation projects and made Shu and Kuan-chung the two most prosperous economic centers in ancient China and for centuries to come. The harvests from the fields irrigated by the Cheng Kuo Canal attained the level of 6.4 *shih* per *mu*; thus, their annual product amounted to 25.6 million *shih*. Small wonder that both the *Shih-chi* and the *Han-shu* held that these irrigation projects laid the material basis for the prosperity and power of the Ch'in and in the end enabled them, economically and militarily, to conquer the Six States and unify China. The tremendous success of these projects definitely induced the people of early Former Han times to engage in irrigation. As a matter of fact, the economic benefits of these irrigation projects also provided, as pointed out by Ssu-ma Ch'ien, the economic basis for the rise to power of the Han dynasty. For all of these projects, see, in addition to the sources just cited, SC (1959), pp. 686, 1407–8; HS (1962), pp. 1677–78, 2185, 2849; Ch'ang Chü, *Hua-yang kuo chih*, pp. 30–31; Li Tao-yuan, *Shui-ching chu*, *chüan* 6, pp. 1–4; Kimura Masao, *Chūgoku kodai teikoku no keisei*, pp. 159–87; Cheng Chao-ching, *Chung-kuo shui-li shih* (reprint; Taipei: Shang-wu, 1966), pp. 258–60, 269–70; Hsu Chung-shu, "Ku-tai kuan-kai kung-ch'eng yuan-ch'i k'ao," *CYYY* 5, no. 2 (1935): 255–69; Yang K'uan, "Chan-kuo shih-tai shui-li

kung-ch'eng te ch'eng-chiu," in *Chung-kuo k'o-hsueh chi-shu fa-ming ho k'o-hsueh chi-shu jen-wu lun-chi*, ed. Li Kuang-pi and Ch'ien Chün-yeh (Peking: San-lien, 1955), pp. 99–119; Tseng Ch'ien, "Ch'in-Han te shui-li kuan-kai yü t'un-tien k'en-t'ien," *Shih-kuo pan-yüeh k'an* 5, no. 5 (March 1, 1937): 26–27; Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilization in China*, vol. 4, pt. 3: "Civil Engineering and Nautics" (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp. 285–96; and Chi Ch'ao-ting, *Key Economic Areas in Chinese History* (reprint; New York: Paragon Reprint Co., 1963), pp. 67–69.

40. HS (1962), pp. 1124–25, 1132; *Huai-nan tzu*, compiled under the auspices of the prince of Huai-nan (Liu An, ca. 179–122 B.C.) (Liu Wen-tien, *Huai-nan Hung-lieh chi-chieh* ed.) (reprint; Taipei, 1969), *chüan* 9, p. 27a; Hiranaka Reiji, *Chūgoku kodai no den-sei to zeisei*, pp. 147–52; Itō Tokuo 1959c, pp. 28–30; Wolfram Eberhard, "Bermerkungen zu statistischen Angaben der Han-Zeit," *T'oung Pao* 36, no. 1 (1940): 4–5.

41. For the various offices of waters, see HS (1962), p. 731; T'ao Hsi-sheng and Shen Jen-yuan, *Ch'in-Han cheng-chih chih-tu* (reprint; Taipei: Shang-wu, 1964; originally published in Shanghai by Shang-wu), pp. 131–32; Tseng Tzu-sheng [Ts'eng Ch'ien], *Chung-kuo Ch'in-Han cheng-chih chih-tu shih*, pp. 116–20; Kimura Masao, *Chūgoku kodai teikoku no keisei*, pp. 211–14. For detailed discussions of the later development of these offices, see Kimura Masao, *Chūgoku kodai teikoku no keisei*, pp. 211–17. See also SC (1959), pp. 1170–71. For the various problems concerning irrigation projects and plans during Wu-ti's reign, see SC (1959), pp. 1409–15; HS (1962), pp. 1679–86; Kimura Masao, *Chūgoku kodai teikoku no keisei*, pp. 188–99; Tseng Ch'ien, "Ch'in-Han te shui-li kuan-kai yü t'un-tien k'en-t'ien," pp. 27–28; Hsu Hung-chieh, "Ch'in-Han she-hui chih t'u-ti chih-tu yü nung-yeh sheng-ch'an," pp. 28–29; and Chu Hsieh, *Chung-kuo yun-ho shih-liao hsuan-chi* (Peking: Chung-hua, 1962), pp. 6–7. At this juncture, it must be emphasized that irrigation and its control had no demonstrable role in Emperor Wu's rise to and control of power. His decision to pursue this venture was based solely on economic need and historical proof of the success of irrigation. His power base was already firmly established, as we have previously noted, prior to his launching of irrigation projects. For the production of food and its distribution in Han times, also see Wu Hui, *Chung-kuo li-tai liang-shih mu-ch'an yen-chiu* (Peking: Nung-yeh ch'u-pan she, 1985), section on the Han period; Chao Kang and Ch'en Chung-i, *Chung-kuo nung-yeh ching-chi shih* (Taipei: Yu-shih, 1989), chap. 7; and Cho-yun Hsu, *Han Agriculture*, chaps. 3 and 5.

42. HS (1962), pp. 1152–53; Hsu T'ien-lin, *Hsi-Han hui-yao*, p. 533; *Ta-T'ang liu-tien*, attributed to the T'ang emperor Hsuan-tsung (A.D. 685–762), commentary attributed to Li Lin-fu (d. 752), completed ca. 739 (reprint; Taipei: Wen-hai ch'u-pan she, 1962), p. 265; Wang Yin-lin, *Han-chih k'ao* (1881 ed.), chap. 1, pp. 12a–14a. Excellent secondary studies on the problems are many. See Lien-sheng Yang, *Money and Credit in China, A Short History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 21–22; Li Chien-nung, *Hsien-Ch'in Liang-Han ching-chi shih kao*, pp. 182–86; P'eng Hsin-wei, *Chung-kuo huo-pi shih*, 3d ed. (Shanghai, 1965), pp. 109–10; Li Tsu-teh, "Lun Hsi-Han te huo-pi kai-chih," *Li-shih yen-chiu* 3 (1965): 84–88; Lao Kan, "Han-tai huang-chin chi t'ung-ch'ien te shih-yun wen-t'i," *CYYY* 42, no. 3 (1971): 349–69; Han K'o-hsin, "Liang-Han huo-pi chih-tu," *Shih-huo pan-yueh k'an* 1, no. 12 (June 16, 1935): 8–15; Katō Shigeshi, *Shina keizai shi kōshō*, 2 vols. (Tokyo, 1952), pp. 184–94; Swann, *Food and Money in Ancient China*, pp. 377–78; Sung Hsu-wu, *Hsi-Han huo-pi shih ch'u-kao* (Hong Kong, 1971), pp. 27–75; and Ch'ien Chien-fu, *Ch'in-Han huo-pi shih-kao* (Wuhan: Jen-min, 1986), pp. 27–50. The interpretations of these scholars are quite diverse. It must be pointed out that the coinage laws prohibiting private mints were again relaxed in 175

B.C., though government regulations regarding the methods and quality of private mints were strengthened to avoid monetary confusion. It must also be noted that the 4-shu coin returned to replace the 3-shu coin in 136 B.C. and circulated until 119 B.C., when a new 3-shu coin was issued bearing a legend indicating its actual weight. In addition to copper coins, gold was used as legal currency. It was measured in units of *chin* (catties), which had 16 *liang*. A catty of gold was generally valued at ten thousand in cash. But gold was mainly used in rewards by the emperor to his officials and generals and in tribute by vassal lords to the emperor; the common currency in transactions was indeed the copper coin.

43. The principal primary sources for the analysis of early Former Han industry and commerce are *Shih-chi* 129 (1959 ed., pp. 3253-83), 30 (1959 ed., pp. 1417-43); *Han-shu* 24 (1962 ed., pp. 1117-86), 28 (1959 ed., pp. 1523-1671), 91 (1962 ed., pp. 3679-94); and *Yen-t'ieh lun* (*Yen-t'ien lun chiao-chu*, 1958 ed.), esp. the first six chaps., pp. 1-253. Significant secondary works include Li Chien-nung, *Hsien-Ch'in Liang-Han ching-chi shih kao*, chaps. 13 and 15 (pp. 165-81, 199-224); Ch'en Chih, *Liang-Han ching-chi shih-liao lun-ts'ung* (Shensi: Shensi Jen-min, 1958), esp. pp. 77-247; P'an Yin-ko, *Shih-chi huo-chih chuan hsin-ch'üan* (Shanghai: Shang-wu, 1931); Ma Fei-pai, "Ch'in-Han ching-chi shih-liao, Part 1," *Shih-huo pan-yueh k'an* 2, no. 8 (September 16, 1935): 22-33, and "Ch'in-Han ching-chi shih-liao, Part 2," *Shih-huo pan-yueh k'an* 8, no. 10 (October 16, 1935): 7-32; Swann, *Food and Money in Ancient China*, esp. pp. 405ff.; Satō Taketoshi, *Chūgoku kodai kogyōshi no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kō bunkan, 1962); Wu Hui, *Chung-kuo ku-tai shang-yeh shih* (Peking: Chung-kuo shang-yeh ch'u-pan she, 1983), vol. 2, pp. 3-60; and Lu Chien-wei, "Ch'in-Han shih-ch'i shih-chi chih-tu ch'u-t'an," *Chung-kuo ching-chi shih yen-chiu* 4 (1999): pp. 21-32. Important contributions to recent archaeology of the Han period in China are Chung-kuo k'o-hsueh-yuan k'ao-ku yen-chiu-so, *Hsin Chung-kuo te k'ao-ku shou huo*, pp. 74-92; Chung-kuo k'o-hsueh-yuan k'ao-ku yen-chiu-so, comp., *Hsin Chung-kuo te k'ao-ku fa-hsien ho yen-chiu* (Peking: Wen-wu, 1984); Wang Chung-shu, *Han-tai k'ao-ku kai-shuo* (Peking: Chung-hua, 1984); and Kwang-chih Chang, trans., *Han Civilization* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), a translation of Wang Chung-shu's book with a full bibliography. My account of early Former Han industry and commerce is based on these sources and supplementary primary materials, archaeological sources, and secondary studies. See also Nishijima Sadao's general and dated article on Han economic history in *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 1, pp. 591-607.

44. HS (1962), p. 3070; HS (1962), pp. 285-86, including the various commentaries on the San-fu-kuan by Li Fei (third century A.D.) and Yen Shih-ku (581-645). See also Li Chien-nung, *Hsien-Ch'in Liang-Han ching-chi shih kao*, pp. 172-73; Ma Fei-pai, pt. 1, p. 25; Satō Taketoshi, *Chūgoku kodai kogyōshi no kenkyū*, pp. 145-47; P'an Yin-ko, *Shih-chi huo-chih chuan hsin-ch'üan*, pp. 46-47; p. 314 (Dubs translates San-fu-kuan as "Three Offices for Garments"); and Swann, *Food and Money in Ancient China*, p. 198.

45. The main sources for table 1 are *Shih-chi* 30 and 129; *Han-shu* 24, 28, and 91 (all major editions have been consulted and compared); Ch'ang Chü, *Hua-yang kuo chih* (*Ts'ung-shu chi-ch'eng ch'u-pien* ed.), *chüan* 3, pp. 27-43; and Ma Tuan-lin, *Wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao* (*Shih-t'ung* ed.), *chüan* 15, p. 150. This table is a result of careful examination and comparison of all these sources. Among the regions (*chiün*) excluded are, first, for iron: Chien-wei (2: Kueichow, Szechwan), Wen-shan (1, Szechwan); and, second, for salt: Chien-wei (1), Wen-shan (1), I-chou (1, Yunnan), So-fang (2, Suiyüan), Nan-hai (1, Kwangtung, Kwangsi), Ts'ang-wu (1, Kwangsi), and Yueh-chün (1, Sikang) (The

numbers in parentheses are the numbers of iron or salt offices.) Later Han *chiün* such as Nan-kuang (Szechwan) and Yung-ch'ang (Yunnan) are also excluded. In addition, Kuei-yang (Hunan) is excluded for reasons that will become clear later. For secondary studies with partial or different counts and views, see Ma Fei-pai, pt. 1, p. 23; Satō Taketoshi, *Chūgoku kodai kogyōshi no kenkyū*, pp. 432–33; Li Chien-nung, *Hsien-Ch'in Liang-Han ching-chi shih kao*, pp. 171–72; and Ch'en Chih, *Liang-Han ching-chi shih-liao lun-ts'ung*, pp. 237–38. See also a recent study of the issue by Yang Yuan, "Hsi-Han yen-t'ieh kuan te ti-li fen-pu," *Chung-kuo wen-hua yen-chiu so hsueh-pao*, vol. 9, no. 1 (1978): 219–44, which lists forty-five and fifty-three in two respective categories (iron and salt), including those established from Wu-ti's early reign to the end of the Western Han.

46. *Yen-t'ieh lun chiao-chu*, p. 42. Esson M. Gale, trans., *Discourses on Salt and Iron* (reprint; Taipei: Ch'eng-wen, 1967), p. 35. Both Wang Li-chi's and Gale's interpretations of the phrase "ts'ai t'ieh-shih ku-chu" are incorrect. "T'ieh-shih" is iron ore; "ku-chu" means "smelt and cast."

47. HS (1962), p. 3075; Swann, *Food and Money in Ancient China*, p. 322. On the use of slaves in iron production, see Chang Cheng-lang, "Han-tai te t'ieh-kuan-t'u," *Li-shih chiao-hsueh* 1 (1951): 17–22.

48. HS (1962), pp. 1165–66; SC (1959), pp. 1424–29; *Yen-t'ieh lun chiao-chu*, pp. 30, 37, 42.

49. SC (1959), pp. 3277–79; HS (1962), pp. 3690–92; *Yen-t'ieh lun chiao-chu*, pp. 30, 37, 42; P'an Yin-ko, *Shih-chi huo-chih chuan hsin-ch'üan*, pp. 48–50.

50. *Yen-t'ieh lun chiao-chu*, pp. 30, 37; SC (1959), p. 3142.

51. HS (1962), pp. 1157, 1592, 1668, 1904, 3722–24. Wei Chao (A.D. 197–274) suggested that Yü-chang was a mistake for Chang-chün. See SC (1954), pp. 3192–93, 3267; Ch'ang Chü, *Hua-yang kuo-chih, chüan* vol. 1, p. 35; and *Yen-t'ieh lun chiao-chu*, pp. 30, 37.

52. See nn. 45–47, esp. Li Chien-nung, *Hsien-Ch'in Liang-Han ching-chi shih kao*, pp. 165–81. See also T'ao Hsi-sheng, *Hsi-Han ching-chi shih*; Hsu Cho-yun, *Han Agriculture*, chap. 6 ("The Nonagricultural Alternatives") and sec. 6 (in pt. 2, translations of original documents); and Lin Chien-ming et al., *Ch'in-Han she-hui wen-ming* (Sian: Hsi-pei ta-hsueh, 1985), pp. 83–114.

53. For early Han population policies and related issues, see Hsu T'ien-lin, *Hsi-Han hui-yao*, pp. 475–506. For population growth, see the works of Ko Chien-hsiung (1989, p. 93, giving 36 million; 1986, p. 72, giving 36 million) and Yuan Tsu-liang (cited in n. 29); and Ko Chien-hsiung, "Hsi-Han jen-k'ou k'ao," *Chung-kuo shih yen-chiu* 4 (1981). My own estimate is 43 to 50 million based on the total number of draftable men and soldiers in Wu-ti's early expeditions. For discussions of cities and major metropolitan centers, see SC (1959), pp. 3253–83; HS (1962), pp. 1543–1671; *San-fu Huang-t'u* (reprint; Taipei: Shih-chieh, 1963), including the Sun Hsing-yen and Chuang K'uei-ching edition, the Chang Lang-sheng edition, and Pi Yuan's *Pu-i* (supplement); Ku Yen-wu (A.D. 1613–82), *Li-tai chai-ching chi* (reprint; Peking: Chung-hua, 1984), pp. 44–89; Ku Tsu-yü (1631–92), *Tu-shih fang-yü chi-yao* (T'u-shu chi-ch'eng yin-shu chü, 1901 ed.), first ten vols.; Lin Chien-ming et al., *Ch'in-Han she-hui wen-ming*, pp. 137–72; Liu Yun-yuan, *Hsi-Han Ch'ang-an* (Peking: Chung-hua, 1982), pp. 94–102; Lo Che-wen and Lo Yang, *Chung-kuo li-tai ti-wang ch'in-ling* (Shanghai: Wen-hua, 1984), pp. 1–69; Hsieh Ming-ts'ung, *Chung-kuo li-tai ti-wang ch'in-ling k'ao-lueh* (Taipei: Cheng-chung, 1975), pp. 45–49; Mou Jun-sun, "Ch'in Han P'ien," in *Chung-kuo li-shih ti-li*, pp. 1–59; Hatsutori Katsuhiko, *Kōdai Chūgoku no gunken toso no shūken* (Kyoto: Shineruva sanbō, 1969), esp.

pp. 3–124, and *Kōdai Chūgoku no toshi toso no shūken* (Kyoto: Shineruva sanbō, 1966), pp. 32–290; Ma Hsien-hsing, *Chung-kuo ku-tai ch'eng-shih lun-chi* (Taipei: Chien-tu hsueh-hui, 1980), pp. 1–176, and *Han-chien yü Han-tai ch'eng-shih* (Taipei: Chien-tu she, 1976), pp. 195–311; and Yeh Hsiao-chün, *Chung-kuo tu-ch'eng li-shih t'u-lu* (Lanchou, Kansu: Lan-chou ta-hsueh, 1986), vol. 2, pp. 29–85 (mainly Ch'ang-an). See also Wang Chung-shu, *Han-tai k'ao-ku hsueh kai-shuo*, esp. the study of Ch'ang-an, pp. 13–15; and Wang Tzu-chin, “Ch'in-Han tu-shih chiao-t'ung k'ao lun,” *Wen-shih* 42 (1997): 21–36, and *Ch'in-Han chiao-t'ung shih* (Peking: Chung-yang tang-hsueh, 1994). Fu Chü-yu believes that the Han population figures do not include the number of slaves, which constituted 1 to 4 percent of the total population. As my later study shows, this is questionable. See Fu Chü-yu, “Ts'ung nu-pei pu-ju hu-chi t'an-tao Han-tai te jen-k'ou shu,” *Chung-kuo shih yen-chiu* 4 (1983): 154–58. See also Wang Yü-ch'üan, *Lai-wu chi* (Peking, 1983), pp. 33–64; and note 29.

54. The total amount of revenue of the Han government in Wu-ti's time has been under debate for a long time. See *Han-shu* 24; Huan T'an (ca. 43 B.C.–A.D. 28), *Hsin-lun* (Yen K'o-chün ed. in CSK), sec. 14, p. 2b; and Li Chien-nung, *Hsien-Ch'in Liang-Han ching-chi shih kao*, pp. 244–56. Recent studies have greatly expanded the old figures. See Ma Ta-ying, *Han-tai ts'ai-cheng shih* (Peking: Chung-kuo ts'ai-cheng ching-chi ch'u-pan she, 1983), pp. 58–64; Kuo Tao-yang, *Chung-kuo k'uai-chi shih k'ao* (Wuhan: Chung-kuo ts'ai-cheng ching-chi ch'u-pan she, 1982), pp. 171–228; and Hu Ch'i-hung, “Han-tai ping-li k'ao,” *Li-shih yen-chiu* 3 (1996): 29–40. Hu estimates that in 140 B.C. there were 14 million draftable Han men (out of 35 million in the population as a whole) and that during Wu-ti's time, the number of Han soldiers reached over 1 million. The national standing army had 500,000 to 800,000 men and over 1.5 million at its peak under Wu-ti. On the new tax and financial schemes under Wu-ti and Tung-kuo Hsien-yang, K'ung Chin, and Sang Hung-yang, see HS (1962), pp. 1127–86, together with Ch'en Chih, *Han-shu hsin-cheng* (Tientsin, 1979), and pp. 165–87; and SC (1959), pp. 1420–42. Special studies on these issues are numerous. Among the important works are Li Chien-nung, *Hsien-Ch'in Liang-Han ching-chi shih kao*, pp. 182–263; Ch'ien Chien-fu, *Ch'in-Han fu-i chih-tu k'ao-lueh*, pp. 8–127, 241–67; Huang Chin-yen, *Ch'in-Han fu-i chih-tu yen-chiu*, pp. 127–229; and Ma Fei-pei (Yuan-ts'ai), *Sang Hung-yang [hsiang] nien-p'u ting-pu* (Chengchow, 1982), pp. 66–154. Ma suggests that Sang Hung-yang (152–80 B.C.) should be read Sang Hung-hsiang, which is correct, but the reading of yang, instead of hsiang, in the name has been followed for many centuries and is followed here for convenience and ready recognition by the reader. See Wu Hui, *Sang Hung-yang yen-chiu* (Chinan: Ch'i-Lu, 1981), pp. 116–291; Chang Wei-hua, *Han-shih lun-chi* (Chinan: Ch'i-Lu, 1980), pp. 125–43; Liu Ch'un-fan, *Ch'in-Han feng-kuo shih-i ssu-chueh chih*, pp. 135–37; and Chu Shao-hou, *Chün-kung chueh chih yen-chiu* (Shanghai: Jen-min, 1990), esp. pp. 80–82. See also Swann, *Food and Money in Ancient China*. It should be noted that some commentators, such as Yen Shih-ku, and modern scholars, such as Liu Ch'un-fan and Chu Shao-hou, suggest that there were more than eleven orders in the *Wu-kung chueh*, but I think such a view is questionable and probably due to a misreading of the *Shih-chi* and *Han-shu* texts. One should also make certain that some orders in the Wu-ti system were taken from the similar Ch'in system of aristocratic ranks but placed in higher order; that may be the cause of the confusion.

Various estimates of the average annual cost of a Han soldier in Western Han times have been made in recent years. Hu Hung-ch'i estimated in 1996 that the annual living expenses alone amounted to 3,900 in cash. Huang Chin-yen and Ch'en Hsiao-ming sug-

gested in 1997 that the total annual cost of a soldier on the frontiers was 7,600 in cash plus 27 *shih* of grain. Ma Ta-ying estimated in 1980 that in Han times the total annual cost for a soldier in continuous combat was 120,000 to 180,000 in cash. The value of each of the three estimates obviously is limited in one way or another. Hu's estimate covers only a soldier's annual living expenses and makes no distinction between an infantryman and a cavalryman in assessing the annual costs. Huang and Ch'en's estimate also makes no such distinction and covers only the soldiers in the frontier regions with various nonmilitary assignments whose status, compensation, and military equipment were inferior to those in the regular fighting forces. Ma's estimate was based on Eastern Han references and soldiers in continuous combat. In general, the annual spending on a soldier in Eastern Han times was twice the cost in Western Han times. For these views, see Hu Hung-ch'i, "Liang-Han chün-fei wen-t'i," *Chung-kuo shih yen-chiu* 4 (November 1996): 91–103, esp. p. 93; Huang Chin-yen and Ch'en Hsiao-ming, "Han-ch'ao pien-fang chün te kuei-mo chi-ch'i yang-ping fei-yung chih t'an-t'ao," *Chung-kuo ching-chi shih yen-chiu* 1 (March 1997): 86–102; and Ma Ta-ying, *Han-tai ts'ai-cheng shih*, pp. 203–8. For Chu-fu Yen's views, see HS (1962), p. 2801.

My own estimates are primarily based on Chun-shu Chang 1963, chaps. 3, 4, and 5; Chun-shu Chang, *Han-tai pien-chiang shih lun-chi* (Taipei: Shih-huo, 1977), pp. 143–78; Chun-shu Chang, "Han-tai te ping yü ping-chih," manuscript; and Chun-shu Chang 1966b, esp. pp. 160–222. For a convenient listing of prices in Han times based on both Han era wooden and bamboo documents and other contemporary literary sources, see Han Fu-chih, *Han-shih lun-chi* (Taipei: Wen-shih-che, 1980), pp. 24–25. I have also consulted the works just discussed, the major collections of Han wooden and bamboo documents, and significant studies by Lao Kan, Ch'en Chih, Ma Hsien-hsing, and Ch'en Meng-chia. I should point out here that in my study I have divided the Han army into four categories: the standing army, the regular fighting force; the soldiers in the frontier regions whose main duties were garrison, farming, construction, and the like; troops for general logistics, transportation, and training horses; and weaponry specialists. The four classes of soldiers enjoyed different statuses, received different treatment, were assigned different duties, and worked with different equipment and tools. In this study, I have basically covered only the first group, which has been divided into two subcategories: infantry and cavalry. In my estimates, I have included both low-ranking officers and regular servicemen, broadly referred to as "soldiers" or by their specialty—infantryman and cavalryman. The servicemen in the second category in the northern and northwestern regions alone numbered more than three hundred thousand in regular times and over eight hundred thousand in Wu-ti's time of heightened expansion and colonization. The total annual cost of those servicemen is discussed later in this book and in *Frontier, Immigration, and Empire in Han China*.

I should further point out that in my estimate the prices of certain items with volatile fluctuations with times and locations are fixed as follows: horse, 15,000 in cash; grain, 1 *shih* for 150 in cash; 1 *shih* of salt also 150 in cash; sword (good condition), 650 in cash; long knife (special, lightweight), 7,000 in cash; crossbow (light, with the strength of 10 *shih*), 8,000 in cash; and bow (regular), 300 in cash. I have also fixed the grain provisions for a horse at 360 *shih* for a year, the grain ration for a serviceman at 36 *shih* a year, and salt provisions for a soldier at 0.36 *shih* a year.

55. This discussion is primarily based on *Han-shu* 6: "Wu-ti chi" and other materials in *Han-shu* and *Shih-chi*, with all editions compared and Homer Dubs's translation consulted. See HS (1962), pp. 1–276, 2193–2209, 2375–2408, 2409–36, 2471–77, 3933–69;

and SC (1959), pp. 341-450, 1027-59, 1119-52, 1967-86. Yen K'o-chün, comp., CSK, contains Wu-ti's literary works (secs. 140-51), and they show aspects of Wu-ti's character and temperament that cannot be easily seen in official texts. For Wu-ti's poetry, see Ting Fu-pao, comp., *Ch'üan-Han San-kuo Chin Nan-pei ch'ao shih* (reprint; Taipei: I-wen, 1975), vol. 1, pp. 46-48, including six songs by the emperor and one attributed to him. For Emperor Wu's love and promotion of music and the establishment of the Bureau of Music (*yueh-fu*), headed by a *hsieh-lü tu-wei* (chief commandant of music [and harmony]), see *Han-shu* (1962), pp. 1045-55, 1218-22, 1756; and *Shih-chi* (1959), esp. pp. 1177-78. It was recorded in Han sources that Emperor Wu composed as many as ten of the nineteen special musical pieces for religious ceremonies, most of which had not survived. They do show his musical talent and strong personal effort to promote music (*yueh*) as part of the high culture. An excellent exposition of Emperor Wu and literature is given in David R. Knechtges, "The Emperor and Literature: Emperor Wu of the Han," in *Imperial Rulership and Cultural Change in Traditional China* ed. Frederick P. Brandauer (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1994), pp. 51-76. Chang Wei-hua's study of Han Wu-ti (chap. 2) quoted earlier is also very useful. But the conclusions and broad characterization of his personality and character traits are based on my own reading and interpretation of the text and its contextual indications. See also the informal and intimate portrait of Emperor Wu in *Han Wu ku-shih*, in *Ku hsiao-shuo kou-ch'en*, ed. Lu Hsun, 2 vols. (Hong Kong: Hsin-i ch'u-pan she, 1967).

In analyzing the formation and growth of Liu Ch'e's character and personality, I have employed some suitable modern psychological skills, particularly Erik H. Erikson's study of the life cycle. For complete references to this aspect and my own theory of psychohistorical studies, see Chun-shu Chang and Shelley Hsueh-lun Chang, *Crisis and Transformation in Seventeenth-Century China: Society, Culture, and Modernity* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992), esp. pp. 47-128, and *Redefining History: Ghosts, Spirits, and Human Society* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1968), pp. 15-64, 223-25.

A few of Emperor Wu's most moving poems have been translated into English. See Ronald C. Miao, "The Autumn Wind," by Liu Ch'e, in *Sunflower Splendor*, ed. Wu-chi Liu and Irving Yucheng Lo (Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1975), p. 29. One example is "Autumn winds rise, / White clouds fly, / . . . As joys reach their end, sorrows multiply." See also Burton Watson, trans., *Courtier and Commoner in Ancient China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), pp. 249-51, which contains Emperor Wu's *fu* (rhyming prose) on the loss of Lady Li: "Beauty soft and yielding, matchless grace, / A life cut off forever, to thrive no more . . ." These lines show the emperor's unusual poetic and literary gifts.

56. HS (1962), pp. 3935-37 (including Yen Shih-ku's annotations). See also Ma Fei-pai 1982b, pp. 879-80; and Wei Hung, *Han-kuan chiu-i*, pp. 17-18, and *Han chiu-i*, p. 11.

57. HS (1962), pp. 208-9, 2177-79, 3948-50; SC (1959), pp. 1978-85. A monographic study on *wu-hui* and the issue of 92-91 B.C. persecutions is given in Teng Ch'i-yao, *Wu-hui k'ao-ch'a* (Taipei: Han-chung wen-hua, 1998), pp. 73-83, 130-31, which traces the origins of *wu-hui* to the Shang period at the latest and lists nearly thirty types of magic. See also Michael Loewe, *Crisis and Conflict in Han China* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1974), pp. 37-44.

58. Wan Ssu-t'ung (1638-1702), *Han chiang-hsiang ta-ch'en nien-piao*, in *Erh-shih wu shih Pu-pien*, pp. 217-27; Chou Tao-chi, *Han-T'ang tsai-hsiang chih-tu* (Taipei: Chia-hsin, 1964), app. 1, pp. 6-9.

59. HS (1962), pp. 162, 189, 3776; SC (1959), p. 2917. In the special edict issued in 104 B.C. (SC, 2917; HS, 3776) after the great victory by General Li Kuang-li in Ta-yuan (Farghana), Emperor Wu vowed to eliminate the Hsiung-nu to avenge the shame that Emperor Kao suffered after “the defeat at P’ing-ch’eng” by the Hsiung-nu. And he quoted the *Ch’un-ch’iu* (Spring and Autumn Annals) to support his call for upholding the “great justice” (*ta-i*), because the book was the Great Canon of Moral Justice then believed to be compiled by Confucius for that purpose. See also Chun-shu Chang, *War and Peace with the Hsiungnu in Early Han China*, pp. 680, 696.

60. HS (1962), pp. 160–61.

61. Ibid., pp. 90, 104, 153.

62. Ibid., pp. 62, 76, 113, 132, 153, 275–77, 1135–36; SC (1959), pp. 436–38, 2698–705.

63. For concise discussions of the classification of these schools and their basic tenets and origins, see the following sources. (1) *Shih-chi* 130: Ssu-ma T’an’s (b. between 180–170 B.C., d. 110 B.C.) *Liu-chia chih yao-chih* (Basic Tenets of the Six Schools), SC (1959), pp. 3290–92 (on the Six Schools: Yin-yang, Ju, Mo, Fa, Ming, and Tao). (2) *Han-shu* 30: *I-wen chih* (Treatise on Bibliography), HS (1962), pp. 1701–46: “Chu-tzu lueh” (On the Philosophers). (3) Liu An, *Huai-nan tzu*, *Huai-nan hung-lieh chi-chieh* ed., *chüan* 21: “Yao-lueh” (Introduction and Summary), pp. 1–10. These three treatises represent the Han views and evaluations of the various schools of thought. Such an attempt, however, was made several times in the pre-Ch’in (pre-221 B.C.) era. The earliest was “T’ien-hsia” (The World of Thought) in *Chuang Tzu*, a thirty-three-chapter book that was written mostly by Chuang Chou (396–286 B.C.?) except for this chapter, 33, which modern studies hold to be the work of a Chuang Chou follower or an admirer at a slightly later time, since its style and contents are not fully in tune with the rest of the chapters. In any case, the “T’ien-hsia” chapter discusses the various trends of thought only by individual thinkers and not by schools, except for the school of Mohism, which is referred to as the group of Mo-che, the practitioners of Mo Ti’s teachings. A later work is the essay “Fei Shih-erh tzu” (A Critique of the Views of the Twelve Philosophers), in *Hsun Tzu*, by Hsun Ch’ing (ca. 298–238 B.C.). The essay, whose authenticity has also been questioned since the T’ang period (A.D. 618–907), criticizes twelve thinkers, including Mo Ti, Mencius, and Sung Hsing, though they are not grouped by intellectual label. The latest such discussion is “Hsien-hsueh” (The Eminent Scholars) in *Han Fei Tzu* by Han Fei (ca. 280–233 B.C.). The essay examines the various thinkers in the Ju (Confucian) and Mo (Mohist) schools and many others, who are referred to as individuals, not as followers of a specific school of philosophy. See *Chuang Tzu*, *Chiao-cheng chi-shih chi-shih* ed., by Kuo Ch’ing-fan (A.D. 1844–96) (Taipei: Shih-chieh, 1962), pp. 1065–1115; *Hsun Tzu*, *Hsun Tzu chien-shih* ed., by Liang Ch’i-hsiung (reprint; Hong Kong: T’ai-p’ing, 1964), pp. 59–70; and *Han Fei Tzu*, *Han Fei Tzu chih-shih* ed. by Ch’en Ch’i-yu (Peking and Shanghai: Chung-hua, 1958), pp. 1080–1104. The *Lü-shih ch’un-ch’iu* (Lü’s Spring and Autumn Annals), by Lü Pu-wei (fl. 285–235 B.C.) et al. in 239 B.C., also contains scattered discussions of the views and thoughts of the individual philosophers such as Confucius, Mo Ti, and Sung Hsing but does not group them under specific schools either. See, for example, *Lü-shih ch’un-ch’iu chiao-shih* ed., 4 vols. (Shanghai: Hsueh-lin, 1984), pp. 1123–24. The *Lü-shih ch’un-ch’iu* has been newly rendered into English by John Knoblock and Jeffrey Riegel as *The Annals of Lu Buwei* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000). For a critical study and analysis of “The World of Thought,” see T’an Chieh-fu, “Hsien-ts’un Chuang Tzu t’ien-hsia p’ien te yen-chiu,”

Chung-kuo che-hsueh shih lun-wen ch'u-chi (Peking: K'o-hsueh ch'u-pan she, 1959), pp. 50–78; Mei Yi-pao, "Ancient Chinese Philosophy according to the *Chuang Tzu*, Chapter 33, 'The World of Thought,'" *Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies*, new ser., 4, no. 2 (February 1964): 186–211 (including English translation). For a study of the "Fei Shih-erh tzu," see Wei Cheng-t'ung, *Hsun Tzu yü ku-tai che-hsueh* (Taipei: Shang-wu, 1967), pp. 218–53; and John Knoblock, trans., *Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works*, 3 vols. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988–94), 1:212, 245–46.

The topic under discussion is enormous. My study here is focused primarily on the theories of statecraft and social structure in these schools of thought. Other philosophical and intellectual issues and themes will be only superficially referenced or simply left out if they have no relevance to these two large subjects. Second, my views on different schools of thought represent new interpretations based on my reading of the primary sources, not a summary of countless past and modern secondary studies, most of which I consulted before reaching my own conclusions. Third, the main focus of my work is on the inner coherence and consistency of each school of thought in the structural logic of its presentation of a fundamental theme. At the same time, I have tried to show the evolutionary process of the thematic structures of each school through an examination of the changing semantic connotations of certain primordial concepts such as *li*, *fa*, *tao*, *ming*, *hsing-ming*, and *cheng-ming*. In the end, I propose that all the schools share the same ancestry in two genealogical lines, one from the south, the Ch'u system, and one from the north, the Shang-Chou system. Fourth, it is not my intention to do any sort of comparative study if the language of the subject is beyond my trained ability to read with full competence. I do this to avoid what I have earlier called "postorientalism," borrowing Edward Said's original idea of orientalism. Without mastery of the language of a country, a region, or a nation, a scholar who is engaged in comparative studies of its history, culture, and ideas is led into the trap of interpreting others' theories and replaying the biases of other scholars. It goes without saying that the numerous sources I have examined cannot and should not be cited here, considering the nature of this study. A few, however, need be indicated to acknowledge my main lines of intellectual debt. On textual criticism and authenticity, my main sources are Chang Hsin-ch'eng, *Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao*, 2 vols. (Shanghai: Shang-wu, 1954); Huang Yun-mei, *Ku-chin wei-shu k'ao pu-cheng* (Chinan: Ch'i-Lu, 1980); Yü Yueh (1821–1907), *Chu-tzu p'ing-i*, *Pu-lu* (reprint; Taipei: Shih-chieh, 1962); Chin Chü-shan, *Chu-tzu kuan-chieh* (Taipei: Shih-chieh, 1962); Lo Ken-tse, *Chu-tzu k'ao-so* (Peking: Jen-min, 1958); Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (1873–1929), *Ku-shu chen-wei chi-ch'i nien-tai*, new ed. (Peking: Chung-hua, 1962; original edition 1927), including Liang's important comments on certain classic texts; and Ch'ü Wan-li, *Hsien-Ch'in wen-shih tzu-liao k'ao-pien* (Taipei: Lien-ching, 1983). Each specialized study of a specific thinker also provides a critical examination of the sources used. Since the dating of an ancient text involves so many disciplines, and these are always changing, old datings frequently need revision. In recent years, a large number of ancient texts have been unearthed and have provided unexpected new information on the dating and authenticity of many old, critically important texts such as the *Tao-te ching*, *Sun Tzu*, *Wen Tzu*, *Wei Liao Tzu*, and *Ho-kuan Tzu*. They have been fully utilized in this study. Also see the numerous specialized works in this area, most of which were cited in the prologue. For classic monographic studies of ancient Chinese thought and society, the most useful are Fung Yu-lan, *Chung-kuo che-hsueh shih*, rev. ed. (Peking: Jen-min, 1964; original edition 1931), English translation by Derk Bodde, published as *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952–53);

Hu Shih, *Chung-kuo che-hsueh shih ta-kang*, vol. 1 (Shanghai: Shang-wu, 1919; rev. ed., 1930); Fu Ssu-nien, *Chan-kuo tzu-chia hsu-lun* and *Hsing-ming ku-hsun pien-cheng* (1938), in the *Lien-ching* complete collection of his works, *Fu Ssu-nien ch'üan-chi*, vol. 2, pp. 415–89, 492–736; Mori Mikisaburo, *Shōko yori Kandai ni itaru seimeikan no tenkai* (Tokyo: Sōbunsha, 1971), pp. 32–127 (Mori, however, overlooks the Legalist views on *hsing-ming* questions); Yang Hsiang-k'uei, *Chung-kuo ku-tai she-hui yü ku-tai ssu-hsiang yen-chiu*, 2 vols. (Shanghai: Jen-min, 1964); Kuo Mo-jo, *Shih p'i-p'an shu*, 4th ed. (Peking: K'o-hsueh, 1966; original edition 1945), and *Ch'ing-t'ung shih-tai*, 4th ed. (Peking: K'o-hsueh, 1965; original edition 1945); Hou Wai-lu et al., *Chung-kuo ssu-hsiang t'ung-shih*, vols. 1–2 (Peking: Jen-min, 1957); and Jen Chi-yü, ed., *Chung-kuo che-hsueh shih*, vols. 1–2 (Peking: Jen-min, 1963). On political thought, see Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, *Hsien-Ch'in cheng-chih ssu-hsiang shih* (Peking and Nanking, 1922), translated into English as *History of Chinese Political Thought*, by L. T. Chen (London: Kegan Paul, 1930); T'ao Hsi-sheng, *Chung-kuo cheng-chih ssu-hsiang shih*, vols. 1–2 (reprint; Taipei: Shih-huo, 1954; originally published in 1943); Hsiao Kung-ch'üan, *Chung-kuo cheng-chih ssu-hsiang shih*, 6 vols. (Taipei: Chung-hua wen-hua, 1954), translated into English by Frederick W. Mote as *A History of Chinese Political Thought*, vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). For dating of the pre-Ch'in (pre-221 B.C.) philosophers, the most useful work is the monumental study *Hsien-Ch'in chu-tzu hsi-nien k'ao-pien*, rev. ed., 2 vols. (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1956; original edition 1935). However, since the dating of almost every thinker varies widely, Ch'ien's work can be taken only as a primary reference for further investigations. For example, the dating of Chuang Chou is variously given by scholars as between 399 and 295 B.C., 369 and 286 B.C., 365 and 290 B.C., and 335 and 275 B.C. On this issue, see also Kuo Mo-jo's two books, cited earlier; Cheng Liang-shu, *Chu-po chien-tu lun-wen chi* (Peking: Chung-hua, 1982); and Li Hsueh-ch'in, *Chien-po i-chi yü hsueh-shu shih* (Taipei: Shih-po wen-hua, 1994). Therefore, many other sources had to be consulted and compared before a relatively dependable set of dates could be used in the text. In many places, I have made my own datings with reference to various authorities.

64. The main sources for my discussions of Confucius and Mencius are *Lun-yü* (The Analects) and *Meng Tzu*, whose dating and authenticity have been thoroughly examined by Ts'ui Shu (1740–1816) in his masterful work *Chu-Ssu k'ao-hsin lu*, *hsu-lu*, in *Ts'ui Tung-pi i-shu*, ed. Ku Chieh-kang (1893–1981) (Shanghai: Ku-chi ch'u-pan she, 1983), pp. 261–336, 613–21. My study follows only the parts that have been judged most relevant to the two Confucian masters. For the texts *Lun-yü* and *Meng Tzu*, the *Ssu-shu chang-chü chi-chu* ed. in *Hsin-pien chu-tzu chi-ch'eng* (Peking: Chung-hua, 1983) is used as the main text. But it is supplemented by the earlier texts and commentaries reprinted in the valuable collection *Chung-kuo tzu-hsueh ming-chu chi-ch'eng* (hereafter CKTH) (Taipei, 1977). Liu Pao-nan (1791–1855) and Liu Kung-mien (1824–1883), *Lun-yü cheng-i* (Hong Kong: Chung-hua, 1963), was also consulted and compared. A number of valuable but rarely available special studies on both *Lun-yü* and *Meng Tzu* included in the CKTH have been very beneficial in my construction of a coherent and interlocked system of primeval concepts and structural logic in the Confucianism formulated by Confucius and Mencius. These include, in the *Lun-yü* category: Hu Kuang (1370–1418), *Lun-yü chi-chü ta-ch'üan* (Ming, 1415; Palace ed.); *Lun-yü chu-shu chieh-ching*, including annotations and commentaries by Ho Yen (d. 249 B.C.) and Hsing Ping (932–1010) and Ming textual criticisms (orig. Ming ed.); *Lun-yü hui-han*, containing five special studies of *Lun-yü*, including Ch'eng Fu-hsin (fl. 1248–d. after 1308), *K'ung Tzu Lun-yü nien-p'u*

(1831 ed.); Su Ch'e (1039-1112), *Lun-yü shih-i* (1597 ed.); Weng Fang-kang (1733-1818), *Lun-yü fu-chi* (Ch'ing); Ch'en Chan (1753-1817), *Lun-yü ku-hsun* (1883 ed.); and Yang Wen-hui (1837-1911), *Lun-yü fa-yun* (Ch'ing). In the Meng Tzu category, the primary works include: *Meng Tzu chu-shu*, by Chao Ch'i (d. A.D. 201) and Su Shih (1036-1101); *Meng Tzu hui-han*, containing six major works written by Su Hsun (1009-66): *Meng Tzu p'i-chu* (Ming, 1617 ed.); Su Ch'e, *Meng Tzu chieh* (Ming, 1597 ed.); Hsu Ch'ien (1270-1357), *Tu Meng Tzu ts'ung-shuo* (manuscript ed.); Chao Te (Yuan-Ming), *Meng Tzu chi-chu chien-i* (manuscript ed.); Ch'eng Fu-hsin, *Meng Tzu nien-p'u* (1831 ed.); and Yang Wen-hui, *Meng Tzu fa-wei* (Ch'ing ed.). For modern monographic studies, see particularly Chao Chi-pin, *Lun-yü hsin-t'an* (Peking: Jen-min, 1976), esp. pt. 1; P'ang Pu, *Ju-chia pien-cheng fa yen-chiu* (Peking: Chung-hua, 1984); Ch'en Ta-ch'i, *Lun-yü i-chieh* (Taipei: Shang-wu, 1968); and Yang Po-chün, "Tao-yen," in his *Lun-yü i-chu* (Peking: Chung-hua, 1965), pp. 1-13, a concise but penetrating analysis. Modern texts composed of annotations and translations (Chinese or non-Chinese) have generally been not referenced, but D. C. Lau's scholarly English translations should be mentioned. See his *The Analects* (Penguin Classics, 1979) and *Mencius* (Penguin Classics, 1970). Both volumes have scholarly introductions, textual notes, and appendixes (about biographical and historical materials and philosophical issues).

65. Ch'eng Fu-hsin, *Meng Tzu nien-p'u*, pp. 532-34. The fact that Ch'eng raised this point under the Yuan (Mongol) regime clearly manifests the profound influence of this revolutionary idea of Meng Tzu's theory of statecraft in the evolution of the Chinese political mind.

66. An elaborate discussion of this point is given in Wu K'ang, *K'ung Meng Hsun che-hsueh* (reprint; Taipei: Shang-wu, 1971), vol. 2, pp. 58-60 (also quoting K'ang Yu-wei's [1858-1927] view). For Chu Hsi's (1130-1200) comment on Meng Tzu's *sheng-wang* issue, see *Meng Tzu chi-chu*, pp. 364-69.

67. The primary sources for the study of Hsun Tzu are *Hsun Tzu*, Liang Ch'i-hsiung ed.; *Hsun Tzu chi-chieh*, ed. by Wang Hsien-ch'ien (Taipei: Shih-chieh, 1962); and Yang Liu-ch'iao, *Hsun Tzu ku-i* (Chinan: Ch'i-Lu shu-she, 1985), in which both the interpretation and annotations include materials not found in the classic works. For modern monographic studies, see, among numerous others, Wei Cheng-t'ung, *Hsun Tzu yü ku-tai che-hsueh*; and Yang Yun-ju, *Hsun Tzu yen-chiu* (Taipei: Shang-wu, 1966). The current version of *Hsun Tzu* includes a considerable number of writings that are not of Hsun Ch'ing's pen. This study has taken textual authenticity under careful consideration in presenting a special point of inquiry. A good scholarly English rendering of *Hsun Tzu* is Homer H. Dubs, *The Works of Hsuntze* (reprint; Taipei: Ch'eng-wen, 1966; originally published in 1928), and his study of Hsun Tzu, *Hsuntze: The Moulder of Ancient Confucianism* (reprint; Taipei: Ch'eng-wen, 1966; originally published in 1927). The most scholarly translation and study of Hsun Tzu is John Knoblock's *Xunzi* (in three volumes), cited in note 63.

68. *Hsun Tzu chi-chieh*, pp. 94-104. A masterful study with a translation of Hsun Tzu's political theory is Y. P. Mei (Mei Yi-pao), "Hsun Tzu's Theory of Government, with an English Translation of *Hsun Tzu*, Chapter IX, Kingly Government," *Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies*, new ser., 8, nos. 1-2 (August 1970): 36-83.

69. The basic sources in this section are *Mo Tzu*, annotated with textual collations by Sun I-jang (1848-1908), which can be found in *Chu-tzu chi-ch'eng*, vol. 2; and *Chiao-pu ting-pen Mo Tzu hsien-ku* (reprint; Taipei: I-wen). A dependable English translation is Mei Yi-pao, *The Ethical and Political Works of Motse* (reprint; Taipei: Ch'eng-wen ch'u-

pan she, 1974; originally published in 1929). A lucid translation of eleven sections of critical importance in *Mo Tzu* was done by Burton Watson in *Mo Tzu, Basic Writings* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963). Mei also wrote a treatise on Mo Ti, *Mo Tzu, the Neglected Rival of Confucius* (reprint; Westport, CT: Hyperion, 1973; originally published in 1934). On the development of logic and semantics in the Mohist School, see the seminal work of T'an Chieh-fu, *Mo pien fa-wei* (Peking: Chung-hua, 1964). On the development of *hsing-ming* (name-form) theory, see T'an Chieh-fu, *Kung-sun Lung tzu hsing-min fa-hui* (Peking: Chung-hua, 1963); and A. C. Graham, *Later Mohist Logic, Ethics, and Science* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1978).

It should be pointed out that my interpretation and analysis of the political thought of the Mohist school is primarily based on my reading of the original writings of its leading figures and the historical and intellectual contexts of these writings. The interpretation of the term *hsing-ming* is a good case in point. Graham translates it as "name" and "object" (pp. 196–99), which is perfectly correct, and H. G. Creel renders it as "title" and "performance," which is also correct in the context, but I have rendered it variously as "name/form," "name/reality," "name/object," and so forth, all according to context. See Creel's *What Is Taoism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 185. An important recent study of Mo Ti and Mohist school is Benjamin Schwartz, *The World of Thought in Ancient China*, pp. 134–72. See also a short interpretive analysis of Mo Ti and Mohism in Frederick W. Mote, *Intellectual Foundations of China* (New York: Knopf, 1989), pp. 77–89.

Part of Mo Ti's thought is concerned with the so-called one world (*ta-t'ung*) philosophy, which appears later in Confucianism in the *Li-chi* (Book of Rites). A systematic study of this issue is given in Ch'en Cheng-t'an, *Chung-kuo ku-tai ta-t'ung ssu-hsiang yen-chiu* (Hong Kong: Chung-hua, 1988); and *Chung-kuo ta-t'ung ssu-hsiang tzu-liao*, comp. Che-hsueh yen-chiu so (Shanghai: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1959), pp. 2–4.

70. On the issue of Mo Ti's assumption of the state of nature and the theory of the covenant, see Mei's analysis of Mo Ti's political thought (p. 111). The issue evidently reminds scholars of the theories of the covenant of Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and the social contract of John Locke (1632–1704) and Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–78). My view is that Mo Ti anticipates Hobbes but not Locke and Rousseau because he fails to define the rights of the people after the leader fails to fulfill the contract. See Thomas Hobbes, "Social Covenant" (1651) in his *Leviathan; or The Matter, Forme, and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil*, ed., Michael Oakshott, (reprint; London: Basil Blackwell, 1955), pt. 2, esp. chaps. 17–19, pp. 109–241; John Locke, *Treatise of Civil Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration*, ed. Charles L. Sherman (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1937); and Jean Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, trans. Henry J. Tozer (New York: Scribner, 1898). It should be pointed out that my main line of inquiry in this study is based on the principle of noncomparative investigations, although some comparison of Chinese ideas and their non-Chinese counterparts or complements are occasionally given for the benefit of students in special academic fields. For, as already noted, without mastery of the native language of a country or region the scholar who is engaged in comparative studies will be at the mercy of the words of previous scholars and unable to judge the biases and incorrect presentations of original sources and scholarship in their works. The danger of this approach, in my view, is compromise of scholarly integrity, which falls into the trap of what Edward Said called orientalism.

71. On ancient Legalist political thought, the useful monographic studies are Ch'en Lieh, *Fa-chia cheng-chih che-hsueh* (Shanghai: Hua-t'ung shu-tien, 1929); Kuo Mo-jo,

Shih p'i-p'an shu, pp. 272–407; and Chang Su-cheng, *Han Fei ssu-hsiang t'i-hsi* (Taipei: Li-ming wen-hua, 1973). For a comparative study of Legalist thought in ancient China and India, see P. V. Pillai, *Perspectives on Power: India and China* (Columbia, MO: South Asia Books; New Delhi: Manohar Books, 1977; original version 1975), esp. pp. 151–85.

72. The various Legalist works have been conveniently collected in the *Chung-kuo ssu-hsiang ming-chu*, vols. 6, 7 (Taipei: Shih-chieh ed.). It includes both authentic works, collections of fragments, and forged writings. This volume contains *Kuan Tzu* (The Work of Kuan Chung; Tai Wang [1837–73] ed.); *Shang-chün shu* (The Book of Lord Shang Yang, Chu Shih-ch'e ed.) in vol. 6; *Shen Tzu* (The Works of Shen Tao), *Shen Tzu* (The Works of Shen Pu-hai), and *Han Fei Tzu*, collated and annotated by Wang Hsien-sheng (preface 1895) in vol. 7. The *Kuan Tzu* and *Shang-chün shu* were composed at a much later time. *Kuan Tzu* was probably composed by several thinkers in Ch'i in the fourth century B.C. at the earliest, and only a small part of the book falls in the category of Legalism, while other parts deal with Taoism, Yin-yang, and Agriculturalism. For the texts of and views on the authenticity of *Kuan Tzu*, see Kuo Mo-ju, Wen I-tuo, and Hsu Wei-chü, *Kuan Tzu chi-chiao* (Peking, 1956); Shih I-ts'an, ed. and annotator, *Kuan Tzu chin-ch'uan*, 2 vols. (Taipei: Shang-wu, 1970); and Kuo Shou-cheng, annotator, *Kuan Tzu chu-i*, 2 vols. (Kwangsai: Jen-min, 1982). *Shang-chün shu* was composed after Shang Yang's death in 338 B.C. but before 221 B.C., when Ying Cheng unified China, and possibly by Wei Liao (ca. 370–319 B.C.); some scholars also hold that the book could have been put together in early Han times. For further studies and translations of both *Kuan-Tzu* and *Shang-chün shu*, see the prologue in this volume. For Shen Tao's and Shen Pu-hai's works, only reconstructed fragments have survived. The most detailed studies and collations of the two works are H. C. Creel, *Shen Pu-hai, a Chinese Political Philosopher of the Fourth Century B.C.*, pp. 343–92 (with twenty-seven Chinese fragments); and P. M. Thompson, *The Shen Tzu Fragments* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 227–303 (Shen Tao's work reconstructed, with plates). See also A. C. Graham, *Later Mohist Logic, Ethics, and Science*. For *Han Fei Tzu*, Ch'en Ch'i-yu's edition is better than Wang Hsien-shen's, but the latter suggests a different dating of Han Fei's life and writing. Part of Wu Ch'i's work was recently unearthed in Han tombs. See Wu Chiu-lung, *Yin-ch'ueh shan Han-chien shih-wen*, pp. 13–18; *Chu-chien ping-fa*, pp. 95–99; *Po-shu chu-chien* (Yen I-p'ing ed.), pp. 163–68; and *Sun Tzu ping-fa* (Wen-wu ed.), pp. 141–60. For the *Lü-hsing* in *Shang-shu*, see *Wu-ching tu-pen* ed., pp. 132–36; Chü Wan-li ed., pp. 175–85; *Shui-hu-ti Ch'in-mu chu-chien*, pp. 292–93 (Li K'uei's *Hu-lü*, Household Statutes); and *Chung-kuo fa-lü ssu-hsiang shih tzu-liao hsuan-pien*, comp. Fa-hsueh chiao-ts'ai pien-chi pu (Shih-chia-chuang: Fa-lü ch'u-pan she, 1983), pp. 117–53. See also the materials cited in note 71.

Secondary studies of these earlier "Legalists" and their writings are numerous; several have already been cited and will be again. In addition, see Lo Ken-tse, *Chu-tzu k'ao-so*, pp. 422–529 (covering Kuan Tzu, Shang Yang, and Shen Tao), and *Kuan Tzu t'an-yuan* (reprint; Hong Kong: T'ai-p'ing, 1966); Ch'en Ch'i-t'ien, *Shang Yang p'ing-chuan* (Taipei: Shang-wu, 1967.), esp. 106–34 (Ch'en dates *Shang-chün shu* to the last decades of the third century B.C.); and Kao Heng, *Shang-chün shu chu-i*, pp. 1–20. For earlier influences such as "Shou-fa shou-ling shih-san p'ien," see the prologue in this volume. For Tzu Ch'an, see Wu Ch'e, *Tzu Ch'an te ssu-hsiang yü chih-chi chih yen-chiu*. For Han Fei, see W. K. Liao's learned translation and introduction in *The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu*, 2 vols. (London: Arthur Probsthain, 1959); and the works of Chang Su-cheng, Ch'en Lieh, and Ch'en Ch'i-t'ien (1973), cited earlier. See also Wang Hsiao-po, *Ju-Fa ssu-hsiang lung-chi* (Taipei: Shih-pao, 1986), pp. 168–268.

For Li K'uei, *Lü-hsing*, and the development of Chinese penal law, see Hsiao Yung-ch'ing, *Chung-kuo fa-chih shih chien-pien* (Taiyuan: Shansi Jen-ming, 1981), pp. 50-65; Yang Hung-lieh, *Chung-kuo fa-lü* (Taipei: Shang-wu, 1967), pp. 33-90; Ch'ü T'ung-tsu, *Law and Society in Traditional China* (Paris: Mouton, 1961), pp. 170, 274; Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris, *Law in Imperial China* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1973), pp. 57-58, 495-97; Wallace Johnson, trans., *The T'ang Code*, vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 7-8; Hulsewé's masterful studies of the Ch'in (Qin) law frequently cited in the prologue in this volume; and Keng Yun-ch'ing, *Hsien-Ch'in fa-lü ssu-hsiang yü tzu-jen fa* (Taipei: Shang-wu, 1973), pp. 114-17 (Legalism within a comparative study of natural law in China and the West).

It should be pointed out that I have based my discussion of the various Legalist thinkers on these works and the biographical and reference materials in such historical materials as the *Shih-chi*, *Han-shu*, *Kuo-yü*, *Chan-kuo ts'e*, and *Tso-chuan*, as well as the descriptions and evaluations of the various schools of thought, particularly the "T'ien-hsia" chapter in *Chuang Tzu*, cited in note 63. I have also tried to compare all relevant sources before assigning certain ideas to particular thinkers.

73. See n. 69; *San-chien chien-tu ho-chi*; and Chu Shao-hou, *Chiin-kung chueh yen-chiu*, pp. 160-66.

74. For *Lao Tzu* and *Chuang Tzu*, see all the editions in *Chung-kuo ssu-hsiang ming-chu*, vols. 4, 5, 6. Other important editions include Ch'en Ku-ying, *Lao Tzu chu-shih chi p'ing-chieh* (Taipei: Chung-hua, 1984), and *Chuang Tzu chi-chu chin-i* (Taipei: Chung-hua, 1983); Wang Shu-min, *Chuang Tzu chiao-ch'üan* (Taipei: Kuo-li pien-i kuan, 1988); Ma Hsu-lun, *Chuang Tzu chiao-ku* (reprint; Hong Kong: T'ai-p'ing, 1965); Wei Yuan, *Lao Tzu pen-i* (reprint; Hong Kong: T'ai-p'ing, 1964), with additional materials included in *Chu-tzu ming-chu*; Hu Yuan-jui, *Chuang Tzu ch'üan-ku* (reprint; Taipei: Shang-wu, 1967); Ch'ien Mu, *Chuang Tzu tsuan-chien*, 4th ed. (Taipei: Privately printed, 1962), and *Chuang Lao t'ung-pien* (Taipei: San-min, 1973). Good translations of these two classics can be found in *Lao Tzu*, *Tao Te Ching*, trans. D. C. Lau (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1967); and *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu*, trans. Burton Watson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968); *The Way of Lao Tzu (Tao-te ching)*, trans. Wing-tsit Chan (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963); *A Translation of Lao Tzu's Tao Te Ching and Wang Pi's Commentary*, Paul J. Lin (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1977).

My discussions of the dating of Lao Tzu, Chuang Tzu, and other Taoist figures and the evolution of the *Tao-te ching* and other Taoist writings are drawn from my article on the reexamination of ancient Taoist thought based mostly on the newly discovered ancient texts on wood, bamboo, and silk. The article is entitled "Chien-po wen-shu yü ku-tai ssu-hsiang chih hsin-yen" (forthcoming). For the study of Taoist canons, the most useful new sources are the Ma-wang-tui texts of *Lao Tzu* (unearthed in a Han tomb of 168 B.C. in 1973, two versions of *Lao Tzu* dated to the late Ch'in and early Han times, ca. 210-195 B.C.); the Kuo-tien texts of *Lao Tzu* (unearthed in 1993 in a Ch'u-time tomb at Chingmen of Hupei in about 300-280 B.C.; three sets); and other Taoist texts from these two tombs and other places, such as the *T'ai-i sheng-shui*, fragments of *Wen-tzu* (unearthed in a Han tomb in Ting-hsien of Hopei in 1973). My new views on Taoist thought, thinkers, and texts presented here are based on highly textual analysis and complex technical examinations of the various ancient literary texts and archaeological sources.

75. These schools have been studied by various scholars. See Ku Nien-hsien, *Tsung-heng chia yen-chiu* (Taipei: Shang-wu, 1969); Ho Ch'i-min, *Kung-sun Lung tzu* (Taipei:

Shang-wu, 1967); T'an Chieh-fu's works (1963, 1964); A. C. Graham's work cited in note 69; Wang Meng-ou, *Tsou Yen i-shuo k'ao* (Taipei: Shang-wu, 1966); Sun Kuang-te, *Hsien-Ch'in Liang-Han Yin-yang wu-hsing te cheng-chih ssu-hsiang* (Taipei: Chia-hsin wen-hua, 1969); Li Han-san, *Hsien-Ch'in Liang-Han chih yin-yang wu-hsing hsueh-shuo* (Taipei: Wei-hsin, 1968); Lü Pu-wei, *Lü-shih ch'un-ch'iu* (Ch'en Ch'i-yu ed.); and John Knoblock and Jeffrey Riegel, trans., *The Annals of Lu Buwei* (including comprehensive studies and scholarly analysis); Li Ting-sheng and Hsu Hui-chün, comp. and annotated, *Wen-tzu yao-ch'üan* (Shanghai: Fu-tan ta-hsueh, 1988); *The Pheasant Cap Master* (He Guan Zi), trans. and annotated Carine Defoort (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), including scholarly studies and the original Chinese text; Liu Chung-p'ing, ed., *Wei Liao Tzu* (Taipei: Shang-wu, 1975); *Chung-kuo ssu-hsiang ming-chu*, vol. 7 (reprint; Taipei: Shih-chieh shu-chü, 1963), including Yin Wen Tzu, Teng Hsi Tzu, Kung-sun Lung Tzu, pp. 1-90; *Sun Tzu shih chia chu* (Kuo-hsueh chi-pen ts'ung-shu ed.); Yin-ch'ueh-shan Han-mu chu-chien cheng-li hsiao-tsu, ed., *Sun Tzu ping-fa* (Peking: Wen-wu, 1972), including Sun Wu and Sun Pin and *Wu-wen*. It should be noted that some scholars considered *Wen-tzu* a Taoist work (also Li Ting-sheng and Hsu Hui-chün). See Hsiung T'ieh-chi, *Ch'in-Han hsin Tao chia*, 2d ed. (Shanghai: Jen-min, 2001), pp. 41-56; Hsiung also holds that the work was written during the late Chan-kuo and early Han times. On "Wu-hsing" and related issues, see Ku Chieh-kang, *Ku-shih lun-wen-chi* (Peking: Chung-hua, 1996), pp. 254-478; Ching-men shih po-wu kuan, ed., *Kuo-tien Ch'u-mu chu-chien* (Peking: Wen-wu, 1998), pp. 29-35 (plates), pp. 147-51 (text in modern Chinese); Ch'en Sung-chang, "Ma-wang-tui po-shu hsing-te," *Wen-wu*, N. 526 (2000): 75-84. *Kuo-yü* (ku-chi, 1978 ed.), pp. 641-59.

76. See my views on the First Emperor's thought in the prologue to this volume; Yü Tsung-fa, *Yun-meng Ch'in-chien ssu-hsiang yü chih-tu* (Taipei: Wen-chin, 1992). The "E-chün chieh," dated 323 B.C., was unearthed in Shou-hsien of Anhui in 1957. It shows that the Ch'u state instituted Legalist control of travel such that even high officials were not allowed to travel without special passports or permits. This means that Legalism and other ideological doctrines coexisted even in the state of Ch'u, which was the home of Taoism. The Yun-meng documents also show the same ideological synthesis of Legalism, Confucianism, Taoism, and Mohism in the Ch'in empire under Shih huang-ti in the 210s B.C. See Kuo Mo-jo, *Wen-shih lun-ts'ung* (Peking: Jen-min, 1961), pp. 333-43. See also the ideological varieties in the Ch'u documents unearthed in Kuo-tien, in *Kuo-tien Ch'u-mu chu-chien* (cited in note 75 above). For a discussion of the stele inscriptions of Ch'in Shih huang-ti, see a new work by Martin Kern, *The Stele Inscriptions of Ch'in Shih-huang* (New Haven: American Oriental Society, 2000).

77. The study and understanding of the Huang-Lao doctrines and the history of Huang-Laoism are very complex and controversial issues. My views presented here are based on my research and differ from those of other scholars. Details are presented in my article "Chien-po wen-shu yü ku-tai ssu-hsiang chih hsin-yen." The sources (primary and secondary) are too numerous to list here, and my logic is too technical to present in this chapter. For the change of image of Huang Ti (Yellow Emperor) in the fourth century B.C., see Hsu Chung-shu, *Shang-ku shih-kang*, pp. 144-204 (articles originally published in 1933, 1934); Kuo Mo-jo, *Liang-Chou chin-wen ta-hsi k'ao-shih*, pp. 219-22. Hsu also holds, and correctly so, that the Five Gods (Wu-ti) were originally the ancestors of different peoples in ancient China and were gradually sacralized. Michael Puett has written a book on the process of self-divinization in early China (*To Become a God: Cosmology, Sacrifice, and Self-Divinization in Early China* [Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

2002]). See also Yang Shu-ta, *Chi-wei chü hsian-hsueh chin-shih lun-ts'ung* (reprint; Taipei: Ta-t'ung, 1971), pp. 271-82; Hsia Tseng-yu, *Chung-kuo ku-tai shih* (reprint; Taipei: Shang-wu, 1963), pp. 338-40; Wang Shu-min, "Huang Lao k'ao," in *Tung-fang wen-hua*, vol. 13 (1975), pp. 146-53. On the dating of *Ching-fa*, I believe that the pieces in the collection were written after 235 B.C. but before 156 B.C. It is more of *Tsa-chia* (school of eclecticism) than of *Tao-chia* (Taoism). Detailed arguments for these points are presented in the article cited above.

78. The rise and development of New Confucianism from the third to the mid-second centuries B.C. are examined in detail in "Chien-po wen-shu yü ku-tai ssu-hsiang hsin-yen." My views presented here are a summary of that article, with detailed sources and textual criticisms. It should also be pointed out here that the New Confucianism discussed here has been generally referred to as Han Confucianism and Tung Chung-shu has incorrectly been considered to be its most important architect.

79. I date Tung Chung-shu's response to the emperor's edict 135 B.C., because that year Empress Tou died and the emperor began his independence at the age of twenty-one. For Ssu-ma Hsiang-ju and Tung Chung-shu, see HS (1962), pp. 1137, 1311-33, 2459-2612, 2498-2526, with all the editions compared. Tung Chung-shu's thought, writings, and life all are under debate among scholars. Here I have based my narrative on the *Han-shu* only for my interpretation of this critical issue in Han history and Chinese history in general. *Shih-chi* 121 (pp. 3115-29, esp. 27-29) were also compared. The two sources are the most authentic primary materials, while later writings and the book *Ch'un-ch'iu fan-lu* are of questionable authenticity and hence are not listed here. The numerous studies on Tung Chung-shu and the book are also excluded. However, as background information, see *Ku-shih pien*, vol. 5; Ku Chieh-kang, *Han-tai te fang-shih yü Ju-sheng*, pp. 43-50; Yang Hsiang-k'uei, *Hsi-Han ching-hsueh yü cheng-chih* (Chungking: Tu-li ch'u-pan she, 1945), pp. 58-71; and Chou Fu-ch'eng, *Lun Tung-shu ssu-hsiang* (Shanghai: Jen-min, 1961), esp. pp. 1-60. For the Confucian theory of social class (mind versus hand), see *Meng-tzu* (*Chi-chu* ed.), p. 259. For the textual differences between the *Shih-chi* and *Han-shu*, see Hsu So-fang, *Shih Han lun-kao* (Kiangsu: Ku-chi ch'u-pan she, 1984), pp. 289-91. For the issue of the emperor and T'ien-hsia (All under Heaven), see the prologue and two general studies of the idea: Abe Takeo, *Chügokujin no tenka kannen* (Tokyo: Hābādo Enkei Dōshisha, 1950) and Hsing I-t'ien, *Ch'in-Han Shih lun-kao* (Taipei: Tung-ta, 1987), pp. 3-59. An earlier, classic study of early Han Confucianism, with an enormous amount of materials translated from primary Han texts should also be mentioned here: John K. Shryock, *The Origin and Development of the State Cult of Confucius* (New York and London: Century, 1932), esp. pp. 21-63. See also the works of Ku Chieh-kang and Yang Hsiang-k'uei cited in note 59. For Tung Chung-shu and the *Ch'un-ch'iu* (and the writing and ideas of the *Ch'un-ch'iu fan-lu*), see Sarah A. Queen, *From Chronicle to Canon: The Hermeneutics of the Spring and Autumn according to Tung Chung-shu* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), esp. pp. 115-240; and Karen Turner Gottschang, "Chinese Despotism Reconsidered: Monarchy and Its Critics in the Ch'in and Early Han Times" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1983). See also Roger Ames, *The Art of Rulership: A Study in Ancient Chinese Political Thought* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983), esp. 1-27; and Michael Loewe, *Divination, Mythology, and Monarchy in Han China* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), and *Crisis and Conflict in Han China* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1974). The origins of the uniqueness of the sovereign as the ultimate authority of the unified T'ien-hsia goes back to the idea of the *ti* as the upholder of the cosmological order in the fourth century

B.C. See the prologue for a detailed discussion of this issue. Ch'in Shih-huang inherited it, and Han Wu-ti elaborated and made full use of it.

80. See SC (1959), pp. 452 ff., 1178-79, 1381-1404; HS (1962), pp. 162-69, 174-212; Hsu T'ien-lin, *Hsi-Han hui-yao*, pp. 62-134.

81. See HS (1962), 739-40. For modern studies of the Ch'in origin of the system of aristocratic ranks and its practice under the Han, see T'ao Hsi-sheng and Shen Chü-ch'en 1936, pp. 235-36; Tseng Tzu-sheng 1942, pp. 262-66; Nishijima Sadao 1961, pp. 70-71; and Liao Pai-yuan 1973, pp. 98-103. For a more recent study of the system, the differences between the Ch'in and Han orders and titles, and the changes in early Han times, see Liu Ch'un-fan, *Ch'in-Han feng-kuo shih-i ssu-chueh chih*, pp. 120-38. As noted in earlier discussions, the Han inherited their institutions and ideas from divergent sources. The Ch'in empire was the most important among all such sources, but even the short-lived Ch'u under Hsiang Yü and the earlier Ch'i of the Eastern Chou era also contributed to the Han political and legal systems. See two recent studies: Pu Hsien-ch'ün, "Ch'in-chih, Ch'u-chih, yü Han-chih," *Chung-kuo shih yen-chiu* 1 (1995): 45-53; and Ch'en Nai-hua, "Ch'i-kuo fa-chih tui Han-chih te ying-hsiang," *Chung-kuo shih yen-chiu* 2 (1997): 38-44. For a different view on "the idea of social classes in Han and pre-Han China," see Derk Bodde's article in *Thought and Law in Qin and Han China*, ed. W. L. Idema and E. Zürcher (Leiden: Brill, 1990), pp. 26-41.

82. HS (1962), pp. 54, 85, 739-40; *Chang-chia shan Han-mu chu-chien*, pp. 173-75. Also see HS (1962), p. 1160, for Yen Shih-ku's commentary on the rank of *wu ta-fu*. For a more detailed discussion of some of these issues, see Tseng Tzu-sheng 1942, vol. 2, pp. 268-70; Ch'en Chih, *Liang-Han ching-chi shih-liao lun-ts'ung*, p. 14; Nishijima Sadao, *Erh-shih teng chueh-chih* (Chinese translation) (Peking: Kuo-chi wen-hua ch'u-pan she, 1992). In his commentary on the rank of *pu-keng* in HS 14 (1962), p. 740, Yen explains that *pu-keng* means "not liable to service." This is a mistake. Perhaps it was true during the Ch'in dynasty. The Ch'in and Han systems of aristocratic ranks have been under discussion since the Han dynasty. There is no reason to cite all the important sources and secondary studies. But the authorities quoted earlier are among the most important, and my interpretation here also represents a new approach.

83. HS (1962), pp. 1127-35.

84. *Ibid.*, pp. 739-40, 1165. See also notes 54 and 86.

85. It should be pointed out here that the meaning and status of the *shih-wu* class have been under debate since the Han dynasty. My view here is further supported by the newly discovered "Erh-nien lü" from a tomb (186 B.C.) in Chang-chia shan in Hupei (cited earlier). The "Erh-nien lü" placed *shih-wu* with *shu-jen* (commoners) and *kung-tsu* (commoner-soldier) in the same class as those receiving only 100 *mu* (Han acres) of land, whereas the bottom-ranked order of *chueh* (people granted aristocratic ranks) received 150 *mu*. Thus, members of the *shih-wu* class in early Han times were treated as commoners, which differs from the Ch'in system, in which *shih-wu* were referred to as people in the regular network of household registration and organization, were given some privileges, and qualified for appointments as low-ranking officers as recorded in the Ch'in laws (before 217 B.C.) uncovered in Shu-hu-ti in Hupei (cited earlier). See *Chang-chia shan Han-mu chu-chien*, doc. 316 on p. 176, doc. 362 on p. 181; *Shu-hu-ti Ch'in-mu chu-chien*, p. 107; and Hsu T'ien-lin, *Hsi-Han hui-yao*, p. 360.

It should further be remarked that the "Erh-nien lü" grouped *wu-ta-fu* (ninth rank) and above as a high-ranking class, whose members received over 7,400 *mu* of land. This classification was made under Emperor Hui (r. 195-188 B.C.). Thus, the *erh-nien* (sec-

ond year) in the "Erh-nien lü" may also have referred to the second year of Emperor Hui's reign (193 B.C.), not necessarily the second year of Empress Lü's, 186 B.C., as has been assumed by many experts. Thus, the events dated after 194 B.C. in the document may have been added to the old text in the process of coping by the owner of this document before his death in 186 B.C. The *shih-wu* issues will be further examined in volume 2: *Frontier, Immigration, and Empire in Han China*.

86. For a detailed analysis of these issues, see Huang Liu-chu, *Ch'in-Han shih-chin chih-tu* (Sian: Hsi-pei ta-hsueh, 1985), pp. 81-241; *Liang-Han Chiao-yü chih-tu shih tzu-liao* (Peking: Pei-ching Shih-fan ta-hsueh, 1983), pp. 9-107; Tseng Tzu-sheng 1968, pp. 289-324; and An Tso-chang and Hsiung T'ieh-chi, *Ch'in-Han kuan-chih shih kao* (Chinan: Ch'i-Lu shu-she, 1984-85), vol. 2, pp. 304-59, 419-39. See also Franklin Hou, "The Civil Service Recruitment of the Han Dynasty," *Tsing Hua Hsueh Pao*, new ser., 1 (1956): 138-64.

87. HS (1962), p. 1165. For the Ch'in system of *li*, see *Shu-hu-ti Ch'in-mu chu-chien* (*Pien-nien chi*), p. 6; Hsu T'ien-lin, *Hsi-Han hui-yao*, p. 360; HS (1962), p. 742; and Hsu Shen, *Shuo-wen chieh-tzu*, p. 315 (*li*, *shih*). See also *Chang-chia shan Han-mu chu-chien*, docs. 474-86 on pp. 203-5.

88. All of these people come up for discussion later.

CHAPTER 2

1. SC (1959), 2719. The English translation follows Burton Watson, trans., *Records of the Grand Historian of China*, 2 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 289 (hereafter Watson), with a few modifications and corrections. *Shan-yü*, meaning "great, immense," is the title of a Hsiung-nu ruler. A detailed discussion of this and other Hsiung-nu terms is given in Ho Chien-min, *Hsiung-nu min-tsu k'ao* (Shang-hai: Chung-hua, 1939), esp. pp. 17-19. See also Uchida Gimpu, *Hoku Ajia shi kenkyu* (Kyoto: Dōbōsya, 1975), pp. 87-91. The matter of *ho-ch'in* is also briefly discussed in Yü Ying-shih, *Trade and Expansion in Han China* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 10-12, 40-43. For a detailed study of the P'ing-ch'eng siege, see Maeda Masana, *Heijō no rekishi chirigakuteki kenkyū* (Tokyo: Kazama Shobō, 1979).

2. Owen Lattimore has elaborated on the character of the Hsiung-nu's way of life on the steppes and its importance to the growth of their power. He has also discussed the significance of their lifestyle as a factor in the history of China in this and later periods. See Owen Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (Boston: Beacon 1962; originally published in 1940 and rev. in 1951 by American Geographical Society of New York), pp. 462-89.

3. Shen Wei-hsien, *Ch'ien-Han Hsiung-nu piao*, in *Pu-pien*, pp. 1753-74, 1755; SC 4523; Watson, vol. 2, 166-67. Most of the *ho-ch'in* records were also translated by J. J. M. de Groot in *Die Hunnen der vorchristlichen Zeit* (Berlin: Verlag von Walter de Gruyter, 1921), esp. pp. 63-102 (with detailed notes); and by Alexander Wylie, in "History of the Heung-no in Their Relations with China," *Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland*, 3 (1874): esp. pp. 412-23 (with useful notes). But neither de Groot nor Wylie provided interpretations of these records.

4. Shen Wei-hsien, p. 1755; SC 4524; HS (1962), 3755.

5. SC 4525-26; cf. Watson, vol. 2, 167-68.

6. SC 4527-28; cf. Watson, vol. 2, 169-70.

7. SC 4529.

8. Ibid., 4523-37; Watson, vol. 2, 173-75.
9. SC 4537; Watson, vol. 2, 175.
10. SC 4537.
11. HS (1962), 140. For the name of T'ao Ch'ing, the original text reads *Ch'ing-ti* instead of Ch'ing. Yen Shih-ku (A.D. 581-645), Ch'en Tsan (probably Hsueh Tsan, fl. late fourth century A.D.), and others maintained that Ch'ing-ti should read Ch'ing. Homer H. Dubs, however, holds that the reading of Ch'ing-ti is correct and that there was an imperial secretary named T'ao Ch'ing-ti. (Dubs, vol. 1, 310.) I have followed Yen and Tsan for reasons given later.
12. HS (1962), 141.
13. Ibid., 144.
14. SC 4538.
15. SC (1959), 2904.
16. Shen Wei-hsien, 1758; HS (1962), 2398; SC (1959), 2912-13.
17. To this list should be added the official seal bestowed upon the *shan-yü* by the Han emperor. But this institution, which was initiated in the third year of the Kan-lu period of Emperor Hsuan (51 B.C.), does not appear in earlier records. By receiving this seal, the *shan-yü* also became a *k'o-ch'en* (guest vassal) of the Han Court. For a detailed discussion of these points, see Kurihara Tomonobu, *Shin-Kan shi no kenkyü* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kō bunkan, 1960), pp. 194-201, 229-42. Clearly this new term, *ho-ch'in*, indicates Han superiority over the Hsiung-nu and signifies the lord-vassal relationship between the two countries, that resulted from the Hsiung-nu campaigns during Wu-ti's reign. The meaning of *ho-ch'in* differs significantly, then, from what has been discussed in this study.
18. The material sent to the Han by the Hsiung-nu included (1) animals, particularly rare domestic animals (mules, donkeys, camels, and horses [dapples, bays, and prancing mounts]), (2) luxuries (sable, marmot, fox, and badger furs, colored rugs, and decorated carpets), and (3) precious materials (auspicious jade stones, corals, and crystals). See YTL, pp. 12, 105; Essen M. Gale, trans., *Discourses on Salt and Iron*, pp. 14-15, 92; Egami Namio, *Yurashia kodai hoppo bunka Kyodo bunka ronko* (Kyoto: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1948), pp. 177-224; and E. G. Pulleyblank, "The Hsiung-nu Language," *Asia Major*, new ser., 60, no. 2 (December 1962): 239-65, references on pp. 245-46, 250-51. In formulating the framework of my analysis, I have benefited from the classic study of the forms and functions of exchanging gifts in archaic societies by Marcel Mauss, *The Gift*, trans. Ian Cunnison (New York: Norton, 1967).
19. On Kung-sun Hung (ca. 200-121 B.C.), a chancellor, see HS 58 (1962), p. 2613. Perhaps he led a cultural mission.
20. Ibid., 759-65; SC (1959), 2685. Ts'ao held the hereditary title of marquis of K'ai-feng. See HS (1962), 599. It is interesting to note that Han diplomacy was not much different from the "old diplomacy," as analyzed by Sir Harold Nicolson in his celebrated *Diplomacy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 28-40, esp. 30-31.
21. For this problem, see also Egami Namio, *Yurashia kodai hoppo bunka Kyodo bunka ronko*, pp. 3-121. At this time, the amount of clothing materials and food that the Han gave the Hsiung-nu during the period from 198 to 133 B.C. was not recorded in the Han literature. The Han influence on Hsiung-nu life exerted through *ho-ch'in* will be discussed later.
22. In contrast to this, later *ho-ch'in* agreements with the Wu-sun were more productive. The Han princesses sent to the Wu-sun had kept close connections with the Han

Court, and one princess, with the support of the court, even became a powerful political figure in Wu-sun. It must be pointed out that *ho-ch'in* agreements with the Wu-sun were simpler than those with the Hsiung-nu, containing only three items: (1) a princess of the imperial house was to be sent in marriage to the king of the Wu-sun, (2) the Han emperor and the Wu-sun king were to be as brothers to one another, and (3) the two nations were to form an alliance against the Hsiung-nu. It is clear that the structure of the Han-Wu-sun *ho-ch'in* treaties followed the basic form of the Han-Hsiung-nu treaties. For Han-Wu-sun relations, see HS 96b, pp. 1658-61.

23. SC (1959), 2901-3899.

24. Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, p. 468.

25. See the debate between Chung-hang Yueh and the Han envoys in *Shih-chi* 110; *Han-shu* 94A: SC (1959), 2899-901; and HS (1962), 3760.

26. Shen Wei-hsien, pp. 1755-58; SC (1959), 2895-905; HS (1962), 3754-65. It should be noted that some *chün* in this table were established at later dates. For example, T'ien-shui was formed in 114 B.C., as was An-ting. The biography of Ch'ao Ts'o in the *Han-shu* indicates that the Hsiung-nu invaded Lung-hsi three times during Empress Lü's reign, but the *Kao-hou chi* (Annals of the Empress of Kao-ti) in the *Han-shu* mentions only two such invasions. See HS (1962), p. 99.

27. HS (1962), 129. The English translation follows Dubs, vol. 1, 263-64, with revisions.

28. SC (1959), 2917. The English translation follows Watson, vol. 2, 190.

29. HS (1962), 2230, 2240-42, 2265. Details of the "three standards and five baits" are given by Yen Shih-ku (A.D. 581-645) in his commentary on the *Han-shu*. A much more elaborate version can be found in the *Hsin-shu*, attributed to Chia I. See Shih-chieh shu-chü, *Chung-kuo ssu-hsiang ming-chu* ed. (Taipei: Shih-chieh shu-chü, 1955), pp. 29-30. For a discussion of textual problems in the book, see Chun-shu Chang 1968, pp. 710-11; Wei Chien-kung et al., "Kuan-yü Chia I 'Hsin-shu' chen-wei wen-t'i te t'an-so," *Pei-ching ta-hsueh hsueh-pao, jen-wen k'o-hsueh, wen-hsueh p'ien*, 3d *chi* (reprint; Nagoya, Japan, 1967; originally published in 1961), pp. 307-14; Chang Hsin-ch'eng, *Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao*, 2 vols. (Shanghai: Shang-wu, 1954), pp. 634-37; Ch'en Wei-liang et al., *Chia I yen-chiu* (Hong Kong: Ch'iu-ching yin-wu she, 1958), pp. 1-30; Ch'i Yü-chang, *Chia Tzu t'an-wei* (Taipei: San-min, 1969), pp. 27-44; and Tai Chün-jen, *Mei-yuan lun-hsueh chi* (Taipei: I-wen yin-shu kuan, 1970), pp. 258-63.

For a recent examination of the "*san-piao wu-erh*," see Yang Lien-sheng, "Notes on the Chinese World Order," in *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations*, ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 20-33; and Yü Ying-shih, *Trade and Expansion in Han China*, pp. 36-37.

30. In using the term *charisma*, I follow Max Weber's definition. See Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, ed., with an introduction, by Talcott Parsons (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 358-59, and *On Charisma and Institution Building: Selected Papers*, ed., with an introduction, by S. N. Eisenstadt (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), esp. pp. 18-27. An excellent discussion of this term can be found in Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber, an Intellectual Portrait* (New York: Anchor, 1960), pp. 88, 299.

31. For a discussion of these psychological terms, see Gordon W. Allport, *The Nature of Personality: Selected Papers* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), pp. 142-46, 155, and "What Units Shall We Employ?" in *Assessment of Human Motives*, ed. Gardner Linzey (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957), pp. 239-60.

32. An example is the propaganda techniques used by Germany during World War

II. See J. S. Bruner, "The Dimensions of Propaganda: German Shortwave Broadcasts to America," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 36 (1941): 311-37.

33. SC (1959), 282; HS (1962), 2242. It is interesting to note that both Chia and Ch'ao were greatly influenced by *The Art of War*. For this side of Ch'ao Ts'o (ca. 200-154 B.C.), an imperial secretary, see SC (1959), 2279-80.

34. For Sun Wu and Sun Pin, see SC (1959), 2161-65. For the original composition and early circulation and influence of the two classics on war, see Chan Li-po, "Lüeh-t'an Lin-i Han-mu chu-chien *Sun Tzu ping-fa*," *Wen-wu* 12 (1974): 13-19; Tsun Hsin, "Sun Pin *ping-fa* te tso-che chi shih-tai," *Wen-wu* 12 (1974): 20-24; Chan Li-po, "Sun Tzu *ping-fa* ts'an-chien chieh-shao," *Wen-wu* 3 (1974): 40-46; Jen Chi-yü, "Sun Pin *ping-fa* te che-hsueh ssu-hsiang," *Wen-wu* 3 (1974): 47-55; introductory remarks in *Chu-chien ping-fa*, ed. Ho-Lo t'u-shu ch'u-pan she (Taipei, 1975); articles by Chan Li-po and Wu Shu-p'ing in *Sun Tzu ping-fa*, ed. Yin-ch'üeh-shan Han-mu chu-chien cheng-li hsiao-tsu (Peking: Wen-wu, 1976); Kuo Hua-ju, *Sun Tzu chin-i* (Shanghai: T'ai-p'ing, 1977), esp. pp. 1-30; and *Shih-i chia chu Sun Tzu* (reprint; Hong Kong, 1966), pp. 267-69. The *Sun Pin ping-fa* disappeared after the Han dynasty. Some important parts of the book, written on bamboo slips, were discovered in a Han tomb at Yin-ch'üeh-shan in Lin-i District of Shantung in April 1972. The rediscovery of the *Sun Pin ping-fa* and part of the text of *Sun Tzu ping-fa* on bamboo slips in the same tomb has cleared up the long-standing controversy over the authorship and authenticity of the two most important ancient classics on war. The *Sun Tzu ping-fa* was translated into English by Lionel Giles as *Sun Tzu on the Art of War* (London: Luzac, 1910); by Samuel B. Griffith as *The Art of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963); and by Thomas Cleary as *The Art of War* (Boston: Shambala Publications, 1988). Sun Pin's book was translated and studied by Ralph D. Sawyer in *Military Methods by Sun Pin* (Boulder: Westview, 1995).

35. HS (1962), 1130. For the origin of this idea, see *The Doctrine of the Mean* in *The Chinese Classics*, ed. and trans. James Legge (reprint; Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1961), p. 409.

36. HS (1962), 1130. A fresh examination of this aspect has recently been done by Professor Lien-sheng Yang in *Money and Credit in China*, pp. 24-25, 26-27. See also Liu Pao-nan (A.D. 1791-1855), *Lun-yü cheng-i* (reprint; Hong Kong: Chung-hua, 1963), pp. 290-91.

37. HS (1962), 2282-83.

38. Biographies of Chia and Ch'ao are in the *Shih-chi* and *Han-shu*. See SC (1959), 2491-504 (Chia), 2745-48 (Ch'ao); HS (1962), 2221-66 (Chia), 2276-305 (Ch'ao); Watson, vol. 1, 508-16 (Chia), 527-32 (Ch'ao). For the works of the two, in addition to references given above, see *Han-shu* 24 (1962 ed., pp. 1127-35, 1153-57); and *Shih-chi* 6 (1959 ed., pp. 276-84). For studies of their political ideas and economic and social thoughts, see Hsiao Kung-ch'üan, *Chung kuo cheng-chih ssu-hsiang shih*, 6 vols. (reprint; Taipei, 1954), vol. 3, pp. 288-92 (Chia); Hou Wai-lu et al., *Chung-kuo ssu-hsiang t'ung-shih*, vol. 2, no. 1 (Peking: Jen-min, 1951), pp. 66-75 (Chia); Li Chien-nung, *Hsien-Ch'in Liang-Han ching-chi shih kao*, pp. 266-70 (Chia and Ch'ao); Ho Ling-hsu, "Chia I te cheng-chih ssu-hsiang ho cheng-ts'e," *Ssu-yü-yen* 4, no. 4 (November 1966): 20-26, 34, 43; T'ao Hsi-sheng, *Chung-kuo cheng-chih ssu-hsiang shih*, 4 vols. (reprint; Taipei: Shih-huo, 1954), vol. 2, pp. 67-77; Yao Shun-ch'in, *Ch'in-Han che-hsueh shih* (Shanghai: Shang-wu, 1936), pp. 24-53; Hu Chi-ch'uang, *Chung-kuo ching-chi ssu-hsiang shih*, vol. 2 (Shanghai: Jen-min, 1963), pp. 8-33; and Hsü Fu-kuan, *Liang-Han ssu-hsiang shih* (Taipei: Hsueh-sheng shu-chü, 1976), pp. 109-31.

For translations of Chia's and Ch'ao's works, see, in addition to Watson's work, H. A.

Giles, trans., *Gems of Chinese Literature: Prose* (reprint; Taipei: Ch'eng-wen, 1964), 68–75 (Ch'ao); William Theodore de Bary, ed., *Sources of Chinese Tradition*, vol. 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), 150–52 (Chia), 213–16 (Ch'ao); and Swann, *Food and Money in Ancient China*, 152–58 (Chia), 158–72 (Ch'ao).

39. Table 5 has been formulated on the basis of information in the *Shih-chi* and *Han-shu*. These two sources differ greatly, however. For example, certain names have the following alternate forms.

<i>Shih-chi</i>	<i>Han-shu</i>
Han T'ui-tang	Han Kuei-tang
Tzu Chün	Yü Chün
Lung Chiang	Lu Chiang
Wei Hsu	Lu Hsu Lu
P'u Ching	P'u Ta
Tai	Fan Tai
Lu T'o-fu	Lu T'o-chih

In some cases, the number of families granted as estates to the various marquises differ widely in the two works. The table represents a revision of each of these two sources on the basis of various commentaries and recent studies by Chinese and Japanese scholars. See HS (1962), 628–30, 639–41, 2061; SC (1959), 1005–6, 1018–21, 1027–28; Ch'ien Mu, *Shih-chi ti-ming k'ao* (Hong Kong: Lung-men, 1968), pp. 756, 761–65; and Yoneda Kenjirō, “Zen-Kan no Kyodo taisaku ni kansuru nisan no mondai,” *Toho Gaku* 19 (November 1959): 7–8.

40. HS (1962), 2492 (with Chao Hsin as an example). For a discussion of Hsiung-nu in the Han army, see Chun-shu Chang, “Military Aspects of Han Wu-ti's Northern and Northwestern Campaigns,” *HJAS* 26 (1966): esp. pp. 151–72. Yoneda Kenjirō (“Zen-Kan no Kyodo taisaku ni kansuru nisan no mondai,” p. 7) suggests that several thousand foreigners, including Hsiung-nu, were in the Han army during Emperor Wen's reign, but no evidence has been found to support this estimate. One should note that the total number of defected Hsiung-nu was not equal to the total number of Hsiung-nu in the Han army. The Han Court definitely did not wish to have all defected Hsiung-nu incorporated into the army.

41. HS 49 (1962), 2286. The earliest suggestion concerning the planned transfer of people from one part of the empire to another was made by Liu Ching in 198 B.C. Kao-ti transferred one hundred thousand powerful feudal magnates from the eastern region to the Kuan-chung (modern Shensi) area. See HS (1962), pp. 2123–24; and Hsu T'ien-lin, *Hsi-Han hui-yao* (Peking: Chung-hua, 1955), pp. 499–500.

The passage translated here is extremely obscure. Interpretations of many of its sentences have long been under debate. And the many commentators, including Yen Shih-ku (A.D. 581–645), Fu Ch'ien (ca. 125–95), Su Lin (fl. 220–26), Chang Yen (third century A.D.), Meng K'ang (180–260), Ch'en Tsan, and Ju Shun (fl. 189–265), have made confusing and contradictory remarks. The main reason for these disputes is that many key words in this essay have never been clearly understood. Fortunately, recent archaeological discoveries have enabled us to reconstruct the Han frontier establishments from the reigns of Emperor Wu and later emperors. I have greatly benefited from this new contribution in my translation. The essay now seems quite understandable. As has been

pointed out elsewhere, Ch'ao Ts'o's proposal later became the blueprint for Han frontier organizations. The rediscovery of these frontier outposts, therefore, has brought into historical view many of the institutions that cannot be found in the extant historical literature. See Chun-shu Chang 1966b, p. 187.

Part of this essay was translated by C. Martin Wilbur in his *Slavery in China during the Former Han Dynasty* (Chicago: Field Museum of Natural History, 1943), pp. 283-85. A complete but very inadequate and often incorrect translation is given in Dun J. Li, ed., *The Essence of Chinese Civilization* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1967), pp. 214-16.

42. For a discussion of the inner and outer walls of Han frontier outposts and a reconstruction of Han walled cities on the frontiers, see Chun-shu Chang 1966b, pp. 209-12, esp. pls. 1-3 on p. 211. The translation of these obscure sentences takes into account certain facts uncovered in these studies.

A Han *pu* (pace) equals 6 Han *ch'ih* (feet) or about 1.39 meters. Three hundred *pu* form 1 Han *li* (mile), which equals about 417 meters or about one-fourth of an English mile. Cf. Yang K'uan, *Chung-kuo li-tai ch'ih-tu k'ao* (Shanghai: Shang-wu, 1955), p. 50; Wu Ch'eng-lo, *Chung-kuo tu-liang-heng shih* (reprint; Taipei: Shang-wu, 1966), pp. 65, 76; Ch'en Meng-chia, "Mu-chih yü li-chih," *K'ao-ku* 1 (1966): 37, 42; and T'ien Shih, "Hsi-Han tu-liang-heng lüeh-shuo," *Wen-wu* 12 (1975): 80, 86.

43. *Hu-lo* is the same as *t'ien-t'ien*, the use of sand to cover surrounding areas so as to detect trespassers. First the brush was cleared away, then the soil was graded level, and finally it was spread with sand. If enemy forces came, they would leave footprints in the sandy fields and the settlers could follow their tracks. For a detailed discussion of this practice, see Chun-shu Chang 1963, pp. 428-32; Haneda Akira, "Tenden bengi," *TK* 1, no. 6 (August 1936): 35-38; Ho Ch'ang-ch'ün, "*Liu-sha chui-chien chiao-pu*," *T'u-shu chi-k'an* 2, no. 1 (1935): 1-18; Ch'en P'an, "Han-Chin i-chien Ou-shu," *CYYY* 16 (1947): 339-40; Lao Kan, "Shih Han-tai chih t'ing-chang yü feng-sui," *CYYY* 19 (1948): 511-13 (hereafter cited as Lao Kan 1948c); Lao Kan, *Chü-yen Han-chien k'ao-shih chih-pu* (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1960), pt. 2, pp. 42-43 (hereafter cited as Lao Kan 1960a); and Yang Lien-sheng, "Notes on Maspero's *Les documents Chinois de la Troisième Expédition de Sir Arel Stein en Asie Centrale*," *HJAS* 18, nos. 1-2 (June, 1955): 144-45 (n. 2).

44. For this interpretation of the term *fu-tso*, see Chun-shu Chang 1966b, pp. 172-73, and nn. 94-96 on pp. 230-31. For a recent discussion of slaves and convicts, see Yang Lien-sheng, *Les aspects économiques des travaux publics dans la Chine impériale* (Paris: Collège de France, 1964), pp. 19-27. See also Chang Cheng-lang, "Han-tai te t'ieh-kuan t'u," in *Li-shih chiao-hsueh*, vol. 1, pp. 17-22; Chang Cheng-lang, "Ch'in-Han hsing-t'u te k'ao-ku tzu-liao," in *Pei-ching ta-hsueh hsueh-pao*, *Jen-wen k'o-hsueh*, *Li-shih p'ien*, 2d chi (reprint; Nagoya, Japan, 1967; originally published in 1958), pp. 163-68; Ch'en Chih, *Liang-Han ching-chi shih-liao lun-ts'ung*, pp. 249-80; and Wu Jung-tseng, "Han hsing-t'u chuan chih tsa-shih," *K'ao-ku* 3 (1977): 193-96.

45. This part of Ch'ao Ts'o's memorial is not in his biography in the *Han-shu*. It is in the *Shih-huo chih* (*Han-shu* 24A). Nancy Lee Swann translated it but misplaced it under 178 B.C. See HS 24A (1962), pp. 1130-34; and Swann, *Food and Money in Ancient China*, pp. 166-70. A translation can also be found in de Bary, *Sources of Chinese Tradition*, pp. 213-16, which follows Swann's dating; and Giles, *Gems of Chinese Literature*, pp. 71-72. See also Shen Wei-hsien, p. 1757; SC (1959), 1419; and MH, vol. 3, p. 543.

46. HS (1962), 1134; Nancy Lee Swann, *Food and Money in Ancient China*, pp.

169-70. One *shih* equals 0.565 U.S. bushels (Dubs, vol. 1, p. 279). For a discussion of the Han orders of aristocratic rank, see Chun-shu Chang 1966b, pp. 185-92 and n. 129 on pp. 233-34; HS (1962), 739-40; and Nishijima Sadao, *Chugoku kodai teikoku no keisei to kozo* (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku shuppan-kai, 1961), pp. 70-78.

47. Detailed records of migrations in connection with northern frontier defense for this period cannot be found in the Han literature. The large-scale operation of obtaining grain for support of frontier migrants, together with generally large figures for population transfers during this period, often ranging from one to two hundred thousand households, suggests that rather large numbers of settlers were removed to the frontiers under the Ch'ao Ts'o plan. For the problem of population migration at this time, see Chun-shu Chang 1978, pp. 572-77. See also Hsu T'ien-lin, *Hsi-Han hui-yao*, pp. 499-500; and Lao Kan, "Liang-Han hu-chi yü ti-li chih kuan-hsi," CYYY 5, no. 2 (1935): 179-214, esp. 191-93, 197-99. The translation of Lao's article appears in E-tu Zen Sun and John de Francis, eds., *Chinese Social History* (Washington, DC: American Council of Learned Societies, 1956), pp. 83-102. See also Chun-shu Chang 1967a, p. 717.

48. HS (1962), 1133. Ch'ang Pi-te, "Hsi-Han te ma-cheng," *Ta-lu tsa-chih* 5, no. 3 (August 1952): 12; Lao Kan 1942a, 28. Also see Hsu T'ien-lin, *Hsi-Han hui-yao*, p. 591.

49. SC 101 (1959), 2746. The translation follows Watson, vol. 1, p. 528, with a few minor changes.

50. HS 49 (1962), 2300; HS 19 (1962), 725-26, 761; SC (1959), 2747. For detailed discussions of the office of the imperial secretary (*yü-shih ta-fu*), see Wang Yü-ch'üan, "An Outline of the Central Government of the Former Han Dynasty," HJAS 12 (1949): 147-50; T'ao Hsi-sheng and Shen Chü-ch'en [Shen Jen-yuan], *Ch'in-Han cheng-chih chih-tu*, pp. 91-97; and Tseng Ch'ien, *Chung-kuo cheng-chih chih-tu shih*, vol. 2 (Chung-king: Nan-fang yin-shu kuan, 1942), pp. 76-86. For more recent studies of this office, see Jui Ho-cheng, *Hsi-Han yü-shih chih-tu* (Taipei: Chia-hsin wen-hua chi-chin hui, 1964), pp. 1-74; Chou Tao-chi, *Han-T'ang tsai-hsiang chih-tu* (Taipei: Shang-wu, 1964), pp. 42-45; and Sa Meng-wu, *Chung-kuo she-hui cheng-chih shih*, pp. 252-61. See also Huang Pen-chi (*Chü-jen* of 1821), *Li-tai chih-kuan piao* (Shanghai: Chung-hua, 1965), pp. 2-3. The position of the imperial secretary was also a stepping-stone to that of the chancellor. Twenty-two of the forty-six chancellors of the Former Han period were promoted from imperial secretaries. See Hsu Chien (A.D. 659-729) et al., *Ch'u-hsueh chi* (compiled ca. 725, new ed. collated by Ssu I-tsu and others), 3 vols. (Peking: Chung-hua, 1962), pp. 288-89; and Chou Tao-chi, "Hsi-Han chün-ch'üan yü hsiang-ch'üan chih kuan-hsi," in CHS, pp. 14-15.

51. HS 24A (1962), p. 1135 and Yen Shih-ku's commentary on p. 1136; Hsu T'ien-lin, *Hsi-Han hui-yao*, p. 591; Swann, *Food and Money in Ancient China*, p. 172; SC (1959), 1419 and Ssu-ma Cheng's (fl. A.D. 713-42) commentary on the same page; MH, vol. 3, p. 544.

52. HS 19A (1962), 729; Hsu T'ien-lin, *Hsi-Han hui-yao*, p. 591. Details are from *Han-chiu-i* by Wei Hung (fl. A.D. 25-57), quoted by Ju Shun in his commentary on *Han-shu* 5 (HS [1962], 150). In his commentary on *Han-shu* 19A, Yen Shih-ku quoted a similar statement from the *Han-kuan-i* by Ying Shao (fl. 140-206). See HS (1962), 729. For these references, see also Wei Hung, *Han-chiu-i pu-i* (HK ed.), p. 3; and Ying Shao, *Han-kuan-i* (HK ed.), p. 14. Ying Shao's statement can also be found in the commentaries on Fan Yeh's (398-445) *Hou-Han shu* by Li Hsien (651-84) and others. See HHS (1965), p. 175. Wei Hung's statement also appeared in a slightly different form in Ou-yang Hsün (557-641) *I-wen lei-chü* (completed in 624; new ed. collated by Wang Shao-ying), 2 vols. (Shanghai: Chung-hua, 1965), p. 881. These statements were also quoted in ency-

clopedias of later dates. For different interpretations and dating of the event, see Wilbur, *Slavery in China during the Former Han Dynasty*, p. 405; Swann, *Food and Money in Ancient China*, p. 38; Dubs vol. 1, pp. 325-26; Wang Yü-ch'üan, "An Outline of the Central Government of the Former Han Dynasty," pp. 153-54; and MH, vol. 2, 517-18. A few of these government pastures and offices of the herdsmen are listed in the "Treatise on Geography" in the *Han-shu*. They include five government pastures and one office of herdsmen in Pei-ti, one pasture in the what was later Hsi-ho (part of modern Suiyuan), and one office in Liao-tung. See HS (1962), 1616, 1618, 1626. The total area of land of the thirty-six pastures was not recorded in Han sources nor in any later literature. It was speculated by both later and modern scholars that the Han system was followed by the T'ang (A.D. 618-907). At its height, the T'ang had fifty-seven government pastures along the northern and northwest borders. The amount of land covered by these pastures was considered to have been the same as under the Han system. The T'ang could raise 440,000 to 706,000 horses. I have calculated the size of the total T'ang land to be about 2,100 acres, with each pasture occupying 231 acres. This size can serve, until the discovery of a direct Han source, as a comparative scale for a general understanding of the Han system. (It should be noted that the Han wooden and bamboo documents have so far provided no new source for the Han system of government pastures, except for a couple of names.) For the T'ang system, see T'ang Chang-ju, *T'ang-shu ping-chih chien-cheng* (Peking: Chung-hua, 1962), pp. 109-12.

53. HS (1962), 147. See also Dubs vol. 1, p. 321; and MH, vol. 3, p. 544. A Han *ch'ih* (foot) is equal to 9.134 inches English measure or about 0.232 meters. According to Fu Ch'ien's commentary, when horses are in their tenth year the surfaces of their teeth become smooth. In a commentary on the *Han-shu* in reference to this matter, Meng K'ang gives the height of horses as "5 *ch'ih* [feet] and 6 *ts'un* [inches]" (HS [1962], 222). It seems that the number "six" (*liu*) was mistaken for "nine" (*chiu*) in the course of copying. An examination of the height of horses in the wooden documents from Chü-yen has shown that none older than ten years had a height less than 5 feet 8 inches. The wooden documents from Chü-yen further show that the Han people often confused the number six with the number nine in handwriting because the Chinese characters then were quite alike. See Chun-shu Chang 1963, 371-82, esp. 375-77. The matter of horses and mounted soldiers is discussed in detail in Chun-shu Chang 1963, pp. 29-53; and Chun-shu Chang 1966a, 167-69. The importance of cavalry horses in Chinese history is surveyed in an article by H. G. Creel, "The Role of the Horses in Chinese History," *American Historical Review* 70, no. 3 (April 1965): 647-72. The problems discussed here, however, are not touched upon in this article. See also Hsieh Ch'eng-hsia, *Chung-kuo yang-ma shih* (Peking: Nung-yeh, 1959), pp. 94-95.

54. See table 4; HS (1962), 150; and Shen Wei-hsien, p. 1758.

55. See table 4; Shen Wei-hsien, p. 1758; and HS (1962), 151 and Yen Shih-ku's commentary on the same page. *Ts'ai-kuan*, literally "skilled soldier," referred to a foot soldier. It was a special military term that has recently been clarified with certainty. See Ōba Osamu, "Zai kan ko," *Ryukoku Shidan* 36 (1952): 76-87; and Yang Lien-sheng, *Studies in Chinese Institutional History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 112-13. For a comprehensive discussion of the Han military system, see Chun-shu Chang 1963, pp. 184-200, 223-27.

56. Readers familiar with European history will readily recognize that I have borrowed the term *precarious balance* from the title of an outstanding work by the eminent German historian Ludwig Dehio, *The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Power Struggle*, trans. Charles Fullman (New York: Vintage, 1962).

57. HS (1962), 2240, 2398-99.

58. Ibid., 2240 (Chia I), 2278-79 (Ch'ao Ts'o), 2398-400 (Wang Hui).

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid., 2241-42.

61. Ibid., 2281.

62. Ibid., 2401-2.

63. According to Chu-fu Yen, the Ch'in statesman Li Ssu (280-208 B.C.) first mentioned these points about the character and fighting strength of the Hsiung-nu, and he quoted Li in support of his own opposition to a war against them (SC 4623-24). However, these words do not appear in the *Biography of Li Ssu* in the *Shih-chi* (pp. 3931-76), and they are unlikely to be Li Ssu's. Ch'eng Chin's antiwar stand also was mentioned only by Chu-fu Yen and cannot be found in other places. But in a court conference of 135 B.C., one year earlier than the memorial, Han An-kuo also mentioned these points in support of his opposition to Hsiung-nu war. Perhaps these points about the character and fighting power of the Hsiung-nu represented the general feeling about the difficulty of the Hsiung-nu problem and Chu-fu assigned their authorship to Li Ssu. See also HS (1962), 2799-801 (Chu-fu Yen), 2398-402 (Han An-kuo).

64. Han An-kuo argued this in 135 B.C. See HS (1962), 2399-400.

65. SC 4250-51 (Chi Pu), 4524.

66. HS (1962), 2401 (Han An-kuo), 2801 (Chu-fu Yen).

67. SC 4626-28 (Chu-fu Yen), 4251 (Chi Pu).

68. HS (1962), 2401 (Han An-kuo); SC, p. 4624.

69. HS (1962), 2800.

70. For example, see HS (1962), 2399.

71. SC 4525-26, 4250-51; HS (1962), 2398. The court conferences played a decisive role in Han relations with the Hsiung-nu and in other state affairs as well. For the structure and operation of Han court conferences, see Yang Shu-fan, "Hsi-Han chung-yang cheng-fu i-shih chih-tu," in CHS, pp. 39-43; Nagata Hidemasa, "Kandai no shugi," *Toho gakuho* 43 (March 1972): esp. 108-21; and Wang Yü-ch'üan, "An Outline of the Central Government of the Former Han Dynasty," pp. 173-79.

72. For a systematic analysis of these campaigns, see Chun-shu Chang 1966a, pp. 148-73, and app. 2 in this volume. See also HS (1962), p. 188.

73. Cf. Chun-shu Chang, 1966a, pp. 148-73; Lei Hai-tsung, "Chung-kuo te ping," *She-hui k'o-hsueh* 1, no. 1 (1935): 29-30; SC (1959), 2975-77, 2980-84, 2986-89, 2993-97; and HS (1962), 3839-42, 3853-59, 3860-63, 3864-67. It must be pointed out that two military campaigns, in 138 and 135 B.C. respectively, were conducted against Min-yueh (in modern Fukien) before the start of Wu-ti's great Hsiung-nu campaigns. But they were launched to stop Min-yueh's attacks on its neighboring states, Tung-ou and Nan-yueh, not with the purpose of conquering it. Because they clearly were not conquests, they are not included in this analysis. But if they were included the argument would still stand, for neither expedition resulted in the establishment of new provinces, as others did.

74. For brief but informative discussions of these problems, see Iriye Keishirō, *Chūgoku koten to kokusaihō* (Tokyo: Seibundō, 1966), pp. 1-31; and Kurihara Tomonobu, *Shin-Kan shi no kenkyū*, pp. 287-305.

75. The most comprehensive studies on these aspects are Liu Po-chi, *Ch'un-ch'iu hui-meng cheng-chih* (Taipei: Chung-hua ts'ung-shu, 1962); Chang Hsin-ch'eng, *Ch'un-ch'iu kuo-chi kung-fa* (Peking: Pei-ching, 1924); Fu Ch'i-hsueh, "Ch'un-ch'iu shih-tai te wai-

chiao," *She-hui k'o-hsueh lun-ts'ung* 10 (July 30, 1960): 149-97; Richard L. Walker, *The Multi-state System of Ancient China*; Iriye Keishirō, *Chūgoku koten to kokusaihō*, pp. 44-164; and W. A. C. H. Dobson, "Some Legal Instruments of China: The Ming and the Meng," in Wen-lin, ed. Chow Tse-tsung (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), pp. 269-82.

76. For a detailed description of diplomatic events of the Chan-kuo period, see Fu Ch'i-hsueh, "Chan-kuo shih-tai te wai-chiao," *She-hui k'o-hsueh lun-ts'ung* 11 (June 30, 1961): 253-305.

77. For a systematic analysis of the development of the concept of T'ien-hsia—a concept of great importance in the history of the Chinese worldview and political thought—in ancient China, see Abe Takeo, *Chūgoku in no tenka kannen*, esp. pp. 29-77.

78. To avoid misunderstanding, it must be pointed out again that the *ho-ch'in* policy in place from 198 to 135 B.C. was unique in its terms of equality. The *ho-ch'in* policy of later periods generally served the sinocentric world order.

79. See, for example, Jen Yü-ts'ai, *T'u-fan yü T'ang-ch'ao kuan-hsi chih yen-chiu* (Taichung: Tzu-li ch'u-pan she, 1971), pp. 14-78, esp. pp. 14-43; and Hsieh I-cheng, *Sung chih wai-chiao* (Shanghai: Ta-tung, 1935), pp. 13-59.

80. These figures are based on my estimate. Other scholars have given slightly different figures, but they all agree that the Han territory was smaller than that of the Hsiung-nu and that the Hsiung-nu population was in the millions. See Lü Ssu-mien, *Yen-shih cha-chi* (Shanghai: Jen-min, 1937), pp. 127-31; Ma Ch'ang-shou, *Pei-Ti yü Hsiung-nu* (Peking: San-lien, 1962), p. 27; and Lin Lü-chih, *Hsiung-nu shih* (Hong Kong: Hung-yeh, 1963), p. 33; Lin Kan, *Hsiung-nu shih* (Huhhot: Jen-min, 1979), p. 50. Lin Lü-chih holds that the Han territory was only one-fourth to one-fifth the size of the Hsiung-nu territory.

81. Needless to say, this is contrary to Karl A. Wittfogel's theory of oriental despotism, under which the ruler possesses "total power" and permits no effective constitutional or societal checks. See his *Oriental Despotism, a Comparative Study of Total Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), esp. pp. 101-60. For a critical evaluation of the theory in the context of early modern China (Sung, Yuan, and Ming), see F. W. Mote, "The Growth of Chinese Despotism: A Critique of Wittfogel's Theory of Oriental Despotism as Applied to China," *Oriens Extremus* 8, no. 1 (August 1961): 1-41. See also Chun-shu Chang, "Review of *Chinese Government in Ming Times: Seven Studies*, by Tilemann Grimm et al.," *American Historical Review* 75, no. 7 (December 1970): 2107.

82. Chun-shu Chang 1966b, p. 187; Chun-shu Chang, "Han-tai pien-sai li-tsu te jih-ch'ang kung-tso," *Shih-huo*, new ser., 1, no. 2 (May 1971): 10; Shih Nien-hai, "Han-tai tui Hsi-pei pien-chün te ching-ying," *Wen-shih tsa-chih* 2, no. 2 (March 1942): 37-38; Sun Yü-t'ang, "Hsi-Han te ping-chih," *Chung-kuo she-hui ching-chi shih chi-k'an* 5, no. 1 (March 1937): 46-49; Shimizu Taiji, "Kandai no tonden," *Toa keizai kenkyū* 14, no. 3 (July 1930): 4-6; Ōshima Riichi, "Tonden to daiden," *Tōyōshi kenkyū* 14, nos. 1-2 (July 1955): 3; and Nishijima Sadao 1961, pp. 144-47.

83. Chang Chün-yueh, *Li-tai t'un-t'ien k'ao*; Tseng Wen-wu, *Chung-kuo ching-ying Hsi-yü shih*; Ise Sentarō, *Chūgoku Seiki keieishi kenkyū*.

84. See appendix 2; and Chun-shu Chang 1966b.

85. As will be discussed later, internal changes and shifts of power in a nomadic empire such as the Hsiung-nu tremendously affected its relations with the agricultural, bureaucratic empire of the Han and later even caused the rise and fall of Chinese regimes. Ch'en Yin-k'o advanced a brilliant thesis of this view in 1940. See his *T'ang-tai*

cheng-chih shih shu lun kao (Preliminary Studies in the Political History of the T'ang Dynasty, 618–907) (reprint; Shanghai: Ku-chi ch'u-pan she, 1980; originally published in 1944), pp. 128–59. Later this thesis was followed and expanded by many scholars in such works as Thomas J. Barfield, "Inner Asia of Cycles of Power in China's Imperial Dynastic History," in *Rulers from the Steppe: State Formation on the Eurasian Periphery*, ed. Gary Seaman and Daniel Marks (Los Angeles: Ethnographics Press, University of Southern California, 1991), and *The Nomadic Alternative* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1993). See also Nicola Di Cosmo, "Ancient Inner Asian Nomads: Their Economic Basis and Its Significance in Chinese History," *Journal of Asia Studies* 53 (1994): 1092–1126.

CHAPTER 3

1. Edward Harper Parker, *A Thousand Years of the Tartars* (London: S. Low, Marston, 1895), pp. 1–51. The translation of Chinese (Han) terms, generally follows Wang Yu-ch'üan, "An Outline of the Central Government of the Former Han Dynasty," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* (HJAS) 12 (1949): 137–84; Charles O. Hucker, *Official Titles in Imperial China* (2 vols. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985); Hans Bielenstein, *Bureaucracy of Han Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). Some translations, however, are my own.

2. J. J. M. de Groot, *Die Hunnen der Vorchristlichen Zeit*, pp. 95–187.

3. Lei Hai-tsung, "Chung-kuo te ping," *She-hui k'o-hsieh* 1 (1935): 28–30.

4. William M. McGovern, *The Early Empires of Central Asia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1939), pp. 130–64. Compare, for example, his account of the campaigns of 128, 123, and 121 B.C. and note his characterizations of Emperor Ching as a capricious, narrow-minded, and niggardly ruler (p. 28).

5. Owen Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (reprint; New York: American Geographical Society, 1950; originally published in 1940 by the same publisher), pp. 484–87; Michael Loewe, "The Campaigns of Han Wu-ti," in *Chinese Ways in Warfare*, ed. Frank A. Kierman Jr. and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 67–122. Different aspects of the issue have been treated in a number of Chinese and Japanese works in recent years, which will be cited later in this book.

6. Part of the original version of this chapter was based on chapter 1 and the appendix in my 1963 Harvard dissertation "The Colonization of the Ho-hsi Region" (Chun-shu Chang 1963). Some parts of the dissertation were published under a different title in HJAS 26 (1965–66): 148–73. This chapter is completely based on my dissertation but has been greatly expanded.

7. In the biography of Wei Ch'ing in *Shih-chi*, the date of this expedition is given as the fifth year of the reign of Yuan-kuang (SC 111.2923).

8. SC 110 reads P'u Tuo (p. 2931); I have followed the reading in HS 17 (p. 648).

9. The original version in SC 110 reads *Fu-ma ssu-ts'ung*; HS 94 reads *Ssu-fu ts'ung-ma*. A similar usage in the Ch'ü-yen wooden documents supports the SC reading; see Yü Hao-liang, "Ch'ü-yen Han-Chien Chia-pien pu-shih," *K'ao-ku* 8 (1961): 451–52. It should be further noted that both SC and HS recorded 140,000 volunteers with their own horses, but some later sources changed this figure to 40,000. I have followed the earliest sources. See also *Li-tai chan-cheng shih*, vol. 3, pp. 180–81.

10. This follows HS 17. SC 110 has Hsing Shan.

11. HS 94A has a different reading.
12. Some commentators interpret “Han-hai” as a great sea of desert instead of a proper name; see SC, 4549, 4594.
13. This is according to HS 96B.3876. HS 17.660 puts Wang’s expedition in the fourth year.
14. Ibid., 61.2704. HS 6 and 94A read *jen* (men) instead of *ch’i* (or *chi*, meaning “horsemen”). According to information in HS 94A.3779, *ch’i* is the correct reading.
15. Ibid., 6, gives twenty thousand *jen*, but thirty thousand is the figure in 94A. Probably a figure of thirty thousand *ch’i* (horsemen) is intended; see note 14.
16. Ibid., 6. But 94A reads Mang Ma.
17. *Li-tai ko-tsu chuan-chi hui-pien* (Peking: Chung-hua, 1958), vol. 1, pp. 441, 472–73, and nn. 32–39 on p. 448. Hsü Sung suggests that Chü-mo, Shan-kuo, and Yen-ch’i are the other three countries; see Shih Chih-mien, *Han shih pien-i* (Taipei: Ta-lu tsa-chih, 1954), p. 29.
18. San-chün ta-hsueh, *Chung-kuo li-tai chan-cheng shih*, rev. ed., 18 vols. (Taipei: Li-ming wen-hua, 1980), vol. 3 (the most comprehensive study of the subject, with colored maps), esp. pp. 149–202; Kao Jui, *Chung-kuo chün-shih shih-lueh*, 3 vols. (Peking: Chün-shih k’o-hsueh ch’u-pan she, 1992), vol. 1, pp. 251–58; Huang Chin-yen, *Ch’in-Han chün-chih shih lun* (Nanchang: Chiang-hsi ch’u-pan she, 1993), pp. 222–23; Kuo Ju-huai et al., comp., *Chung-kuo chün-shih shih* (Peking: Chieh-fang chün ch’u-pan she, 1988), pp. 120–29.
19. A comprehensive study of this topic is given in Chun-shu Chang 1963, pp. 9–28.
20. See *ibid.*, pp. 36–37, pp. 51–52, nn. 65–67.
21. For a detailed discussion see *ibid.*, pp. 29–35.
22. For a detailed study of the horse administration in this period, see *ibid.*, pp. 37–38, p. 52, nn. 70–71.
23. See *ibid.*, pp. 184–200, pp. 223–27, nn. 236–68, where I give a detailed account of the Han military system based on early source materials and the research of modern scholars, especially Hamaguchi Shigekuni, Sun Yü-t’ang, Li Yuan-ch’eng, Lao Kan, Nishida Taichirō, Ōba Osamu, Nishimura Genyū, Yoneda Kenjirō, Henri Maspero, Yang Lien-sheng, and others. For the origins of the Han military system, see Kao Jui, *Chung-kuo shang-ku chün-shih shih* (Peking: Chün-shih k’o-hsueh ch’u-pan she, 1995), pp. 460–80.
24. Chun-shu Chang 1963, pp. 39–40; p. 53, nn. 76–78.
25. *Chan-kuo ts’e*, 3 vols. (Shanghai: Ku-chi, 1978 ed.), esp. pp. 655–68; SC, pp. 223–94, 1689–1864 (including all commentaries). San-chün ta-hsueh, *Chung-kuo li-tai chan-cheng shih*, pp. 149–274; Kuo Jui-huai and others, *Chung-kuo chün-shih shih*, vol. 4, pp. 63–77, 118–19; Kao Jui and others, *Chung-kuo chün-shih shih-lueh*, pp. 147–49; Kao Jui, *Chung-kuo shang-ku chün-shih shih*, pp. 468–76.
26. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Chun-shu Chang 1963, chap. 1; and chapter 1 in this volume.
27. See chapter 2 for a discussion of this issue.
28. In 166 B.C., Emperor Wen was recorded to have sent a thousand chariots with horsemen and foot soldiers totaling one hundred thousand to attack the Hsiung-nu. Some earlier sources and many modern scholars have interpreted this to mean that there were already one hundred thousand horsemen under Wen-ti (in the fourteenth year of his reign), but this is questionable. The *Han-shu* and *Shih-chi* texts under Wen-ti indicate

the total force of the Han army in this campaign and do not specifically mention the number of horsemen. Moreover, a thousand chariots would already have amounted to seventy-five thousand soldiers, which left only twenty-five thousand horsemen at the most. See HS, pp. 125-26, 3761-62; SC, pp. 428, 2901; and Ssu-ma Kuang, *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien* (Shanghai: Ku-chi, 1957), pp. 497-98.

29. See a discussion of this controversial issue in Chinese military history in Chun-shu Chang 1963, pp. 184-86; the prologue to this volume, especially the discussion of the Yun-meng documents and note 71; and volume 2, chapter 2, in this book. For the estimate of the total force of the Han army under Wu-ti, see chapter 1 of this volume. One modern scholar estimates that the Han army actually reached 1 million under Wu-ti. See Huang Chin-yen, *Ch'in-Han chün-chih shih lun*, pp. 222-23.

30. HS, pp. 727-28, 737-38; *Chung-kuo li-tai chan-cheng shih*, pp. 110-12; Chang Wei-hua, *Han-shih lun-chi*, rev. ed. (Chinan: Ch'i-Lu, 1980), pp. 101-2. Both the dating of establishment and the strength of force are my own estimates. A division (*pu*) with a high-ranking (equal-to-2,000 *shih*) colonel could command as many as seven to eight thousand soldiers. If that is the case, then the Eight Divisions could have had as many as sixty-four thousand men. Here I have taken the lowest possible figure. It should be clarified that the Han armed forces consisted of two contingents: the standing army and paramilitary soldiers recruited or drafted for both military and nonmilitary duties such as land cultivation and guard or garrison assignments. Some scholars have not made a distinction between the two and hence have estimated the Han military strength as much greater, eight hundred thousand to a million men (see Huang Chin-yen, *Ch'in-Han chün-chih shih lun*, pp. 221-22).

31. See the conclusion in this volume.

32. For a discussion and reconstruction of the organizational and command structure of the Han cavalry, see Yang Hung, *Chung-kuo ku ping-ch'i lung-ts'ung*, 2d rev. ed. (Peking: Wen-wu, 1986), pp. 97-101; Yang Hung et al., *Chung-kuo ku-tai p'ing-ch'i yü ping-shu* (Peking: Hsin-hua, 1993), pp. 54-57; Kuo Ju-huai et al., *Chung-kuo chün-shih shih*, pp. 75-78; Huang Chin-yen, *Ch'in-Han chün-chih shih lun*, pp. 207-11, 229-32; Kao Jui, *Chung-kuo shang-ku chün-shih shih*, pp. 247-51. These studies are based on both literary records and archaeological sources, particularly Yang Hung's, which include pottery cavalry figures discovered in Yang-chiao wan of Hsien-yang in 1977 (tomb 4 of Emperor Wen's time), Shih-tzu shan of Hsu-chou (Kiangsu) in 1984, and Sian (Emperor Ching's tomb area) in May 1990. My reconstruction of the Han cavalry command structure is partly based on my own review of the Yang-chia wan and Sian discoveries. See also Shensi Wen-kuan hui, "Hsien-yang Yang-chia wan Han-mu fa-chueh chien-pao," *Wen-wu* 10 (1977): 10-16 and pls.; and Chan Li et al., "Shih-t'an Yang-chia wan Han-mu ch'i-ping yung," *Wen-wu* 10 (1977): 22-26.

33. For a detailed examination of Han training handbooks and the military legal system, see Chun-shu Chang, "The Military Leadership in the Former Han Period," sec. entitled "The Written Word for Training in the Art of Warfare" and nn. 39, 40. See also Lan Yung-wei, *Ch'un-ch'iu shih-ch'i te pu-ping* (Peking: Chung-hua, 1979), pp. 131-47, discussion of the *Ssu-ma Fa*, 205-15 (a discussion of early training manuals and military treatises); and Wang Hsien-ch'en and Hsu Pao-lin, *Chung-kuo ku-tai ping-shu tsa-t'an* (Peking: Chan-shih ch'u-pan she, 1983), pp. 82-128 (discussion of military treatises). These two references have often been cited by Western scholars, but they are not learned works and should be used with caution, particularly regarding the authorship and textual authenticity of the ancient texts.

34. See Yang Hung, *Chung-kuo ku ping-ch'i lung-ts'ung*, pp. 18-29, 97-101; Yang Hung et al., *Chung-kuo ku-tai p'ing-ch'i yü ping-shu*, pp. 57-63; Kuo Ju-huai et al., *Chung-kuo chün-shih shih*, pp. 122-23; Chou Wei, *Chung-kuo ping-ch'i shih kao* (Shanghai: San-lien, 1957 and later editions), pp. 161-92; Chung Shao-i and Ch'eng Tung, *Chung-kuo ping-ch'i t'u-chi* (Peking: Chieh-fang chün ch'u-pan she, 1990), pp. 67-68, 84-86 (pls.); and Chung Shao-i, "Han-shih t'ieh-chien tsung-lun," *K'ao-ku hsueh-pao* 1 (1998): 35-59.

35. See the conclusion in this volume.

36. Although *military revolution* was not a new term, Michael Roberts (*The Military Revolution, 1560-1660* [Belfast: Queen's University Press, 1956]); and Geoffrey Parker ("The 'Military Revolution' in 1550-1660: A Myth?" *Journal of Modern History* 48 [1976]) made it an influential historical term meant to symbolize a new age in European history. See also Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1550-1800* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988) (a second edition was published in 1996); and William H. McNeil, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 110-12. In this study, I have made use of the concept of military revolution, but my historical approach, conclusions, and analytical perspectives are different from those of the authors cited here.

37. Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, p. 485.

38. See chap. 5 and the conclusion in this volume. For an account of the negotiations and submission of Shan-yü Hu-han-yeh in 52 B.C., see Ellis Tinios, "Pan Ku, the Hsiung-nu, and Han-shu 94," Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1988.

39. See appendix 2 in this volume.

40. See the conclusion in this volume; and HS, pp. 636-89, 766-91.

41. SC, pp. 3176-78; HS, pp. 636-89, 766-91, esp. 2699-703.

42. HS, pp. 211, 217, 791.

43. See SC, p. 253; and the prologue in this volume.

44. In an unpublished paper, "The Statesmanship of the *Ching-shih* Movement in the Late Ch'ing Period," I have discussed this subject as viewed by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Ting Wen-chiang (V. K. Ting), Wei Chü-hsien, and P'an Kuang-tan. Chang Chung-tung has examined the geographical distribution of the Han leaders in various fields and confirmed this point, too. See Chang Chung-tung, "Liang-Han jen-wu te ti-li fen-pu," *Ta-lu tsa-chih* 28, no. 1 (January 15, 1964). While the subject is enormously complex and exceptions do exist, the regional, natural, economic, and social environments and long-established local cultural and family traditions play a critical role in shaping the history and character of a nation.

CHAPTER 4

1. For the geography of Ho-hsi, see Bo Sommarström, *Archaeological Researches in the Edsen-gol Region, Inner Mongolia*, 2 vols. (Stockholm: Statens Ethnografiska Museum, 1956-58), vol. 1, pp. 1-5, and maps at the end of the book. Also see Aurel Stein, *Ruins of Desert Cathay*, 2 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1912), vol. 1, map showing portions of Sinkiang and Kansu, and vol. 2, map showing portions of the Kunlun Range and map showing portions of the Western and Central Nan-shan Range. Also useful is map 1 in this volume, which was drawn on the basis of a number of Chinese and Japanese sources. In 1982 and 1985, I twice surveyed the topography and other physical conditions of the corridor. Some of the figures are based on my measurements.

The Ch'in-Han local administrative unit, the *chün*, had varying connotations. Generally speaking, it was the highest local unit below the central government, and its institutional and functional (especially military) characteristics make the translation "commandery" most appropriate. Up to the early Han period, from Emperor Kao to Empress Lü (202–180 B.C.), "commandery" was still a valid translation for *chün*; from Emperor Wen to late in Emperor Wu's reign (ca. 180–90 B.C.), the number of *chün* increased from the original fifty-some in Emperor Kao's time up to the 90s B.C., and, except for the frontier and special regions, its military function was separate from that of the governor's office, having to do with security only. Therefore, a *chün* was equivalent to a "province" in modern times—the largest and highest local administrative unit. However, beginning late in Emperor Wu's reign, 100–87 B.C., a new and higher layer of local administration, the *chou pu* (regional division), gradually developed from an original legal and censorial institution headed by a regional inspector (*tz'u-shih*) to a unit of local administration above the *chün*, hence reducing the position of a *chün* to the equivalent of a prefecture. A *chou pu* usually oversaw three to ten *chün*. The middle position of regional inspector, with a rank of 600 *shih* (bushels) in annual salary, was gradually elevated to the high position of regional governor (*chou-mu*), with a rank of 2000 *shih*. The regional governor was in charge of all civilian, military, judicial, and financial affairs in his region. To sum up, the term *chün* should be thought of as a commandery if it is dated in the period from the Ch'in to the early Han (to about 180 B.C.), as a province from 180 to 90, and as a prefecture after 90. Since the four *chün* of Ho-hsi had been gradually established from 111–110 to 72, a uniform translation of *chün* as any one of these three terms would not be appropriate. I have chosen to leave the word untranslated when it is used in the context of *Ho-hsi Ssu-chün*. There has been no scholarly study of this issue, but a large number of primary and secondary sources that shed light on the evolution and political and institutional significance of *chou pu*, *tz'u-shih*, and *chou-mu* have been compiled since the Han dynasty. I have been benefited particularly from the *Ti-li chih* in the *Han-shu* (1962 ed.), pp. 1543–1640, 740; Wei Hung (fl. A.D. 25–57), *Han-kuan chiu-i* (*Ts'ung-shu chieh'eng* ed.), p. 7 (about the establishment of the thirteen *chou* or regions in 106 B.C. and each *tz'u-shih* with a fixed capital in a region [*yu ch'ang-chih so*]); Ku Chieh-kang, "Liang-Han chou-chih k'ao," *CYYY* 1, no. 2 (January 1935): 855–906; and Yen Keng-wang, *Chung-kuo ti-fang hsing-cheng chih-tu shih*, 2 vols. (Taipei: Chung-yang yen-chiu yuan, 1961), pp. 30–35, 67–72 (fourteen *chou pu*, including Ching-chi). Yen's work has followed but also revised Ku's seminal piece.

2. Ssu-ma Ch'ien (145–86 B.C.), *Shih-chi*. References are to *Shiki kaichū kō shō* (hereafter cited as SC), edited by Takigawa Kametarō, 10 vols. (Peking: Wen-hsueh kuchi k'an-hsing she, 1955), pp. 4510–12, 4965–66. Also see *Li-tai ko-tsu chuan-chi hui-pien* (hereafter cited as *Hui-pien*), ed. Chien Po-tsan et al. (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chū, 1958), vol. 1, pp. 15, 108–9. The population of the Yueh-chih at this time has been estimated at between 400,000 and 500,000 and that of the Wu-sun between 120,000 and 200,000. See Ch'en Liang-tso, "Ts'ung jen-k'ou t'ui-ts'e Ta Yueh-chih Wu-sun ku-ti," *Ta-lu tsa-chih* 37, no. 3 (August 15, 1968): 8–32.

3. SC, p. 4966; *Hui-pien*, p. 109; Pan Ku (32–92), *Han-shu*. References are to *Han-shu pu-chu* (hereafter cited as HS), edited by Wang Hsien-ch'ien (1842–1917), 2 vols. (Taipei: I-Wen Yin-shu Kuan, 1955), pp. 1239–40, 1658. According to William W. Tarn, the Sai were a Sacas (or Sakās) tribe. See his *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938), chap. 7, esp. pp. 276–79; 2d ed. (Cambridge, 1951), p. 532. A recent study of the Sai people in Central Asia is Taishan Yu (Yu T'ai-

shan), *A Study of Sakā History* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Asian and Middle East Studies, 1998), which is a revised translation of the author's *Sai-chung shih yen-chiu* (Peking: Chung-kuo she-hui k'o-hsueh ch'u-pan she, 1992). Yu holds that the Sai, or Sakās, were mainly made up of four tribes—the Asii, the Gasiani, the Tochari, and the Sacarauli. Late in the Han dynasty, they were scattered over several states, including Ta Yueh-chih, Ta-yuan, K'ang-chü, Yen-sai, Wu-sun, Chi-pin, and Wu-i-shan-li. See also Harold W. Bailey, *The Culture of the Sakās in Ancient Iranian Khotan* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Khotan will be discussed in a later chapter. A more recent comprehensive study of the physical anthropology of the Sakās and other peoples in ancient Central Asia is Han Kan-hsin, *Ssu-ch'ou chih-lu ku-tai chü-min chung-tsu jen-lei-hsueh yen-chiu* (Ürümqi: Xinjiang jen-min, 1993), esp. pp. 1-370, 378-413 (physical measurements of Sakās, Wu-sun, and Hsiung-nu). See also Victor H. Mair, ed., *The Bronze Age and Early Iron Age Peoples of Eastern Central Asia*, 2 vols. (Washington, DC, and Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Museum Publications, 1998), pp. 558-70; and Elizabeth Wayland Barber, *The Mummies of Ürümchi* (New York: Norton, 1999).

4. HS, pp. 1239-40. For the Hsiung-nu population at this time, see Hsieh Chien, "Hsiung-nu she-hui tsu-chih te ch'u-pu yen-chiu," CYYY 40, no. 2 (November 1969): 699-701.

5. SC, pp. 4975-76; HS, p. 1239. The most comprehensive study of the Wu-sun is Wang Ming-che and Wang Ping-hua, *Wu-sun yen-chiu* (Ürümqi: Sinkiang jen-min, 1983). The authors hold that *k'un-mo* and *k'un-mi*, pronounced as *kün-ming* in Turkic, were the titles of Wu-sun's ruler and meant "great heavenly ruler" (pp. 76-78). I have followed this understanding in my study here. The Wu-sun will be discussed in detail in a later chapter.

6. HS, pp. 1240, 1658; SC, pp. 4975-76.

7. Vol. 11, no. 1; vol. 12, nos. 1-2. Reprinted in the author's *Seikishi kenkyū* (hereafter cited as Shiratori 1941) (Tokyo, Iwanami Shōten, 1941), vol. I, pp. 1-67.

8. Vol. I, no. 1; vol. II, no. 1; and vol. III, nos. 1-2. Reprinted in Shiratori 1941, vol. 1, pp. 69-288.

9. Shiratori 1941, pp. 23, 29, 31, and 275. The date of Lao-shang's death is based on Ssu-ma Kuang (1019-1086), *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien* (Shanghai: Ku-chi ch'u-pan she, 1957), vol. 2, p. 505. The dates of the reigns of Hsiung-nu *shan-yü* are conveniently listed in Hsieh Chien 1969, app. 1. See also Lin Kan, *Hsiung-nu li-shih nien-piao* (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1984), pp. 293-96.

10. Reprinted in the author's *Tōzai kōtsūshi ronsō* (hereafter cited as Kuwabara 1933) (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1933), pp. 1-117.

11. Ibid., pp. 18-19, 22-23, 26-29.

12. Vol. 6, no. 3. Reprinted in the author's *Tōzai kōshō-shi no kenkyū* (hereafter cited as Fujita 1933) (Tokyo: Kō Shoin, 1933), vol. 2, pp. 45-96. The author indicated that the essay was completed on June 30, 1917. "Seiki kenkyū" (pt. 4), *Shigaku Zasshi* 38, no. 4 (April 1927): 253-359 (hereafter cited as Fujita 1927); references cited are on pp. 335-58.

13. Fujita 1933, pp. 58-59, 69, 84; Fujita 1927, pp. 351, 353, 355.

14. Yasuma Yaichirō, "Getsushi no seho ido ni tsuite," *Shigaku Zasshi* 43, no. 5 (1932): 101-13.

15. Uchida Gimpū, "Gesshi [Getsushi] no Bakutoria [Bactria] seni ni kansuru chiriteki nendai teki kōshō," *Tōyōshi kenkyū* 3, no. 4 (April 1938): 29-56; no. 5 (June 1938): 29-51; no. 6 (September 1938): 59-63. See also his *Kodai no Mōko* (hereafter

cited as Uchida 1950) (Tokyo: Fuzanbō, 1950). References cited are in Uchida (April 1938), pp. 40, 49, 53; and Uchida 1950, pp. 90-91, 136. According to Uchida, Mount Ch'i-lien in Han times was part of the eastern T'ien-shan Range located in the north-western part of the modern province of Kansu, probably in the modern Karluk Tag area. But the location of what was called Mount Ch'i-lien in later dynasties was different. It was in the border area of the prefectures of Chang-yeh and Chiu-ch'üan. See Uchida (September 1938), pp. 59-60.

16. Matsuda Hisao, *Kodai Tenzan no rekishi chirigaku teki kenkyū* (hereafter cited as Matsuda), (Tokyo: Waseda Daigaku, 1955), pp. 29-33. His argument is based on the *Shih-tao chih*, compiled by Liang Tsai-yen (fl. early seventh century A.D.). For a discussion of and an excerpt from the *Shih-tao chih*, see Wang Mo (eighteenth century A.D.), comp., *Han-T'ang ti-li shu ch'ao* (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chū, 1961), pp. 267-90. For another, more recent Japanese study of the history of the Yueh-chih, see Shigematsu Toshiaki, "Da Getsushi minzokushi zoko," *Shien* 61 (March 1953): 19-42, esp. pp. 19-23. It must be pointed out that all of these Japanese studies have made a comprehensive survey of Chinese works and of Western-language studies of the Yueh-chih and Wu-sun, including works by Édouard Chavannes, Otto Franke, Berthold Laufer, Sylvain Lévi, Paul Pelliot, Ferdinand P. W. von Richthofen, Aurel Stein, and many others.

17. Friedrich Hirth, "The Story of Chang K'ien, China's Pioneer in Western Asia," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 37, no. 2 (September 1937): 89-93, 133-34, 151, 152.

18. Sten Konow, *Kharoshthi Inscriptions*, Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum, vol. 2, pt. 1 (Calcutta: Government of India Central Publication Branch, 1929), pp. xlvii-lxxix (esp. liii-lvi, lviii-lx). A Chinese translation together with comments by Chang Cheng-lang appeared in his "Ta Yueh-chih min-tsu tsui-chin chih yen-chiu," *Yü-kung pan-yueh k'an* 5, nos. 8-9 (July 1936): 19-27. See also Sten Konow, "Notes on the Indo-Scythian Chronology," *Journal of Indian History* 12, no. 1 (April 1933): 8-17.

19. Feng Chia-sheng, "Ta Yueh-chih min-tsu chi-ch'i yen-chiu chih chieh-lun," *Yü-kung pan-yüeh k'an* 5, nos. 8-9 (July 1936): 1-18. For some of the older studies of the Yueh-chih and Wu-sun problems, also see Hsu Sung (A.D. 1781-1848), *Han-shu Hsi-yü chuan pu-chu* (preface 1829), in *Hsi-yü san-chung* (Peiping, n.d.), vol. 6, pp. 27a-27b, and vol. 7, p. 2a; Ting Ch'ien (1843-1919), *P'eng-lai-hsien ti-li hsueh ts'ung-shu*, 4 vols. (reprint; Taipei: Cheng-chung Shu-chū, 1962), vol. 1, pp. 191-92, "Ta Yueh-chih k'ao," and pp. 210-13, "Wu-sun k'ao"; Wang Kuo-wei (1877-1927), *Kuan-t'ang chi-lin*, 4 vols. (reprint; Peking: Chung-hua Shu-chū, 1959), vol. 4, pp. 1156-58, "Yueh-chih wei hsi-i Ta-Hsia shih ku-ti k'ao." See also Chang Mu (1805-49), *Meng-ku yu-mu chi*, ed., with additional notes, by Ho Ch'iu-t'ao (1824-62) (Taipei: Chung-hua wen-hua, 1959), pp. 391-92; Ho Ch'iu-t'ao, *So-fang pei-ch'eng*, 2 vols. (reprint; Taipei: Wen-hai ch'u-pan she, 1962), pp. 636-48; and Richard N. Frye, *The Heritage of Central Asia* (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1996), pp. 119-50, 248-50 (languages).

20. Tarn 1938, pp. 276-79. A second edition of the book appeared in 1951, but Tarn's views on the topic remained unchanged (p. 532).

21. Otto Maenchen-Helfen, "The Yüeh-chih Problem Re-Examined," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 65, no. 2 (April-June 1945): 71-81, esp. 71, 80-81. On the Yueh-chih and Wu-sun problems, see also Alexander Wylie, "Notes on the Western Regions," *Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland* 10 (1881): 34-35, 40-41, and 11 (1882): 83-85; Otto Franke, *Beiträge aus chinesischen Quellen zur Kenntniss der Türkvolker und Skythen Zentralasiens* (Abhandlungen der Königlich Preussis-

chen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin) (Berlin: Verlag der Königl., 1904), esp. pp. 13-15, 20, 23-56; Albert Herrmann, *Die alten Seidenstrassen zwischen China und Syrien* (Göttingen: Herrose and Ziemsen, 1910), esp. p. 43, and *Das Land der Seide und Tibet im Lichte der Antike* (Leipzig: K. F. Koehlers Antiquarium, 1938), pp. 129-41; J. J. M. de Groot, *Die Westlande Chinas in der vorchristlichen Zeit*, ed. Otto Franke (Berlin: Verlag von Walter de Gruyter, 1926), pp. 9-11, 95-97, 122-23; Gustav Haloun, "Zur U-tsi Frage," *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 91 (1937): esp. 246-57, 297-310; and Édouard Chavannes, "Les pays d'Occident d'après le *Heou Han chou*," *T'oung Pao*, ser. 2, 8 (1907): 151-52, 187-90. The following works touch on the Yueh-chih and Wu-sun problem, although they do not address the same issues under discussion here: Wolfram Eberhard, *Kultur und Siedlung der Randvölker Chinas* (Leiden: Brill, 1942), pp. 62-63, 64-65, and *Lokalkulturen im alten China* (Leiden: Brill, 1942), pp. 22, 144, 267, and *China und seine westlichen Nachbarn* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1978), pp. 226-32, and *Settlement and Social Change in Asia* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1967), pp. 93, 111; Edward Harper Parker, *A Thousand Years of the Tartars*, 2d ed. (New York: Knopf, 1924), pp. 20-21, 24-25; William Montgomery McGovern, *The Early Empires of Central Asia*, pp. 111, 116-20, 126-28; H. W. Bailey, "Ttagara," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 8, no. 4 (1937): 885-87, 893; W. B. Henning, "Argi and the 'Tokharians'," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 9, no. 3 (1938): 563-64; Wang Ching-ju, "Arsi and Yen-ch'i, Tokhri and Yüeh-chih," *Monumenta Serica* 9 (1944): 89-90; Owen Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), p. 489, and *Studies in Frontier History: Collected Essays, 1928-1958* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 68-69; Lawrence Kraker, *Peoples of Central Asia*, 3d ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1971), pp. 74-75; and Jaroslav Průšek, *Chinese Statelets and the Northern Barbarians, 1400-300 B.C.* (Prague: Academia, 1971), pp. 14-15.

22. See *Ssu-ch'ou chih-lu wen-hsien hsu-lu* (Lanchou: Lan-chou ta-hsueh, 1989), entries 426-72; *Hsi-yü shih-ti lun-wen tzu-liao so-yin* (Ürümqi: Jen-min, 1988), entries 2081-18; *Hsin-chiang k'ao-ku san-shih nien* (Ürümqi: Jen-min, 1983), secs. 1 and 2; Tai-shan Yu, *A Study of Sakā History*, pp. 213-25 (bibliography); Denis Sinor, *The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), bibliography; Elizabeth Wayland Barber, *The Mummies of Ürümchi*, pp. 226-31; Feng Chih-wen, *Hsi-yü li-shih pien-nien*, 5 vols. (Kashgar, 1984); Lin Kan, *Hsiung-nu shih-liao hui-pien*, 2 vols. (Peking: Chung-hua, 1988); and Lin Kan, *Hsiung-nu li-shih nien-piao* (Peking: Chung-hua, 1984). See also Yu T'ai-shan's views in his English and Chinese books and Wang Ming-che's and Wang Ping-hua's views (and their criticism of each other's views) in their book.

23. The following section is based on my own view, formed partly from detailed analysis and criticism of some of the theories mentioned earlier and related studies. They are given in Ch'un-shu Chang, 1967a, esp. 707-14.

24. See SC, p. 4966; and HS, p. 1651. Generally speaking, the *Shih-chi* text on the story of the Wu-sun and Sai and the Yueh-chih migration is primary and the *Han-shu* is based on it, with the addition of some genuine new information and arbitrary embellishments. An excellent textual study of this problem may be found in E. G. Pulleyblank, "The Wu-sun and Sakās and the Yueh-chih Migration," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 33 (1970): 154-60; and Fan Yeh (A.D. 398-445), *Hou-Han-shu*. References are to *Hou-Han-shu chi-chieh* (hereafter cited as HHS), ed. Wang Hsien-ch'ien, 2 vols. (Taipei: I-wen Yin-shu Kuan, 1955), p. 1037. The SC, HS, and HHS texts never

state explicitly that this event took place prior to the first Yueh-chih migration, but it is obvious that such was the case because the Yueh-chih went to the Sai territory during their first migration and a trip from the Sai territory to the Ch'iang territory was evidently far more difficult than a trip to Ta-hsia.

25. SC, p. 4585. Compare the translation in Watson, vol. 2, p. 203.

26. Fujita 1933, p. 60; Chun-shu Chang 1967a, p. 733.

27. For a detailed study of this problem, see Fujita 1933, pp. 361–88; and Uchida (September 1938).

28. *Ts'ung-shu chi-ch'eng*, ed. Chang Chu (A.D. 1781–1847) (Shanghai: Shang-wu, 1935), p. 3. The author of this work is anonymous. Uchida (September 1938) holds that the book was compiled in the fourth or fifth century A.D. (p. 59). One Han *li* is equivalent to 417 meters.

29. SC, p. 4966. Compare Watson 1961, vol. 2, p. 268. According to HS, pp. 1239, 1651, the correct version of this statement should read “The Yueh-chih originally lived together with the Wu-sun in the area between Tun-huang and the Ch'i-lien Mountains.”

30. SC, p. 4966.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 4515; HS, p. 1597.

32. HS, p. 1597. Also see Chun-shu Chang 1967a, pp. 707–8.

33. For example, another strong possibility is that the Wu-sun made an alliance with the Hsiung-nu in an attempt to squeeze out the Yueh-chih by attacking them on both eastern and western fronts. While the Yueh-chih could not break the strong Hsiung-nu eastern front, they did manage to defeat the weak Wu-sun and marched westward. This point aids us in interpreting the *shan-yü*'s willingness to take care of the defeated Wu-sun and the infant son of King Mi-tou-nan. For a detailed analysis of this point, see Chun-shu Chang 1967a, pp. 709–11.

34. SC, pp. 4525–26; Watson, vol. 2, p. 168. Also see SC, p. 4524; HS, p. 1599; and Fujita 1933, p. 59. For a discussion of the rendering of the Hsiung-nu title *yu-hsien wang*, see E. G. Pulleyblank, “The Consonantal System of Old Chinese,” *Asia Major*, new ser., 60, no. 1 (April 1962): 58–144; no. 2 (December 1962): 206–65, esp. 257–58.

35. SC, p. 4517 and the commentaries on the text by Ssu-ma Cheng (fl. A.D. 713–42) and Chang Shou-chieh; HS, p. 1598. Also see Chun-shu Chang 1967a, pp. 709–10, esp. n. 5 on p. 709.

36. For a detailed discussion and documentation of this point, see Chun-shu Chang 1967a, pp. 710–11, esp. nn. 1 and 2 on p. 710 and n. 4 on pp. 710–11.

37. Hsu Sung, vol. 7, pp. 2b–3a.

38. SC, p. 4975. My English translation follows Watson, vol. 2, p. 271, except for a few minor revisions. Watson translates *Hsi-ch'eng* as “the western forts” and *kung-chan* as “aggressive warfare.” As was pointed out earlier, *k'un-mo* is a title mistakenly identified by Chang Ch'ien and others as La-chiao-mi's name. Modern scholars, too, have generally failed to understand this point.

39. HS, p. 1240. Also see HS, p. 1651; and SC, p. 4966. The records on these pages are mistaken in attributing the slaying of the Yueh-chih king to Lao-shang rather than K'un-mo. For a detailed discussion of the use of the skull as drinking cup by the Hsiung-nu, see Shiratōri Kiyōshi, “Dokurō inki shiyō no fūzoku to sono dempa,” *Tōyō Gakuhō* 20, no. 3 (March 1933): 121–44; no. 4 (May 1933): 139–55.

40. HS, pp. 1240, 1685.

41. This is my reconstruction of the Hsiung-nu, Yueh-chih, Wu-sun, and Sai in the

context of the history of pre-121 B.C. Ho-hsi. In spite of the numerous other views advanced in the works cited earlier, especially those in note 22, I still think that my views stand the test. The reasons behind the migration and the conflicts between the Hsiung-nu and their neighbors are complex, and many scholars have offered differing interpretations. See Hsieh Chien, "Hsiung-nu she-hui tsu-chih te ch'u-pu yen-chiu," 669-720; Wang Ming-k'o, "Hsiung-nu te yu-mu ching-chi," CYYY 64, no. 1 (1993): 9-50; Jagchid Sechin and Van Jay Seymons, *Peace, War, and Trade along the Great Wall* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), esp. chaps. 2, 4, and 5; Thomas Barfield, *The Perilous Frontier*, and "The Hsiung-nu Imperial Confederacy: Organization and Foreign Policy," *Journal of Asian Studies* 41, no. 1 (1981): 45-61; Wang Ming-che and Wang Ping-hua, *Wu-sun yen-chiu*; and Andrew Waldron, *The Great Wall*. On the origins of the Hsiung-nu and their relations with the Ch'iang, see the works of Jen Nai-ch'iang, Wang Ming-k'o, and others cited in the prologue; and Lin Kan, *Hsiung-nu t'ung-shih* (Peking: Chung-hua, 1986). For a detailed discussion of Hsiung-nu organizations and activities, see Chun-shu Chang 1967a, pp. 712-14; and Uchida 1960, p. 119. A recent study of this problem is Hsieh Chien, "Hsiung-nu cheng-chih chih-tu te yen-chiu," CYYY 41, no. 2 (June 1969): 231-72, esp. 252-54. See also Ch'en Liang-tso 1968, pp. 18-20; and Uchida Gimpu, *Hoku Ajia kenkyū* (Tokyo: Dōhōsha, 1975): 47-64, 83-99.

42. Chun-shu Chang 1967a, pp. 713-14. Also Shen Wei-hsien (Ch'ing), "Ch'ien-Han Hsiung-nu piao," in *Erh-shih-wu shih pu-pien*, ed. K'ai-ming Shu-tien, 6 vols. (Shanghai: K'ai-ming shu-tien, 1938), vol. 1, pp. 1753-74, esp. pp. 1755-61.

43. See Chun-shu Chang 1966a, pp. 57-58; Chun-shu Chang 1967a, p. 715; *Chung-kuo li-tai chan-cheng shih*, vol. 2; Kao Jui, *Chung-kuo chün-shih shih*, vol. 1, pp. 241-57; Huang Chin-yen, *Ch'in-Han chün-chih shih lun*, pp. 16-151. See also Michael Loewe, "The Campaigns of Han Wu-ti." Loewe seriously misinterpreted the meaning of the word *ping* (pp. 90-96). See *Shih-chi: Ch'in shih-huang pen-chi* (The Annals of Ch'in shih-huang); Ying Shao (fl. A.D. 140-206), *Han kuan i* (Ts'ung-shu chi-ch'eng ed.); and Huang Chin-yen, *Ch'in-Han chün-chih shih lun*, pp. 152-241.

44. Chun-shu Chang 1967a, pp. 715-16.

45. SC, pp. 2026, 4547; HS, p. 9. For an interpretation of Hsin-Ch'in-chung, see Haneda Akira, "Shin-shin-chū to Yu-chū," *Tōyōshi kenkyū* 4, nos. 4-5 (June 1939): 67-69. Generally speaking, while the location changed in Ch'in times, Hsin-Ch'in-chung in Han times was an area between So-fang and Ch'ang-an. The *Shih-chi* indicates that after the acquisition of Ho-hsi the Han government reduced by half the number of frontier guards in former border regions. See SC, p. 4547.

46. SC, pp. 4549-50; HS, p. 1604. Also see Chun-shu Chang 1967a, p. 717. The Han also established outposts in areas farther west beyond Ling-chü. Recently discovered Han wooden documents indicate the existence of such outposts in modern Chin-t'a *hsien* of Kansu even in 119 B.C. See Doc. EJT 10:311 (*Wen-wu* 10 [1978]: 10).

47. For a detailed study of this and the previous points, see Chun-shu Chang 1967a, pp. 717-18.

48. SC, p. 4976; HS, pp. 1240, 1658-59. Chun-shu Chang 1967a, pp. 719-20, gives a detailed analysis of this problem.

49. Li Tao-yuan (A.D. 467-527) states that Ling-chü was established as a *hsien* (district) in 115 B.C. See *Shui-ching chu* (Kuo-hsiieh chi-pen ts'ung-shu ed.) (Shanghai, 1933), vol. 1, p. 35. But the *Hou-Han-shu* (p. 1028) indicates that Ling-chü was first established as a *sai*. Evidently Li mistook *hsien* for *sai*, which was established in 115 B.C. In my archaeological explorations of the Yung-teng area in 1982 and 1985, I discovered the

ruins of a fortress with some Han wooden documents. The Han fortress was located in a mountain valley guarding the strategic road into the region; it might be the earliest Han establishment in the area. If that is indeed the case, then Ling-chü was first established as a *sai* and later became a *hsien* by way of the expansion and development of the region. On this point, see also Ōshima Riichi, "Tonden to daiden," *Tōyōshi kenkyū* 15, nos. 1-2 (July 1955): 1-22, esp. pp. 5-6; Hibino Takeo, "Kasei shigun no seiritsu ni tsuite," in *Silver Jubilee Volume of the Zinbun kagaku Kenkyusyo* (Kyoto: Kyoto University, 1954), pp. 120-40, esp. p. 140; and Chun-shu Chang 1967a, pp. 720, 747.

50. Pan Ku, *Han-shu* (hereafter cited as HS [1962]), ed. and punctuated by the Department of History, Hsi-pei ta-hsüeh (Peking: Chung-hua Shu-chü, 1962), pp. 184-85 and the commentary on the text by Li Fei. Homer H. Dubs translated this commentary into English in *The History of the Former Han Dynasty by Pan Ku*, vol. 2, p. 75.

51. HS, p. 94; Shen Wei-hsien, p. 1762. The governor of Wu-yuan was killed during the Hsiung-nu raids.

52. Chun-shu Chang 1966a, p. 161. Also see HS, pp. 195, 1604.

53. SC, p. 2048; HS, p. 95. It is significant to point out that all migrants were prohibited from moving to the interior without special permission from the government. See Fan Yeh (A.D. 398-445), *Hou-Han shu*, 12 vols. (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1965) (hereafter HHS [1965]), p. 2140.

54. The dating of Ho-hsi's four *chün* (Ho-hsi *ssu-chün*) has long been a puzzling and highly controversial problem, especially since Pan Ku's account is not only full of contradictions but differs from that in the *Shih-chi*, which never even mentions Wu-wei *chün*. Later scholars, such as Ssu-ma Kuang (A.D. 1019-86), Wang Chün (1694-1751), Ch'üan Tsu-wang (1705-55), Ch'i Chao-nan (1703-68), Wu Cho-hsin (1755-1823), Chu I-hsin (1846-94), Chang Wei-hua, Lao Kan, Shih Chih-mien, and Hibino Takeo, have made different interpretations and suggestions, thereby adding to the confusion. For a comprehensive examination and criticism of all these views, see Chun-shu Chang 1967a, pp. 681-706. Pages 745-49 suggest a new set of dates for the four *chün* of Ho-hsi in the light of newly discovered wood and bamboo documents. The new dating given here is based on a detailed study of the historical development of Ho-hsi in the Former Han period, aspects of which have been overlooked by other scholars. There have been more than forty articles written on the dating of Ho-hsi *Ssu-chün* since my views were first published. Some have agreed and some disagreed, and none agreed with each other. There is no reason to list all of these works here, but some important ones are Shao T'ai-hsin, *Han-tai Ho-hsi ssu-chün te t'o-chan* (Taipei: Shang-wu, 1988), pp. 74-100; Liu Kuang-hua, *Ch'in-Han shih lun-ts'ung* 2 (1983), and *Tun-huang hsueh chi-k'an* (1983), and *Lan-chou ta-hsueh hsueh-pao* 2 (1980); Chai Wan-hua, *Lan-chou hsueh-k'an* 6 (1985); Chou Chen-p'eng, *Hsi-pei shih-ti* 1 (1985); Wang Tsung-wei, *Hsi-pei shih-ti* 3 (1986); and Wu Jen-hsiang and Yü Yao, *Hsi-pei shih-yuan hsueh-pao* 2 (1982).

55. Chun-shu Chang 1967a, pp. 725-26. See also Lao Kan 1960a, p. 28.

56. SC, pp. 4990-95; Chun-shu Chang 1967a, p. 721; Chun-shu Chang 1966a, pp. 162-64.

57. SC, p. 4999; wooden slip (11) 303.39, in *Chü-yen Han-Chien Chia-pien* (hereafter *Chia-pien*), ed. Institute of Archaeology, Chinese Academy of Sciences (Peking: K'o-hsueh, 1959), no. 1598; Chun-shu Chang 1967a, p. 726.

58. Chun-shu Chang 1967a, pp. 699-700, 721 (n. 4), 727-29. These pages have summarized and criticized various studies on the transfer of the Yü-men *kuan* and its new location west of Tun-huang, published since Édouard Chavannes first discussed the

problem in 1913. For the various studies on the issue, see Édouard Chavannes, *Les Documents chinois découverts par Aurel Stein dans les sables du Turkestan Oriental* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1913), p. vi, and "Introduction to *Les documents chinois découverts par Aurel Stein dans les sables du Turkestan Oriental*," trans. Mme. Édouard Chavannes and H. Wilfred House, *New China Review* 4 (1922): 341-59, 427-42, esp. 348-49; Wang Kuo-wei, *Liu-sha chui-chien*, 4 vols. (1914), vol. 3, pp. 1-2 (hereafter cited as Wang Kuo-wei 1914); Lao Kan, "Liang-kuan i-chih k'ao," *CYYY* 11 (1943): 287-96; Lao Kan 1960a, pp. 27-29; Lao Kan, "Lun Han-tai Yü-men-kuan te ch'ien-hsi wen-t'i," *Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies*, new ser., 2, no. 1 (May 1960): 40-52; Fang Hui [Hsiang Ta], "Yü-men Kuan Yang Kuan tsa-k'ao," *Chen-li tsa-chih* 1, no. 4 (1944): 389-98; Hsia Nai, "Hsin-huo chih Tun-huang Han-chien," *CYYY* 19 (1948): 235-65; and Ch'en Meng-chia, "Yü-men Kuan yü Yü-men Hsien," *K'ao-ku* 9 (1965): 469-77. Generally speaking, although they differ as to the location of the new Yü-men *kuan* site, Chavannes, Wang, and Lao all agree on Yü-men *kuan*'s transfer from east of Tun-huang to its west after the Ta-yuan expedition; Hsia, Hsiang, and Ch'en hold that the Yü-men *kuan* was never moved.

59. SC, p. 4999. For the definition and structure of a chief commandant area, see Chun-shu Chang 1967a, pp. 739-42. Broadly speaking, it was a region on the frontier under military rule and commanded by a *tu-wei*, who directed both military and civil affairs in the region.

60. Chun-shu Chang 1967a, pp. 726-27. See also HS, p. 807; Édouard Chavannes 1913, p. 65, wooden doc. 271; Wang Kuo-wei 1914, vol. 2, pp. 14b-29b, vol. 3, map of the Tun-huang area frontier line.

61. HS, p. 808.

62. Hsia Nai, p. 239.

63. Chavannes 1913, p. 71, wooden doc. 305; Wang Kuo-wei 1914, vol. 2, p. 465; Lao Kan, "Tun-huang Han-chien chiao-wen," in Lao Kan 1960a, pp. 205-40, esp. 219.

64. SC, p. 4999; HS, p. 1638; Chun-shu Chang 1967a, pp. 728-29. See also Aurel Stein 1912, vol. 1, map showing "Ancient Frontier Line with Adjacent Tracts, North and West of Tun-huang"; Wang Kuo-wei 1914, vol. 3, "Maps and Charts"; Lao Kan 1960a, vol. 2, p. 38; and Fujieda Akira, "Shaku 'ken sho yo hoku' hoka," *Tōyōshi kenkyū* 14, nos. 1-2 (July 1955): 151-56, esp. 152 (hereafter cited as Fujieda Akira 1955b).

65. The term *Chü-yen region* is used as it is defined in Bo Sommarström, *Archaeological Researches in the Edsen-gol Region*, vol. 1, p. 1, and nn. 1-3 on p. 4.

66. HS, p. 1145; Chun-shu Chang 1967a, pp. 733-34.

67. HS (1962), p. 2700; SC, p. 4993. Also see Lao Kan 1960a, vol. 2, p. 30; Chun-shu Chang 1967a, p. 734.

68. HS (1962), pp. 201, 2493, 3776; Lao Kan 1960a, vol. 2, p. 30; Chun-shu Chang 1967a, pp. 734-37, esp. n. 4 on pp. 736-37.

69. Chun-shu Chang 1967a, pp. 742-44.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 744. Also see HS (1962), pp. 1138-39.

71. See doc. 65.18, in which Chü-yen was listed as an independent unit at the border, and Lao Kan's study on this document in Lao Kan 1960a, vol. 2, pp. 7-8. Lao ascribes this document to the period from 74 to 72 B.C.

72. Doc. 313.44-213.28 in Lao Kan, *Chü-yen Han-chien k'ao-shih* (Shanghai: Shangwu, 1949), p. 10. This is another edition of Lao's transliterations of the Han wooden documents (hereafter cited as *Han-chien k'ao-shih* [1949]).

73. Chun-shu Chang 1967a, pp. 744-45; Lao Kan 1960a, vol. 2, pp. 32-33. In about

72 B.C., there was an important change in the administrative division of Ho-hsi; the large Chang-yeh *chiün* in the eastern part of the territory was divided, its eastern part forming a new prefecture named Wu-wei and its western part remaining as Chang-yeh *chiün*. From all indications, it is highly probable that at this time the Chü-yen region to the north of the old Chang-yeh *chiün* was annexed to the new and the status of the region was changed to *hsien*.

74. The development of Hsiao-ku *hsien* in Tun-huang seems to have followed the same pattern as it did in the three areas just examined. It stands to reason that it also started with a fortress (Yü-tse Fortress under the command of Ts'ui Pu-i), then developed into a chief commandant area (the Yü-tse Chief Commandant Area), and finally was changed into a *hsien* type of administrative unit. Many details remain unclear, and it is for this reason that I have not discussed the development of Hsiao-ku in the text. For a detailed study of this problem, see Chun-shu Chang 1967a, p. 725.

75. SC, pp. 4983–84. According to Lao Kan, the old Yü-men *kuan* site was at modern Chia-ku Pass. See his “Liang-kuan i-chih k'ao,” p. 289.

76. SC, p. 4559 and Chang Shou-chieh's commentaries on the text. Yü-lin is in modern Suiyuan. See HS (1962), p. 201 (under 102 B.C.). Lu-chü has not been clearly located; many scholars have made different suggestions about a river or a mountain or some location in Mongolia. Ch'ien Mu suggests that Lu-chü is the river named Kerulen in central Mongolia and that the Han fortress Lu-chü was built by this river and hence was so named. Judging from the *Han-shu* text, which states that the Han fortress was in the far northwest of the Wu-yuan barrier and guarded by General Han Yueh, I suggest that it was a large Han fortress in the middle of the Hsiung-nu domain corresponding to the modern Arbai Khere area. See Ch'ien Mu, *Shih-chi ti-ming k'ao* (Taipei: San-min shu-chü, 1984), pp. 887–88.

77. HHS, p. 1028.

78. HS, pp. 1665–67. Lun-t'ai (Bugur) is in modern Sinkiang. According to Lao Kan, the proposal for the development of Lun-t'ai was drafted on the basis of the Han experience in Ho-hsi. Therefore, it was meant to follow the Ho-hsi pattern. See Lao Kan, “Han-tai te Hsi-yü tu-hu yü Wu-chi chiao-wei,” CYYY 28 (1956): 485–96, esp. 485 (hereafter cited as Lao Kan 1956b); and Chun-shu Chang, *Han-tai pien-chiang shih lun-chi* (Taipei: Shih-huo ch'u-pan she, 1977), pp. 123–26.

79. Wooden doc. 60, in Chavannes 1913, p. 25; SC, p. 4510; HS, p. 1223.

80. Huang Wen-pi, *Lo-pu nao-erh k'ao-ku chi* (Peking: Kuo-li Pei-ching ta-hsueh ch'u-pan she, 1948), p. 105; Lao Kan 1948c, 501–22, esp. 516. See also Aurel Stein 1912, vol. 1, map showing “Ancient Frontier Line with Adjacent Tracts, North and West of Tun-huang,” which indicates that each of the watch stations and fortresses was near a source of water.

81. Huang Wen-pi 1948, p. 105; Lao Kan 1948c, p. 516.

82. HS, p. 1665.

83. Huang Wen-pi 1948, pp. 105–12; Chun-shu Chang 1966b, pp. 220–22; HS, p. 1665.

84. HS, p. 1665; Huang Wen-pi 1948, pp. 105–12, 179–213.

85. HS, p. 1642.

86. For a comprehensive discussion of this problem, see Chun-shu Chang 1966b, pp. 157–58. See also Lao Kan 1960a, vol. 2, pp. 37–38, 40; and Wang Kuo-wei 1914, vol. 2, pt. 2, pp. 10a, 14a–15a.

87. Chun-shu Chang, 1966b, p. 199.
88. Chun-shu Chang 1967a, p. 728; Chun-shu Chang 1963; Lao Kan 1960a, vol. 2, p. 38; Fujieda Akira 1955b, p. 152.
89. Chun-shu Chang 1966b, p. 203.
90. Ibid., pp. 209-16.
91. Comprehensive studies of this problem have been made by Ch'en P'an and Yen Keng-wang. See Ch'en P'an, "Han-Chin i-chien ou-shu chih hsu," CYYY 23 (1952): 349-83, esp. 349-51; and Yen Keng-wang, *Chung-kuo ti-fang hsing-cheng chih-tu shih*, vol. 1: *The Ch'in and Han Dynasties*, 2 vols. (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1961), pp. 154-75, esp. 155.
92. For example, all matters relating to *t'un-t'ien* and the families of servicemen and civilians who resided at the watch stations and other military establishments were under the chief commandant's jurisdiction. See Chun-shu Chang 1966b, pp. 157, 170-71, 220-22.
93. Ibid., pp. 727, 729, 747-48. One of the older districts was Hsiao-ku, which was established as a district in 105 B.C. (Chun-shu Chang 1967a, p. 725).
94. Clearly there could be other possibilities. Such a region could become a new prefecture, though no examples of this development have been found.
95. Chun-shu Chang 1966b, pp. 697-99, 744-47. Two eastern districts of Chang-yeh had been split by 81 B.C. to form, with four districts of T'ien-shui and Lung-hsi *chiün*, the Chin-ch'eng *chiün*. See HS (1962), p. 224.
96. HS (1962), p. 2700. One should note the distinction between the geographic Ho-hsi and the political Ho-hsi. The latter designates that part of Ho-hsi under Han control, which gradually expanded as time went on.
97. Lao Kan 1960a, vol. 2, p. 30. Also see Li Tao-yuan, vol. 6, pp. 128-29.
98. Li Tao-yuan, vol. 6, p. 129. The *Ti-li chih* (Treatise on Geography) in the *Han-shu* ascribes the establishment of Wu-wei *chiün* to 101 B.C., but we know for certain that the dating of Wu-wei was 72 B.C. or not earlier than 78 B.C. See HS (1962), p. 1622; and Chun-shu Chang 1967a, pp. 697-99, 746-47. The author of the *Treatise on Geography* must have mistaken Wu-wei *chiün* for Wu-wei *hsien*. Li Tao-yuan's point therefore is reliable, although his entire statement regarding the development of Wu-wei *chiün* is not clear.
99. HS (1962), p. 1612; Lao Kan 1960a, vol. 2, p. 30.
100. Wooden doc. 42.6 on p. 79 in Lao Kan, *Han-chien k'ao-shih* (1949); HS (1962), 1612; Li Tao-yuan, vol. 6, p. 129.
101. SC, pp. 4983-84, 4999.
102. Huang Wen-pi 1948, p. 59; Chun-shu Chang 1966b, p. 736.
103. Wooden doc. 148.1, cited in Chun-shu Chang 1966b, p. 176. The second *t'ing* belonged to the T'ung-tse *hou* which was under the T'ien pei *hou-kuan* (see p. 202).
104. SC (1959), pp. 3174-79; SC, p. 4983; HS, pp. 1241, 3873.
105. For references on these aspects of Ho-hsi, see, for example, Luce Boulnois, *The Silk Road*, trans. Dennis Chamberlain (New York: Sutton, 1966); Sven A. Hedin, *The Silk Road*, trans. F. H. Lyon (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1938); Berthold Laufer, *Sino-Iranica: Chinese Contributions to the History of Civilization in Ancient Iran* (reprint; Taipei: Ch'eng-wen, 1967; originally published in 1919); Ch'en Yin-k'o, *T'ang-tai cheng-chih shih shu-lun kao* (Shanghai: Shang-wu, 1947), esp. pp. 3-94ff., and *Sui-T'ang chih-tu yuan-yüan lueh-lun kao* (Shanghai: Shang-wu, 1946), pp. 3ff.; Maeda Masana, *Kasei no rekishi*

chirigakuteki kenkyū (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kō bunkan, 1964), pp. 15ff.; Ts'ao Shih-pang, "Lun Liang-Han ch'i Nan-pei ch'ao Ho-hsi chih k'ai-fa yü Ju-hsueh Shih-chiao chih chin-chan," *Hsin-ya hsueh-pao* 5, no. 1 (August 1960): 49-177; Kenneth K. S. Ch'en, *Buddhism in China: A Historical Survey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 3-209; Erik Zürcher, *The Buddhist Conquest of China: The Spread and Adoption of Buddhism in Medieval China*, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1959); Su Ying-hui, *Tun-huang hsueh kai-yao* (Taipei: Chung-hua ts'ung-shu, 1960); Lionel Giles, *Six Centuries of Tun-huang* (London: China Society, 1944); Seiiki Bunka Kenkyū kai, ed., *Monumenta Serindica*, vols. 2-3 (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1959-60); and Michael Sullivan, *The Cave Temples of Maichishan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969).

106. For discussions of the struggle between the agricultural and nomadic peoples of North and East Asia and its historical stages and significance, see Tamura Jitsudō, *Hoku Ajia ni okeru rekishi sekai no keisei* (Kyoto: Hābado Enkei Dōshisha, 1956), esp. pp. 1-13, 34-40; Owen Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, esp. pp. 27-38, 54-70, and "The Geographical Factor in Mongol History," *Geographical Journal* 91, no. 1 (January 1938): 1-16; Wolfram Eberhard, *A History of China*, new ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 29-32; Miyazaki Ichisada, *Tōyō ni okeru soboku shugi no minzoku to bummei shugi no shakai* (Tokyo: Tōyō kenkyūkai, 1940), pp. 49ff.; Nicola Di Cosmo, "The Economic Basis of Ancient Inner Asian Nomads and Its Relationship to China," *Journal of Asian Studies* 53, no. 4 (1994): 1092-1126, and "State Formation and Periodization in Inner Asian History," *Journal of World History* 10, no. 1 (spring 1999): 1-40. The issue of nomadic movements has been discussed by scholars from the perspective of world history. See Ellsworth Huntington, *Mainsprings of Civilization* (New York: Mentor, 1959), pp. 555-60, 569-79; Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History*, vol. IIIA, annex 2 (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), pp. 395-452: "The Causes of the Occasional Outbursts of the Nomads out of Their Own Domain on the Steppes into the Adjoining Domains of the Sedentary Societies around Them."

107. Detailed analyses of Han frontier society are given in Chun-shu Chang 1963, esp. chap. 5 and conclusion; Chun-shu Chang 1966b; and Chun-shu Chang, "Han-tai pien-sai li-tsu te jih-ch'ang kung-tso," *Shih-huo*, new ser., 1, no. 2 (May 1971): 1-12 (hereafter Chun-shu Chang 1971).

108. See also An Tso-chang, *Han-shih ch'u-t'an* (Shanghai: Hsueh-hsi sheng-huo, 1955), pp. 97-123; Huang Wen-pi 1948, pp. 54-72, 179-213, 220; Tseng Wen-wu, *Chung-kuo ching-ying Hsi-yü shih*, pp. 24ff., 49-53; Chun-shu Chang 1971, pp. 8-10; Han Ju-lin, "Han-tai Hsi-yü t'un-t'ien yü Chü-shih I-wu te cheng-to," *Wen-shih tsa-chih* 2, no. 2 (February 1942): 25-34; and Ise Sentarō, *Chūgoku Seiki keieishi kenkyū*, pp. 37-47.

109. Chang Chün-yueh, *Li-tai t'un-t'ien k'ao*, pp. 152ff.

110. Ibid., pp. 108-47; Yuan Shih-hsing, "Ts'ao-Wei T'un-t'ien chih yü Hsi-Chin chan-t'ien chih," in *Chung-kuo li-tai t'u-ti chih tu wen-t'i t'ao-lun chi*, ed. Li-shih Yen-chiu Pien-chi Pu (Peking: San-lien, 1957), pp. 131-65, ref. on pp. 131-56.

111. Chun-shu Chang 1967a, pp. 717-18, 720; Hsu T'ien-lin (fl. A.D. 1211), *Hsi-Han hui-yao* (Peking: Chung-hua Shu-chü, 1955), pp. 546-47, 563, 585-86; HS, p. 90.

112. This estimate is based on certain authentic figures. First, the cost of the military campaign commanded by General Huo Ch'ü-ping in 121 B.C. and its subsequent rewards amounted to more than 10 billion in cash. Second, the cost of moving 100,000 plus people to populate So-fang in 126 B.C. were from several to 10 billion. Third, as recorded in the *Biography of Chao Ch'ung-kuo* in the *Han-shu*, an army of 10,281 military colonists had to be supported by 9,121 *hu* of grain and 10.27 *hu* of salt every day. See HS

(1962), pp. 1158, 1161, 2986; SC (1959), pp. 1421-22, 1424; and Swann, *Food and Money in Ancient China*, pp. 249, 258-59. A *hu* (or *shih*) was equivalent to 0.565 U.S. bushel.

113. See chapter 1. The annual revenue of grain after 111 B.C. was raised to 4 to 6 million *shih*. See *Ch'üan Shang-ku San-tai Ch'in-Han San-kuo Liu-ch'ao wen*, comp. Yen K'o-chün (A.D. 1762-1843), 9 vols. (Taipei: Shih-chieh Shu-chü, 1963), vol. 2 (*Ch'üan Hou-Han wen*), *chüan* 14, pp. 2b-3a; Li Fang (925-996), *T'ai-p'ing Yü-lan*, 6 vols. (reprint; Taipei: Shang-wu yin-shu kuan, 1968), vol. 5, p. 2940; HS (1962), pp. 1127, 1141, 1175; Lao Kan, *Ch'in-Han shih* (Taipei: Chung-hua wen-hua ch'u-pan shih-yeh wei-yüan-hui, 1952), p. 136; Chou Chün-ch'i, "Hsi-Han ts'ai-cheng chih-tu chih i-pan," *Shih-huo pan-yueh k'an* 3, no. 8 (March 16, 1936): 18; Su Ch'eng-chien, *Hou-Han shu shih-huo chih ch'ang-pien* (Shanghai: Shang-wu yin-shu kuan, 1947), pp. 22-23; Yoshida Torao, *Ryō-kan sozei no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Ōsakayagō shoten, 1932), pp. 238-41; Li Chien-nung, *Hsien-Ch'in Liang-Han ching-chi shih kao*, pp. 253-56; and Kato Shigeshi, *Shina keizaishi kōshō*, 2 vols. (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1952), vol. 1, pp. 36-82.

114. SC (1959), pp. 1432, 1439; HS (1962), pp. 1173, 2625.

115. See chapter 1. Also add Ma Yuan-ts'ai, *Sang Hung-yang nien-p'u* (Shanghai: Shang-wu yin-shu kuan, 1934), pp. 31ff. (rev. ed. under the name Ma Fei-pai, *Sang Hung-yang nien-p'u ting-pu*, pp. 66-154); P'eng Hsin-wei, *Chung-kuo huo-pi shih* (Shanghai: Jen-men, 1965), pp. 164-68; and T'ao Hsi-sheng, *Hsi-Han ching-chi shih* (Shanghai: Shang-wu, 1935), pp. 56-60.

116. HS (1962), pp. 1165-66, 1168, 1170; Chao I (A.D. 1727-1814), *Nien-erh shih cha-chi*, 2 vols. (reprint; Peking: Chung-hua, 1963), vol. 1, p. 51.

117. HS (1962), p. 3156.

118. A detailed study of this aspect is Kojima Sukema, "Kan no Butei to Shina rekidai zaiseisaku," *Tōa keizai kenkyū*, 4, no. 1 (January 1920): 1-15; no. 2 (February 1920): 143-60.

CHAPTER 5

1. A new route was established toward the end of the Former Han period. It extended from the northwest of Tun-huang *chün* to I-wu (in the modern Hami area in northeastern Sinkiang), then northwest to Chü-shih hou-kuo (in the modern Chi-mu sa-erh [Jimsa] area in northern Sinkiang), and then along the northern side of the Heavenly Mountains all the way to Wu-sun. This was the New Northern Route (Hsin Pei-tao). The analysis of the geography, history, and conditions of Hsi-yü before the Han conquest is based on various sources, and only a few of the most important are given here. See the *Hsi-yü chuan* of both the *Han-shu* and the *Hou Han shu*, including Wang Hsien-ch'ien's *pu-chu*; Hsun Yueh, *Han-chi*; Li Tao-yuan, *Shu-ching chu*; Hsu Sung (A.D. 1781-1848), *Han-shu Hsi-yü chuan pu-chu* (Ch'ing-ch'ao fan-shu yü-ti ts'ung-shu ed.), and *Hsi-yü shui-tao chi* (Ch'ing-ch'ao fan-shu yü-ti ts'ung-shu ed.); Ting Ch'ien (1843-1919), *Hsi-yü chuan k'ao-cheng* (reprint; Taipei: I-wen yin-shu kuan, 1972); T'ao Pao-lien (fl. late nineteenth century), *Hsin-mao shih-hsing chi* (reprint; Taipei: Chung-hua ts'ung-shu, 1957; reprint of the 1897 ed., originally published in 1891); Fu Heng (d. 1770) et al., *Ch'in-ting huang-ch'ao Hsi-yü t'u-chih* (reprint; Taipei: Wen-yu shu-tien, 1965; originally published in 1756); Ts'en Chung-mien, *Han-shu Hsi-yü chuan ti-li chiao-shih*, 2 vols. (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1981); Li Kuang-t'ing (1812-80), *Han Hsi-yü t'u-k'ao*, 4 vols. (N.p., n.d.); Hung Ti-ch'en, *Hsin-chiang shih-ti ta-kang* (Nanking:

Cheng-chung shu-chü, 1935); Tseng Wen-wu, *Chung-kuo ching-ying Hsi-yü shih* (Shanghai: Shang-wu yin-shu kuan, 1936); Ise Sentarō, *Chūgoku Seiki keieishi kenkyū*; Matsuda Toshio, *Chūgoku kodai Tenzan no rekishi chirigaku teki kenkyū*; Kuwabara Jitsuo, *Tōzai kotsushi ronsō*; Fujita Tōyōhachi, *Tōzai kōshō-shi no kenkyū*; Seiki hen; Hsin-chiang she-hui k'o-hsueh yuan min-tsu yen-chiu so, *Hsin-chiang chien-shih*, 2 vols. (Ürümqi: Hsin-chiang jen-min ch'u-pan she, 1980); Huang Wen-pi, *Hsi-pei shih-ti lun-ts'ung* (Shanghai: Jen-min ch'u-pan she, 1981), and *T'a-li-mu p'en-ti k'ao-ku chi* (Peking: K'o-hsueh ch'u-pan she, 1958), and *Lo-pu no-erh k'ao-ku chi* (Peiping: Pei-ching ta-hsueh ch'u-pan she, 1948); Chun-shu Chang, "Han-tai ssu-ch'ao chih-lu te k'ai-t'o yü fa-chan," and "Ku-tai t'un-t'ien chih-tu te yuan-shih yü Hsi-Han Ho-hsi Hsi-yü pien-sai shang t'un-t'ien chih-tu chih fa-chan kuo-ch'eng." See also T'an Ch'i-hsiang, ed., *Chung-kuo li-shih ti-t'u chi* (Shanghai: Ti-t'u ch'u-pan she, 1982), vol. 2, map 37–38; Yang Shou-ching (1839–1915), *Li-tai yü-ti-t'u* (Yang-shih kuan-hai t'ang ed., 1906–11), ts'e 2; *Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho kuo fen-sheng ti-t'u chi* (Shanghai: Ti-t'u ch'u-pan she, 1964); Ting Wen-chiang (V. K. Ting) et al., *Chung-kuo hsin ti-t'u* (Shanghai: Shen-pao kuan, 1934); Chang Ch'i-yun et al., comps., *Chung-hua min-kuo ti-t'u chi* (Taipei: Kuo-fang yen-chiu yuan, 1959–62); and Chun-shu Chang, "Archaeological Travels and Explorations in Xinjiang in 1982 and 1985," unpublished field notes from two extended archaeological trips from east to west Sinkiang in 1982 and 1985. I have also benefited enormously from the following Western-language works: Aurel Stein, *Ruins of Desert Cathay* (London: Macmillan, 1912), *Serindia* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921), *Inner Asia* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928), and *On Ancient Central Asian Tracks* (London: Macmillan, 1933); Sven Hedin, *The Silk Road*, and *The Wandering Lake* (London: G. Routledge and Sons, 1940); and Albert Herrmann, *Die alten Seidenstrassen zwischen China und Syrien* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1910). My presentation of the history and geography of Hsi-yü is based on my own interpretation of the various primary sources and on my fieldwork in Sinkiang. I have followed in many places one school of thought over the others. For example, Li Kuang-t'ing did not believe that Ta-yuan was part of Han-controlled Hsi-yü, but T'an Ch'i-hsiang and others did. For some other recent studies, see Richard N. Frye, *The Heritage of Central Asia: From Antiquity and the Turkish Expansion* (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1996), pp. 248–50 (on languages); Denis Sinor, ed., *The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); *Hsin-chiang k'ao-ku san-shih nien*; and other sources cited in note 3 of chapter 4 in this volume. A recent, monumental, two-volume work, *The Bronze Age and Early Iron Age Peoples of Eastern Central Asia*, ed. Victor H. Mair (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of Man, 1998), provides important information about the archaeology, anthropology, migration, nomadism, and language of the region and complements some of the issues briefly discussed here. See also J. P. Mallory and Victor H. Mair's interesting work, *The Tarim Mummies: Ancient China and the Mystery of the Earliest Peoples from the West* (London: Thames and Hudson, 2000), esp. pp. 102–31, 270–97.

2. See HS (1962), p. 3872. It should be pointed out here that there were no autochthonous states in Hsi-yü before the Han conquest, as is generally held in various sources. There were actually thirty-eight states. In Han sources, the Chinese term for these states was *kuo*, meaning both a country and a state. In the Han usage of the term, both *country* and *state* are semantically correct as long as such an entity included a territory, populace, and political organization. My use of *country* or *state* in this chapter follows this Han connotation. See the prologue for detailed discussions of these terms.

3. For these campaigns, see chapter 3.

4. The location of old Lou-lan has been under debate among scholars. Here I have followed Huang Wen-pi's view (*Lo-pu no-erh k'ao-ku chi*, p. 193). The old Lou-lan capital, Wu-ni, should have been at the site discovered by Sven Hedin at longitude 89° 44' east and latitude 40° 30' north. That was the center of Lou-lan before the removal of the capital to the southwest in the modern Miran area and the change to Shan-shan in 77 B.C. A. F. P. Hulswé has discussed the various suggestions for the location of old Lou-lan in his notes on the section on Lou-lan (Shan-shan) in his *China in Central Asia* (Leiden: Brill, 1979), pp. 81–83. To all these suggestions, we need to add those of Li Tao-yuan (*Shui-ching chu*, vol. 1, p. 20) and T'ao Pao-lien (*Hsin-mao shih-hsing chi*, pp. 92–93), which are almost the same as Huang Wen-pi's. See also Li Kuang-t'ing, *Han Hsi-yü t'u k'ao, chüan*, vol. 1, p. 3a. Recent studies and archaeological discoveries in 1979 have further clarified the history and later development of the old Lou-lan site (northwest of Lop-nor near the delta of the Konche River) from the third century B.C. to the fourth century A.D. See Mu Shu-ying, "Sha-mo ku-kuo—Lou-lan k'ao-ch'a chi," *Chung-kuo chien-she* 5 (1981); Ch'en Ju-kuo, "Lou-lan ku-ch'eng li-shih ti-li jo-kan wen-t'i t'an-t'ou," *Hsin-chiang ta-hsueh hsueh-pao: Che-she pan* 3 (1984); and Hou Ts'an, "Lun Lou-lan ch'eng te fa-chan chi-ch'i shui-t'ui," *Chung-kuo she-hui k'o-hsueh* 2 (1984), and Kao-ch'ang *Lou-lan yen-chiu lun-chi* (Ürümqi: Hsin-chiang jen-min, 1990), pp. 294–333.

5. For the location of Ku-shih (Chü-shih), I have followed Hsu Sung (*Han-shu Hsi-yü chuan pu-chu, chüan*, 1, p. 7b). For a discussion of the identification of Ku-shih with Chü-shih, see Ch'ien Ta-hsin (A.D. 1728–1804), *Nien-erh shih-k'ao-i* (*Kuo-hsueh chi-pen ts'ung-shu* ed., 1937), *chüan* 5, p. 91. See also Feng Ch'eng-chün, *Hsi-yü ti-ming*, new ed. (Peking: Chung-hua, 1980; originally published in 1955), p. 78; Huang Wen-pi, *Lo-pu no-erh k'ao-ku chi*, p. 193; and Li Kuang-t'ing, *Han Hsi-yü t'u k'ao, chüan* 1, p. 5b. In 60 B.C., the Han divided Ku-shih into eight smaller states.

6. The capital of Lun-t'ou was about 50 kilometers southwest of modern Lun-t'ai (also called Pu-ku-erh or Yü-ku-erh, Bugur). Huang Wen-pi identified the old ruins at K'o-yu k'o-hsin as the capital. The city wall of this site measures 932 meters. See Huang Wen-pi, *T'a-li-ma p'en-ti k'ao-ku chi*, pp. 10–11. This site was also discussed by Hsu Sung (*Hsi-yü shui-tao chi, chüan* 2, p. 17a). See also Wang Shu-nan, *Hsin-chiang t'u-chih, chüan* 81, p. 9b; and Ting Ch'ien, *Hsi-yü chuan k'ao-cheng*, p. 34b. My own archaeological survey in the Lun-t'ai area also supports Huang Wen-pi's view.

7. The 90 B.C. expedition was aimed at drawing the Hsiung-nu army away from the siege of General Li Kuang-li's force. This time no Han soldiers were sent under the marquis of K'ai-ling. See HS (1962), p. 3922. For the Han control of Chi-pin, see pp. 3885–86.

8. For the modern location of Wei-li and Wei-hsü, I have followed Huang Wen-pi (*T'a-li-mu p'en-ti k'ao-ku chi*, pp. 1–3). Huang also holds that the capital of Wei-li was in the vicinity of Ssu-shih-li ch'eng-shih. See also Tseng Wen-wu, *Chung-kuo ching-ying Hsi-yü shih*, p. 16; and Hsieh Pin, *Hsin-chiang yu-chi* (Shanghai: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1927), p. 281. For the location of Chü-mo and Shan-kuo, see Kao Ch'ü-hsun, "Tu Ch'ien Han-shu Hsi-yü chuan cha-chi," *Yü-kung pan-yueh k'an* 3, no. 5 (May 1935): 27; Li Kuang-t'ing, *Han Hsi-yü t'u k'ao, chüan* 1; Feng Ch'eng-chün, *Hsi-yü ti-ming*, pp. 48 (west of Kuruktagh), 57 (new ed.). and T'an Ch'i-hsiang, *Chung-kuo li-shih ti-t'u chi*, p. 38. The *Shui-ching chu* listed Shan-kuo as Mo-shan, and this has been followed by many scholars. But Mo-shan was a later name for Shan-kuo. In Han times, it was Shan-kuo. My location for Shan-kuo is based on its distance from Wei-li, Wei-hsu, and Yen-ch'i, as given in the *Hsi-yü chuan*. For Yen-ch'i, see Chang Ch'un-shu Chang, "Ku-tai t'un-t'ien

chih-tu te yuan-shih,” p. 594; Huang Wen-pi, *T'a-li-mu p'en-ti k'ao-ku chi*, pp. 1, 5, 7; and Ch'ien Ta-hsin, *Nien-erh shih k'ao-i*, *chüan* 8, p. 87. The capital of Yen-ch'i, Yuan-ch'ü, is about 10 kilometers south of Ha-la mu-teng. My fieldwork in the Yen-ch'i area in 1985 confirms Huang's point. A reexamination of the modern locations of the Hsi-yü states is in Chang Ch'un-shu, “Han-tai Hsi-yü ku-kuo k'ao” (manuscript).

9. HS (1962), p. 662. The So-chü conquest did not induce Han total control immediately.

10. Ibid., pp. 2703–4, 3895. The *Han-shu* states that the total force in the two Ta-yuan expeditions numbered over 120,000 men. For the human and material losses of these campaigns, see pp. 3017–18.

11. For the location of Ch'ü-li, I have followed the views of Ting Ch'ien (*Hsi-yü chuan k'ao-cheng*, p. 34b) and my own fieldwork in the Kurla area. For the location of Chieh-chih, I have followed Feng Ch'eng-chün's view in his *Hsi-yü ti-ming*, p. 24, and my own survey in the Charchi area. Ch'ü-li and Chieh-chih are two other states that were devastated by Li Kuang-li's forces in the Ta-yuan expeditions. See Ting Ch'ien, *Hsi-yü chuan k'ao-cheng*, p. 35b; and Hsu Sung, *Han-shu Hsi-yü chuan pu-chu*, *chüan* 1, p. 7b.

12. The data in this table are based on the *Shih-chi*, *Han-shu*, and *Shui-ching chu*; the works of Hsu Sung, Li Kuang-t'ing, Fu Feng, T'ao Pao-lien, Ting Ch'ien, Ts'en Chung-mien, and Huang Wen-pi cited in note 1; and my surveys in Sinkiang in 1982 and 1985. The calculation of distances is my own.

13. A recent survey indicates that part of this long wall extended for 200 kilometers from its eastern end; it is indeed buried under the sand and could be excavated in the future.

14. The Lun-t'ou area was a large oasis full of irrigation facilities near the K'o-tzu-erh River. Its fertile land measured over 110 square miles. Huang Wen-pi identifies the old ruin of Cho-kuo t'e-hsin, about 20 kilometers east of K'o-yu k'o-hsin (the capital of Lun-t'ou), as the headquarters of the Han force. There are ruins of barracks, watch stations, and granaries at the site, which is enclosed by an earthen wall. Watchtowers were located outside the wall. See Huang Wen-pi, *T'a-li-mu p'en-ti k'ao-ku chi*, pp. 10, 11; and Li Tao-yuan, *Shui-ching chu*, *chüan* 2, p. 13 (referring to this place as the fortress of the colonel sent by Wu-ti to work in the land of Lun-t'ou). The colonel also carried the title *shih-che* (literally “imperial envoy”). That means that he was also an administrator dispatched to represent the emperor and direct the various states in Hsi-yü. Such power and authority were clearly indicated in both the *Shih-chi* and *Han-shu*. In addition, the recently discovered documents at the Han site of Hsuan-ch'üan Station, about 64 kilometers east of Tun-huang, show that in one case a *shih-che* named Wang commanded 1,074 men of Yü-t'ien *kuo* in modern Ho-t'ien *hsien* of southwestern Sinkiang (doc. I90DXT0309:134).

15. HS (1962), p. 3912. For a detailed discussion of both the text and the intent of this proposal, see Chang Ch'un-shu, “Shih-lun Han Wu-ti shih t'un-t'ien Hsi-yü Lun-t'ou te wen-t'i,” *Ta-lu tsa-chih* 48, no. 4 (April 15, 1974): 1–4, and *Han-tai pien-chiang shih lun-chi* (Taipei: Shih-huo, 1975), pp. 123–30 (including additional comments). My presentation of the proposal is based on my interpretation in the article.

16. According to the Han regulations for mounted couriers, a fast horse was to run 380 *li* (Han), or 158.62 kilometers, in twenty-four hours. See Chang Ch'un-shu, “Han-tai ssu-ch'ao chih-lu te k'ai-t'o yü fa-chan,” p. 12; and volume 2, chapter 5, of this book.

17. See HS (1962), pp. 3928–29; and Chang Ch'un-shu, “Han-tai ssu-ch'ao chih-lu te k'ai-t'o yü fa-chan,” p. 4.

18. HS (1962), p. 3916; Chang Ch'un-shu, "Ku-tai t'un-t'ien chih-tu te yuan-shih," p. 590. Scholars have generally agreed that Ch'iu-tz'u was in the Kucha region in modern Sinkiang. See, for example, Li Kuang-t'ing, *Han Hsi-yü t'u-k'ao*, *chüan* 1, p. 7b; Tseng Wen-wu, *Chung-kuo ching-ying Hsi-yü shih*, p. 15; and Albert Hermann, *Die alten Seidenstrassen zwischen China und Syrien*, p. 31. But opinion about the pronunciation of the words Ch'iu and tz'u has been divided since early times. Here I have followed Li Tao-yuan's view in the *Shui-ching chu* (vol. 1, p. 22). The capital Yen-ch'eng of Ch'iu-tz'u was about 50 kilometers south of modern Kucha city.

19. HS (1962), pp. 3002, 3877-78; Chang Ch'un-shu, "Ku-tai t'un-t'ien chih-tu te yuan-shih," p. 590. An-kuei was called Chang-kuei in the *Hsi-yü chuan* and An-kuei in the *Chao-ti chi*. I have followed the *Chao-ti chi*.

20. This event was not recorded in any Han written sources. It was recorded on a recently discovered wooden document from Chü-yen (doc. 303.8). See Chang Ch'un-shu, "Han-tai ssu-ch'ao chih-lu te k'ao-t'o yü fa-chan," pp. 11-12; and volume 2, chapter 5, of this book.

21. HS (1962), p. 3877. For the location of I-hsun, see Huang Wen-pi, *Lo-pu no-erh k'ao-ku chi*, p. 39. For the removal of the capital to I-hsun, see Li Tao-yuan, *Shui-ching chu*, vol. 1, p. 19; and Hsu Sung, *Han-shu Hsi-yü chuan pu-chu*, *chüan* 1, p. 14b. As Shan-shan made I-hsun its capital, its main territorial domain now also moved southwest of Yen-tse (Lop-nor), whereas Lou-lan had its domain northwest of Yen-tse. The old territory of Lou-lan in the north was taken over by the Han force, which established a military-agricultural colony in the area. See Huang Wen-pi, *Lo-pu no-erh k'ao-ku chi*, p. 3.

22. HS (1962), pp. 3004, 3785. The figures of 39,000 and so on are given on page 3004 ("Ch'ang Hui chuan"). The passage on page 3785 (Wu-sun section in "Hsi-yü chuan") reads "over 40,000" and "over 70,000"; it is slightly exaggerated.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 3004.

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 3005, 3922-23. For the location and interpretation of Shih-ch'eng (Stone-Walled city), I have followed Li Kuang-t'ing (*Han Hsi-yü t'u-k'ao*, *chüan* 3, p. 6b). Hsu Sung and others considered Shih-ch'eng a common term meaning a city or town surrounded by a stone wall.

25. HS (1962), p. 3005.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 3294-95. For the modern location of the So-chü of Han times, I have followed Li Kuang-t'ing, *Han Hsi-yü t'u k'ao*, *chüan* 1, p. 4b; Hsu Sung, *Han-shu Hsi-yü chuan pu-chu*, *chüan* 1, p. 8; and K'ao Ch'ü-hsun, "Tu Ch'ien Han-shu Hsi-yü chuan," p. 230. Modern Sha-ch'e was Yeh-erh ch'iang (Yarkand) in Ch'ing times. For a different view, see Ts'en Chung-mien, *Han-shu Hsi-yü chuan ti-li chiao-shih* (Peking: Chung-hua, 1981), pp. 323-41.

27. HS (1962), pp. 3005, 3923.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 3924. The new king was Chün-hsu, the heir apparent of Chü-shih, and was in Yen-ch'i at that time. The old king of Chü-shih, Wu-kuei, was escorted to Ch'ang-an from Wu-sun in 62 B.C.

29. *Ibid.*, pp. 262, 738, 3006, 3790, 3873-74; Ssu-ma Kuang, *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien* (Ku-chi ch'ü-pan she ed.), pp. 859-60; *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien k'ao-i* (Ssu-pei ts'ung-k'an ed.), *chüan* 1, p. 12; Hsu Sung, *Han-shu Hsi-yü chuan pu-chu*, p. 3463; Shen Wei-hsien, *Ch'ien-Han Hsiung-nu piao*, p. 15. For a discussion of the confusion about the dating of this event, see Chang Ch'un-shu, "Ku-tai t'un-t'ien chih-tu te yuan-shih," p. 591.

30. The location of Wu-lei has not been conclusively identified. Scholars have made various suggestions, the best known of which are Ts'e-t'e-erh (Chadir) west of Ch'ü-li

(Ting Ch'ien, *Hsi-yü chuan k'ao-cheng*, *chüan* 1, p. 34b), north of Ch'ü-li (Li Kuang-t'ing, *Han Hsi-yü t'u-k'ao*, *chüan* 1, p. 6b), the Ts'e-t'e-erh and Ch'e-erh-ch'u (K'u-erh-ch'u) area (*Han-shu Hsi-yü chuan pu-chu*, *chüan* 1, p. 8b), Bugur (Tseng Wen-wu, *Chung-kuo ching-ying Hsi-yü shih*, p. 29), Chadir Feng (Ch'eng-chün, *Hsi-yü ti-ming*, p. 22), and Hsiao Yeh-yun-kou at longitude 80° 20' east and latitude 42° north (Huang Wen-pi, *T'a-li mu p'en-ti k'ao-ku chi*, p. 9). See also Ts'en Chung-mien, *Han-shu Hsi-yü chuan ti-li chiao-shih*, pp. 403–4. After extended fieldwork in the area between Yen-ch'i and K'u-ch'e (Kucha) in 1985, I suggested that Wu-lei was north of modern Yeh-yun-kou, which was 12 kilometers west of Hsiao Yeh-yun-kou, 82 kilometers east of Lun-t'ai, 18 kilometers west of K'u-erh-ch'u, and 128 kilometers west of Yen-ch'i. See Chang Ch'un-shu, "Ch'in-Han shih yü Ch'in-Han chien-tu chung-te i-hsieh wen-t'i," p. 176.

31. For a detailed analysis of these issues, see Chang Ch'un-shu, "Ku-tai t'un-t'ien chih-tu te yuan-shih," p. 591. For the modern location of the eight smaller states, see Hsu Sung, *Han-shu Hsi-yü chuan pu-chu*, *chüan* 1, p. 7; Li Kuang-t'ing, *Han Hsi-yü t'u k'ao*, *chüan* 1, pp. 5–6; Ting Ch'ien, *Hsi-yü chuan k'ao-cheng*, pp. 34–35; Feng Ch'eng-chün, *Hsi-yü ti-ming*, p. 78; and Kao Ch'ü-hsun, "Tu Ch'ien *Han-shu Hsi-yü chuan* ch'ai-chi," pp. 229–30.

32. HS (1962), pp. 2996, 3907; Hsu Sung, *Han-shu Hsi-yü chuan pu-chu*, pp. 3535–36; Ssu-ma Kuang, *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien*, pp. 883–84; Ch'i Chao-nan, *Li-tai ti-wang nien-piao* (Ssu-pu pei-yao ed.), p. 9; Shen Wei-hsien, *Ch'ien-Han Hsiung-nu piao*, p. 1768. The dating of this event is from Hsu Sung. See also Chang Ch'un-shu, "Ku-tai t'un-t'ien chih-tu chih yuan-shih," pp. 591–92. Recent studies suggest that Ch'ih-ku ch'eng, also called Ch'ih-shan ch'eng (Red Mountain Walled town or city) was located about 1,000 li (259 miles) east of Issyk Kul along the Te-k'o-ssu (Tekes) River near Chao-su in modern western Sinkiang. See Wang Ming-che and Wang Ping-hua, *Wu-sun yen-chiu* (Ürümqi: Hsin-chiang jen-min, 1983), pp. 45–47. But this view is questionable. It is based on the reasoning that the Issyk Kul area was Wu-sun's western boundary and the Wu-sun would not locate their capital in its westernmost boundary region. But since the Wu-sun moved west to avoid Hsiung-nu attacks from the east it stands to reason that they would establish their capital as far west as possible.

33. HS (1962), pp. 2996, 3917–18. For the dating of this event, see Chang Ch'un-shu, "Ku-tai t'un-t'ien chih-tu chih yuan-shih," p. 592 and n. 92.

34. *Han-shu pu-chu*, by Wang Hsien-ch'ien (Wang ed. of the *Han-shu*), pp. 309, 1639; Ssu-ma Kuang, *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien*, p. 896; Hsu Sung, *Han-shu Hsi-yü chuan pu-chu*, pp. 8b–9a. On the organization of Wu-Chi chiao-wei, see An Tso-chang, *Han-shih ch'u-t'an* (1955 ed.), pp. 105–7; Lao Kan, 1956b, 491–96. In Former Han times, the Wu-Chi chiao-wei was one chiao-wei only. In the Latter Han period, there were two chiao-wei, the Wu colonel and the Chi colonel.

35. *Han-shu pu-chu*, p. 1662. The distance from Ku-mo to Wu-lei and Tun-huang follows Hsu Sung's calculation. Ku-mo should include the modern Pai-ch'eng, Aksu, and Wen-su regions, with Aksu being its political center. Based on my fieldwork in 1985, its capital, Nan-ch'eng, should have been west of modern Aksu city. Huang Wen-pi suggests that Nan-ch'eng was between Pai-ch'eng and Aksu (*Ta-li-mu p'en-ti k'ao-ku chi*, pp. 38–40). See also Li Kuang-t'ing, *Han Hsi-yü t'u k'ao*, *chüan* 1, 7b; Feng Ch'eng-chün, *Hsi-yü ti-ming*, pp. 13–14; and Chang Ch'un-shu, "Ku-tai t'un-t'ien chih-tu te yuan-shih," p. 592. Some scholars have raised the question of whether the Han soldiers were sent to Ku-mo to establish a military-agricultural colony because the Chinese text reads only *t'un* (to station) not *t'un-t'ien*. In this case, it is clear that they were sent there for *t'un-t'ien*, for the Chi Division under Colonel Wu-Chi was composed of farming soldiers

and their deployment in Hsi-yü had only one purpose—working in and guarding the Han military-agricultural colonies.

36. HS (1962), pp. 3010–17, 3892; Ssu-ma Kuang, *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien*, pp. 935–39. For an analysis of the battle of Chih-chih city and K'ang-chü, see J. J. L. Duyvendak, "An Illustrated Battle-Account in the History of the Former Han Dynasty," *T'oung Pao* 34, no. 4 (1939): 249–64. For the possible involvement of Roman soldiers (legionaries) in the battle, the Han capture of 145 of them, and their removal to Chang-yeh, see Homer H. Dubs, *A Roman City in Ancient China* (London: China Society, 1957). Dubs believed that the Roman soldiers captured by the Han troops were moved to Chang-yeh in Ho-hsi to be settled in a new district named Li-chien, homophoned after the Roman *legions*. Many others have questioned this view. See Yin-shih Yü, *Trade and Expansion in Han China*, pp. 89–91; Schuyler Cammann, "Review of H. H. Dubs' *A Roman City in Ancient China*," *Journal of Asian Studies* 21, no. 3 (May 1962). Yang Hsi-mei dismissed Dubs's theory in a lengthy article in 1969; see his *Hsin-Ch'in wen-hua shih lun-chi*, pp. 870–902 (including comments by many other scholars). A definitive study of this issue that also dismisses the Roman legions theory, is Liu Kuang-hua and Hsieh Yü-chieh, "Li-chien shih Hsi-Han an-chih Lo-ma chan-fu ch'eng shang-ch'ueh," *Hsi-pei ti-erh min-tsu hsueh-yuan* 2 (1999). I thank Professor Liu Kuang-hua for showing me a draft. Liu and Hsieh, however, do not deny that there were other Indo-Europeans, such as the Ta Yueh-chih, in Ho-hsi. The recently discovered Chü-yen documents also show that the name Li-chien existed as early as 60 B.C. during the reign of Hsuan-ti (74–49 B.C.). See docs. EJJH2:2 and EJT4:98. This document further dismisses that particular theory.

37. HS (1962), pp. 3874, 3918.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 3908.

39. This discussion is based mainly on *ibid.*, pp. 3873–928; and Hsu Sung, *Han-shu Hsi-yü chuan pu-chu* and *Hsi-yü shui-tao chi*. For secondary studies, see Tseng Wen-wu, *Chung-kuo ching-ying Hsi-yü shih*, pp. 40ff.; and Ise Sentarō, *Chūgoku Seiki keieishi kenkyū*, pp. 37–80. For the Hsuan-ch'üan documents, which date from 111 B.C. to A.D. 107, see the introduction, note 8.

40. The *Han-shu* mentions that there were eighteen protector generals from 60 B.C., when the position was established, to the end of the Hsin dynasty in A.D. 23. See HS (1962), p. 3030. But only twelve of the eighteen had their names mentioned in Han sources, and one of the twelve, Tuan Hui-tung, had three three-year terms. See Huang Wen-pi, *Lo-pu no-erh k'ao-ku chi* and *Hsi-pei shih-ti lung-ts'ung*, pp. 310–14, 318; Wang Ming-che and Wang Ping-hua, *Wu-sun yen-chiu*, pp. 102–4; and Chang Wei-hua, *Han-shih lun-chi* (Chinan: Ch'i-Lu shu-she, 1980), pp. 270–82. See table 10.

41. HS (1962), pp. 738, 896, 3874, 3924. A recently discovered Hsuan-ch'üan document indicates that this division must have taken place before 39 B.C. (doc. I90DXT0125:21).

42. *Ibid.*, p. 3962. But the most important sources are the recent archaeological investigations. See Huang Wen-pi, *T'a-li-mu p'en-ti k'ao-ku chi*, pp. 7, 10–11, and *Lo-pu no-erh k'ao-ku chi*, pp. 3, 192–93.

43. This is based on recent archaeological reports such as Huang Wen-pi, *T'a-li-mu p'en-ti k'ao-ku chi*, esp. pp. 10–11, 40, and *Lo-pu no-erh k'ao-ku chi*, esp. pp. 3, 105. For *t'ien-kuan*, see HS (1962), pp. 3874, 3924; SC (1963), p. 1439; and volume 2, chapter 2, of this book.

44. See the archaeological report of Huang Wen-pi, *Lo-pu no-erh k'ao-ku chi*, pp. 191–95. See also HS (1962), p. 3926.

45. Recent archaeological surveys and fieldwork have led to the discovery of many of

the watch stations and watchtowers that connected the Han establishments in Hsi-yü. See particularly Aurel Stein, *Innermost Asia*, and *On Ancient Central-Asian Tracts*; and Huang Wen-pi, *Ta-li-mu p'en-ti k'ao-ku chi* and *Lo-pu no-erh k'ao-ku chi*. In my fieldwork in Sinkiang in 1982 and 1985, I made a systematic study of a series of ruins of Han watch stations between Kucha (Ch'iu-tzu in Han times) and Aksu (Ku-mo in Han times) and found them situated 10 kilometers apart. Northeast of Kucha I also found fifteen Han watchtowers spaced 5 kilometers apart in a long line.

46. HS (1962), pp. 3924, 3926; Huang Wen-pi, *Lo-pu no-erh k'ao-ku chi*, pp. 179–84.

47. Wooden docs. 15 and 16, uncovered in Lop-nor by Huang Wen-pi; see his *Lo-pu no-erh k'ao-ku chi*, pp. 195, 196.

48. Lop-nor docs. 27–46, in *ibid.*

49. Lop-nor docs. 27, 35, 41, in *ibid.*

50. Lop-nor docs. 22 and 47, in *ibid.*

51. Lop-nor doc. 20, in *ibid.*, pp. 190–92; Lao Kun, “Liang-Han cheng-fu tsai Hsi-yü te ching-ying,” in Chung-kuo pien-chiang li-shih yü-wen hsueh-hui, ed., *Hsin-chiang yen-chiu* (Taipei: Chung-kuo pien-chiang li-shih yü-wen hsueh-hui, 1964), pp. 19–20.

52. Huang Wen-pi, *Lo-pu no-erh k'ao-ku chi*, pp. 68–69. For the location of Wen-su, see Li Kuang-t'ing, *Han Hsi-yü t'u-k'ao*, *chüan* 1, p. 8a.

53. For the later history of Hsi-yü and Sinkiang, see Tseng Wen-wu, *Chung-kuo ching-ying Hsi-yü shih*; Chung-kuo pien-chiang li-shih yü-wen hsueh-hui, *Hsin-chiang yen-chiu*, esp. pp. 21–204; Hsin-chiang she-hui k'o-hsueh yuan Min-tsu yen-chiu so, *Hsin-chiang chien-shih*; Ise Sentarō, *Chūgoku Seiki keieishi kenkyū*; Fujita Tōyōhachi, *Tōzai kōshō-shi no kenkyū*; *Seiki hen*; and Kuwabara 1933.

CONCLUSION

1. The Ch'iang territory acquired by the Han in the northwest was relatively small, only about 24,000 square miles and most of it was developed by the military during the reigns of Emperors Hsuan and Yuan. The Ch'iang land seized first by the Hsiung-nu and then by the Han during Wu-ti's reign was included in the Ho-hsi region. See Chun-shu Chang, “Ku-tai t'un-t'ien chih-tu chih yuan-shih,” pp. 589–90; and Liu Kuang-hua, *Han-tai Hsi-pei t'un-t'ien yen-chiu* (Lanchow: Lan-chou ta-hsueh ch'u-pan she, 1988), pp. 83–86. The newly discovered Han wooden and bamboo slips at Hsuan-ch'üan also contain a good number of documents but of a much later period (from the last decades of the first century B.C. to the first century A.D.). See HCHC. Chang Te-fang has examined eighty-six of these Ch'iang documents in *Chien-po yen-chiu*, vol. 1 (Kuei-lin: Kuang-hsi shih-fan ta-hsueh ch'u-pan she, 2001), pp. 358–68.

2. HS (1962), pp. 186–88, 3847–59; SC (1959), 2967–77. However, Tan-erh was abolished as a *chün* in 82 B.C. under Emperor Chao and Chu-ya in 46 B.C. under Emperor Yuan. It should be noted that the time of the conquest of Nan-yueh was recorded in Han sources from the fall of Yuan-ting 5 (112 B.C.) to the winter of Yuan-ting 6 (111 B.C.). But since the Han New Year started in the tenth month at this time, the beginning months of Yuan-ting 6 were actually in 112 B.C. For the Nan-yueh kingdom and its history, institutions, and civilization, see the two-volume work, *Hsi-Han Nan-yueh wang mu* (Nanyue King's Tomb of the Western Han), ed. Museum of Guangdong Province (Beijing: Wen-wu, 1991). For the development of Han *chün* in Vietnam after the first century B.C., see Jennifer Holmgren, *Chinese Colonization of Northern Viet-*

nam: Administrative Geography and Political Development in the Tongking Delta, First to Sixth Centuries, A.D. (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1980). The earlier Ch'in expansions to the Yueh lands and Korea are detailed with extensive notes in the prologue to this volume.

3. HS (1962), pp. 3814-15. See also Hans Bielenstein, "The Chinese Colonization of Fukien until the End of the T'ang," *Studia Serica Bernhard Karlgren Dedicata* (Copenhagen: Ejnar Munksgaard, 1959), pp. 98-122.

4. HS (1962), pp. 189-90, 3859-63; SC (1959), pp. 2979-84. According to Han era sources, the conquest of Tung-yueh took place in the fall of Yuan-ting 6 (111 B.C.) and the winter of Yuan-feng 1 (110). But, as explained in note 2, it really took place in late 111 B.C.

5. HS (1962), pp. 3837-42; SC (1959), pp. 2991-97. Later in 97 B.C. Shen-li was abolished, and in 67 B.C. Wen-shan was abolished. A detailed discussion of the peoples and geographical locations of the various tribal states and tribes is given in Fang Kuo-yü, *Chung-kuo Hsi-nan li-shih ti-li k'ao-shih*, vol. 1 (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1987), pp. 9-40. See also Herold J. Wiens, *Han Chinese Expansion in South China* (reprint; 1967; originally published in 1954 as *China's March Towards the Tropics*).

6. HS (1962), pp. 193-94, 3863-67; SC (1959), pp. 2985-89. Later in 82 B.C. Emperor Chao abolished Lin-t'un and Chen-p'an and made them parts of Lo-lang. The identification of the Pa River follows T'an Ch'i-hsiang, *Chung-kuo li-shih ti-t'u chi*, vol. 2, map 27-28. Chao Sung-ch'en identifies the Pa River as the modern Yalu (*Chung-kuo te pan-t'u*, p. 76). Lo-lang was the command center of the Han in Korea, and it has inspired extensive archaeological and historical studies. See Komai Kazuchika, *Rakurō* (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1972); Sekino Tadashi, *Archaeological Researches on the Ancient Lo-lang District* (Seoul: Chōsen Sōtokufu, 1925); Harada Yoshito, *Lo-lang: A Report on the Excavation of Wang Hsu's Tomb in Lo-lang Province, an Ancient Chinese Colony in Korea* (Tokyo: Toko-shoin, 1930), p. 12 (contains a Han wooden document); and Yoshifumi Kubozoe, "Rakurōgun to Taihōgun no suii," in *Nihon Kōdaishi Kōza*, vol. 3 (Tokyo: Gakuseisha, 1982), pp. 21-55.

7. This estimate is based on the territory of Min-yueh and the twenty *chün* that the Han established after the conquest of the three regions.

8. This figure includes all land under Han control in 87 B.C. It should be pointed out that not all new territorial expansion was by military means under Wu-ti; a small amount of new land was added through other means.

9. For these changes and conditions in China after the fall of Western Chou in 771 B.C., see the prologue in this volume; Cho-yun Hsu 1965a; and Yang K'uan, *Chan-kuo shih*, 3d ed. (Shanghai: Jen-min, 1981), which is the most comprehensive of all such studies.

10. For detailed examination of these measures of unification under Ch'in Shih Huang-ti, see Ma Fei-pai (Ma Yuan-ts'ai), *Ch'in Shih-huang-ti chuan*, 2 vols. (Changsha: Shang-wu, 1941) (as well as the revised and enlarged edition published by Chiang-su ku-chi ch'u-pan she in 1985). See also Derk Bodde, *China's First Unifier*.

11. SC (1959), pp. 252-53.

12. Ku Chieh-kang and Shih Nien-hai, *Chung-kuo Chiang-yü Yen-ko Shih* (Changsha: Shang-wu, 1938), pp. 76-86; Chao Sung-ch'en, *Chung-kuo te pan-t'u*, vol. 1, pp. 55-63.

13. SC (1959), pp. 239, 245. This was according to Shih Huang-ti's own words, which are engraved on a stone monument in Lang-yeh (in modern southern Shantung).

14. For a detailed analysis of these aspects, see Chun-shu Chang, "Emperorship in Eighteenth-Century China," *Journal of the Institute of Chinese Studies* 7, no. 2 (1974): 566–68. Paul Kennedy advances the brilliant thesis that great powers (empires) fell when the state's military and political ambitions outpaced its capacity to support them in his *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflicts from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987). Our three cases do not fit his thesis, as two of them occurred before 1500 and the last failed due to the incompetence of military commanders.

15. HS (1960), pp. 189, 243.

16. HS (1962), pp. 1158, 3816; and earlier chapters on the development of Ho-hsi in this volume, a project that was larger and should have been more costly than the development of Ho-nan.

17. Huan T'an (ca. 43 B.C.–A.D. 28), *Hsin-lun* (New Treatise), in Yen K'o-chün, CSK, sec. 14, p. 2b; trans. Timotheus Pokora (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, MI, 1978), pp. 49–50. Li Chien-nung, *Hsien-Ch'in liang-Han ching-chi shih kao*, pp. 244–56; Ma Ta-ying, *Han-tai ts'ai-cheng shih* (Peking: Chung-kuo ts'ai-cheng ching-chi ch'u-pan she, 1983), p. 64. Ma's work is the most detailed study of this issue, and my figures are based on his. The total annual revenue of the Han government in Wu-ti's time, with a population of 50 million, was 7.8 billion in cash; it was 10.5 billion later, when the population reached 60 million. This revenue included the land tax (4 billion) and poll and service commutation taxes. My estimate here is larger than Ma's.

18. Ma Ta-ying has estimated that in military operations the average total cost per soldier in a year in Han times ranged from 130,000 to 180,000 in cash (*Han-tai ts'ai-cheng shih*, p. 208). I set the annual average at 150,000 in cash for a soldier and have estimated the total number of soldiers engaged in the western expansion from 129 to 90 B.C. to be 12.6 million men. The figures given here are based on these estimates. It should be noted that the total annual cost of a soldier during military operations is much higher than the average annual cost of a military man in noncombat situations. This estimate refers to the total operational cost per soldier in combat, including transportation costs, losses of horses and weapons, and so forth, not just the regular annual expenses for a serviceman (infantry and cavalry). The annual cost of 150,000 in cash a year represents a rough average, as precise figures are not found in the Han documents. For details of these estimates, see chapter 1 of this book (text and n. 54).

19. The Han western frontiers may be compared to other frontiers in history to provide new understanding of their role in different societies and countries. For other frontiers, see particularly C. R. Whittaker, *Frontiers of the Roman Empire: A Social and Economic Study* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); and Howard Lamar and Leonard Thompson, eds., *The Frontier in History: North America and Southern Africa Compared* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).

20. HS (1962), pp. 3916–17.

21. The discussion of the long-range economic impact of Hsi-yü on Han China is based on *Han-shu* 96; Ch'en Chu-t'ung, *Liang-Han ho Hsi-yü teng-ti te ching-chi wen-hua chiao-liu* (Shanghai: Jen-min ch'u-pan she, 1957), esp. pp. 1–15; Chang Hsing-lang, *Chung-Hsi chiao-t'ung shih-liao hui-pien* (reprint; Taipei: Shih-chieh shu-chü, 1962), vol. 1; Tseng Wen-wu, *Chung-kuo ching-ying hsi-yü shih*, pp. 62–66; and Ise Sentarō, *Chūgoku Seiki keieishi kenkyū*, pp. 63–74. The list of vegetables, fruits, and other plants introduced from Hsi-yü includes only new species. Any variety of a species already found in Han China is excluded, for it amounted to no basic change.

22. Ch'en Chu-t'ung, *Liang-Han ho Hsi-yü teng-ti te ching-chi wen-hua chiao-liu*, pp. 49-52.

23. Works by scholars who held this view include Geoffrey Francis Hudson, *Europe and China: A Survey of Their Relations from the Earliest Time to 1800* (Boston: Beacon, 1961), pp. 96-98; C. G. Seligman, "The Roman Orient and the Far East," in *Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1938), pp. 96-98; and Mortimer Wheeler, *Rome beyond the Imperial Frontiers* (London: Bell, 1954), p. 175. Glassmaking probably originated in Mesopotamia in about 2300 B.C. In the sixteenth and fifteenth centuries B.C., the technique was further refined in Egypt. Glassblowing was invented by the Romans in about 50 B.C. See S. Frank, *Glass and Archaeology* (London: Academic Press, 1982). Archaeological finds have shown that the glass industry began in China in the sixth century B.C. and glassblowing was known there no later than third century B.C. Thus, while glassmaking in China may have had foreign origins, glassblowing was an independent invention and possibly was introduced to Rome through the Western Regions, together with Chinese silk. See Kao Chih-hsi's essays on glass in ancient China in *Chung-kuo ku po-li yen-chiu* (Peking: Chung-kuo chien-chu kung-yeh, 1986), pp. 53-57; and Kuang-tung sheng po-wu kuan, *Hsi-Han Nan-yueh wang mu* (Peking: Wen-wu, 1991), vol. 1, pp. 133, 211, 251, 271, 338-40.

24. On the introduction of Buddhism to China through the Western Regions, see T'ang Yung-t'ung, *Han-Wei Liang-Chin Nan-Pei ch'ao fo-chiao shih*, 2 vols. (Peking: Chung-hua, 1955), vol. 1, pp. 47-86; Huang Wen-pi, *Hsi-pei shih-ti lun-ts'ung*, pp. 240-48; Kenneth Ch'en, *Buddhism in China: A Historical Introduction*, pp. 27-53; Erik Zürcher, *The Buddhist Conquest of China: The Spread and Adaption of Buddhism in Medieval China*, pp. 18-43; and Jen Chi-yü et al., *Chung-kuo fo-chiao shih*, vol. 1 (Peking: Chung-kuo she-hui k'o-hsueh yuan, 1981), pp. 90-105. Some scholars, however, believe that Buddhism came to China in the Ch'in period (ca. 220-213 B.C.). See Ma Fei-pei, *Ch'in Shih-huang-ti chuan* (Yangchou: Chiang-su ku-chi, 1985), pp. 585-86.

25. For comprehensive discussion of these items, see Ch'en Chu-t'ung, *Liang-Han ho Hsi-yü teng-ti te ching-chi wen-hua chiao-liu*, pp. 1-9, 18-24, 34-52; Yü T'ai-shan, *Liang-Han Wei-Chin Nan-pei ch'ao yü Hsi-yü kuan-hsi shih yen-chiu* (Peking: Chung-kuo she-hui k'o-hsueh ch'u-pan she, 1995), esp. pp. 3-68; Ch'ang Jen-hsia, *Ssu-ch'ou chih-lu yü Hsi-yü wen-hua i-shu* (Shanghai: Wen-i ch'u-pan she, 1981), pp. 1-77, 215-46; and Ying-shih Yü, *Trade and Expansion in Han China*, pp. 196-99. In my discussions, it is not appropriate to include the Han impact on the West; but for real and possible impact of the Han western expansion on the Roman Empire, in addition to the titles already cited, see Frederick J. Teggart, *Rome and China: A Study of Correlations in Historical Events* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1939), esp. pp. 225-45 (Teggart suggests that the Han attacks on the Hsiung-nu led to barbarian uprisings and invasions on the Danube between Vienna and Budapest); Mortimer Wheeler, *Rome beyond the Imperial Frontiers*; and C. R. Whitaker, *Frontiers of the Roman Empire*.

26. HS (1962), pp. 774-90, 2623. It should be pointed out that the last prime minister during Wu-ti's reign was T'ien Ch'ien-ch'iu, who took office in the fall of 89 B.C. Fortunately for him, the emperor died in the spring of 87 B.C. without having killed him. Although T'ien continued to serve as prime minister until 77 B.C., the office never recovered its former power and respect.

27. *Ibid.*, pp. 2877-79.

28. All of these views about the new Han Confucianism and related religious and ideological issues were discussed in chapter 1.

29. HS (1962), pp. 1101, 2638–46; Ch'eng Shu-teh, *Ch'iu-ch'an lü-k'ao*, p. 181; *Chin-shu* (I-wen ed.), p. 654; Yang Hung-lieh, *Chung-kuo fa-lü fa-ta shih*, pp. 96–97. Some of the institutional issues are briefly discussed in Ōba Osamu, *Ch'in-Han fa-chih shih yen-chiu*, trans. Lin Chien-ming et al. (Shanghai: Jen-min, 1991).

30. The terms *hegemonic* (or *dominant*) *position* and *emergent* (or *minority*) *cultures* are used for the sake of convenience. They are defined and discussed in Raymond Williams, *Marxism and Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 121–27. I used *hegemonic culture* to mean the culture of the majority people of a unified empire and *emergent culture* to mean the culture of the minority.

31. For detailed accounts of Yuan loyalism, see the Ming dynasty work (A.D. 1370) *Yuan-shih* (History of the Yuan Dynasty), rev. and enlarged ed., ed. Yao Ts'ung-wu et al. (Taipei: Kuo-fang yen-chiu yuan, 1967), pp. 2058–93. The accounts of Ch'ing loyalism are found in the *Ch'ing-shih kao* (Draft History of the Ch'ing Dynasty, completed in 1927–28) (new ed.; Taipei: Kuo-shih kuan, 1990), pp. 11232–433. The last biography in the section “Chung-i” (The Loyal and Righteous) of the *Ch'ing-shih kao* is Wang Kuo-wei's (p. 11433). See also a detailed study of Wang Kuo-wei's life in Wang Teh-i, *Wang Kuo-wei nien-p'u* (A Chronological Biography of Wang Kuo-wei) (Taipei: Chung-kuo hsueh-shu chu-tso ching-chu wei-yuan hui, 1967), pp. 355–89 (including various interpretations of the motives behind Wang's suicide). For reference to the Han empire as *Han-chia*, or for that matter the Chinese empire (China) at that time, see *Han-shu* (1964 ed.), pp. 2893, 3674.

32. For the terms *alien dynasties* (or *regimes*) and *conquest dynasties* (or *regimes*) in China and a description of how these non-Han peoples ruled China under a system of “synarchy” or “joint administration” (by Chinese and non-Chinese), see John K. Fairbank, “Synarchy under the Treaties,” in *Chinese Thought and Institutions*, ed. John K. Fairbank (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 204–12.

33. The discussion to this point involves the concepts of nation and nationalism, two of the most critical ideas and foundational concepts in modern historical analysis. There has been a serious lack of literature on the origins and development of the two concepts among scholars of modern China. For a discussion of this issue in China, see the prologue.

34. For a detailed study of the origins and development of the concepts of Chung-kuo and later Chung-kuo-jen, see appendix 3. It should be pointed out here that Hsu Shen (A.D. 58–147) defined *Hsia* as “Chung-kuo chih-jen,” literally, “the people of Chung-kuo [the Central Plain]” in his *Shuo-wen chieh-tzu* (Script Explained and Characters Elucidated), a dictionary compiled between A.D. 100 and 121. The script character for *Hsia* was a picture of a human with legs crossed to show the characteristic way the Hsia people in Chung-kuo walked. That is probably the etymological origin of the term *Chung-kuo jen*. See Hsu Shen, *Shuo-wen chieh-tzu* (Peking: Chung-hua shu chü, 1963), p. 112. Cheng Hsuan (127–200), who lived generations later than Hsu Shen, also interpreted *Hsia* as referring to Chung-kuo. See P'ei Yin's (fl. 465–72) quote in SC (1959), pp. 39–40. See also p. 2967. For a detailed examination of the terms *Hua*, *Hua-Hsia*, and the later *Chung-hua*, see appendix 3.

35. HS (1962), p. 3913. In the Han writings and wooden and bamboo documents, the term *Ch'in-Hu* is also found. Scholars have variously interpreted it to mean a Ch'in person who went to the Hu; a Ch'in (Han) person *and* a Hu person; a Hu who lived among the Han for long and eventually became a Han person; and so forth. See Hsing I-

t'ien, *Ch'in-Han shih lun-kao* (reprint; Taipei: Tung-ta, 1987; originally published in 1985), pp. 317-31. My own view is that Ch'in-Hu was a Hu (of the Hsiung-nu or another group) who moved to "China" under the Ch'in dynasty or a Ch'in who had lived in the Hu land.

36. General references to the terms and names mentioned here can be found in two massive works: Ssu-ma Kuang (A.D. 1019-86), *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien* (Shanghai: Ku-chi ch'u-pan she, 1957); and Pi Yuan (1730-97), *Hsu Tzu-chih t'ung-chien* (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1957).

37. For the *Hua-hua* (or *Han-hua*) under the Northern Wei, see Sun T'ung-hsun, *T'o-pa shih te Han-hua* (The Sinicization of the Toba [of Hsien-pei of the Northern Wei]) (Taipei: Kuo-li T'ai-wan ta-hsueh, 1962). For the large issue of racial assimilation by means of cultural and institutional transformation in China during the Six Dynasties period and in the Sui and T'ang empires, see Ch'en Yin-k'o's penetrating, pathbreaking studies: *Sui-T'ang chih-tu yuan-yuan lueh lun kao* (On the Origins of the Sui and T'ang Institutions and Cultures) (Shanghai: Ku-chi ch'u-pan she, 1982); *T'ang-tai cheng-chih shih shu lun kao* (Studies on the Political History of the T'ang Period) (Shanghai: Ku-chi ch'u-pan she, 1982); and *Chin-ming kuan ts'ung-kao* (Collected Essays of Ch'en Yin-k'o), 2 vols. (Shanghai: Ku-chi ch'u-pan she, 1982).

38. My definition of *feudalism* (*feng-chien*) is given in appendix 3, note 1. For the origins and development of the term *kuo-chia*, see prologue and *Shang-shu* (*Wu-ching tu-pen* ed.), p. 118 (following many early studies, I believe that this chapter in the *Book of History* was written in the late eleventh century B.C.); *Tso-chuan* (*Wu-ching tu-pen* ed.), p. 67 (although the dating of *Tso-chuan* is generally set in the fourth century B.C. by modern scholars, this reference to the *kuo* and *chia* was dated 710 B.C. in the *Tso-chuan*); Mo Ti (fl. 479-438 B.C.), *Mo-tzu* (The Works of Mo-tzu; Wan-yu wen-k'u ed.), pp. 50-63; Meng Tzu (Meng K'o, 371-289 B.C.), *Meng Tzu* (The Works of Mencius; Ssu-shu chang-chü ed.), pp. 234-36, 278; Han Fei (280?-233 B.C.), *Han Fei Tzu* (The Works of Han Fei (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1958), p. 60; *Han-shu* (1964), pp. 2648, 3010; Fan Yeh (398-446), *Hou Han shu* (History of the Latter Han Dynasty; 1965 ed.), pp. 3167-70, citing Ying Shao's (ca. A.D. 140-206) quote from Ma Pai-ti's *Feng-shan i-chi* (Record of the Feng and Shan Sacrifices by the Kuang-wu Emperor, r. 25-57); and Fang Hsuan-ling (578-648) et al., *Chin-shu* (History of the Chin Dynasty; 1965 ed.), p. 1189 (in the words of T'ao K'an, 259-334). For Ch'in Shih huang-ti's (the First Emperor's) views on the unification of T'ien-hsia (All under Heaven) during his reign and the end of the feudal *kuo-chia* system, see prologue in this volume and his many proclamations and stone inscriptions. See SC (1963), pp. 246-67; and *Ch'in Shih-huang chin-shih k'o-tz'u* (Shanghai: Jen-min, 1975).

I should further point out that in recent years several scholars have questioned the existence of a feudal system in Chou China because many Marxist historians politicized the term *feng-chien* (feudalism) as a vehicle for collective action in the revolutionary movement in China from the 1920s on and particularly in the 1950s and 1960s, when it reached a point of intellectual fanaticism. That extreme reaction is equally groundless. In my discussion, I have clearly reset the boundaries of the *feng-chien* system. I believe that feudalism, as I have defined it, did exist in Chou China and that it can serve as an effective conceptual framework for the analysis of the Chou society and state.

39. This structural sketch of the Han empire is based on the materials presented in this volume and discriminating reading of all the relevant primary sources, including the

Shih-chi, *Han-shu*, *Han kuan i*, *Han chiu-i*, *Yen-t'ieh lun*, *Hou Han shu*, and *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien* (vol. 2). The most important primary materials are those on the Hsiung-nu, the Western Regions, the Ch'iang, the imperial official and administrative systems, and the Han and non-Han personages who had a special impact on Han relations with the Hsiung-nu, the Ch'iang, and the states of the Western Regions and on the rise of the Han colonial empire. In the *Shih-chi*, see especially SC (1959), pp. 451–86, 1119–56, 2867–998, and 3157–80; in the *Han-shu* see especially HS (1962), pp. 155–362, 721–860, 2439–94, 2687–706, 2971–3034, 3743–932. There have been an enormous number of secondary studies on the *shu-kuo* institutions, the development of the Western Regions under the Han, and Han–Hsiung-nu relations, but the most “recent” classic works stand out. See Yen Keng-wang, “Han-tai chün to-wei chih-tu,” *Ta-lu tsa-chih t'e-k'an* (Taipei: Ta-lu tsa-chih, 1952), pp. 442–50; Yen Keng-wang, *Chung-kuo ti-fang hsing-cheng chih-tu shih*, pp. 157–75; Chang Wei-hua, *Han-shih lun-chi* (Chinan: Ch'i-Lu shu-she, 1980), pp. 245–308; Huang Wen-pi, *Hsi-pei shih-ti lun-ts'ung* (Shanghai: Jen-min, 1981), pp. 54–72, 310–14; Tseng Wen-wu, *Chung-kuo ching-ying Hsi-yü shih*, pp. 13–66; Ise Sentarō, *Chūgoku Seiki keizishi kenkyū*, pp. 1–94 (cf. Tseng Wen-wu's work); Wang Kuo-wei, *Kuan-t'ang chi-lin*, vol. 3, pp. 865–67; Lin Kan, comp., *Hsiung-nu shih-liao hui-pien*, pp. 1–423; and Chien Po-tsan et al., comps., *Li-tai ke-tsu chuan-chi hui-pien*, vol. 1, esp. pp. 3–494.

40. See, for example, HS (1962), pp. 730, 735, and note 39 in this chapter for a Han wooden document from Chü-yen (doc. 303.8), which records that two female interpreters were sent to Lou-lan from Ta-wan, the headquarters of Chien-shui, chief commandant in the Chü-yen region. See also Richard N. Frye, *The Heritage of Central Asia*, pp. 121–30, 248–50.

41. All of these Han officials and generals have been discussed in previous chapters.

42. Ting Fu-pao, *Ch'üan Han San-kuo Chin Nan-pei ch'ao shih*, vol. 1, p. 74. For issues on the authenticity of this poem, see Fang Tsu-shen, *Han-shih yen-chiu* (Taipei: Cheng-chung, 1969), pp. 64–67. Fang's study reviews all the other important works and concludes that the poem was indeed written by Su Wu (ca. 150–60 B.C.) in about 100 B.C. But judging from the new semantic structure, which is a significant departure from the earlier tradition, it was probably written in the 60s and 50s B.C. For the original semantic structure of the line in the fifth century B.C., see Liu Pao-nan, *Lun-yü cheng-i*, pp. 264–65.

43. For the identification of Ssu-hai and Hsi-hai as the Persian Gulf, see HS (1962), pp. 3021, 3881, 3888; Ts'en Chung-mien, *Han-shu Hsi-yü chuang ti-li chiao-shih* (Peking: Chung-hua, 1981), pp. 165–78; Hsu Chien (A.D. 659–729), *Ch'u-hsueh chi* (completed in 725) (Peking: Chung-hua, 1962), pp. 114–15; and the various discussions and identifications in this volume.

44. See and compare Ou-yang Hsiu (A.D. 1007–72) and Sung Ch'i (998–1061), *Hsin T'ang shu* (Peking: Chung-hua, 1975), pp. 6258–59; and Liu Hsu (887–946), *Chiu T'ang shu* (Peking: Chung-hua, 1975), pp. 5311–13. It should be noted that whereas Liu Hsu made no exaggerated statements about the T'ang influence in the west, Ou-yang and Sung made misleading statements about the T'ang colonial control and sphere of domination in Central Asia (pp. 6264–65), without understanding the full extent of the earlier Han expansion in the Western Regions. Unfortunately, their views were often followed by later and modern historians and scholars. See also T'an Ch'i-hsiang, *Chung-kuo li-shih ti-t'u chi*, vol. 5, map 32–33.

45. HS (1962), pp. 3888-90.

46. The sources for this point are scattered in Ssu-ma Ch'ien's *Shih-chi* and Pan Ku's *Han-shu*. See SC (1959), pp. 2872-78, 2905-19, 3157-78; and HS (1962), pp. 160-328, 2637-704, 2971-3029, 3292-301, 3765-80, 3871-930.

APPENDIX I

1. There have been a large number of outstanding studies of the *tu-wei* system as a primarily military institution in Han times. While it is impossible to list all of them here, a few of the early and most systematic works are Yen Keng-wang, "Han-tai chün tu-wei chih-tu," *Ta-lu tsa-chih t'e-k'an* 2, no. 1 (July 1972): 433-50; *Chung-kuo ti-fang hsing-cheng chih-tu shih* (Taipei: Chung-yang yen-chiu yuan 1961), pp. 147-75; Kamada Shigeo, *Kandai shi kenkyū*, pp. 287ff.; T'ao Hsi-sheng and Shen Chü-ch'en, *Ch'in-Han cheng-chih chih-tu*, pp. 224-29; and HHS (1965), p. 2854.

2. HHS (1965), pp. 176, 735; SC (1959), p. 4590; Yen Keng-wang *Chung-kuo ti-fang hsing-cheng chih-tu shih*, pp. 157-59; Kamada Shigeo, *Kandai-shi kenkyū*, pp. 287ff., which also has a detailed discussion of the locations of the five Shu-kuo. Also see Lao Kan, "Han-tai chün-chih chi ch'i tui-yü chien-tu te ts'an-cheng," in *Fu Ku-hsiao-chang Ssu-nien Hsien-sheng chi-nien lung-wen chi* (Taipei: Taiwan ta-hsueh, 1953), pp. 26-61, esp. 29-30; and Chun-shu Chang 1966b, p. 232 (n. 118).

3. HHS (1965), p. 2854.

4. Yen Keng-wang *Chung-kuo ti-fang hsing-cheng chih-tu shih*, p. 155; SC, p. 4696.

5. SC, pp. 2994, 4695-96; HS, p. 3839.

6. SC, p. 2988; HS, pp. 1627, 3867; Wu Cho-hsin (fl. early eighteenth century A.D.), *Han-shu ti-li chih pu-chu*, in *Erh-shih wu shih pu-pien*, p. 981; HHS (1965), pp. 2849, 2857.

7. SC, pp. 4690-93, 4696. For example, the land was cultivated and there were well-organized communities.

8. HHS (1965), p. 189.

9. Ibid., pp. 114, 2849-51. Sometimes a *chün* on the frontier was degraded to a *tu-wei* if local conditions were extremely unstable. See p. 2858 (Wen-shan *chün*).

10. Yen Keng-wang, *Chung-kuo ti-fang hsing-cheng chih-tu shih*, pp. 157-58. Also see T'ao Hsi-sheng and Shen Chü-ch'en, *Ch'in-Han Cheng-chih chih-tu*, p. 129.

11. SC, pp. 2967-68; HS, p. 3847. See also the prologue in this volume for the Ch'in conquest of South China and Vietnam. It should be noted that the early-fifth-century *Shih-san chou chih* explained the Nan-hai *tu-wei* in the Ch'in system as a *tu-wei* who was "usually appointed to govern a smaller *chün* where a regular *chün* had a governor (*chün-shou*)" (SC, p. 2698) This explains the evolution of the special *tu-wei* institution.

APPENDIX 2

1. This appendix was originally delivered at a conference on Chinese military history jointly sponsored by Harvard University and the American Council of Learned Societies, in Dedham, Massachusetts, in August 1969. Extensive revisions have since been made. No studies of a similar nature have been published in any language since its first appearance. Some related studies include Huang Chin-yen, *Ch'in-Han chün-chih shih lun* (Nanchang, Kiangsi: Jen-min ch'u-pan she, 1993), pp. 16-44, 122-51; and Liao Pai-

yuan, “Lu Hsi-Han Chiang-chün chih-tu chi-ch’i cheng-chih ti-wei,” in *Li-shih yü chih-tu: Han-tai cheng-chih chih-tu shih-shih* (reprint; Hong Kong: Chia-yü t’u-shu kung-ssu, 1997; originally published in 1990), pp. 138–203. For a study of generals in the T’ang dynasty (A.D. 618–907), see David A. Graff, “Early T’ang Generalship and the Textual Tradition,” Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1995. The rendering of special terms and official and military titles generally follows the work of Wang Yü-ch’üan and Homer H. Dubs: Wang’s article in *Studies of Governmental Institutions in Chinese History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968); and Dubs, trans. *The History of the Former Han Dynasty*, 3 vols. (Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1938–55). Some translations are my own. The recently (1978) discovered Han documents of the Hsuan-ti period (74–49 B.C.) in Shang Sung-chia-chai in Ta-t’ung hsien of Ch’ing-hai (Tsinghai) provide some information about the organization of the Han army but not much about the issues of military leadership. See Li Chün-ming and Ho Shuang-ch’üan, *San-chien chien-tu ho-chi* (Peking: Wen-wu, 1990), pp. 31–43.

2. The following summary and analysis of the development of the Former Han period is primarily based on chapter 1 and the conclusion in this volume. Some of the issues will be also explored later in this appendix.

3. HS (1962), p. 3029.

4. In the interest of simplicity, I have in general omitted variations in the system, particularly those on the frontier. For comprehensive discussions of the Han military organization, see Chun-shu Chang 1966b, pp. 154–269; 1967a, pp. 681–749; and 1963, pp. 184–200, 223–27, nn. 236–68.

5. For studies of this and other military officers, see Hamaguchi Shigekuni, *Shin Kan Zui to shih no kenkyū*, 2 vols. (Tokyo, 1966), pp. 251–90; Sun Yü-t’ang, “Hsi-Han te ping-chih,” *Chung-kuo she-hui ching-chi shih chi-k’an* 5, no. 1 (March 1937): 23–40; Ho Ch’ang-ch’ün, “Han-ch’u chih Nan-pei chün,” *Chung-kuo she-hui ching-chi shih chi-k’an* 5, no. 1 (March 1937): 75–84; Lao Kan, “Lun Han-tai te wei-wei yü Chung-wei chien-lun Nan-pei chün chih-tu,” *CYYY* 29 (November 1958): 445–59; Yen Keng-wang, “Ch’in-Han lang li chih-tu k’ao,” *CYYY* 23 (December 1951): 89–143; and Ch’ien Wen-tzu, *Pu Han ping-chih* in *Erh-shih wu shih pu-pien* (Shanghai: Kaiming, 1935), pp. 402–23.

6. HS (1962), pp. 2647–49, 2939, 2948, 2952; Tao Hsi-sheng and Ch’ü Ch’ing-yuan, *Chung-kuo cheng-chih chih-tu shih* (reprint; Taipei: Ch’i-yeh, 1969), pp. 137–45. Other than the generals of the left and right, the rank order after the grand general was generals of swift cavalry, chariots and cavalry, and protection.

7. HS (1962), pp. 162–63, 2404; Dubs, vol. pp. 2, 39.

8. HS (1962), pp. 243–44, 3785; Dubs, vol. 2, pp. 211–12. For other examples, see Chun-shu Chang 1966a, pp. 151–66.

9. For a systematic discussion of professionalism, see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 7–18, M. D. Feld, “Professionalism, Nationalism, and the Alienation of the Military,” in *Armed Forces and Society: Sociological Essays*, ed. Jacques Van Doorn (The Hague: Mouton, 1968), pp. 55–70; and Charles H. Coates, *Military Sociology* (College Park, MD: University of Maryland, 1965), pp. 199–203.

10. For a discussion of the special seals and credentials, see HS (1962), pp. 726, 2475, 2952; and HHS (1965), pp. 838–39 (Li Hsien’s [fl. A.D. 675–84] commentary). For the organization of the general’s office, see HS (1962), pp. 2421–22, 2477 (including commentaries by Yen Shih-ku [581–64] and others), p. 2978. For supervision of training, see Ch’ien Wen-tzu in *Pu Han ping-chih*, p. 417.

11. See Chun-shu Chang 1966a, pp. 151-66; and HS (1962), pp. 229, 2085, 2404, 2972, 2980, 3796-97.
12. HS (1962), pp. 2274, 2451, 2987, 3850.
13. Ibid., p. 725; Wang Yü-ch'üan, "An Outline of the Central Government of the Former Han Dynasty," HJAS 12 (1949): 150.
14. HS (1962), pp. 2971-95, 2996-97.
15. Ibid., pp. 2476-77, 2978; Chun-shu Chang 1966a, p. 156. Cf. communications and maneuvers during the Ch'iang campaign, 61-60 B.C., on pages. 2975-92. For further discussion of communications in the Han army, see Chun-shu Chang 1963, chap. 5.
16. For the components of the Han army, see Chun-chu Chang, 1966b, pp. 150-66.
17. HS (1962), pp. 229, 2977-92.
18. Max Weber, *From Max Weber*, pp. 221-23.
19. For the conceptual and comparative framework of the discussions in the next two sections, I have benefited chiefly from Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960), pp. 3-442, and *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 1-125; Jacques van Doorn, "Armed Forces and Society: Patterns and Trends," in Jacques van Doorn, *Armed Forces and Society*, pp. 39-51; Stanislaw Andreski, *Military Organization and Society* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 139-56; Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 8-151, 372-97; Edward Shils, "The Military in the Political Development of the New States," in *The Role of Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, ed. John J. Johnson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 7-67; Charles H. Coates, *Military Sociology*, pp. 67-281; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, pp. 1-97, 315-466; and Walter Millis, *Military History* (Washington, DC: American Historical Association, 1961). As my discussion proceeds, my indebtedness to these scholars will become clear. Further acknowledgments will not be given except for definitions of special terms and cases.
20. The most important sources for the compilation of the data used in this study are listed below (abbreviations in parentheses).

Shih-chi (SC)

1. *Shiki kaichu kosho* edition, ed. Taikigawa Kametarō.
(Peking: Wen-hsueh ku-chi k'an-ksing she, 1955).
2. Punctuated edition, ed. Ku Chieh-kang et al.
(Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1959).
3. *Po-na* edition (Shanghai: Shang-wu yin-shu kuan, 1937).
4. I-wen Yin-shu kuan edition (Taipei, I-wen yin-shu kuan, 1955).

Han-shu (HS)

1. Punctuated edition, ed. Department of History,
Hsi-pei ta-hsueh (Northwestern University) (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1962).
2. *Po-na* edition (Shanghai: Shang-wu yin-shu kuan, 1937).
3. I-wen yin-shu kuan edition (Taipei: I-wen yin-shu kuan, 1955).

Hou-Han-shu (HHS)

1. *Po-na* edition (Shanghai: Shang-wu yin-shu kuan, 1937).
2. Punctuated edition, ed. Sung Yun-pin (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1965).
3. I-wen yin-shu kuan edition (Taipei: I-wen yin-shu kuan, 1955).
Ch'üan-shang-ku San-tai Ch'in-Han San-kuo Liu-ch'ao Wen (CSK) (Taipei: Shih-chieh shu-chü, 1963).

Yen-t'ieh-lun (YTL). Basic Sinological Series (reprint; Taipei: Chinese Materials Center, 1956).

Han-kuan ch'i-chung (HK), ed. Sun Hsing-yen (1753–1818), 1884 edition.

Shih-k'o shih-liao ts'ung-shu, Chia-pien (SKS), preface by Yen Keng-wang (Taipei: I-wen yin-shu kuan, 1966).

Han-Wei Liu-ch'ao Chung-mu i-wen t'u-lu (HWL), ed. Chao Wan-li (N.p., n.d.).

Erh-shih-wu-shih pu-pien (Shanghai: K'ai-ming shu-tien, 1935).

A. Ch'ien Wen-tzu, *Pu-Han-ping-chih*, pp. 407–23.

B. Shen Wei-hsien, *Ch'ien-Han Hsiung-nu piao*, pp. 1753–74.

C. Wan Ssu-t'ung, *Han Chiang-hsiang ta-ch'en nien-piao*, pp. 217–28.

Les memoires historiques de Se-ma Ts'ien (MH), 6 vols., trans. Edward Chavannes (Paris: Leroux, 1895–1905; Maisonneuve, 1967).

The History of the Former Han Dynasty (Dubs), 3 vols., trans. Homer H. Dubs (Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1938, 1944, 1955).

Records of the Grand Historians of China (Watson), 3 vols., trans. Burton Watson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961–93, 1961).

21. HS (1962), p. 2477.

22. Edward Shils, "The Military in the Political Development of the New States."

23. HS (1962), p. 2098. Chang Ts'ang (256?–152 B.C.) was the first real civilian appointed as chancellor in Former Han history. He received the appointment in 176 B.C.

24. See Chun-shu Chang 1966a, pp. 162–66, 172.

25. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 11.

26. Ch'en Meng-chia, "Han-chien so-chien feng-li," *Wen-wu* 5 (1963): 32–41; Lao Kan, "Kuan-yü Han-tai kuan-feng te chi-ko t'ui-ts'e," *Wen-shih-che hsüeh pao* 3 (1950): 11–22; Chun-shu Chang 1963, pp. 316–17. For cases of cash rewards, see HS (1962), pp. 2478, 2487.

27. HS (1962), p. 2439.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 739–40, 2490, 2492, 3686.

29. See, for example, HS (1962), pp. 2152–53, 2937; Wang Yü-Ch'üan, "An Outline of the Central Government of the Former Han Dynasty," p. 176; and Yang Shu-fan, "Hsi-Han chung-yang cheng-fu i-shih chih-tu," *Ta-lu tsa-chih* 16, no. 9 (May 15, 1958): 9–13.

30. HS (1962), pp. 2998–99.

31. For the evolution of the militarists and the writing of military texts, see Pan Ku, *Han-shu: I-wen chih* (Ch'en Kuo-ch'ing, *Han-shu I-wen chih chu-shih hui-pien* ed., Peking: Chung-hua, 1983), pp. 186–99; *Wu-ching chih-chieh*, annotated by Liu Yin (*chin-shih* of 1641), preface to the 1486 ed. (except for the Sung edition, which was reprinted by Han-fen lou in Shanghai (*Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an*), this is the best edition of the *Wu-ching ch'i-shu* [The Seven Military Classics]); and Lu Ta-chieh, *Li-tai ping-shu mu-lu* (Taipei: Ku-t'ing shu-tien, 1970), preface and chap. 1. Two less useful and outdated works, which have been consulted by many scholars for research on the Chinese military classics, should also be mentioned here: Hsu Pao-lin and Wang Hsien-ch'en, *Chung-kuo ku-tai ping-shu tsa-t'an* (Peking: Chan-shih, 1983), esp. pp. 82–129; and Lan Yung-wei, *Ch'un-ch'iu shih-ch'i te pu-ping* (Peking: Chung-hua, 1979), pp. 131–46. These books are, however, highly useful in many areas in the study of Chinese military history. For scholarly textual studies of the *Sun-tzu ping-fa*, *Sun Pin ping-fa*, and *Wei Liao tzu* in light of new archaeological

discoveries, see Cheng Shu-liang, *Chu-chien Po-shu lun-wen chi* (Peking: Chung-hua, 1982), pp. 89–148; and Li Hsueh-ch'in, *Chien-po i-chi yü hsueh-shu shih* (Taipei: Shih-pao wen-hua, 1994), pp. 349–65. For the original bamboo texts of these military classics, see Wu Chiu-lung, *Yin-ch'ueh-shan Han-chien shih-wen* (Peking: Wen-wu, 1985). For late Shang and early Chou society, see the prologue in this volume. For the issue of *wen* and *wu*, see Li Tsung-t'ung, *Chung-kuo ku-tai she-hui shih* (Taipei: Hua-kang, 1954); Hsu Chin-hsiung, *Chung-kuo ku-tai she-hui* (Taipei: Shang-wu, 1988), esp. pp. 401–57; *Tso-chuan* (Yang Po-chün, *Ch'un-ch'iu Tso-chuan chu* ed.) (Peking: Chung-hua, 1981), under 574 B.C. (p. 861); and Ch'en P'an, *Ch'un-ch'iu shih-tai te chiaoyü* (Taipei: Chung-yang yen-chiu yuan, 1973), esp. pp. 2–10, 37–40.

32. *Han-shu: I-wen chih* (Ch'en Kuo-ch'ing ed.), pp. 49–50 (including various comments by past and modern scholars). In modern times, *li* is generally translated as “rites,” “rituals,” “ceremonials,” and so forth. But in early Chou times *li* referred to the totality of Chou culture. In this sense, it was the superstructure of a culture as manifested by its political (and military), institutional, and social structures; its religious and artistic expressions; and its instituted rules of human conduct and code of ethics both in its daily life and in its official actions. In later times, *li* was known only by its narrower definition, as rules of conduct and a code of ethics in a civilized society. The extant *Ssu-ma Fa* is a different text from the one listed in the *I-wen chih*, which was entitled *Chün-li Ssu-ma Fa* and had 155 sections. Modern scholars believe that the current version of the *Ssu-ma Fa*, in only five sections (see *Wu-ching chih-chih*, 1486 ed., or the *Wu-ching [ch'i-shu]*, Han-fen lou ed. in *Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an*), is either a forgery or a collection of some fragments of the original, which did not survive after the Han dynasty. For a discussion of the broader meaning of the term *li*, see the prologue in this volume. *Li* in its traditional, narrower definition is discussed in Chou Ho, *Li-hsueh kai-lun* (Taipei: San-min, 1988), pp. 11–22.

33. See Liu Po-chi, *Ch'un-ch'iu hui-meng cheng-chih* (Taipei: Chung-hua ts'ung-shu, 1962), esp. pp. 55–84, 449–59; Yang K'uan, *Chan-kuo shih*, 3d ed. (Shanghai: Jen-min, 1981), pp. 261–372; and San-chün ta-hsueh, comp., *Chung-kuo li-tai chan-cheng shih*, 18 vols. (Taipei: Li-ming wen-hua, 1980), vols. 1 and 2 (up to p. 246). See also the prologue in this volume.

34. Kao Jui, *Chung-kuo chün-shih shih-lueh* (Peking: Chün-shih k'o-hsueh, 1992), pp. 131–42, 183–207, 229–32; Kao Jui et al., *Chung-kuo chün-shih shih* (Peking: Chün-shih k'o-hsueh, 1995), pp. 355–69, 490–515; Kuo Ju-huai et al., *Chung-kuo chün-shih shih*, pp. 99–115.

35. See note 30.

36. Pan Ku, *Han-shu: I-wen chih* (Ch'en Kuo-ch'ing ed.), pp. 105 (following Yen Shih-ku's commentary), 186–88, 191, 199. It should be noted that the last title, *Liu-t'ao*, has long been wrongly attributed to T'ai-kung, that is, Chiang Shang, of early Chou times in the eleventh century B.C. It is, I believe, an error that was first made by the compilers of the *Sui-shu* (History of the Sui Dynasties) in the seventh century and was followed thereafter by later scholars. The *Han-shu: I-wen chih* (pp. 118–19) actually listed a work entitled *T'ai-kung ping-[fa]* ([Chiang] T'ai-kung's Art of Warfare), of 85 sections, under the broad title *T'ai-kung mu* (T'ai-kung's Strategies), of 273 sections, under the title “School of Taoism” (*Tao-chia*).

37. See Ch'en Kuo-ch'ing, “Preface” (Hsu-yen), in *Han-shu I-wen chih chu-shih hui-pien*, pp. 1–4, 237–47 (app. 1).

38. For the archaeological rediscovery of these texts, see Chun-shu Chang 1989, pp. 433–37; and Wu Chiu-lung, *Yin-ch'ueh shan Han-chien shih-wen*, pp. 1–24. Among the

numerous detailed studies and reconstructions of these texts, especially *Sun-tzu ping-fa* and *Sun Pin ping-fa*, see Wu Chiu-lung, *Yin-ch'ueh shan Han-chien shih-wen*, pp. 1-243; Yin-ch'ueh shan Han-mu chu-chien cheng-li hsiao-tsu, *Yin-ch'ueh shan Han-mu chu-chien*, 10 vols. (Peking: Wen-wu, 1975), vols. 1-4 (*Sun-tzu ping-fa*), 5-4 (*Sun Pin ping-fa*); Chang Chen-tse, *Sun-tzu ping-fa chiao-li* (Peking: Chung-hua, 1984); Lu K'ui-fu, "Yin-ch'ueh shan Han-mu chu-chien yuan-lieh Sun-tzu ping-fa hsia-pien shih-wu p'ien chia-shih," *Wen-shih* 44 (September 1998): 201-11 (including a discussion of the seven p'ien); Chao K'ui-fu's supplementary collations in *Chien-tu hsueh-pao* 5 (1999): 4-12; Cheng Liang-shu, *Chu-chien po-shu lun-wen chi*, pp. 48-148 (ascertaining that *Wei-liao tzu* was written between 370 and 335 B.C.; *Sun Pin ping-fa* in about 320 B.C.; *Sun-tzu ping-fa* between 496 and 453 B.C.; and *Wu-wen* between 453 and 403 B.C.); Shou Yung, "Yin-ch'ueh shan Han-chien Wu-wen tsuan-hsieh nien-tai k'ao-pien," *Wen-shih* 43 (1997): 247-51 (ascertaining that *Sun-tzu ping-fa* was written in 513 B.C. and *Wu-wen* between 512 and 496 B.C.); Ho Ping-ti, "Wo-kuo hsien-ts'un tsui ku te ssu-chia chu-shu Sun-tzu ping-fa," *Li-shih yen-chiu* 5 (1999): 72-89 (also ascertaining that *Sun-tzu ping-fa* was written in 513 B.C. and *Wu-wen* in the same year). Ho's article does not aim to argue against Shou Yung's conclusions, since he does not mention Shou Yung's study. On the dating of *Sun-tzu ping-fa* and *Sun Pin ping-fa*, I prefer 513 B.C. for the former and 350-320 B.C. for the latter. See Huang P'u-min, "Hsien-Ch'in chu-tzu chün-shih ssu-hsiang i-t'ung ch'u-t'an," *Li-shih yen-chiu* 5 (1996): 175-90; and T'ien Hsu-tung, "Hsien-Ch'in Ch'i-kuo ping-hsueh ch'eng-chiu lueh-lun," *Chung-kuo shih yen-chiu* 3 (1997): 53-59. Among the many English translations and studies of *Sun-tzu ping-fa* and *Sun Pin ping-fa*, see Roger T. Ames, trans., *Sun-tzu: The Art of Warfare* (New York: Ballantine, 1993); D. C. Lau and Roger T. Ames, trans., *Sun Pin: The Art of Warfare* (New York: Ballantine, 1996) (long introduction on pp. 1-127 and the translation of thirty-four chapters); Ralph D. Sawyer, *Sun Pin: Military Methods* (Boulder: Westview, 1995) (long introduction on pp. 3-77 and translation of thirty-three chapters); and other works cited note 34 of chapter 5 in this volume. See also Robin D. S. Yates, "New Light on Ancient Chinese Military Texts: Notes on their Nature and Evolution and the Development of Military Specialization in Warring States China," *Toung Pao* 74 (1988): 211-48.

It should be noted here that among these familiar military classics the *Wu Ch'i* is conspicuously missing. The *Wu-tzu* in the later *Wu-ching ch'i-shu* (Seven Military Classics) collection (cf. Han-fen lou reprint of the Sung ed. or the 1486 ed.) was in only six sections, which did not survive in later Han times. It should be further noted that the *Wu Ch'i* was often mistaken for the *Wu-tzu*, which was listed in the *Han-shu: I-wen chih* under "Tsa-chia" in one section only (p. 153). The two are different books by different persons and of very different natures. The *Wu-tzu* prevailed up to the Latter Han dynasty (A.D. 25-220). Even the erudite compilers of the *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu* (The Complete Library of Four Treasuries) in A.D. 1773-82 made the same mistake. A modern study of Chinese military history suggests that the *Wu-tzu* in the *Wu-ching ch'i-shu* is a forgery of the mid-Former Han period. The reasons presented seem to be well grounded and convincing. See Ku Ju-huai et al., *Chung-kuo chün-shih shih*, pp. 149-50.

39. *Han-shu: I-wen chih*, pp. 196-97.

40. See chaps. 2-5 of vol. 2 of this book; Chang Ch'un-shu, "Pa-shih nien lai," pp. 419-37; Wu Chiu-lung, *Yin-ch'ueh shan Han-chien shih-wen*; Li Chün-ming and Ho Shuang-ch'üan, comps., *San-chien chien-tu ho-chi* (Peking: Wen-wu, 1990); Shen Chia-pen, *Han chün-fa* in *Han-lü tse-i* under *Li-tai hsing-fa k'ao* in *Shen Chi-i hsien-sheng i-shu* ed. 1929; and Wu Chung-k'uang, "Han chün-fa chi-pu," *Chung-hua wen-shih lun-ts'ung* 1

(1981). Shen and Wu naturally had no chance to use the massive records on bamboo and wood discovered or made available in the 1980s and 1990s.

41. See Ch'en Shu-kuo, *Ch'in-Han li-chih yen-chiu* (Changsha: Hunan Chiao-yü, 1993), pp. 182-91.

42. The system of granting generalship, *chiang-chün*, was changed after Han Wu-ti's reign, when the court started to grant such titles (and powers) to officials who were not professional soldiers. This led to a new phase of the system of generalship. See Liao Pai-yuan, *Li-shih yü chih-tu* (Hong Kong: Chiao-yü t'u-shu kung-ssu, 1997), pp. 138-203.

APPENDIX 3

1. *Feudalism* is a politically misused and intellectually misunderstood term in historical analysis. The term as it is used in this study is defined simply as a political-economic-social-military-educational system based on a clearly stratified castelike class structure embedded with hereditary land tenure and a power structure of lord-vassal relationships. It is a defined stage in the evolution of the state, as was discussed in the prologue in this volume. This definition is conceptual and does not resemble any other so-called feudal system such as the one that prevailed in Europe. It is intended to correct the political misuse and outdated understanding of the term (or system) *feng-chien* among the historians and ideologues in modern China. For recent Western studies of "feudalism" and "feudal society" that aim to correct the old misunderstandings, see Marc Block, *Feudal Society*, trans. L. A. Manyon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963); Joseph Reese Strayer, *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Norman F. Cantor, *Inventing the Middle Ages: The Lives, Works, and Ideas of the Real Medievalists of the Twentieth Century* (New York: William Morrow, 1991); Elizabeth A. R. Brown, "The Tyranny of a Construct: Feudalism and Historians of Medieval Europe, 1063-1688," *American Historical Review* 79 (1974); and Chris Wickham, "The Other Transition: From the Ancient World to Feudalism," *Past and Present* 103 (1984): 3-36. The Chinese sources for this discussion are of the eleventh through the third centuries B.C. and include *Shang-shu* (Wu-ching tu-pen ed.), pp. 69-74, 86-90, 119; *Tso-chuan* (Wu-ching tu-pen ed.), pp. 18-20, 64-66, 87, 168-70, 187-89, 290-95, 428-31, 492-96; and *Shih-ching* (Shih-san ching chu-shu ed.), vol. 17, p. 6.

2. *Tso Chuan* (Tso's Commentary on the [Classic] *Spring and Autumn Annals*; Wu-ching tu-pen ed.), p. 505 (no earlier than 500 B.C. for the passage in question); Meng Tzu (Meng K'o, 371-289 B.C.), *Meng Tzu* (The Works of Mencius; Ssu-shu chang-chü ed.), pp. 258-61; Han Fei (280?-233 B.C.), *Han Fei Tzu* (The Works of Han Fei; Chung-hua shu-chü ed.), pp. 207-8; *Chung-yung* (The Doctrine of the Mean; Ssu-shu chang-chü ed.), p. 38. It should be pointed out that the commonly accepted translation of the term *Chung-kuo* as "Middle Kingdom" carried a strong sense of sinocentrism. See a profound discussion of this issue in John K. Fairbank, *The Chinese World Order*, pp. 2-9. Bernhard Karlgren rendered *Chung-kuo* as the "Central Kingdom" in his translation of the *Shih-ching* (*Book of Odes*) (Stockholm: Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities, 1950), pp. 210-12. The meaning of the word *Hua* in the term *Hua-Hsia* has been interpreted differently by various scholars since the Han dynasty. In interpreting *Hua* and *Hua-Hsia* here, I have followed the *Tso-chuan* and Hsu Shen's (A.D. 58-147) *Shuo-wen chieh-tzu* (Script Explained and Characters Elucidated), compiled in 100-121; and Tuan Yü-ts'ai's (1735-1815) annotations of Hsu Shen's views. I believe that the word *Hsia* prior to Han times meant both the land of Hsia in the Central Plain and the people who controlled

the territory, traditionally considered the creators of a "glorious (*hua*) culture" later referred to as the Hsia Culture. The commonly known name Chung-hua (literally, "Central Glorious Region") as the Chinese name for China (Chung-kuo), however, came into use at a much later time, no earlier than the Three Kingdoms period (A.D. 220-80). At first, it was only an alternate name for Chung-kuo among the Eastern Chou (770-221 B.C.) or it generally referred to the Central Plain, the home of high Chinese civilization. Later it gradually grew to mean the whole of the Chinese empire with a strong sense of superior culture and power. See *Shuo-wen chieh-tzu* (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1963), pp. 112, 128; Tuan Yü-ts'ai, *Shuo-wen chieh-tzu chu* (Annotations on the *Shuo-wen chieh-tzu*), Wan-yu wen-k'u ed., pp. 5:2, 72-73, 6:2, 11; P'ei Sung-chih (372-451), commentary in Ch'en Shou (233-97), *San-kuo chih* (History of the Three Kingdoms) (Peking: Chung-hua, 1964), p. 912; Fang Hsuan-ling (578-648) et al., *Chin-shu* (History of the Chin Dynasty), I-wen, 1965 ed., p. 1182 (reference was made in the time of T'ao K'an, A.D. 259-334); and Wei Shou (506-72), *Wei-shu* (The History of the [Northern] Wei Dynasty), I-wen, 1965 ed., p. 1110.

3. See SC (1959), pp. 246-67, 2967; and Ch'in Shih-huang chin-shih k'o-tz'u (Shanghai: Jen-min, 1975). Hsu Shen defined Hsia as "Chung-kuo chih-jen," literally, "the people of Chung-kuo," in his *Shuo-wen chieh-tzu*. The script was a picture of human with legs crossed to show the characteristic way the people of Chung-kuo walked. That is probably the etymological origin of the Chung-kuo jen. See *Shuo-wen chieh-tzu*, 1963 ed., p. 112.

4. For examples, see SC (1963), pp. 2894-919.

5. Ibid., 296, 2919, 3160; HS (1964), pp. 2110-12.

6. *Ta-Tai Li-chi* (The Elder Tai's [Tai Teh] Version of *The Book of Rites*) of the third century B.C., *Chin-chu chin-i* ed., by Kao Ming (Taipei: Shang-wu, 1984), secs. 62-63 (pp. 258-64); *Shih-pen* (Genealogical Records [of Ancient Rulers]) of the late third century B.C. (Lei Hsueh-ch'i ed. in *Ts'ung-shu chi-ch'eng*), pp. 1-43; *Kuo-yü* (Discourses of the States), mostly of the third century B.C. (Shanghai: Ku-chi ch'u-pan she, 1978), p. 356; SC (1959), pp. 488-500, 2879, 2985, 2991-98; Fan Yeh (398-445), *Hou-Han shu* (History of the Latter Han Dynasty) (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1965), pp. 2807-902. Also see Meng Wen-t'ung, *Chou-Ch'in shao-shu min-tsu yen-chiu* ("Minority Nationalities" in Chou and Ch'in Times) (Shanghai: Lung-men Lien-ho shu-tien, 1958), esp. pp. 44-109; and the prologue in this volume for a detailed discussion.

7. See, for example, *Shang-shu* (Wu-ching tu-pen ed.), pp. 115-19. Modern scholars generally agree that the chapter in the *Book of History* dates to the eleventh century B.C. See HS (1964), pp. 2642, 2832, 3298, 3872, 3886, 3912.



Glossary

THE FOLLOWING GLOSSARY is a highly selective one. It includes a small number of key terms, phrases, names, and titles in the text and notes but omits the names of persons and titles of books that appear in the bibliography and that are generally familiar to the specialists or raise no controversy among the experts in the various fields.

An-hsi 安息

An-i 安邑

An-ting 安定

An-yang 安陽

ch'an (shan) 禪

chan-pu 占卜

chang 長

chang 丈

chang 障

Ch'ang 昌

Chang Ch'ien 張騫

Ch'ang Hui 常惠

Chang T'ang 張湯

Chang Tz'u-kung 張次公

Ch'ang-an 長安

Ch'ang-shui 長水

Ch'ang-shui chiao-wei 長水校尉

Ch'ang-wu hou 昌武侯

Chang-yeh (Chang-i) 張掖

Chao 趙

Chao An Chi 趙安稽

Chao Ch'ung-kuo 趙充國

Chao Hsin 趙信

Chao I-chi 趙食其

Chao Kuo 趙過

Chao P'o-nu 趙破奴

Chao Pu-yü 趙不虞

Chao Shih-ch'eng 趙始成

Chao T'o 趙陀

Ch'ao Ts'o 趙錯

Ch'ao-hsien 朝鮮

ch'ao-hui 朝會

Ch'e-shih (also Chü-shih) 車師

Ch'en T'ang 陳湯

Chen-p'an 真番

Cheng 鄭

Cheng 政 (正)

cheng 正

Ch'eng 丞

ch'eng 城

Ch'eng 程

- Cheng Chi 鄭吉
 Cheng Hsuan 鄭玄
 Ch'eng Wan 成婉
 Ch'eng-chi 成紀
 Ch'eng-Chou 成周
 ch'eng-kuo 城郭
 Cheng-so 正朔
 Ch'eng-wang 成王
 Ch'i 弃
 Ch'i 契 (Hsieh, name)
 ch'i (chi) 騎
 Chi chiao-wei 己校尉
 Chi-li 季歷
 Ch'i-lien shan 祁連山
 Chi-pin 罽賓
 Ch'i-shan 岐山
 ch'i shih 騎士
 chi-ssu 祭祀
 Chia I 賈誼
 Chia-ch'ü 甲渠
 Chia-ku wen 甲骨文
 Ch'iang 羌
 Chiang Shang 姜尚
 Chiang Yuan 姜嫄
 Chiang-chün 將軍
 Ch'iang-Han 強漢
 Ch'iang-jen 羌人
 Chiao-chih 交趾
 Chiao-ho ch'eng 交河城
 chiao-wei 校尉
 Chieh 桀
 chieh 節
 Chieh-chih 捷枝
 chieh-ho 解何
 Chieh-ho 介和
 chien 監
 ch'ien 錢
 ch'ien-jen 千人
 chien-keng 踐更
 Chien-shui 肩水
 chien-tu 簡牘
 Chien-wei 犍為
 chih 置
 chih kuan-min 治官民
 chih lü-ling 知律令
 Chih-chih ch'eng 郅支城
 Ch'ih-ku ch'eng 赤谷城
 Chin 金
 chin 錦
 chin 津
 Ch'in 秦
 Ch'in Hu 秦胡
 Ch'in-jen 秦人
 Ching-chao 京兆
 Ching-chao-yin 京兆尹
 Chiu-chen 九真
 Chiu-ch'üan 酒泉
 Ch'iu-tzu 龜茲
 Chiu-yuan 九原
 ch'üung-lu 穹廬
 Chou 周
 Chou 紂
 Chou Kung 周公
 Chou-jen 周人
 Chou-yuan 周原
 Ch'u 楚
 ch'ü 曲
 ch'u-chün 初郡
 Chü-fu 車父
 chü-kuo 居國
 Ch'ü-lei 渠勒
 Ch'ü-li 渠犂
 chü-tso 居作
 Chü-yen 居延
 chuan 傳
 Chuan-Hsu 顓頊
 chuan-she 傳舍
 chueh 爵
 chün 郡
 Chün-ch'en shan-yü 軍臣單于
 Chün-chi Chiang-chün 浚稽將軍
 chün-hsien 郡縣

- chün-shih* 軍市
chün-shih ling 軍市令
chün-shu 均輸
Ch'ung 崇
chung-ch'eng 中程
Chung Chün 終軍
Chung-hang Yueh 中行說
Ch'ung-ho hou 重合侯
Chung-hua 中華
Chung-kuo 中國
Chung-kuo jen 中國人
Chung-shan 中山
chung-ti 中的
Chung-yuan 中原

Erh-shih ch'eng 貳師城
Erh-shih Chiang-chün 貳師將軍
erh-yeh 二業

Fan Tai 范代
fang (pang) 方
fang-shih 方士
feng 烽, 烽, 羹
feng 封
Feng 豐, 鄧
Feng Feng-shih 馮奉世
feng-chien 封建
Feng-ch'iu 封丘
feng-huo 烽火
feng-kuo 封國
fu 傅
fu 符
fu 賦
Fu Lu Chih 復陸支
fu-ch'ien 賦錢
Fu-chü Chiang-chün 浮沮將軍
fu-lao 父老
fu-ma ssu-ts'ung 負馬私從
fu-se 服色

Hai 亥

Han 漢
Han 韓
Han Kuei-tang 韓隤當
Han T'ui-tang 韓頽當
Han Yen-nien 韓延年
Han Yueh 韓說
Han-chia 漢家
Han-chien 漢簡
Han-chung 漢中
Han-hai 翰海
Han-jen 漢人
Han-min-tsu 漢民族
Han-ti 漢帝
Han-t'ing 漢廷
Han-tsu 漢族
Hao 鎬
Hao Hsien 郝賢
Ho Po 河伯
ho-ch'in 和親
Ho-hsi 河西
Ho-nan 河南
Ho-nei 河內
Ho-t'ien 和田, 和闐
Ho-tung 河東
hou 侯, 候
Hou-Chi 后稷
hou-kuan 候官
Hou-t'u 后土
Hsi Po 西伯
Hsi-ho 西河
Hsi-shui 漆水
Hsi-yü 西域
Hsi-yü Tu-hu 西域都護
hsia tang-yung che 下當用者
hsiang 鄉
hsiang-chü 象車
Hsiao-ku 效穀
hsiao-shih 小石
hsien 縣
hsien-kuan 縣官
Hsien-pi 鮮卑 (also Hsien-peì)

Hsien-yang 咸陽
 Hsin 新
 Hsin-Ch'in-chung 新秦中
 Hsin Ch'ing-chi 辛慶忌
 hsing 姓
 hsing-kuo 行國
 hsing-shih 姓氏
 hsing-tsu 姓族
 Hsiu-Ch'u 休屠
 Hsiung-nu 匈奴
 Hsu Lu 徐盧
 Hsu Tzu-wei 徐自為
 Hsuan-ch'üan 懸泉
 Hsuan-t'u 玄菟
 Hsun Chih 荀彘
 hsun-li 循吏
 Hu 胡
 hu 斛
 Hu Ch'iang Chiao-wei 護羌校尉
 Hu Ch'ung-kuo 壺充國
 Hu Wu-huan Chiao-wei 護烏桓校尉
 Hu-ch'i 胡騎
 Hu-Han-yeh 呼韓邪
 Hu-shih 胡市
 hu-tiao 戶調
 Hua 華
 Hua-Hsia 華夏
 Hua-jen 華人
 Huai-nan 淮南
 Huang 皇
 Huang 湟
 huang 黃
 Huang-Lao 黃老
 Huang-men 黃門
 huang-ti 皇帝
 Huang-ti 黃帝
 Huang-T'ien 皇天
 Hun-yeh wang 昆邪王, 渾邪王
 Huo Ch'ü-ping 霍去病

i 夷

I (yi) 邑
 I Chi Hsien 伊即軒
 I-chih 驛置
 I-ch'ü 義渠
 I-hsun 伊循
 i-i-chih-i 以夷制夷
 i-i-fa-i 以夷伐夷
 i-ma 驛馬
 i-tsu 驛卒
 I-ts'ung Hu 義從胡
 i-wan 億萬
 I-wu ssu-ma 伊吾司馬

jen 人
 Jen Li-cheng 任立政
 Jen-ch'eng 任城
 jih-chi pu 日記簿
 Jih-nan 日南
 ju chao-shu 如詔書
 ju lü-ling 如律令
 ju-ku-shih 如故事
 Jung 戎
 jung 戎

K'ai-ling hou 開陵侯
 Kan Yen-shou 甘延壽
 kan yen-chih 敢言之
 kan-lan 間闌
 kan-lan 干蘭 (杆蘭)
 K'ang-chü 康居
 Kao Pu Shih 高不識
 Kao Yü 高圍
 Kao-ch'ang pi 高昌壁
 keng-fu 更賦
 keng-tsu 更卒
 ko 戈
 k'o 客
 k'o-min 客民
 k'o-she 客舍
 k'o-tzu 客子
 K'u 轡

Ku Kung T'an Fu 古公亶父
 K'u-ch'e (Kucha) 庫車
 ku-li 故吏
 k'u-li 酷吏
 Ku-mo 姑墨
 Ku-shih 姑師
 ku-shih 故事
 K'uai-chi 會稽
 kuan 關
 kuan 官
 Kuan Chung 管仲
 kuan-sai 關塞
 kuan-she 館舍
 kuan-shih 官市
 kuei 鬼
 kuei 軌
 Kuei Jung 鬼戎
 Kuei-shan 貴山
 K'un-mi 昆靡(彌)
 K'un-mo 昆莫
 K'un-wu 昆吾
 kung 功
 Kung Fei 公非
 Kung Liu 公劉
 Kung Tsu 公祖
 kung-lao 功勞
 Kung-sun Ao 公孫敖
 Kung-sun Ho 公孫賀
 Kung-sun Jung-nu 公孫戎奴
 kuo 國
 Kuo Ch'ang 郭昌
 kuo-chia 國家
 kuo-jen 國人
 kuo-so 過所

 lan-ch'u 蘭出
 lan-ju 蘭入
 lao 勞
 Lao-shang shan-yü 老上單于
 li 禮
 li 里

li 吏
 Li Ch'e 李哆
 Li Chü 李沮
 Li Hsi 李息
 Li Kan 李敢
 Li K'o 李克
 Li Kuang 李廣
 Li Kuang-li 李廣利
 Li K'ui (also Li K'uei) 李愷
 Li Ling 李陵
 Li So 李朔
 Li Ssu 李斯
 Li Ts'ai 李蔡
 li-cheng 里正
 li-jen 里人
 li-yueh 禮樂
 Liang-shan 梁山
 lien 連
 ling 令
 Ling-chü 令居
 ling-shih 令史
 Liu Ch'e 劉徹
 Liu Pang 劉邦
 Lo-i 洛邑(雒邑)
 Lo-lang 樂浪
 Lou-chuan 樓專
 lou-ch'uan 樓船
 Lou-lan 樓蘭
 Lu 魯
 Lu Chia 陸賈
 Lu Chiang 陸疆
 Lu Po-te 陸博德
 Lu T'o-chih 陸它之
 Lu T'o-fu 陸它父
 Lu-te 鱒得
 Lun-t'ai 輪台
 Lun-t'ou 侖頭
 Lung Chiang 隆疆
 Lung-hsi 隴西

 Ma T'ung 馬通

mai-ti-ch'üan 買地券
 Man-i ti 蠻夷邸
 Mao-tun (Modun) 冒頓 (Modu 墨毒)
 Mien Ch'en 綿臣
 min 民
 Ming-t'iao 鳴條
 mu-chu 木主
 mu-mien 木棉
 mu-shih 牧士
 mu-shih 募士

 Nan-tou-mi 難兜摩
 Nan-yueh 南粵 (南越)
 nei 內
 nei-chün 內郡
 nei-shih 內史
 nei-shu 內屬
 neng-shu k'uai chi 能書會計
 ni-lü 逆旅
 Nuo-ch'iang 婁羌 (also Juo-ch'iang)

 pa 霸
 Pa 巴
 pa-tsu 罷卒
 Pai I 伯夷
 pai-hsing 百姓
 pan-liang 半兩
 P'an-yü 番禺
 pang 邦
 pao-sai 保塞,葆塞
 Pao-sai man-i 葆塞蠻夷
 Pao-sai wai-man-i 葆塞外蠻夷
 Pei 沛
 Pei-chün 北軍
 Pei-ti 北地
 pi 壁
 pi 鄙
 p'i 匹
 pi-hsia 陛下
 Pi-lu 卑陸

pien-hu 編戶
 pien-hu ch'i-min 編戶齊民
 Pin 隴
 P'ing-ch'eng 平城
 p'ing-chun 平準
 ping-fa 變法
 P'ing-yang 平陽
 Po 毫
 P'o 夔
 po-shih 博士
 Po-teng (Pai-teng) 白登
 pu 布
 pu 部
 P'u Ching 僕隸
 Pu K'u 不窋
 P'u P'eng 僕朋
 P'u Ta 僕黠
 P'u-ch'ang hai 蒲昌海 (Yen-tse)
 pu-ch'ü 部曲
 P'u-lei 蒲類
 pu-luo 部落
 P'u Tuo 僕多

 sai-wei 塞尉
 San-fu 三輔
 san-lao 三老
 San-tsung 三叟
 Sang Hung-yang 桑弘羊 (also Sang Hung-hsiang)
 se-fu 嗇夫
 Sha-ch'a (Sha-ch'e) 沙車
 Sha-chü 沙車 (also Sha-ch'e, Sha-ch'a, So-chü)
 Shan (Tan) 撣
 Shan Kuo 山國
 Shan-shan 鄯善
 shan-yü 單于
 Shang 商
 Shang Chia Wei 上甲微
 Shang Ch'iu-ch'eng 商丘成
 Shang chün 上郡

Shang Yang 商鞅
 Shang-fang 尚方
 Shang-jen 商人
 Shang-ku 上谷
 Shang-kuan Chieh 上官桀
 Shang-kuei 上邽
 Shang-ti 上帝
 Shao-fu 少府
 she 社
 she-chu 社主
 shen 神
 Shen Pu-hai 申不害
 Shen-tu 身毒
 sheng 聖
 sheng 升
 sheng 省
 sheng t'ien-tzu 聖天子
 sheng-tsu 省卒
 shih 氏
 Shih 史
 shih 石
 Shih huang-ti 始皇帝
 shih-che 使者
 Shih-che chiao-wei 使者校尉
 shih-jen 市人
 shih-li 士吏
 shih-tsu 氏族
 shih-tsu 士卒
 shih-wu 什伍, 仕伍, 士伍
 Shu 蜀
 shu-chia tsu 戌甲卒
 shu-kuo 屬國
 Shu-kuo tu-wei 屬國都尉
 Shu-lei 疏勒 (So-lo)
 shu-min 庶民
 Shu-pu 蜀布
 Shu-sun T'ung 叔孫通
 shu-tao yen 書到言
 shu-t'ien tsu 戌田卒
 shu-tsu 戌卒
 Shun 舜

So-chü (Sha-ch'a, Sha-ch'e) 莎車
 So-fang 朔方
 Sou-su tu-wei 搜粟都尉
 Ssu 姁
 Ssu-fu ts'ung-ma 私負從馬
 ssu-huo 祀火
 ssu-kuan 私館
 Ssu-ma 司馬
 Ssu-nung 司農
 ssu-shih 私市
 ssu-ts'ung 私從
 Su Chien 蘇堅
 Su Wu 蘇武
 suan 算
 suan-fu 算賦
 sui 隧(燧), 隰
 Sui Ch'eng 遂成
 sui ch'u mu chu shui ts'ao pu shih t'ien-
 tso 隨畜牧逐水草不事田作
 sui-chang 隧長
 sui-chang 隧障
 Sun Wu 孫武
 Sung 宋

 ta Chiang-chün 大將軍
 Ta Ch'in 大秦
 Ta Yueh-chih 大月氏
 Ta-Chien 大前(煎)
 Ta-Han 大漠
 Ta-Hsia 大夏
 Ta-i 大乙
 ta-p'i 大辟
 ta-shih 大石
 ta-shih chi 大事記
 Ta-sou 大搜
 ta-tsung 大宗
 Ta-yuan 大宛
 Tai 代
 Tai 郃
 T'ai Wang 太王
 t'ai-hsueh 太學

tai-mao 玳瑁 (*tai-mei*)
T'ai-p'u 太僕
T'ai-shan 泰山
t'ai-shih 太史
tai-t'ien 代田
T'ai-yuan 太原
Tan 儻
Tan-yang 丹陽
tao 道
Ti 氐
Ti 帝
Ti 狄
Ti 邸
Ti 第
Ti-Hsin 帝辛
ti-kuo 帝國
Ti-tao 狄道
t'ieh-kuan 鐵官
Tien 滇
T'ien 天
T'ien Ch'ien-ch'iu 田千秋
T'ien Fen 田蚡
T'ien-ming 天命
T'ien-shui 天水
T'ien-ti 天帝
t'ien-t'ien 天田
t'ien-tsu 田卒
T'ien-tzu 天子
T'ien-wang 天王
Tien-yen shan 填顏山
t'ing 亭
t'ing-chang 亭長
t'ing-chuan 亭傳
Ting-hsiang 定襄
t'ing-shih 亭市
tou 斗
Tou I-ju 豆豉如
Tou Ying 寶嬰
ts'ai-kuan 材官
tsan 贊
Tsang 牂

Ts'ang-hai 蒼海
Tsang-k'o 牂柯
Ts'ang-wu 蒼梧
Ts'ao Hsiang 曹襄
Tso P'ing-i 左馮翊
tsu 族
tsu 卒
Tsu-mo 且末 (also *Chü-mo*)
Tsung-Chou 宗周
tsung-fa 宗法
Tsung-pu 寶布
ts'ung-shih 從事
tsung-tsu 宗族
t'u 徒
t'u-chu 土著
T'u-fan 吐蕃 (often misread as
 T'u-po)
Tu-hu 都護
Tu-ling 杜陵
t'u-t'eng 圖騰
Tu-wei 都尉
Tuan Hui-tsung 段惠宗
tui 隊
t'un-chang 屯長
t'un-ch'i 屯騎
Tun-huang 敦煌
t'un-t'ien 屯田
Tung Chung-shu 董仲舒
Tung Yueh 東越 (東粵)
Tung-Hu 東胡
Tung-ou 東甌
T'ung-p'u 僮僕
T'ung-p'u tu-wei 僮僕都尉
tzu 子
Tzu-ch'an 子產
tzu-chia 贅家

wai 外
wai-ch'en 外臣
wai-chün 外郡
wai-kuo 外國

- wang* 王
Wang Hai 王亥
Wang Hsien 王險
Wang Hui 王烱
Wang Shen-sheng 王申生
wei 尉
Wei 魏
Wei 渭
Wei 衛
Wei Ch'ing 衛青
Wei Man 衛滿
Wei Shan 衛山
Wei-li 尉犁 (尉黎)
Wei-li chih-tao 爲吏之道
Wei-su 尉須
Wei-t'ou 尉頭
wen 文
Wen Ting 文丁
wen-li 文吏
Wen-su 溫宿
Wen-wang 文王
Wen-wu Ting 文武丁
wu 武
wu 塢
Wu Ch'i 吳起
Wu chiao-wei 戊校尉
Wu Hsu-lu 唯徐虛
Wu-chi chiao-wei 戊己校尉
wu-chün 五鈞
wu-hsing 五行 (*wu-heng*)
Wu-huan 烏桓
Wu-lei 烏壘
wu-li 武吏
wu-shu 五銖
Wu-sun 烏孫
Wu-t'an tzu(chü)-li 烏貪訾距離
Wu-ti 武帝
Wu-wang 武王
Wu-wei 武威
Wu-yuan 五原
Yang-kuan 陽關
yang-tsu 養卒
Yao 堯
yeh 野
Yeh-che 謁者
Yeh-lang 夜郎
Yen 燕
Yen-ch'i 焉耆
yen-chih 闕氏
Yen-chih shan 焉支山
Yen-jan 燕然
yen-kuan 鹽官
Yen-men 雁門
Yen-tse 鹽澤
yi 邑 (also I)
Yin-jen 殷人
Yin-tun 因敦
Yin-yü Chiang-chün 因杅將軍
Ying Cheng 嬴政 (正)
Ying-ch'uan 潁川
ying-mu shih 應募士
yu 郵
Yu Fu-feng 右扶風
Yu Hsien-wang 右賢王
Yu I 有易
Yü-ch'eng 郁城
yu-chiao 游徼
yu-chih 有秩
Yu-t'ing 郵亭
Yü-men 玉門
Yü-men kuan 玉門關
Yu-pei-p'ing 右北平
Yü-t'ien 于闐
Yü-tse 魚澤
Yü-wu 余吾
yuan-shu 爰書
Yueh-ch'i chiao-wei 越騎校尉
Yueh-chih (often misread as Jou-chih) 月支 (月氏)
Yun-chung 雲中
Yun Tu 雲都



Sources

THE FULL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF this book is in the second volume, *Frontier, Immigration, and Empire in Han China*. It includes five parts: "Abbreviations," "Basic Sources, Conventions, and Style of Citing Han Wooden and Bamboo Documents," "Works in Western Languages," "Works in Japanese," and "Works in Chinese." To avoid unnecessary duplications in the two volumes, volume 1 includes only the first two parts while the second volume has all five. But the section "Basic Sources, Conventions, . . ." is in the front of the book in volume 2. The reader is referred to that volume for full citations of primary and secondary sources. It is for this reason that the "Glossary," which provides the Chinese characters for commonly used terms, is in both volumes.

ABBREVIATIONS

- | | |
|----------------------|---|
| Chun-shu Chang 1963 | "The Colonization of the Ho-hsi Region: A Study of the Han Frontier System." Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1963. |
| Chun-shu Chang 1966a | "Military Aspects of Han Wu-ti's Northern and Northwestern Campaigns," <i>HJAS</i> 26 (1966): 148-73. |
| Chun-shu Chang 1966b | "The Han Colonists and Their Settlements on the Chü-yen Frontier," <i>TH</i> 5, no. 2 (December 1966): 154-269. Reprinted as <i>Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies</i> , no. 25. Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1967. |
| Chun-shu Chang 1967a | "Han-tai Ho-hsi Ssu-chün te Chien-chih nien-tai yü k'ai-t'uo kuo-ch'eng te t'ui-ts'e" (On the Dating and Developmental Stages of the Four Prefectures of Ho-hsi), <i>CYYY</i> 37, no. 2 (1967): 681-749. |
| Chun-shu Chang 1975a | <i>Han-tai pien-chiang shih lun-chi</i> (Studies in Han Frontier History). Taipei: Shih-huo, 1975. |
| Chun-shu Chang 1978 | "Ku-tai t'un-t'ien chih-tu te yuan-shih yü Hsi-Han Ho-hsi Hsi-yü pien-sai shang t'un-t'ien chih-tu chih fa-chan kuo-ch'eng" (The Origins of the Agricultural Colony System and China's Establishment of It in the Frontier Regions of |

- Ho-hsi and Hsi-yü [the Western Regions]), in *Ch'ü Wan-li hsien-sheng ch'i-chih jung-ch'ing lun-wei chi* (Taipei: Lien-ching, 1978), pp. 563-99.
- Chun-shu Chang 1989 "Pa-shih-nien lai Han-chien te fa-hsien cheng-li yü yen-chiu" (The Discovery and Studies of Han Wooden and Bamboo Documents in the Last Eighty Years [1900-1989]), in *Chung-yang yen-chiu yuan ti-erh chieh kuo-chi Han-hsueh hui-i lun-wen chi* (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1989), pp. 417-40.
- Ch'ien Wen-tzu *Pu Han ping-chih* (A Treatise on the Han Military System). In *Pu-pien*, pp. 407-23.
- Ch'in-mu chu-chien *Shui-hui-ti Ch'in-mu chu-chien* (The Ch'in Bamboo Documents from Shui-hu-ti [of Yun-meng, Hupeh]), comp. Shui-hu-ti Ch'in-mu chu-chien cheng-li hsiao-tsu. Peking: Wen-wu, 1978.
- CHS *Ch'in Han shih chi chung-ku shih ch'ien-ch'i yen-chiu lun-wen-chi* (Essays on the History of China from 221 B.C. to A.D. 907), ed. Ta-lu tsa-chih she. Taipei: Ta-lu tsa-chih she, 1960.
- Cp *Chü-yen Han-chien chia-pien* (The Han Wooden and Bamboo Documents from Chü-yen, Pt. 1), ed. Institute of Archaeology, Chinese Academy of Sciences. Peking: K'o-hsueh ch'u-pan she, 1959.
- CSK *Ch'üan Shang-ku San-tai Ch'in-Han San-kuo Liu-ch'ao wen* (Complete Writings from High Antiquity to the Six Dynasties), ed. Yen K'o-chün. 9 vols. Taipei: Shih-chieh shu-chü, 1963.
- CYC *Chü-yen Han-chien Shih-wen ho-chiao* (Collected Collations of Old Deciphered Texts of the Han Wooden and Bamboo Documents from Chü-yen), ed. Li Chün-ming et al. 2 vols. Peking: Wen-wu ch'u-pan she, 1987.
- CYYY *Chung-yang yen-chiu yuan li-shih yü-yen yen-chiu so chi-k'an* (*Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica*).
- Dubs *The History of the Former Han Dynasty*, by Pan Ku. Translated by Homer H. Dubs. 3 vols. Baltimore: Waverly Press, vol. 1, 1938; vol. 2, 1944; vol. 3, 1955.
- HHS *Hou-Han-shu* (History of the Later Han Dynasty), by Fan Yeh. Po-na ed., Wang Hsien-ch'ien ed., *Hou-Han-shu chi-chieh* ed. 2 vols. Taipei: I-wen yin-shu kuan, 1955.
- HHS (1965) *Hou-Han-shu* (History of the Later Han Dynasty), punctuated and ed. Sung Yun-pin et al. 12 vols. Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1965.
- HJAS *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*.
- HK *Han-kuan ch'i-chung* (Seven Treatises on Han Institutions), ed. Sun Hsing-yen. 1884 ed.
- HP *Han-pei chi-shih* (Comprehensive Annotations on Han Era Tomb and Stone Inscriptions), by Kao Wen. Kaifeng: Honan ta-hsueh, 1985.

- HS *Han-shu* (History of the [Former] Dynasty), by Pan Ku. *Po-na* ed., Wang Hsien-ch'ien ed., *Han-shu pu-chu* ed. 2 vols. (Taipei: I-wen yin-shu kuan, 1955).
- HS (1962) *Han-shu* (History of the [Former] Han Dynasty), punctuated and ed. Hsi-pei ta-hsueh li-shih hsi. 12 vols. Peking: Chung-hua, 1962.
- Hui-pien *Li-tai ko-tsu chuan-chi hui-pien* (A Collection of Monographs on the Minority Nationalities and Border Peoples in the Dynastic Histories), ed. Chien Po-tsan et al. Peking: Chung-hua, 1958.
- MH *Les memoires historiques de Se-ma Ts'ien*, trans. and annotated by Édouard Chavannes. Paris: Leroux, 1895–1905. 6 vols. Paris: Maisonneuve, 1967–69.
- Pu-pien* *Erh-shih-wu shih pu-pien* (Supplements to the Twenty-five Dynastic Histories). Vols. 1–2. Shanghai: K'ai-ming shu-tien, 1935.
- RR *Ritsumeikan Literature Review*.
- SC *Shih-chi* (Historical Records). *Po-na* ed. Ed. Takigawa Kametarō. *Shiki kaichu kōshō* (Historical Records Annotated and Collated). 10 vols. Peking: Wen-hsueh ku-chi k'an-hsing she, 1955.
- SC (1959) *Shih-chi* (Historical Records), punctuated and ed. Ku Chieh-kang et al. 10 vols. Peking: Chung-hua shu-chū, 1959.
- Shen Wei-hsien *Ch'ien-Han Hsiung-nu piao* (A Chronological Table of the Hsiung-nu in the Former Han Period). In *Pu-pien*, pp. 1753–74.
- SPPY *Ssu-pu pei-yao* (Collectanea of the Classics and Most Essential Works in Four Classifications).
- SPTK *Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an* (Collectanea of the Classics and Most Essential Works in Four Classifications).
- ST *San-tai Ch'in-Han Wei-Chin shih yen-chiu lun-chi* (A Collection of Essays on the History of the Hsia, Shang, Chou, Ch'in, Han, Wei, and Chin Dynasties), ed. Ta-lu tsa-chih she. Taipei: Ta-lu tsa-chih she, 1966.
- SZ *Shigaku zasshi* (Journal of Historical Science).
- TG *Tōyō gakuho* (Reports of the Oriental Society).
- TH *Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies*, new series.
- THG *Tōhō gakuho* (Journal of Oriental Studies).
- TK *Tōyōshi kenkyū* (Journal of Oriental Studies).
- TLT *Ta-lu tsa-chih* (Continent Magazine).
- Watson *Records of the Grand Historian of China*, trans. Burton Watson. 2 vols. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961. New ed. 3 vols. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, and New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. Volumes 1 and 2 of new edition are reprints of 1961 edition. Volume 3 is new. Translations from the *Shih-chi*.
- YTL *Yen-t'ieh lun* (Discourses on Salt and Iron), by Huan K'uan. Ed. Wang Li-ch'i. *Yen-t'ieh lun chiao-chu* (YTL

Annotated and Collated). Shanghai: Ku-tien wen-hsueh ch'u-pan she, 1958.

BASIC SOURCES, CONVENTIONS, AND STYLE OF
CITING HAN WOODEN AND BAMBOO DOCUMENTS

*Basic Sources for Han Wooden
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CONVENTIONS

The following conventions for citing wooden and bamboo documents are used.

- a. For a document from the *Chü-yen Han-chien k'ao-shih chih-pu* (Taipei, 1960), the plain document number is given. For example, 2781 means the document numbered this way in Lao Kan 1960a.
- b. For a document from the *Chü-yen Han-chien k'ao-shih* (Shanghai, 1949), the number of the document followed by its page number in parentheses is given. For example, 140.5 (87) means document 140.5 on page 87 in Lao Kan 1949.
- c. For a document from the *Chü-yen Han-chien chia-pien* (Peking, 1959), the document number prefixed by the abbreviation of this work, Cp, is given. For example, Cp 1102 means the document numbered 1102 in the *Chia-pien*.
- d. Occasionally, the plate number of a document is given at its end, mostly following the regular document number(s). This number is prefixed by the abbreviation pl. (plate). If no additional abbreviation is attached, the reference is to a plate in Lao Kan 1957 (i.e., *Chü-yen Han-chien t'u-pan chih-pu*). If it is further followed by Cp, the reference is to a plate in the *Chia-pien*.
- e. For a document from other collections, the document number is prefixed by the abbreviation of the work, for example, *Chü-yen hsin-chien* EPT-59: 582.
- f. Wooden documents in other collections are cited with both the titles of the collections, or their abbreviations, and the document numbers.

STYLE

In citing and translating the Han wooden and bamboo documents, the following symbols are used.

1. In Translation

- | | |
|-------------|---|
| (x) | The upper part of a strip broken off. |
| (x) | The lower part of a strip broken off. |
| . . . (?) | Two or more undecipherable characters in the original Han era Chinese document. |

- (?) An undecipherable character in the original Chinese document.
- ... An omission in the English translation.
- [?] A tentative English translation.

2. Original Chinese Documents

-  An undecipherable character.
-  An unknown number of undecipherable characters.
-  Either the upper or lower part of a strip broken off.
- An omission in the citation.
- (?) Tentative deciphering suggested in my citation.



Index

This index is highly selective. It includes only a limited number of key terms, phrases, names, institutions, and major historical events in the text and notes but omits names of persons and terms of no major historical significance as well as names of modern authorities quoted and referenced.

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